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ABSTRACT 
 
Pressure for Indian independence had been building up throughout the early  
decades of the twentieth century, initially through the efforts of the Indian National  
Congress, but also later, when matters were complicated by an increasingly vocal  
Muslim League. When, in May 1940, Leo Amery was appointed by Winston Churchill  
as Secretary of State for India, an already difficult assignment had been made more  
challenging by the demands of war.  
    This thesis evaluates the extent to which Amery’s ultimate failure to move  
India towards self-government was due to factors beyond his control, or derived  
from his personal shortcomings and errors of judgment. Although there has to be  
some analysis of politics in wartime India, the study is primarily of Amery’s attempts  
at managing an increasingly insurgent dependency, entirely from his metropolitan  
base. Much of the research is concentrated on his success, or otherwise, in  
influencing Churchill and diehard Conservatives, who wanted Britain to retain India  
at any cost, but also Labour colleagues in the coalition, who were much more closely  
aligned with Congress. 
    Inevitably, Amery’s relationships with his two Viceroys, Lord Linlithgow and  
Viscount Wavell are central to this investigation. In different ways, his dealings with  
the dour, inflexible Linlithgow and the surprisingly radical, if irritable, Wavell varied  
between the cordial and the frosty, yet in both cases he regarded them with a  
considerable degree of intellectual snobbery. That said, the thesis demonstrates that  
he was unable to convince these colleagues in Delhi that the man on the spot did  
not always know best. 
   For many years Amery had been irked by American opposition to his cherished  
principle of imperial preference, and their overall dislike of the perceived colonialism  
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implicit in the British Empire. Once the USA had entered the war, transatlantic  
attempts to interfere in matters in India increased, further damaging Amery’s  
efforts to promote constitutional reform. It was all the more painful for him that his  
desire to counter these ideas was compromised by the need to appease American  
public opinion in the interests of the war effort. 
   In making a balanced judgment on Amery at the India Office it is unwise to look  
only at his efforts to broker a constitutional settlement that ultimately foundered  
with the failure of the Simla conference in the summer of 1945. There is ample  
evidence of better outcomes in administrative and practical areas. From his early  
achievement in moderating the terms in which Congress could be prosecuted until  
his later successes in obtaining grain to alleviate famine he revealed a tenacity, and  
courage that could, on occasion, overcome the suspicion that he often generated  
amongst his peers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis will examine the realities of imperial management, chiefly from a  
 
metropolitan perspective. In simple terms, it will consider Leo Amery’s success or  
 
failure as Secretary of State for India from May 1940 until July 1945; a period that  
 
coincided exactly with Winston Churchill’s first occupation of 10 Downing Street. 
 
There has been relatively little academic consideration of Amery’s entire spell at the  
 
India Office, and similarly there has been a shortage of analysis of the wider matter  
 
of the administration of Britain’s dependencies from London, in wartime. This study  
 
represents an attempt to fill both these lacunae. 
 
    The research that has been undertaken shows that an examination of Amery’s  
 
effectiveness needs to encompass not only a review of his own strengths and  
 
weaknesses, but also an evaluation of the wide variety of external factors that  
 
affected his duties as Secretary of State. Certain of these influences might well have  
 
been important at any time in the twentieth century. However, the complications  
 
introduced by global war proved to be even more critical, frequently making Amery’s  
 
task almost impossibly onerous. 
 
    A brief account of the formation of Amery’s imperial ideas will be attempted in the 
 
first two chapters, but to make any real sense of his approach to his official duties it  
 
is necessary to consider the detailed aspects of his personality. For a politician who  
 
had enjoyed the advantages of Harrow, Balliol and All Souls, he remained an  
 
outsider. Indeed, were it not for his luck in 1917 to have the support of his mentor,  
 
Lord Milner, in obtaining the post of assistant to Lord Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary,  
 
he might well have remained a backbencher. 
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    A number of reasons can be adduced as to why he failed to secure a major post  
 
in the Cabinet, but it will be seen that a tendency to verbosity, both in speech and  
 
the written word, reduced his influence with his colleagues. As early as 1920, the  
 
normally taciturn Stanley Baldwin had remarked that ‘Amery does not add a gram of  
 
influence to the government’.1 Despite the fertility of his mind, particularly in  
 
realising the strategic and global potential of technological progress, he often spoiled  
 
matters by self-delusion, either regarding supposed past successes, or perhaps more  
 
seriously, his future capacity to be effective. Examples of both scenarios abound.  
 
Firstly, in a speech to the Oxford University Conservative Association on 24  
 
November 1934 he predicted that the provisions of the 1935 Government of India  
 
Act would be favourably received by moderate opinion in India, thereby making  
 
Congress largely irrelevant.2 This claim proved to be completely incorrect. Secondly,  
 
a few weeks after being appointed to the India Office, Amery, in conversation with  
 
Churchill, offered to go to France to ‘keep the French up to scratch’.3 Not surprisingly  
 
the Prime Minister rejected this attempt to rally Britain’s demoralised allies.  
 
    The following chapters will show Amery to have been a patriotic and hard working  
 
man, but also prone to intellectual snobbery, and not a little pomposity. He was  
 
often generous about the personal and moral qualities of colleagues such as Stafford  
 
Cripps, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Archibald Wavell, and even Churchill, but rarely  
 
did he praise their intelligence.4 Such accolades were generally reserved for  
                                        
1 Robert Holland, review of William Roger Louis, In the Name of God, Go! Leo Amery and the British 
Empire in the Age of Churchill, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1992, North American Conference 
on British Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 755. 
2 Oxford Mail, 24 November 1934, Amery Papers, AMEL 2/5, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill 
College, Cambridge. Hereafter, references to this collection will just bear the identification of the 
relevant file. 
3 Amery diary, 14 June 1940, AMEL 7/34. 
4 Stafford Cripps (1889 – 1952): Leader of the Cripps mission to India 1942, Lord Privy Seal, Leader 
of the House of Commons and Minister of Aircraft Production. Clement Attlee (1883 – 1967): Deputy 
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academics such as Reginald Coupland, who more often than not, were fellows of All  
 
Souls.5 The same overestimation of his own abilities led him to offer himself for  
 
posts for which he had little chance of being chosen. For example, before he fell out  
 
with Neville Chamberlain at the Ottawa Conference in 1932, he had pressed his case  
 
to be the President of the Board of Trade in a future Conservative administration.6  
 
    Although he pursued such energetic activities as cross country running and  
 
mountaineering, the latter into middle age, his attitude towards cerebral hobbies  
 
could be precious and snooty. On the one hand he read Greek and Roman literature 
as well as a large number of works of economic theory. On the other hand he was 
quick to dismiss King Lear as an ‘ignoble potboiler’, and Jane Austen’s novels as 
demonstrating a ‘good knowledge of the world of emptiness’.7 
    It will be shown that his donnish approach to politics led to difficulties with more 
pragmatic, hard headed colleagues. One of the key qualities in a minister is the 
ability to be convincing both in Cabinet and in the House of Commons, and here, it 
has to be admitted, Amery was found wanting. Since his first spell as a government 
minister he had been regarded as long winded to the point of losing his listeners’ 
interest. In the context of articulating his ideas on Indian constitutional reform, 
despite often repeating himself, he rarely managed to carry the other members of 
the War Cabinet with him. With such diehards as not only Churchill, but also Sir John 
                                                                                                                          
Prime Minister, Dominions Secretary and Lord President of the Council. Ernest Bevin (1881 – 1951): 
Minister of Labour. Archibald Wavell (1883 – 1950): Commander-in-Chief, Middle East; Commander-
in-Chief, India and Viceroy of India. 
5 Reginald Coupland (1884 – 1952): Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford University, 1920 – 
1948.  
6 Amery diary, 9 December 1930, AMEL 7/24. Neville Chamberlain, who was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in 1932, was irked by Amery who had attended the conference merely as a representative 
of the Empire Sugar Federation, and as always, indefatigably made his case for imperial preference.  
7 Amery diary, 13 January 1945, AMEL 7/39. Amery, who served a term as President of the Alpine 
Club, climbed Mount Cook, a peak in New Zealand of over 12,000 feet. 
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(‘Percy’) Grigg, Lord Simon and Lord Cherwell to contend with, the task of promoting 
reform was tricky enough.8 For all his reputation as a Tory right winger, it will be 
seen that he enjoyed more support in this area of policy from senior Labour 
politicians such as Attlee and Cripps. 
    The relationship of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India was one of 
constitutional clarity, since the latter was responsible to the British Parliament for the 
conduct of affairs in India. However, this did not guarantee an efficient working 
partnership. It had long been necessary for both their personal and official dealings 
to be harmonious, if Britain’s presence were to be maintained in a country whose 
own politicians had been steadily increasing their demands for independence since 
the end of the nineteenth century. This remained the imperative with Amery and the 
two Viceroys with whom he worked, Lord Linlithgow and Viscount Wavell. 
    Although his relationship with each of these two men was very different with 
consensus on the prosecution of the war far stronger than on the nature of reform 
to the Indian constitution, their public demonstrations of agreement rarely faltered. 
Nevertheless, matters became more fraught, as during the war a number of new 
factors made the partnership between London and Delhi far more complicated, and 
on occasion, troubled. 
    Many problems arose because the Secretary of State did not visit India, almost 
certainly because it was thought that this would diminish the Viceroy’s authority and 
status as the representative of the King Emperor. Amery realised that he suffered by 
not being the man on the spot, but his attempts to go to India were rebuffed in their 
                                        
8 ‘Percy’ Grigg (1890 – 1964): Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War 1939 – 1942, Secretary of 
State for War from 1942 – 1945. John Simon (1873 – 1954): Lord Chancellor 1940 – 1945, previously 
Chairman of the Simon Commission on Indian constitutional reform. Lord Cherwell (1886 – 1957): 
Before ennoblement, Frederick Lindemann, statistical and scientific adviser to Churchill, 1939 – 1945. 
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different ways by both Linlithgow and Wavell. Although such visits would have been 
difficult, it is more than probable that if he had been able to do so, he would have 
paid greater attention to Indian politicians such as Gandhi and Jinnah, whom, for a 
long time, he regarded as irrelevant, and able to be bypassed in reform initiatives. 
    It will be necessary to look at the difficulties of governing a dependent territory, 
at a time when the mother country was enduring German bombing, and for a time 
was under the threat of invasion. As will be seen, home interest in Indian matters 
waned as the need to finish the war, and reconstruct a damaged and bankrupt 
Britain took priority. This was to be the case when Amery sought aeroplanes, 
military equipment and even shipping capacity to transport grain for the relief of 
famine. 
    Furthermore, another set of problems were posed when Japan entered the war in  
December 1941. The risk of Japanese occupation altered the balance of Indian  
politics, emboldening Congress to make demands that required Amery to support  
the firm stance taken in Delhi, particularly as the maintenance of the war effort, at 
least for a while, took precedence over the creation of a new constitution and  
progress towards Indian self-government. The rather more subtle rise of Jinnah and 
the Muslim League proved harder to read, both in London and in Delhi, especially as  
unlike Congress, they took no steps to withdraw their support from the war effort. 
     During the course of the war, it became apparent that other factors were 
hindering Amery’s attempts to perform his duties. Firstly, Labour backbenchers and 
a senior coalition minister, Ernest Bevin, became frustrated with certain aspects of 
British policy towards India, especially the apparent absence of a forward position on 
constitutional reform. In the House of Commons, a small group of socialist MPs, led  
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by the member for Leyton, Reginald Sorensen, tenaciously questioned Amery in their  
support for Gandhi and the Congress Party. Secondly, once the USA had entered the 
the war, dislike of British colonialism  and concern at the possibility of an Indian 
military defeat, tempted its politicians to interfere in Indian politics. This rarely came  
directly from the White House, but generally through emissaries, who may, or may  
not have been sent by Roosevelt. Amery had long been opposed to American  
economic ideas, especially as these contradicted his fundamental tenet of imperial 
preference. Once matters such as most favoured trading nation status, and the  
American conditions for Lend-Lease, were added, his dislike for the policies  
represented, above all by Cordell Hull, increased.9 However, as the thesis will show, 
Amery was obliged to take American public opinion into account when proposing any  
new constitutional initiatives or taking action against Congress. 
    Amery’s grasp of detail was formidable, and did not deteriorate, even for a man  
who by July 1945 was in his seventy second year. However, he tended to hold  
certain opinions, that in their repetition would be a barrier to making constitutional  
progress. To the very end of his period in office, he believed that no solution could  
be made to work until there was a considerable amount of communal agreement. 
Similarly he was convinced, possibly with reason, that the British system of an  
executive responsible to a democratically elected legislature, was not suited to the  
particular circumstances of India. Unfortunately the creativity that he brought to 
strategic issues was not applied to these political conundrums. 
    The possessor of a highly academic mind, Amery was generally more  
comfortable with similar persons, with the consequence that, on many occasions, his 
                                        
9 Cordell Hull (1871 – 1954): United States Secretary of State, 1933 – 1944. 
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first instinct in finding a solution to a problem was to set up a committee or arrange 
a conference attended by intellectuals. The result would invariably be a long and 
closely argued report. While this was generally acceptable in Whitehall, it drew  
condemnation from shrewd, practical administrators such as Wavell, especially 
during the tense meetings in 1944 and 1945, when Britain’s proposals for the Simla  
Conference were discussed. Here, Wavell’s plan to introduce an interim government  
in which the only Englishmen would be the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief,  
was summarily rejected by Jinnah, but it cannot have helped that the precise terms  
of the British offer were discussed for far too long in London. 
     Amery’s later years in office were dogged with worry over his son, John (Jack), 
who had led a dissolute life involving failed relationships and bankruptcy. In 1943, to  
his parents’ horror, he was heard broadcasting pro-Nazi propaganda from Berlin.  
Although Amery was treated by colleagues, opponents and the press with a level of  
kindness and understanding that would be unthinkable today, his occasional diary 
entries about this ordeal show the distress that he was suffering. By contrast, he  
was proud of Julian whose army career had taken him to the Balkans, where his  
father had undertaken intelligence duties during the Great War. Often, as a  
distraction from his official duties, he would visit the room in which the Allied 
campaign in this theatre of war was being run. 
    With these influences consistently in mind this study will examine, in 
chronological order, the major events and crises during Amery’s service from May 
1940 until July 1945. In terms of chapters this can be summarised. 
     Chapter I is a review of the relevant literature, not only about Amery and his  
career, but also about accounts written by witnesses of the various crises during the 
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war.  
    Chapter II examines attempts at Indian constitutional reform before Amery took  
Office. In particular, there is a study of his dogged defence of the 1935 Government 
of India Act against the diehards, albeit from the back benches. There is also a less 
flattering account of Amery’s first official contact with Indians in the context of their  
rights in East Africa, thereby providing the origins of lasting Congress suspicion of 
his opinions about Indian independence. 
    Chapter III initially chronicles the doomed attempts to implement the federal  
provisions of the 1935 legislation before looking at Amery’s appointment to the India  
Office. The latter part of this chapter analyses Amery’s first crisis and his difficulties 
with Linlithgow and Churchill over the drafting of the August offer of Indian self- 
government, after the war. 
     The response by Amery, His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India  
to the satyagraha campaign that followed the rejection of the August offer is  
covered in the early part of Chapter IV. In particular, there is an exploration of his  
disagreements with Churchill and Linlithgow over the release of the satyagrahas.     
Later in the chapter there is a review of Amery’s attempts to revive the moribund  
reform process by giving All Souls men, Henry (Harry) Hodson and Reginald  
Coupland, the opportunity to work in India and produce new constitutional ideas.  
Finally, there is reference to the Atlantic Charter, a document that led to friction with  
both Americans and Indian nationalists over the issue of self-determination. 
     The important episode of the Cripps mission to India in March and April 1942 is 
the main topic in Chapter V. It will be seen that Amery played a diminishing part in 
this initiative, although the consequences of the failed enterprise made some form 
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of Indian independence inevitable. 
     The major violence during Amery’s time in office took place during the ‘Quit  
India’ movement that was launched after the Cripps mission had failed. Amery’s  
response to this Congress campaign forms a large part of Chapter VI, although  
considerable attention is also given to his attitude towards Gandhi’s fast in 1943. 
    Chapter VII shows that Amery had little influence on the surprise choice of  
Wavell as Linlithgow’s successor. However, he had more control over events in the  
struggle to prevent his War Cabinet colleagues from altering the financial  
arrangements that had led to India becoming a major sterling creditor of Britain. 
The final part of the chapter proves that Amery fought tenaciously to obtain the  
necessary supplies of food to combat widespread famine in 1943 and 1944. 
    The last doomed attempts by Amery and Wavell to produce a constitutional  
settlement in the summer are examined in Chapter VIII. It will be seen that in  
addition to serious disagreements with each other, Amery and Wavell were faced 
by powerful forces of reaction in London that were against any reform commitments  
being made in wartime. This final chapter ends with the failure of the Simla  
Conference and Amery’s defeat in the General election of 1945. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
Introduction 
 
Although a vast amount of primary source material relating to Amery’s term  
 
as Secretary of State for India exists, there is far less secondary material  
 
available to provide analysis or information. As this thesis seeks to evaluate  
 
the influence that Amery was able to exert from his base at the India Office in  
 
London, much of the literature chosen for this review will not be exclusively  
 
concerned with matters on the subcontinent. Consequently, the  
 
historiography will be concerned both with Amery’s earlier personal and public  
 
development, and also his time in office from 1940 to 1945. Where literature  
 
has been chosen to review specific episodes, it is on the basis that it informs  
 
the reader about Amery’s ability to control matters from his metropolitan  
 
location.     
 
 
1. Works that Concentrate on Amery 
 
 
(a) Childhood and Education 
 
There is not a great variety of published material on Amery’s early life and  
 
influences, although the introduction to the first volume of his edited diaries is  
 
a rich source of information. Here, his son Julian paid more than his due of  
 
filial duty when he stated that his father started life with little in the way of  
 
inherited wealth or family connections, yet achieved Cabinet office, as well as  
 
becoming a true imperial thinker and enthusiast as heir to the traditions of  
 11 
Benjamin Disraeli, Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred Milner.1  
 
     Amery’s first set of memoirs written in 1953 revealed the likely source of  
 
his ferocious ambition by showing the extreme penury into which he was  
 
placed when his father left his young family to pursue a series of doomed  
 
business ventures.2 Amery’s diaries and memoirs were remarkably short on  
 
detail as regards the racial origins of his mother from whom he inherited  
 
much of his drive and energy.3 Although rumours had existed throughout  
 
Amery’s life over his mother’s Jewish ancestry, he maintained his reticence  
 
until his death, and the matter was not publicly revealed until 2000 in a  
 
passionately written article by William D. Rubinstein.4 He showed that  
 
Amery’s mother, while taking the name of her British step-father, Dr J M  
 
Leitner, had been born in 1841 to a Jewish couple in Budapest with the family  
 
name of Saphir. Rubinstein accused Amery of dissimulation over his mother’s  
 
origins, but acknowledged that his awareness of his ethnicity gave him the  
 
impetus to support a number of Jewish causes as well as his better known  
 
imperial ones.5 
 
     A more sympathetic account of Amery’s childhood by a former  
 
Conservative MP, David Faber, identified a spell of two years in Cologne from  
 
the ages of nine to eleven, when the harshness of the school regime left him  
 
with an affection for, but also, a lifelong suspicion of, Germany. But, Faber’s  
                                           
1 Julian Amery, Introduction, The Leo Amery Diaries Volume I, 1896 – 1929, John Barnes and 
David Nicholson (eds.), London, Hutchinson, 1980, pp. 11 – 22. 
2 L. S. Amery, My Political Life Volume I, London, Hutchinson, 1953, pp. 28 – 29.  
3 Ibid, p. 30. 
4 William D. Rubinstein, ‘The Secret of Leopold Amery’, Historical Research, Vol. 73 (2000), 
pp. 175 – 176. 
5 Ibid, pp. 183 – 186. Rubinstein cited Amery’s work on the Balfour Declaration as evidence 
of his closet Zionism. 
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main focus was on Amery’s progress through Harrow, Balliol and All Souls  
 
when his successes were nearly all the result of overcoming earlier setbacks.6  
 
 
(b) Chamberlain, Milner and the Origins of Amery’s Imperial Views 
 
The historiography of both Amery’s intellectual and spiritual commitment to  
 
the British Empire, and also a ministerial career concerned with wider imperial  
 
issues, is much larger. It is important because Amery developed opinions and  
 
policies which although not primarily in connection with India, would have  
 
consequences for his period of office from 1940 to 1945, whether in  
 
connection with the way he approached the job, or in the way he was  
 
perceived, especially by Congress and the Muslim League.  
 
     Although Amery was first attracted to the idea of the British Empire while  
 
still a pupil at Harrow, his first serious thinking on the matter really began  
 
with the influence of Joseph Chamberlain who had launched a campaign of  
 
tariff reform based on a system of imperial preference. Amery had recently  
 
returned from working as a journalist in the South African War (1899 – 1902),  
 
and was so affected by Chamberlain’s speech in his native Birmingham in May  
 
1903 that he likened it to ‘the theses which Luther nailed to the church door  
 
at Wittenberg’.7 Furthermore, a recent study by Travis L. Crosby has shown  
 
that Chamberlain formalised his relationship with Amery by asking him to join  
 
Leo Maxse, J. Garvin, and others in a small unofficial cabinet, charged with  
 
                                           
6 David Faber, Speaking for England, London, The Free Press, 2005, pp. 15 – 25. Faber wrote 
not just about Leo Amery, but also his sons Julian, and the tragic John who was executed for 
high treason in December 1945. Many of the critical political episodes in Amery’s life are, of 
necessity, dealt with cursorily, but the work is useful in drawing together the threads of his 
family and public life. 
7 Denis Judd, Radical Joe, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1977, p. 245. 
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acting as a think tank for their boss.8 
 
     When Chamberlain was incapacitated by a stroke, Amery’s mentor in  
 
imperial matters became Lord Milner. Milner, who had met Amery while  
 
serving as High Commissioner in South Africa had the capacity to inspire  
 
younger men with his ideas, a matter that has been the subject of scholarly  
 
literature.9 Although Amery generally wrote about Milner in fulsome terms,  
 
they did not always agree. Indeed, when their former enemy, Jan Smuts, was  
 
in London in 1917 as the South African representative at the Imperial War  
 
Cabinet, Amery took his side against Milner and other Round Table members   
 
who wanted the future British Commonwealth to be a federal state.10 
 
    Milner’s views on the need for cooperation and federation within the British  
 
Empire have attracted more unfavourable comment from historians, especially  
 
as his opinions were based on imperial preference for white dominions only,  
 
and furthermore demonstrated an undisguised contempt for parliaments and  
 
the democratic process. Amery’s perceived closeness to Milner, and his ideas,  
 
would have consequences when he later had responsibility for dependencies  
 
in the British Empire.11  
 
    Amery’s attempts to build on the ideas of Chamberlain and Milner were  
                                           
8 Travis L. Crosby, Joseph Chamberlain, New York, I. B. Tauris, 2011, p. 166. 
9 A. M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics; a Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power, New 
York, Macmillan, 1964. This was a study of Milner as a practitioner of imperial ideas. Also, 
W. Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men: The Kindergarten in Edwardian Imperial Affairs, Durham, 
 N. C. 1968.  
10 O. Geyser, ‘Jan Smuts and Alfred Milner’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, No. 360 (2001), p. 429. 
11 Eric Stokes, ‘Milnerism’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1962), pp. 47 – 60. Milner’s 
willingness to use war rather than diplomacy as a means of defeating Kruger in the Boer War 
shocked even Joseph Chamberlain who had appointed him. Also, Paul Williams, ‘A 
Commonwealth of Knowledge: Empire, Intellectuals and the Chatham House Project, 1919 – 
1939’, International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2003), pp. 35 – 58.  Milner had restricted ideas 
about freedom, liberty and equality within a changing British Empire. 
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analysed in 1995 by E. H. H. Green as part of a work on the difficulties of the  
 
Conservative Party before the Great War. Green asserted that Amery divided  
 
British subjects into two classes; the full British citizen and the British subject.  
 
Amery expanded this notion of a two tier imperial citizenship, based on an  
 
explicitly racial division, and concluded that British subjects within his  
 
definition would have rights under the law, if not of full electoral franchise.12  
 
Amery’s memoirs revealed that his ambitions for the British Empire were less  
 
related to political development, but rather had a stronger basis in economics.  
 
His first theoretical work on the subject, The Fundamental Fallacies of Free  
 
Trade advocated such a basis for imperial cooperation, while dismissing both  
 
the ideas of Keynes and Marx.13  These conclusions did not to change to any  
 
great degree over the long period from 1906 until 1945.  
 
     In understanding the development of Amery’s imperial thought, it is also  
 
worth considering his differences with Lionel Curtis, who was a full Round  
 
Table thinker, and like Milner a believer in political union. The root causes of  
 
their often prickly relationship were cogently explained in a journal article by  
 
William Roger Louis about the Australian historian, Sir Keith Hancock. Louis  
 
explained that in the 1920’s Hancock, during his spell as an All Souls fellow,  
 
supported Amery’s almost metaphysical concept of ‘British’ imperial  
 
consciousness against Curtis’ Milnerite attachment to federalism.14 
 
                                           
12 E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism 1880 - 1914, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 200 
– 201. 
13 L. S. Amery, The Fundamental Fallacies of Free Trade, London, National Review Office, 
1906. 
14 William Roger Louis, ‘Sir Keith Hancock and the British Empire: The Pax Britannica and the 
Pax Americana’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 120, No. 488 (September 2005), p. 939. 
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(c) Amery, Mandates and the Colonial Office 
 
Amery’s subsequent thoughts on the British Empire were developed through  
 
his experiences of ministerial office during the 1920s, the majority of  
 
which were spent as Secretary of State for the Colonies and Dominions  
 
Secretary. The way that his conduct over the dependent territories developed  
 
in this period would have repercussions for perceptions of him, not least in  
 
India.  
 
     The historiography of Britain’s role in the post-war Mandates system is  
 
vast, but there are sources that are relevant to Amery’s duties in connection  
 
with East Africa, where he had responsibility for Indian citizens, especially in  
 
the annexed former German East Africa (Tanganyika) and the East African  
 
Protectorate, shortly to become Kenya. Accounts of the origins and early days  
 
of the Mandates system revealed that both Amery and Milner were pragmatic  
 
in their fulfilment of Britain’s responsibilities to the League of Nations under  
 
the East African treaties, despite making complacent public statements about  
 
the paramountcy of native interests.15  
 
     The long period during the later years of the decade when Amery fought a  
 
long, and sometimes acrimonious battle to establish responsible white  
 
government in Kenya, and a form of federation in the region, has been  
 
chronicled by a variety of historians representing different standpoints. Not all  
 
of the literature is confined to India and East Africa, as Diana Wylie has  
 
written persuasively of the cool relationship that existed in London during the  
                                           
15 Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Great Britain and the African Peace Settlement of 1919’, The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (April 1966), pp. 875 – 892. Also, Andrew J. Crozier, ‘The 
Establishment of the Mandates System 1919 – 1925’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 
14, No. 3 (July 1970), pp. 483 - 513. 
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1920s between an Amery-led Colonial Office, uncertain as to whether to  
 
support Africans or white settlers in Kenya, and an India Office without any  
 
such doubts as to its loyalties.16   
 
     The most comprehensive and unbiased account of the effect of British  
 
colonial policy on Indians in East Africa was written by Robert G. Gregory in  
 
1971, and has since suffered very little from revisionism.17 Amery’s ultimately  
 
fruitless campaign to achieve economic union in East Africa did not fail  
 
through lack of energy, but Gregory showed that throughout his spell as  
 
Colonial Secretary he managed to alienate not only Indians in East Africa and  
 
India, but also colleagues in London and Delhi. However, whether it would  
 
have been believed in the subcontinent or not, his personal appointee as  
 
Governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, regretted that he (Amery) had more  
 
sympathy for Indians than the white settlers.18  
 
     However, Amery’s ambivalence towards Indians in East Africa was  
 
perfectly illustrated  by his decision to send the Permanent Under-Secretary at  
 
the Colonial Office, Sir Samuel Wilson, on a mission to East Africa in order to  
 
circumvent the findings of the Hilton Young Commission that had broadly  
 
found in favour of Indians in the region and against the brand of economic  
 
federalism that was being advocated in London. Many of the relevant primary  
 
documents, and accompanying commentaries relating to this unwise  
 
enterprise, and the resulting outcry in Delhi, are included in a collection edited 
                                           
16 Diana Wylie, ‘Confrontation over Kenya: The Colonial Office and its Critics 1918 – 1940’, 
The Journal of African History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1977), pp. 427 – 430. 
17 Robert G. Gregory, India and East Africa, A History of Race Relations within the British 
Empire, 1890 to 1939, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. 
18 Lord Altrincham, Kenya’s Opportunity, Memories, Hopes and Ideas, London, Faber and 
Faber, 1955, p. 213. 
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 by Frederick Madden and John Darwin.19     
  
    Amery’s work for the rest of his time in this period demonstrated his idea  
 
of a two-tier British Empire. His memoirs and diaries are not the only  
 
authority for his dream, which, in 1925 became a reality when he persuaded  
 
Baldwin to create a separate Dominions Office that he would lead, but yet  
 
keep responsibility for the Colonial Office. The teething troubles of this new  
 
department, and its difficult relationship with the Colonial Office, which  
 
retained responsibility for the dependent territories, were well set out in a  
 
recent journal article by Andrew Stewart.20 
 
 
(d) Amery, the Conservative Party and 1935 Government of India Act 
 
This section examines the historiography of Amery’s opinions and actions in  
 
connection with constitutional reform in India during the period from 1922  
 
until the Government of India Act received its Royal Assent in 1935. During  
 
this period he had little or no contact with Indians other than in connection  
 
with his responsibilities for East Africa. However his diaries showed that he  
 
did talk about matters in India on his occasional visits to All Souls College,  
 
Oxford, in February 1926 when he tried to inspire Irwin, who was about to  
 
take up his duties as Viceroy of India.21  Amery and the All Souls connection  
 
over India was covered in great detail by Sarvepalli Gopal who, despite a  
 
Congress bias, showed that Irwin, Sir John Simon and Amery, although  
                                           
19 Frederick Madden and John Darwin (eds.), The Dependent Empire 1900 – 1948, Colonies, 
Protectorates and Mandates, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 740 – 768. 
20 Andrew Stewart, ‘The “Bloody Post Office”: The Life and Times of the Dominions Office’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2010), pp. 45 – 47. 
21 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries Volume I, p. 443. Lord Irwin (1881 – 
1959), previously Edward Wood, and subsequently Lord Halifax, was Viceroy of India from 
1926 to 1931. During the Second World War he was British Ambassador to the USA.  
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being fellows of such an influential college, made very different contributions  
 
to reform in India.22   
 
     Amery’s views on the radical changes to Indian governance made by the  
 
Secretary of State for India, Sir Edwin Montagu, and the Viceroy, Lord  
 
Chelmsford, were forcefully explained in his work of imperial and economic  
 
philosophy, The Forward View. Given Amery’s lifelong aversion to liberal  
 
political thinking, it is not surprising that he found the resulting system of  
 
diarchy, providing for limited delegation in provincial government, well  
 
intentioned, but muddled. Furthermore, he deplored the mild reforms at the  
 
centre, which he felt encouraged irresponsible representation ahead of Indian  
 
readiness for self-government.23  
 
     By November 1927, Sir John Simon had joined Irwin in holding a post that  
 
directly affected reform in India, having been appointed by the diehard  
 
Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, to chair an all-party commission  
 
to review the consequences of the 1919 Act, and to make recommendations  
 
for further reform.24   
 
      The amount of scholarship on Irwin’s promise of future dominion status  
 
for India and its contrast with the timidity of Simon’s proposals is large, but  
 
other than Gopal’s article, there has been very little commentary on their  
 
connection with Amery. His diaries and correspondence for the period show  
                                           
22 Sarvepalli Gopal, ‘All Souls and India’, JICH, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1999), pp. 189 – 205. Also, ‘All 
Souls and India: The 1920’s’ and ‘All Souls and India: The 1930’s and After’, S.J.D. Green and 
Peregrine Hordern, (eds.), All Souls and the Wider World, Oxford, OUP, 2011, pp. 193 – 221. 
This is an expanded, and very useful version of Gopal’s original article. 
23 L. S. Amery, The Forward View, Freeport, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1935, 211 – 
217. 
24 John Campbell, F. E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead, London, Jonathan Cape, 1983, pp. 
741- 743.  
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that his political sympathies were with Simon, whom he clearly felt to be a  
 
Tory in disguise, rather than with his personal friend, Irwin, who had  
 
managed to annoy both moderates and radical nationalists in India.25 Despite  
 
his qualified opinion of Irwin’s declaration, two of his biographers have  
 
suggested that his support for the Viceroy was rather more fulsome.26 
 
    It is possible to identify two major studies of the Conservatives and their  
 
divisions over India in the period from 1929 to 1935. Carl Bridge devoted an  
 
entire volume to the interaction between politics in Britain, and the  
 
complicated situation in India.27 By contrast, Graham Stewart’s work was  
 
wider in scope covering the party’s response to the European dictators’  
 
ambitions as well as the passage of the 1935 Act.28 Unfortunately, neither  
 
Bridge nor Stewart provided much in the way of detail about Amery’s  
 
apparently loyal support for Baldwin as party leader in opposition, or as a  
 
partner in the National Government. Their scholarship is restricted to Amery’s  
 
parliamentary humiliation of Churchill in the debate on the Report of the  
 
Committee of Privileges in June 1934.29  
 
     Apart from an excess of schadenfreude at the embarrassment caused to  
 
Churchill by his speeches, it is difficult to find a straightforward explanation of  
 
Amery’s support for Hoare and Baldwin over the 1935 legislation, especially as  
 
he had already been absent from the Conservative front bench for several  
 
                                           
25 Amery, My Political Life Volume III, London, Hutchinson, 1935, pp. 96 – 97. 
26 Faber, Speaking for England , p. 264.  
27 Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, The British Conservative Party and the 1935 
Constitution, Delhi, Stirling Publications, 1986. 
28 Graham Stewart, Burying Caesar, Churchill, Chamberlain and the Battle for the Tory Party, 
London, Weidefeld and Nicolson, 1999. 
29 Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, p. 131. Stewart, Burying Caesar, p. 179. 
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years. With Amery’s fondness for intrigue in mind, it is tempting to apply  
Maurice Cowling’s yardstick of the pursuit of personal advantage in the form 
of a front bench job as the reason for such apparent loyalty.30 
     Although Amery appears to have shown little interest in India from the  
1935 India Act to his appointment as Secretary of State in May 1940, there  
were developments, or indeed a lack of them, that were to affect his wartime  
duties. The critical historiography for this period concerns the attempts by  
London and Delhi to implement the federation clauses in the 1935 legislation,  
in particular the need to persuade the Indian princes to sign their accession  
deeds. It is easy to ignore the constitutional importance of the princes and  
concentrate too much on the triangular struggle between Britain, Congress  
and the Muslim League. The definitive work on the part played by the princes  
at this time was written in 1997 by the Australian academic, Ian Copland, who 
laid much of the blame for the failure to produce a truly federal India upon  
the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, whose dilatory approach allowed the  
princes to become alarmed by the success of Congress in the provincial  
elections held in 1937.31  
     A wider review of British policy during the period from 1936 until the fall 
of Chamberlain has been written by R. J. Moore.32 While stressing the  
damage caused by the failing negotiations with the princes, Moore was also 
30 Carl Bridge, ‘The Impact of India on British High Politics of the 1930’s: The Limits of 
Cowlingism’, South Asia, Vol. 5, No. 2 (December 1982), pp. 13 – 23. 
31 Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire 1917 – 1947, Cambridge, 
CUP, 1997, pp. 144 – 182. 
32 R. J. Moore, ‘British Policy and the Indian Problem 1936 - 1940’, C. H. Phillips and M. D. 
Wainwright (eds.),The Partition of India, Policies and Perspectives 1935 – 1937, London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1971, pp. 79 – 94. 
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keen to emphasise the growing problem during this time of reconciling  
 
Congress pressure for a self-governing India, with Jinnah’s demands for the  
 
safeguarding of Muslim interests.33 Above all, it should be remembered that  
 
the failure of federation would have been particularly disappointing to Amery,  
 
who had spoken up for it and written so enthusiastically about it during the  
 
passage of the Act.  
 
 
(e) Amery as Secretary of State for India 
 
There are three main published sources that provide important information  
 
of Amery’s period in office from May 1940 to July 1945. Firstly the detailed  
 
commentaries by John Barnes and David Nicholson in the second volume of  
 
Amery’s diaries.34 Each chapter containing the edited diary entries was  
 
prefaced by approximately fifteen pages of explanations, which are extremely  
 
valuable, although more in the way of narrative than analysis. The editors  
 
made no attempt to consult any Cabinet archives or India Office records, but  
 
referred to correspondence from Amery’s papers, held at Churchill Archives  
 
Centre, Cambridge, and cited secondary sources on constitutional reform in  
 
India.35 Although it is important to be aware that the published extracts  
 
represented only a part of Amery’s original diaries, and that some subjectivity  
 
was inevitably introduced by the very act of selection, the commentaries  
 
                                           
33 Ibid, pp. 82 – 83. 
34 John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds), The Empire at Bay, The Leo Amery Diaries 1929 – 
1945, London, Hutchinson, 1988. 
35 Ibid, p. 604. In their first commentary on Amery’s time at the India Office, Barnes and 
Nicholson turned to B. R. Tomlinson and R. J. Moore to provide essential background material 
to events in India since the Royal Assent of the 1935 Act. B. R. Tomlinson, The Indian 
National Congress and the Raj, London, Macmillan, 1976, and R.J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps 
and India, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979. 
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show both the fluctuations in the urgency of his work at the India Office,  
 
as well as the other matters in which he became interested during the war.36 
 
     The second published source is a collection of the transcripts of a selection  
 
of Amery’s speeches that he delivered during his early years at the India  
 
Office.37 The speeches delivered, not only in the House of Commons, but also 
 
before a number of other audiences, varied in subject matter from the  
 
Congress rejection in 1940 of the August offer, India’s contribution to the war  
 
effort and the complexities of constitutional reform following the Cripps  
 
mission. The theme throughout the speeches was the need to proceed with  
 
caution to the goal of self-government that he thought would never be  
 
available, in any circumstances, until after the war.  
 
     The third, and most relevant in terms of an assessment of Amery’s  
 
performance during the war, was written by the American historian, William  
 
Roger Louis.38 In a slim volume that was really a collection of lectures  
 
examining Amery’s imperial commitment, the author showed how he divided  
 
his time between the narrower portfolio of his duties at the India Office, and  
 
his perennial campaign for imperial preference. Central to this account of  
 
Amery’s time at the India Office is the continual, if ultimately one-sided battle  
 
with Churchill over constitutional reform. Louis drew out the policy differences  
 
between the two men with great clarity, but even after making some  
 
reference to the contributions of Clement Attlee and Stafford Cripps to  
 
                                           
36 Barnes and Nicholson referred to Amery’s active interest in other theatres of war such as 
the Balkans and Middle East. 
37 L. S. Amery, India and Freedom, London, OUP, 1942. 
38 William Roger Louis, In the Name of God, Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age 
of Churchill, New York/London, W. W. Norton, 1992. 
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developments in India, oversimplified what was, in reality, a more complex  
 
situation. That said, this is an excellent signpost for further research,  
 
especially as the author made judicious use of the India Office records held at  
 
the British Library. 
      
     David Faber’s family portrait of Amery and his two sons devoted a mere  
 
thirty pages to the Second World War, but although saying very little on the  
 
constitutional position that is not be found in Louis’ book, provided a possibly  
 
better informed analysis of the political realities faced in London by Amery.39  
      
     Although there are many other books and journal articles which cover  
 
various aspects of Britain’s relationship with India from 1939 to 1945, and  
 
which include references to Amery, there is very little discrete material on his  
 
performance as Secretary of State. One exception is a detailed paper written  
 
in 1979 by Peter Hill, which gave a sympathetic, if uncritical account of his  
 
attempts to encourage constitutional reform from the date of his appointment  
 
in 1940 to the eve of the Cripps mission in early 1942.40  
 
 
2. Amery’s Viceroys 
 
Linlithgow and Wavell, the two Viceroys who served under Amery, have  
 
been the subjects of a historiography that contains memoirs, diaries and  
 
works of analysis. All make some contribution to Amery’s dealings with the  
 
‘men on the spot’. Not surprisingly, Lord Glendevon, as Linlithgow’s son,  
 
attempted to rehabilitate his (Linlithgow’s) reputation in a biography that  
 
                                           
39 Faber, Speaking for England, pp. 367 – 396. 
40 Peter Hill, ‘L. S. Amery, India and the Commonwealth: 1940 – 42’, Journal of Indian 
History, Vol. 57, Parts 2 – 3 (1979), pp. 315 – 341. 
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dealt as much with his father’s service from 1935 until 1940 as with the final  
 
three years of his Viceroyalty. Amery was generally shown to have been  
 
supportive of Linlithgow, particularly in regard to Gandhi and Jinnah, but  
 
throughout the book was the underlying suspicion that, back in London, he  
 
did not really understand the political and practical difficulties in India.41  
 
     Gowher Rizvi followed Glendevon in trying to restore Linlithgow’s  
 
standing, but although having full access to official documents, was not able  
 
to consult the private papers of Amery or Churchill.42 Rizvi generally absolved  
 
Amery of the charge of dilatoriness that was levelled at the previous Secretary  
 
of State, Lord Zetland, and although he offered some censure for his part in  
 
the difficulties with Churchill in the summer of 1940, believed that he gave  
 
Linlithgow real help in coordinating the Indian war effort. Whether he had a  
 
case in asserting that Linlithgow ‘dominated Amery’ in the period leading up  
 
to the Cripps Mission is highly questionable.43 
 
     Of greater relevance to a study of Amery is Wavell’s journal that was  
 
edited by Penderel Moon, a career member of the ICS.44  The greater  
 
frankness afforded by the diary format reinforces the view, that while Amery  
 
may have been more progressive towards Indian reform than Linlithgow, the  
 
reverse was the case with Wavell, who had been appointed by Churchill in the  
 
mistaken belief that he would be an opponent of Indian nationalism.  
 
 
 
                                           
41 John Glendevon, The Viceroy at Bay, London, Collins, 1971. 
42 Gowher Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, London, Royal Historical Society, 1978. 
43 Ibid, p. 234. 
44 Penderel Moon (ed.), Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, London, OUP, 1973. Penderel Moon 
(1905 – 1987) was a Senior Indian Civil Service official and historian of Indian affairs. 
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2. PUBLISHED SOURCES ON BRITAIN AND INDIA FROM 1919 TO   
   1945 
 
Collections 
 
A number of invaluable collections are available, whether of official  
 
documents, or articles in connection with India’s final progress towards  
 
partition and independence. From the standpoint of research into the British  
 
policy and decision making over India, it is essential to consult the selections  
 
of official papers assembled by Nicholas Mansergh, E.W.R. Lumby and  
 
Penderel Moon for the Transfer of Power series which covers the period from  
 
the genesis of the Cripps Mission in January 1942 until the handover of power  
 
in August 1947.45 Each volume is arranged in broadly the same pattern as the  
 
Documents on British Foreign Policy, the choice of papers being made by  
 
independent historians who had free access to both official archives and  
 
private collections of viceregal correspondence held by the British Library in  
 
their collection of India Office records.  
 
    For the purposes of this research into the career of Amery as Secretary of  
 
State for India, it would have been more useful if the series had begun with  
 
the outbreak of war, or his appointment by Churchill in May 1940. However  
 
the editors have made the case for a starting date of January 1942 on the  
 
basis that it coincided both with the renewed demands for independence by  
 
Congress, and the outbreak of hostilities in the East. Although this series of  
 
documents has been chosen from British sources by British scholars, with a  
 
short factual commentary by the editors prefacing each volume, it is difficult  
                                           
45 Nicholas Mansergh, E. W. R. Lumby and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942 
– 1945, Volumes I – V, London, HMSO, 1971 to 1974. 
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to find any suggestion, even from Indian academics, that the result is 
anything less than fair and objective.46   
    The first of two important collections of articles was published in the same  
year as the earliest Transfer of Power  volume.47 This anthology, edited by  
Professor C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, was based on a seminar  
held in 1967 at the London School of Oriental and African Studies. The essays 
were written by scholars using primary archival sources, and middle ranking  
participants in the Raj reflecting on their experiences. The real value of this  
volume in relation to Amery lies in the background detail on the period  
between the wars as well as rigorous reviews of the developing rift between  
Congress and the Muslim League. There was a considerable emphasis on the  
political development of local areas in India, but rather less on how this may  
have been changed by the war. Disappointingly, Professor Philips when  
writing his otherwise informative introduction to the book, disposed of the  
effect of the war on constitutional change in a mere two paragraphs.
     The second anthology is a more radical collection edited by Professor D. 
A. Low, and published a few years later in 1977.In terms of the consequences
of British policy towards reform, the articles written by Johannes Voigt and  
Professor R.J. Moore are particularly useful in that these scholars came to  
diametrically opposed explanations of the eventual partition of the country.  
Voigt took the more predictable view that the strains of war made the ending 
46 B. Shiva Rao, ‘The Cripps Mission’, review of Nicholas and E.W.R. Lumby (eds.),The 
Transfer of Power, Volume I, January – April 1942, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 
(1971), p. 273. 
47 Philips and Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India, Policies and Perspectives 1935 – 
1947. 
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of the Raj inevitable, since the British were forced to take harsh repressive  
 
measures that finally alienated all sections of Indian opinion. Moore, by  
 
contrast, believed that the offer made by Cripps in 1942, although refused by  
 
Indians, nevertheless made full independence inevitable, soon after the war.48 
 
 
Britain and India during the War 
 
     Later, Voigt and Moore also produced full volumes about Britain and India  
 
during the Second World War.49 Both are of value in judging Amery’s success  
 
or failure at the India Office. Voigt’s account was more conventional, but well  
 
researched using official archival material from India and the USA as well as  
 
Britain. It is welcome that there were rigorous analyses of the British attempts  
 
to control matters from London and Delhi, and the responses from all sections  
 
of Indian political life. He also wrote in detail about the intensity of the  
 
American influence on constitutional reform and the Indian war effort. 
 
     Professor Moore’s wartime study was a sequel to his earlier work, The  
 
Crisis of Indian Unity 1917 – 1940, and chronicled in detail one of history’s  
 
great ‘might-have-beens’.50 If Congress had been able to accept the offer put  
 
to them by Cripps on behalf of the British government, it is possible to make a  
 
case that the ‘Quit India’ movement, communal bloodshed, and even partition  
 
might have been avoided. Moore showed that Amery, although having a more  
 
                                           
48 D. A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj, London, Heinemann, 1977. Also, in this connection, 
Joahannes Voigt, ‘Cooperation or Contradiction, 1939 – 1942’, pp. 349 – 374. Also, R J. 
Moore, ‘The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London’s India Policy, 1917 – 1947’, pp. 395 – 
402. 
49 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India 1939 – 1945, Oxford, OUP, 1979. Johannes Voigt, 
India in the Second World War, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1988. 
50 Judith Brown, review of R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, The English Historical 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 374 (January 1980), p. 184. 
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central role in the preparation of the declaration that Cripps took to Delhi, 
was far less influential during the final stages of the mission.  
     A relatively recent short essay by Nicholas Owen on Britain and India  
during the war is particularly useful in pointing out the internal divisions that  
were present throughout the conflict, in each of three main groups; the  
British authorities, Congress and the Muslim League.51 The fissures amongst  
the British, both within the Government of India and the War Cabinet in  
London are well known, but Owen identified the dissatisfaction of liberal  
Hindus such as Tej Bahadur Sapru towards more radical Congress leaders,  
and the antagonism of some Muslims towards Jinnah. Owen’s short, concise  
account of the August offer and the Cripps mission offered a good view of the 
political climate in which Amery was obliged to work, although his judgement  
that the latter’s appointment as Secretary of State strengthened the diehard  
element, which opposed Indian nationalism, is very much open to question.52 
     Although only covering the early years of the war, two distinguished  
historians have explained the relationship between Britain and Indian  
campaigners for independence.53 The earlier work by Tomlinson was brief,  
but revealed how Amery was outmanoeuvred by Churchill in the wording of  
the August offer, and by Attlee over the nature of the Cripps mission. Perhaps 
more useful and surprising, was his analysis of the failure of Linlithgow,  
51 Nicholas Owen, ‘War and Britain’s Political Crisis in India’, What Difference did the War 
Make?  Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (eds.), London, Leicester University Press, 1994, pp. 
106 – 129. 
52 Ibid, pp. 110 – 112. 
53 B. R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj 1929 – 1942. Also, D. A. Low, 
Britain and Indian Nationalism, The Imprint of Ambiguity 1929 – 1942, Cambridge, CUP, 
1997. 
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Amery and Churchill to exploit the negotiating potential of Congress  
 
moderates such as Chakrovarti Rajagopalachari, in order to ensure an orderly  
 
path to reform that would not derail the Indian war effort.  
 
     Low also did not ignore the significance of Indian liberals in his history,  
 
that stressed British incompetence in responding to nationalist calls for  
 
reform. His review of the ultimately doomed initiative by Sir Tej Bahadur  
 
Sapru to produce rapid constitutional change was an essential element in his  
 
analytical model that identified a contradiction between Britain’s naturally  
 
liberal attitude towards national self-determination, and the repressive  
 
measures employed to maintain the stability and continuation of the Raj.  
 
     Amery, although admitted by Low to be a true Conservative reformer, was  
 
regarded as a classic example of such British ambiguity, especially in regard  
 
to Sapru’s proposals for reform in January 1942.54 When Japan entered the  
 
war in December 1941, and an invasion of India seemed likely, a frustrated  
 
Sapru attempted to circumvent Amery and Linlithgow with direct approaches  
 
to Churchill, and more prophetically, Roosevelt. Low showed that Amery  
 
reluctantly agreed with Churchill to do nothing with Sapru’s proposals, a  
 
decision that forced the hand of Attlee, and made the Cripps mission  
 
inevitable.55 Whether the failure to act positively to the Indian liberals really  
 
did prejudice a more orderly path to independence, or whether Britain was  
 
just outwitted by Nehru, Gandhi and Jinnah were the questions asked by  
 
Low’s perceptive work.56 
                                           
54 D. A. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, p. 320. 
55 Ibid, pp. 333 – 336. 
56 Peter Reeves, ‘The Unravelling of Ambiguity: Anthony Low’s Exploration of Imperialist-
Nationalist Confrontation in the Process of Decolonisation in Late British India’, South Asia, 
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     Louis’ account of Amery’s problems with Churchill has already been  
 
mentioned. To a lesser extent, he shared the Prime Minister’s dislike of  
 
Congress and its leading politicians, although perhaps not to the point of  
 
encouraging communal strife between Hindus and Muslims in order to prolong  
 
the existence of the Raj. Amery similarly had little time for Jinnah. By  
 
contrast, a recent work by Warren Dockter has shown that Churchill’s  
 
sympathies lay with the Muslim community, possibly dating from the  
 
contribution of their forces in the Great War. This made for difficulties with  
 
Amery, especially as Churchill was more prepared than his Secretary of State  
 
to encourage Jinnah’s quest for Pakistan.57 
 
 
Histories by Insiders 
 
An important part of the historiography of Britain’s part in the final years of  
 
the Raj was the series of accounts prepared by individuals who had held  
 
responsible posts in British India, and in some cases had been appointed by  
 
Amery. The work that was accorded the greatest official approval was written  
 
by Sir Reginald Coupland, who had already combined a career in imperial  
 
administration with academic work at All Souls when asked by Amery to  
 
conduct a study of Indian constitutional reform under the auspices of Nuffield  
 
College.58 Coupland began his research in India in 1941, and soon completed  
 
three volumes, of which the more relevant for a study of Amery were the  
 
                                                                                                                         
Vol. 25, No. 2 (August 2002), pp. 1 – 12. Reeves maintained that Low’s greatest contribution 
was to the historiography of the processes of Indian independence, particularly his steadfast 
adherence to the unfashionable view that credit should be given to the Government of India, 
and certain leading players in London. 
57 Warren Dockter, Churchill and the Islamic World, London, I.B. Tauris, 2015, pp. 239 – 246. 
58 Coupland had been a Round Table member from as early as 1910. 
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second and third as they combined analysis of the period from 1936 to 1942  
 
with reform proposals.59  
 
     Although a superficial reading of Coupland’s work might suggest an  
 
unambiguous attack on Gandhi and the more militant elements of Congress,  
 
there was as Moore suggested, a worthy, if Whiggish analysis, which traced a  
 
sequence of progress from the Montagu-Chelmsford report to the promise of  
 
independence enshrined in Cripps’ declaration in March 1942.60 Coupland  
 
produced two solutions to the constitutional impasse. Firstly, a loose  
 
confederation of regions, formed by groups of provinces and princely states,  
 
which could be said to represent the Balkanisation so feared by Amery, but  
 
was hardly the disingenuous denial of freedom suggested by Moore.61  
 
Secondly, a fanciful scheme based on the four main river basins of India, of  
 
which two would be Hindu led, and two would be Muslim-led. Surprisingly,  
 
sporadic support for this latter proposal survived until the final two years of  
 
the war.62 
    
       Vapal Pangunni (V.P.) Menon was an Indian career civil servant who, in  
 
1942, became adviser to Henry (H. V.) Hodson, the Reforms Commissioner.   
 
After supervising the accession of over five hundred princely states following  
 
independence, he was in a good position to write an insider’s account of the  
 
events leading to the transfer of power. Amery, his boss in London was not  
 
spared strong criticism, chiefly over his perceived inability to read a particular  
                                           
59 R. Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942 Report on the Constitutional Position in India 
 Part II, Madras, OUP, 1942. Also, R. Coupland, The Future of India, Madras, OUP, 1943. 
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situation with the subtlety required to avoid making inflammatory comments. 
Menon’s comments demonstrated that however progressive the Secretary of  
State’s intentions, the opposite impression was frequently given.63 
    Hodson who was Menon’s predecessor, was obliged by the weight of his  
duties at the Ditchley Foundation to wait until 1971 to publish his review of  
partition.64 Unlike Menon, he was not an ICS man, but an All Souls fellow, a  
journalist specialising in economics, and an editor of the Round Table.  
Unfortunately, his appointment as Reforms Commissioner ended prematurely, 
although he stayed long enough to appreciate the difficulties caused by the  
lack of understanding between the Delhi government and the India Office.65  
As Hodson had full access to the Mountbatten papers, but could only  
interview middle ranking politicians from India and Pakistan, the sections  
referring to the war years were inevitably weaker, although still lucid.66 As  
was the case with Hodson, Amery was not exempt from censure. Before the  
Simla Conference in 1945, his reform proposals that were intended to bypass  
Congress and the Muslim League were described as ‘showing a profound  
neglect of the facts of Indian political life’.67 
     The final history of this period to be written by an insider in Indian  
administration is a work published in 1961 by the editor of Wavell’s diaries, 
63 V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Bombay, Longmans, 1957; p. 94 following the
August offer; p. 107 in connection with the S93 notices; p. 142 for his response to the ‘Quit 
India’ campaign. 
64 H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide Britain – India – Pakistan, London, Hutchinson, 1971.
65 Robert Wade-Gery, ‘Hodson, Henry Vincent [Harry] (1906 – 1999)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, henceforth ODNB, OUP, 2004, online edition, 2006. 
66 W. H. Morris-Jones, ‘The Road to Disunion’ The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 
(August 1972), pp. 916 – 918. 
67 Hodson, The Great Divide, pp. 116 – 117. 
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Penderel Moon.68 Moon spent much of his career in the Punjab, and after  
 
reaching the post of deputy commissioner to Amritsar, resigned in 1942 over  
 
the failure of the Government of India to provide better conditions for political  
 
prisoners. Divide and Quit took a surprisingly impartial view of the events  
 
leading to partition, blaming Britain for not promising dominion status at an  
 
earlier date, and also criticising Congress for failing to respond more positively  
 
to the Cripps mission. Muslims, for whom he clearly had more understanding  
 
and affection, were considered to have been cunningly drawn by Jinnah into  
 
partition arrangements they did not really want. 
 
 
Specific Episodes in the Second World War 
 
Certain events have been seen as sufficiently important to attract their own  
 
discrete historiography. Almost certainly the most prolific has chronicled the  
 
mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India during March and India 1942. He  
 
attempted to broker a deal, whereby the constitution of India would be  
 
reformed at the end of hostilities, and in the interim, more Indians would  
 
participate in the management of the war effort. 
 
     Despite the mission ending in failure, the causes of the breakdown, and its  
 
effect on relations between Britain and India for the remainder of the war,  
 
have produced many different interpretations. Accounts written by insiders,  
 
although useful, need to be read with caution. For example, the Congress  
 
President, Maulana Azad, can be shown to have had an incomplete 
 
recollection of both his correspondence with Cripps  in 1938, and the extent  
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 34 
of the promises that were made regarding quasi-Cabinet government.69  
 
     Three fringe participants, who have been mentioned before, and who  
 
wrote more measured memoirs, albeit without access to the official archives,  
 
were V. P. Menon, H. V. Hodson, and R. Coupland. Hodson and Menon who  
 
worked in the Viceroy’s Reforms Office throughout the mission, both  
 
produced accounts that were even handed, and by no means biased against  
 
Congress.70 Coupland, who stayed with the Cripps entourage, was more  
 
scholarly in his conclusions.71  
 
     Amery’s contribution to events, particularly during the early stages when  
 
the decision to send out an emissary was being considered, was covered in  
 
substantial, if not always flattering detail by P. Clarke in his biography of  
 
Cripps. Not surprisingly, Amery disappeared from Clarke’s narrative of  
 
the last few frenetic days in Delhi.72 
 
     Amery’s sole account was never published, but can be found in his draft  
 
memoirs. Considering that he had enjoyed the benefit of over a decade to  
 
reflect on the events, his analysis, although typically long-winded, was  
 
surprisingly thin, and contained an element of self-justification.73 A better clue  
 
to his thinking during this period is, of course his diary which is full of  
 
London-based detail, but for this reason is less helpful about events in Delhi  
 
in April 1942. Of special value is the detailed commentary provided by his  
 
editors, Barnes and Nicolson, who were at least able to show that Amery had  
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been even handed in his criticism of Cripps and Congress.74 
     The most detailed analysis of the mission was written by Professor R.J.  
Moore in 1979, and as the title suggests, polarised the British approach  
between Churchill and Cripps. He did not suggest that Amery was a major  
player in the episode, and his highly detailed, but perhaps oversimplified  
account of the days leading up to the breakdown, puts the blame for the  
failure on an axis constructed between Churchill and Linlithgow.75 A well  
argued article by Nicholas Owen, written in 2002, suggested that there was 
more common ground between Attlee and Amery over the conduct of the  
Cripps mission than might have been supposed. As an extension of this  
theme, he dismissed Moore’s conclusion that an axis between Churchill and 
Linlithgow sabotaged Cripps’ negotiations. Consequently, Cripps was happy 
with his support from the War Cabinet, and blamed Congress almost  
exclusively for the breakdown. At no time did Cripps feel any resentment  
towards Amery.76 
     A second issue that created considerable political ill-will between London 
and Delhi during the war was the rapidly increasing amount of British  
indebtedness to India through the sterling balances. The historical  
background to the institutional complexities of Britain’s financial relationship 
with India have been well explained by the economic historian,  
74 Barnes and Nicolson (eds.), The Empire at Bay, The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929 – 1945, pp. 
729 – 738. 
75 Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, pp. 96 – 132. 
76 Nicholas Owen, ‘The Cripps Mission of 1942: A Reinterpretation’, JICH, Vol. 30, No. 1  
(2002), pp. 90 – 98. 
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B.R.Tomlinson.77 Many politicians were confused by the speed at which the  
balances grew, and while no cogent interpretations were offered at the time,  
Herbert Austen Shannon’s article, written in 1950, properly apportioned  
blame between military and financial causes.78 Although many of the political  
exchanges were public, and therefore are reported in Cabinet archives and  
Hansard, the origins of discontent with the balances amongst senior Treasury 
officials in London were usefully explored by Allister E. Hinds as recently as  
1991.79
     The tragic food shortages, of which the Bengal famine was the most  
serious, have produced a large historiography, which is still increasing. Firstly, 
the size of the tragedy, and its causes. Sugata Bose, writing in 1990  
summarised the statistical  work of his colleagues, and computed a death toll  
exceeding three millions, almost twice the figure reported at the time.80 While 
hoarding by Indian profiteers was often quoted in London and Delhi as a  
likely cause for the deaths, later analyses have been more sophisticated.  
Professor Amartya Sen accepted that there had been no real overall shortage  
of grain, but stressed that the income of poor families was not sufficient to  
make purchases at spiralling prices.81  
77 B. R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914 – 1947, London, Macmillan, 1979, 
pp.91 – 92. Also, B. R. Tomlinson, ‘Indo-British Relations in the Post-Colonial Era: The 
Sterling Balances Negotiations, 1947 – 1949’, JCIH, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1985), p. 143. 
78 Herbert Austen (H.A.) Shannon, ‘The Sterling Balances of the Sterling Area, 1939 – 1949’, 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 60, No. 239 (September 1950), p. 540. 
79 Allister E. Hinds, ‘Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances, 1943 – 1956, JICH, Vol. 19 
No. 1 (1991), p. 25. 
80 Sugata Bose, ‘Starvation amidst Plenty: The making of Famine in Bengal, Honan, and 
Tonkin, 1942 – 1945’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 1990), pp. 701 – 702. 
81 Amartya Sen, ‘Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach and its 
Application to the Great Bengal Famine’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1977, I, pp. 34 – 
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     Secondly, there has been convincing scholarship on British failures to  
 
provide food relief. Lance Brennan attached particular blame to an indolent 
 
and certainly despondent  administration in Bengal that had done very little,  
 
but had not yet not yet experienced the benefit of Casey’s energetic  
 
leadership, while for the same period Auriol Weingard deplored the lack of  
 
coordination between Delhi and Calcutta.82 
       
 
Biographies, Autobiographies and Collections of Letters 
 
In addition to the biographies of Amery, Linlithgow and Wavell that have  
 
already been mentioned, there are a number of other works that are of  
 
potential value. However, for many politicians, their involvement with Amery  
 
or India represented only a small part of their careers, and care must be  
 
taken to be as selective as possible.  
 
     Firstly, Churchill, who was the most important British political figure from  
 
1940 until 1945. His official biographer, Martin Gilbert, made surprisingly few  
 
references to either Amery, or the wider matter of India in both the volumes  
 
that cover the period of the war, although there is an interesting account of  
 
Churchill’s reaction to the increasing interest of the USA in Indian affairs.83  
 
Offering much more insight into Churchill’s stance on India is Volume IV of his  
 
wartime memoirs which covers the period immediately before and after the  
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Cripps mission. His analysis of events clearly revealed his outright opposition 
to any immediate concessions to the nationalist cause, and also reinforced  
Gilbert’s view that he resented any interference by the USA in South Asian  
politics.84  
     Most biographies of Attlee have concentrated on his socialist origins in  
voluntary work in the East End of London, or on his reforming post war  
administration. However he had a strong and lasting interest in India, both as  
a member of the Simon Commission in the late 1920s, and also as the  
chairman of the wartime Cabinet India Committee which sat from February  
1942. Kenneth Harris wrote a short account of this latter role, although a  
recent biography by Nicklaus Thomas Symonds has provided more detailed  
analysis of both his time in India with Simon, and his influence during the  
war.85 Another recent, and much praised biography of Attlee dealing only with 
the war years, said disappointingly little about his involvement with India,  
concentrating almost exclusively on domestic political infighting.86  
Attlee’s own account in his autobiography is typically cryptic, but still  
managed to show his commitment to constitutional reform in India.87 
     The Labour politician who had an even keener interest in India was Sir  
Stafford Cripps, who had already visited that country in 1939, and was sent 
84 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War Volume IV The Hinge of Fate, London, Cassell 
and Co., 1951, pp. 181 – 196. 
85 Kenneth Harris, Attlee, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982, pp. 201 – 204. Nicklaus 
Thomas Symonds, Attlee A Life in Politics, London, I.B. Tauris, 2010, pp. 43 – 53; 109 – 114. 
86 Robert Crowcroft, Attlee’s War, London, I. B. Tauris, 2011. The only reference of real 
relevance to this dissertation is at page 40, where Crowcroft described Attlee’s disquiet over 
Linlithgow’s decision to declare war against Germany on behalf of India, without consulting 
any Indian politicians. 
87 Lord Attlee, As it Happened, London, Heinemann, 1954, pp. 179 – 181. 
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back by Churchill in early 1942 to secure a measure of agreement on 
constitutional reform; almost certainly in order to prevent any disruption of 
India’s contribution to the war effort. Peter Clarke’s meticulously researched  
biography of Cripps provided considerable detail on the mission, especially the 
personal and political differences with Amery who remained privately, and 
sometimes publicly, sceptical throughout.88 
 The Australian, Richard Casey, was only Governor of Bengal for a short 
time from January 1944 until March 1946, but his innovative approach to  
alleviating the famine in the province yielded successful results. His working 
relationship with Amery was closer than would normally have been the case  
between a provincial governor and the Secretary of State, possibly because  
the latter had chosen him, or at least had taken the credit for having done so. 
Their prolific  private correspondence is supported by important works of  
biography and autobiography that give valuable insight into, not only Amery’s 
approach to the famine, but also provincial and national governance in 
India.89 
    There is a wide variety of biographical coverage of the two most important 
Indian politicians during the war; Gandhi and Jinnah. Gandhi’s autobiography  
was written in 1927, and he was already an elderly man of seventy years  
when war was declared. Judith Brown’s biography of Gandhi followed her 
earlier accounts of specific periods when he was particularly politically 
active.90 In particular she wrote with great clarity about the ageing Gandhi’s 
88 Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version,  pp. 276 – 330. 
89 R. G. Casey, An Australian in India, London, Hollis, 1947. Also, R. G. Casey, Personal 
Experience, 1939 – 1946, London, Constable, 1962. Also, W. J. Hudson, R. G. Casey, 
Melbourne, OUP, 1986. 
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reconnection with his Congress colleagues, his part in the ‘Quit India’  
campaign, and his eventual reluctant realisation  that foreign troops might be 
needed for defence against Japan.91 
     Wolpert had earlier written a similarly researched biography of Jinnah in  
which he made little use of the voluminous Quaid-i-Azam papers held in the  
National Archives of Pakistan.92 There was an absence of hard detail about  
the Cripps mission and how it affected the Muslim community, although his  
account of Jinnah’s dismay at the success of Congress in the 1937 provincial  
election was especially valuable. While the message from Wolpert was that, at 
this point, Jinnah had already settled for a separate state of Pakistan, Ayesha  
Jalal in her biography of Jinnah believed that he retained the idea of Muslim  
representation within a united India for longer.93 
     Of particular value to researchers is the collection of letters written by the  
veteran Hindu politician Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Although more moderate than 
Gandhi in his preferred methods of achieving reform, his dislike of the British  
Raj was unambiguous, and during the war frequently manifested itself in  
vitriolic, if sometimes unfair, criticism of Amery.94 
The ‘Cambridge’ School 
The relevance of the work of the ‘Cambridge’ school of Indian history to a 
90 Judith Brown, Gandhi Prisoner of Hope, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989. 
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thesis about the Secretary of State in wartime is a matter for delicate  
judgement. If it is accepted that Amery was not as well briefed on Congress  
and Muslim League politics away from the larger cities, then at least a  
working understanding of this work is of value. The intellectual origins of this  
coterie were not in the study of India, but in the work done by John Gallagher 
and Ronald Robinson on the nature of imperialism in Africa.95 Once they had  
transferred their interest to India, the focus became the interaction between  
local groups and anticolonial nationalist movements. The authors believed  
that imperial rule spread as the result of the collaboration between the British  
and local Indian rulers, and that later, when colonised groups chose to  
discontinue their cooperation, they formed into nationalist groups seeking  
independence.96 The mechanics of this were clearly explained by Gallagher,  
who noted that the economic imperatives of maintaining the Raj required  
greater levels of local bureaucracy that became increasingly unwelcome to  
Indians, who to protect their interests, began to mobilise politically. The  
corollary was that Gallagher found it difficult to accept the idea of a united  
national Congress party, with Gandhi and Nehru as its truly representative  
leaders.97  
     Anil Seal, whose work was initially supervised at Cambridge University by 
Gallagher, took his mentor’s ideas regarding collaboration between  
imperialists and the colonised as far as the date of partition. In particular, he 
95 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The 
Official Mind of Imperialism, London, St Martin’s Press, 1961. 
96 Howard Spodek, ‘Pluralist Politics in British India: The Cambridge Cluster of Historians of 
Modern India’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (June 1979), pp. 689 – 690. 
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identified the financial pressures that caused the British to devolve more 
responsibility to local politicians, who then frequently sought even more. He  
believed that the desire for independence was really only the goal of a small  
group of elite politicians, but that as the war progressed, and the stakes  
relating to self-government became higher, local leaders of both  
communities were obliged to leave the final negotiations to Congress and the 
Muslim League.98  
     Amery and his colleagues in India would certainly have benefitted from  
not only from better information on local politics, but certainly also the start 
of the long term financial difficulties in maintaining the Raj. This matter was 
rarely mentioned in the correspondence between Amery and the two  
Viceroys, although Gallagher and Seal’s important work of collaboration  
proved that the sombre raw data had been available.99 
‘Subaltern’ History 
In connection with this study, it is difficult to assess the value of a number of 
works that were written by a group of scholars, who under the collective  
name of ‘Subalterns’, eschewed an elite approach to historiography, and  
concentrated on the lower social classes in India. Unfortunately, many of  
these historians have overstated their otherwise valuable reviews of the  
impetus for change coming from poor communities by an excess of polemic 
and Marxist jargon.100 Although these histories stress the link between  
98 Anil Seal, ‘Imperialism and Nationalism in India’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 
(1973), pp. 344. 
99 Gallagher and Seal, ‘Britain and India between the Wars’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 15, 
No. 3 (1981), pp. 387 – 414. 
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national elites and activism from below, there is disappointingly little analysis  
 
or explanation of how this might have affected negotiation with the British. 
 
Guha himself, wrote a useful, if simplistic article to explain the nature of the  
 
‘Subaltern’ school, although in the first few pages he dismissed traditional  
 
histories, written from whatever standpoint, as merely providing chronological  
 
and institutional background for presumably more valid interpretations.  
 
Nevertheless, he was more convincing in his argument that independence  
 
might not have been achieved without the contribution of those at a lower  
 
level in Indian society.101 
 
     An important work by Sumit Sarkar bridged the gap between the more  
 
conventional histories of India and the ‘Subaltern’ approach. He derided the  
 
‘Cambridge’ approach for suggesting that the collaboration of local groups  
 
with the British sprang from a degree of selfishness, and lack of patriotism  
 
that he believed was not the case.102 Although this work was frequently  
 
provocative, and not even handed, he made a fair job of allocating the roles  
 
of absolute diehard, reluctant diehard, and cautious reformer to Churchill,  
 
Linlithgow, and Amery respectively.103 
 
 
Purpose of This Study 
 
This literature review has shown that there is a large historiography on both  
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the role of Congress and the Muslim League, before and during the war.  
 
There are also a number of secondary sources on British attitudes towards  
 
the increasing demands of Indian nationalism, especially in the twenty five  
 
years before the 1935 Government of India Act. However there has been little  
 
written about the process of imperial management from London, and how it  
 
was prioritised or not during the fluctuating Allied fortunes of the Second  
 
World War. As an already established thinker on the British Empire, if not  
 
its dependent parts, Amery’s experiences provide academics an excellent  
 
opportunity to examine the difficulties when leaders were obliged to  
 
substitute pragmatism for theory, if faced with a wide variety of adverse  
 
influences. Ultimately it is hoped that it will reveal as much about the  
 
problems of British Cabinet government as the issues of Indian governance.  
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 CHAPTER II 
 
 
AMERY’S VIEWS OF EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM 
 
Introduction 
  
Despite Amery’s often pejorative references to Indian politicians and the  
 
India Office when seeking a move towards federation in East Africa, in the  
 
decade after the Great War, it is possible to trace only a few references in his  
 
papers to constitutional reform in India until he began his active support of  
 
the Conservative front bench over the long gestation period of the  
 
Government of India Act of 1935. This is not surprising, as during the periods  
 
before the July crisis in 1914, and certainly after the Armistice until the Irwin  
 
declaration in late 1929, he concentrated on such issues as Irish home rule,  
 
imperial preference, and the economic development of the dominions.  
 
     During these years, Indian pressure for constitutional change, and the  
 
consequent need for Britain to make an appropriate response, gathered  
 
momentum. The Secretary of State for India, John Morley and the Viceroy,  
 
Lord Minto, had introduced a limited amount of reform in the Indian  
 
Councils Act 1909 which provided for the election of Indians to the central  
 
and provincial legislatures for the first time. However in the eyes of an  
 
increasingly militant Indian National Congress seeking nothing short of self- 
 
government, these modest measures were woefully inadequate.1  
 
     A number of factors such as the rise of communalism (despite the  
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‘Lucknow Pact’ of 1916), and the expectancy of Indians for political rewards  
 
following the Great War, soon rendered the 1909 legislation obsolete.2  
 
Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, proposed a constitutional  
 
solution that was radical for its time, with the rather more guarded support of  
 
the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. Montagu made his aspirations clear in an  
 
announcement that he made on 20 August 1917, albeit with some cautious  
 
editing by Lord Curzon.3  
 
     In his hopes for progression towards a system based on the British  
 
political model he envisaged ‘the increasing association of Indians in every  
 
branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing  
 
institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible  
 
government in India as an integral part of the British Empire’.4 Barely two  
 
months after Montagu’s famous declaration, Amery, at the time Assistant  
 
Secretary to the War Cabinet, made his own views clear in a letter to the  
 
Australian Prime Minister, William Hughes. While introducing his now well  
 
known theory on British war aims that envisaged a worldwide circle of British  
 
domination, he identified the place of India in such an arrangement.  
 
Eschewing Montagu’s purple prose he foresaw a British Monroe doctrine in  
 
South Asia, keeping the region free from other ambitious powers, and  
 
centred on an India that moved slowly towards democracy.5  
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     Montagu’s announcement presaged the reforms that carried his name,  
 
and that of Chelmsford. The resulting legislation was the Government of India  
 
Act of 1919 that introduced the principle of ‘dyarchy’, or dual government,  
 
into the provinces of British India. This innovative, if cumbersome system was  
 
the brainchild of Lionel Curtis, the Milnerite Round Table member and imperial  
 
thinker who travelled around India from November 1916 to February 1918 in  
 
order to work out the final details of a scheme that carried the imprint of the  
 
progressive liberalism of both Montagu and himself.6 The Act enlarged the  
 
provincial and central legislative councils and removed official majorities,  
 
although it was significant that provincial governors and the Viceroy  
 
respectively, kept reserve powers which could be used in cases of deadlock. 
 
     The new system made little difference to the Government of India, but at  
 
provincial level there was real change through ‘diarchy’, which transferred  
 
some subjects such as education to Indian ministers, responsible to the  
 
legislature and the electorate. Others, including policing and the  
 
administration of justice, remained under the direct charge of governors  
 
and their executive councils.7 For his measures to be successful, Montagu  
 
needed a long period of stability in India, and the goodwill of the politically  
 
minded Hindu and Muslim elites. Unfortunately, the initial support of  
 
moderate Congress politicians such as Gopal Krishna Gokhale was soon  
 
replaced by the opposition of Mahatma Gandhi who believed that full  
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independence, or swaraj, should be granted within a year.8 Although Gandhi’s  
 
protests against Montagu’s legislation were non-violent, more serious unrest  
 
broke out after three hundred protestors were killed at Amritsar by troops  
 
ordered to fire by the military commander, General Dyer.9  
 
     Amery had no direct responsibility for imperial affairs when he expressed  
 
his own views on constitutional reform in India to the Cambridge Branch of  
 
the Royal Colonial Institute on 9 February 1922. In a cautious and vague  
 
speech he agreed that responsible government as practised in the white  
 
dominions, was inappropriate for India at that time. Basing his arguments on  
 
the conclusions reached by Curtis, his Round Table colleague, he believed  
 
that such government could only be given to India on an incremental basis.  
 
He also showed a degree of uncharacteristic pessimism in stating that the  
 
reform process should have been started at least fifteen years earlier so that  
 
moderates would have had more influence in India, and agitators rather  
 
less.10  
 
     Within a few months, Amery was given much of the missing detail, albeit  
 
in partisan form, by his former colleague in the Balkans, George Lloyd, who at  
 
this time, was Governor of Bombay.11 Lloyd who, during the next decade was  
 
 was to become a diehard opponent of Indian independence, told Amery that  
 
the Viceroy, Lord Reading, had lost control of public order. Lloyd blamed  
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Gandhi’s campaign of disobedience that had not confined itself to peaceful  
 
protest, as there had been many outbreaks of violence, both of a communal  
 
and anti-Raj nature. Following his threat of resignation, Lloyd was able to  
 
arrest Gandhi and other protestors, an action that he believed had bought  
 
him sufficient time to make an overall assessment of matters. He explained to  
 
Amery that the stark choice for Britain was either to enforce the 1919  
 
legislation, or to grant immediate full dominion self-government to India.12  
 
     The closest we can get to Amery’s view of the 1919 Act is in his volume of  
 
applied political philosophy, The Forward View, published in 1935. Although  
 
Amery’s analysis was a combination of a Whiggish history of British  
 
achievement in civilising India, and unashamed propaganda for the 1935  
 
Government of India Act, he went to some lengths to demonstrate that the  
 
Montagu-Chelmsford proposals were the product of doctrinaire liberalism. In  
 
particular, he believed that this philosophy led to unwise attempts to  
 
introduce British style parliamentary democracy to India. He was to promote 
 
this view throughout his period in office.13 
      
 
Amery, Sir John Simon and Lord Irwin 
 
In 1926 Amery discussed reform in India with two politicians, who during the  
 
next five years were to shape such change in very different ways. Both Sir  
 
John Simon, a Liberal and Edward Wood (later Lord Irwin, and even later  
 
Lord Halifax), a Conservative, were All Souls fellows, and represented two  
 
opposing approaches to Indian constitutional reform that dominated much of  
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British political debate until the 1935 Government of India Act received the  
 
Royal Assent.14 Amery spoke to Irwin shortly before he left Britain on 17  
 
March 1926 to become Viceroy, and possibly frustrated by Indian opposition  
 
to his own plans for an East African federation, advised him ‘get away from  
 
the atmosphere of constitutional grievances, buck up India and make it proud  
 
of itself’.15 During dinner at All Souls two weeks later Amery had a discussion  
 
with Simon who had just returned from a private visit to India, and was also  
 
now convinced of its unsuitability for a British system of parliamentary  
 
government.16 Amery showed his approval of this opinion by writing that  
 
‘Simon was rapidly becoming a Tory’.17 
 
     In 1927 Amery was concerned with two matters in connection with India  
 
that did not directly involve constitutional reform, but that demonstrated his  
 
lack of sympathy for that country. Firstly, as a portent for the later crisis of  
 
the sterling balances he took part in Cabinet discussions about Indian  
 
financial liabilities that had accrued during the Great War. Unsurprisingly,  
 
Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer took a hawkish view over repayment,  
 
although he was vigorously opposed by the Secretary of State for India, Lord  
 
Birkenhead. Amery did not give explicit support to either colleague, but  
 
presciently declared that a final solution was required, otherwise ‘these  
 
financial questions with India are going to involve us in continual trouble  
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during the next twenty years’.18  
 
     Secondly as a member of the Defence of India Cabinet Committee that  
 
had been set up to counter a possible Bolshevik threat on the subcontinent,  
 
Amery contributed some fanciful strategic thinking. Adhering to his long held  
 
belief in the value of federation, he advocated the creation of a new frontier  
 
empire of Afghanistan and Persia, ‘leaving India behind as a dominion  
 
contributing less in men and equipment to a defence that will have moved  
 
beyond them’.19 
     
    The 1919 Government of India Act had provided for a Statutory  
 
Commission to review the outcome of the reforms by the end of 1928.  
 
Birkenhead brought this forward as he feared that, under a future Labour  
 
Government, his likely successor, Colonel Wedgwood, would appoint  
 
radicals to the Commission.20 This panel under the chairmanship of Sir John  
 
Simon consisted of four Conservative and two Labour politicians, including  
 
Clement Attlee, but no personnel from India, a policy that Irwin had  
 
suggested to Birkenhead on the grounds that a mixed race committee could  
 
well lead to separate and contradictory reports.21 Indian outrage at the  
 
composition of the Commission was shared by all shades of Congress opinion  
 
as well as by a minority of the Muslim League under Jinnah’s leadership.22  
 
Although Irwin predicted that the resulting boycott of the Commission would  
 
quickly die out, this did not turn out to be the case, and Simon was obliged to  
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travel around India obtaining information where he could.23  
 
     Simon also had to compete with a constitutional report prepared, at the  
 
same time, under the chairmanship of a leading Congress politician and  
 
lawyer, Motilal Nehru.24 This called for dominion status and a unitary system  
 
of government, demands that were soon increased, under the threat of 
 
further civil disobedience, to full independence.25  
 
          The development of Amery’s views on Indian constitutional reform,  
 
which lasted until he became Secretary of State in 1940, can be traced to his  
 
reaction to both the Irwin declaration and the recommendations of the Simon  
 
report. Irwin acted because he decided that the bitterness felt in India over  
 
the composition of the Simon Commission made it necessary to restore  
 
confidence in British intentions.26 He planned to take action in two ways.  
 
Firstly, to make a clear statement that Britain had dominion status in mind for  
 
India, and secondly to arrange a conference in London where British and  
 
Indian politicians could discuss the issue of constitutional reform.27  
 
    Irwin returned to London in the summer of 1929 to explain his proposals to  
 
King George V, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, William Wedgwood and  
 
Baldwin, now leader of the opposition. The first three gentlemen assented  
 
with enthusiasm, but the wily Baldwin was more circumspect. He did not  
 
consult his colleagues in the Conservative Business Committee (Shadow  
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Cabinet), but told Irwin that his approval of both proposals depended on  
 
Simon’s support. Simon’s memoirs do not mention any resulting discussions  
 
with either Baldwin or Irwin.28  Even if he had indicated agreement at any  
 
earlier time, this was repudiated on 24 September when he spoke for the  
 
Commission in opposing both the declaration on dominion status, and the  
 
need for a constitutional conference in London.  
 
     When the Conservative Business Committee met on 23 October, Baldwin  
 
was apparently told for the first time of Simon’s objections to Irwin’s  
 
proposals.29 Surprised by the strength of his colleagues’ outrage, he  
 
attempted to persuade Irwin to delay his statement, but without success.30  
 
Having returned to India, Irwin ignored the anger of a variety of politicians,  
 
including Lord Salisbury, Lord Birkenhead and Lloyd George, and made his  
 
statement on 31 October 1929 by means of a communiqué to the Indian  
 
Gazette. Whether Halifax truly believed in awarding full dominion status to  
 
India on the terms given to Australia, South Africa and New Zealand cannot  
 
be completely verified, but his final statement was, 
 
I am authorised on behalf of His Majesty’s Government to state 
clearly that in their judgement it is implicit in the declaration of 
1917 that the natural issue of India’s constitutional progress as 
          there contemplated is the attainment of dominion status.31 
 
     Amery took little time to express his disapproval of Irwin’s statement. On  
 
5 November 1929 he wrote a long and detailed letter to Baldwin, from its  
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tone and content seemingly ignorant of the fact that he was no longer  
 
addressing him as the Prime Minister, but stating that the declaration should  
 
not have been made before the publication of the findings of the Simon  
 
Commission. His chief concern was the expectation that had already been  
 
created in India among moderate politicians while the reaction of more  
 
extreme elements was one of scorn and disbelief. He believed that it should  
 
soon be made clear to all sections of Indian opinion that any future  
 
conference would not be able to discuss any arrangements for dominion  
 
status, but merely debate the Simon Report, and how it might involve the  
 
princes.32 Remarkably, Amery does not refer to the Irwin declaration in either  
 
the chapter on India in The Forward View, published in 1935, or in his draft  
 
memoirs written in 1953. 
      
     If Irwin had hoped that his declaration would have a calming effect, he  
 
was soon to be disappointed. In Britain such prominent Tory figures as  
 
Birkenhead, Churchill and Austen Chamberlain condemned it as foolish and  
 
dangerous.33 The response in India was mixed. Liberal politicians signified  
 
approval, but Congress was outraged, seeing in Irwin’s choice of words either  
 
calculated procrastination, or the offer of some inferior brand of dominion  
 
status.34  
 
     Simon quickly realised that Irwin’s statement had fatally undermined his  
 
Commission whose findings had become obsolete before their publication in  
 
June 1930.35 Nevertheless, Amery was unrestrained in his praise of Simon’s  
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conclusions that he believed went some way to rectifying the mistakes  
 
of the 1919 Act.36 The Commission recommended the early replacement of  
 
diarchy by a fully responsible executive in the provinces, although with  
 
substantial powers reserved to governors. At the centre, larger changes were  
 
proposed whereby the idea of national or unitary government was discounted  
 
in favour of a federal structure capable of including the princely states.37  
 
 
Amery as a Backbencher and his Early Battle with the Diehards 
 
Amery’s active political interest in India in the five years from the Simon  
 
Report until the India Act of 1935 was conducted as a loyal supporter of party  
 
policy, although he had left the Conservative front bench in February 1930 as  
 
a result of differences with the leadership over the issue of imperial  
 
preference. The Labour Government fell in August 1931, and was replaced by  
 
a National Government. Amery never held ministerial office in this  
 
administration under either Ramsay MacDonald or Baldwin, but proved to be  
 
of value to the Conservative leadership during the frequently vicious party  
 
infighting that characterised this period over the issue of reform in India.  
 
     The timetable that resulted in the Government of India Act of 1935 was  
 
long and complicated, not only in terms of Britain’s complicated relationship  
 
with India’s diverse political and religious groupings, but also at home where  
 
there was an acrimonious struggle for power within the Conservative Party.  
 
Before the constitutional measures were finally enacted in 1935, there had  
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been three Round Table conferences in London, a White Paper on the  
 
proposals, a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee to examine them, and  
 
further scrutiny when the Bill went through its parliamentary stages.  
 
     Amery had little to do with the first Round Table conference that took  
 
place from November 1930 to January 1931, and was boycotted by Congress  
 
as it coincided with Gandhi’s second civil disobedience campaign that had  
 
begun with his protest over the salt tax issue, and ended with his pact with  
 
Irwin in March 1931.38 In their absence, the moderate Hindus, Muslims and  
 
representatives of the princely states made a limited amount of progress  
 
towards a federal centre, a scheme approved by both the Labour Government  
 
and Samuel Hoare, who led the Conservative Party delegation.39 By contrast,  
 
Churchill opposed these first tentative steps towards Indian self-government  
 
in a series of stinging speeches that marked an almost complete severance  
 
from Baldwin and Hoare.40 Somewhat prophetically in May 1930, Baldwin  
 
had already confided in Amery over Churchill’s likely future behaviour as a  
 
diehard over India, and revealed that his strategy since the General Election  
 
in 1929 had been to ‘allow him enough rope to hang himself’.41  
    
     Although Amery had not attended the first Round Table conference he did  
 
correspond with individuals who were deeply concerned about the latest  
 
developments on reform in India. In February 1931 he had an acrimonious  
 
disagreement over India with Lord Lloyd, who had been dismissed as High  
 
                                           
38 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, p. 
236. 
39 Moore, ‘The Making of India’s Paper Federation’, p. 60. 
40 Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, 1986, pp. 55 – 62. 
41 Amery diary, 26 May 1930, AMEL 7/24. 
57 
 
Commissioner of Egypt in 1929 by the Labour Government, and who was now  
 
as fiercely opposed to Indian constitutional reform as Churchill. At a meeting  
 
of the India Committee of Conservative MPs on 9 February 1931, Lloyd led a  
 
powerful diehard faction in asking for more repression of dissent by the  
 
Government of India. Amery believed that he had protected Baldwin by  
 
making the first reply to Lloyd, pleading for more consideration of the federal  
 
idea, but not abandoning the need to maintain order in India.42  On the  
 
following day, Lloyd apologised to Amery by letter for having verbally  
 
harangued him at the meeting, but nevertheless expressed his fears for India  
 
that he felt was suffering from a combination of ‘a Brahamin conspiracy and  
 
Soviet sedition’. His fundamental imperial tenet was that, ‘if India goes,  
 
everything goes’.43  
           
     Amery did not speak again on these matters before the second Round  
 
Table conference that began in September 1931. However he did keep in  
 
touch with Irwin, who had retired as Viceroy, and discussed the situation in  
 
India with him at All Souls on 17 May 1931, before recording that he agreed  
 
with him on most aspects of reform policy.44 Within three weeks, Irwin wrote  
 
to him from his home in Garrowby to warn him that many British  
 
administrators working for the Government of India would only be prepared  
 
to support measures that actually delayed any transfer of power.45 
 
     Before the second Round Table conference opened on 7 September, the  
 
National Government had replaced the Labour administration that had  
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resigned a couple of weeks earlier. During the conference a General Election  
 
was held on 27 October 1931, resulting in a Conservative representation of  
 
473 seats, although Ramsay MacDonald remained as Prime Minister. Hoare  
 
became Secretary of State for India, although Amery did not regain  
 
ministerial office. 
 
      Britain suffered a grave financial crisis in the late summer of 1931 which  
 
necessitated corrective measures, some of which caused problems for the  
 
Indian rupee. Relations between the conference delegates were also affected  
 
by the loan indebtedness of India to Britain while the trade balance of  
 
payments saw a fundamental change against the Lancashire cotton  
 
manufacturers, due mainly to Indian tariffs aimed to protect their own textile  
 
industry.46  
 
     It had been hoped that the optimism created by the pact between  
 
Irwin and Gandhi would have produced a more favourable atmosphere at the  
 
conference, but tensions between Congress, led by Gandhi, and other groups  
 
such as Muslims and the princes made for little progress.47 This vacuum was  
 
skilfully filled by Hoare, who pressed on with the legislative timetable to  
 
produce provincial autonomy, and a federal centre.48 In India, the failure of  
 
the conference led to further civil disobedience, with Gandhi and Nehru   
 
imprisoned once again.49 A third hastily arranged Round Table conference  
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lasted just five weeks during November and December 1931, achieving very  
 
little beyond a communal award of one third of the seats at the centre to  
 
Muslims. 
 
     Throughout this period, and throughout 1932, Amery concentrated on  
 
imperial preference, and the state of British military preparedness. His  
 
prospects for regaining office were certainly not helped by his attendance at  
 
the Ottawa Imperial conference in August 1932, when as a representative of  
 
the Empire Sugar Federation, his perceived interference caused resentment  
 
amongst his former front bench colleagues, many of whom vowed to have  
 
him permanently excluded from ministerial office.50 
 
 
Amery in Support of the White Papers and the Joint Select 
Committee 
 
Hoare then acted quickly. On 17 March 1933 he published his reform  
 
proposals for consideration by a Joint Select Committee of both Houses.51  
 
During the period of three months between the close of the third Round Table  
 
conference and the publication of the White Paper, the Conservative diehards  
 
stepped up their campaign of resistance. Believing that their constituency  
 
members were opposed to responsible government at the centre in India, Sir  
 
Henry Page Croft and his diehard colleagues proposed a motion in the House  
 
of Commons that legislation should be confined to self-government in the  
 
provinces; a return to the Simon Commission proposals.52 Although this  
 
motion was defeated, opposition had already been formalised with the  
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creation of the India Defence League (IDC) which included Churchill, and the  
 
peers, Carson and Lloyd.53 
 
     Hoare’s White Paper, although formidable in length, had only two main  
 
Recommendations; firstly, the creation of provinces with a good measure of  
 
self-government; and secondly, a carefully designed federal structure that  
 
through the design of the legislative and the executive would allow a  
 
combination of princes, Muslims and liberal Hindus to vote down a militant  
 
Congress.54 The selection of the members of the Joint Select Committee  
 
represented another tactical victory for Hoare. Of the thirty two members  
 
(sixteen from each House), only five were confirmed diehards, with another  
 
six, sceptical but uncommitted. This, combined with the minority status of the  
 
approximately sixty potentially rebellious MPs in a very large Conservative  
 
parliamentary representation, left the critical arithmetic very much in Hoare’s  
 
favour.  
 
     Bearing in mind such a voting advantage for the government, it is  
 
important to make a realistic assessment of Amery’s contribution to the  
 
successful enactment of the legislation. In 1933, although not a member of  
 
the Joint Select Committee, he addressed two important Conservative Party  
 
meetings on the reform proposals. Firstly, in June 1933 he spoke in support  
 
of Hoare at the annual meeting of the Central Council of the National Union,  
 
and was quick to praise his own contribution at this caucus.55 However, the  
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true architect of the front bench success was Baldwin who skilfully convinced  
 
the meeting by a margin of 838 votes to 356 votes to have the work of the  
 
Joint Select Committee declared sub judice until the final report.56  
 
     Secondly, in October 1933, at Hoare’s insistence, Amery spoke in support  
 
of the White Paper at the Party Conference held in Birmingham. Although the  
 
India Defence League made a considerable attempt to influence the  
 
constituency delegates, Neville Chamberlain made a skilful speech in his home  
 
city, and managed to turn the debate on Indian reform into a motion of  
 
confidence in the Government which he won by a two to one margin.57 Amery  
 
believed he had been able to reduce the temperature of the meeting by  
 
stressing the similarities between the White Paper and the Simon Commission  
 
recommendations, and minimising the points of difference. Whether this was  
 
sufficient grounds for claiming that he had demonstrated the true Tory 
 
credentials of the proposed constitution is less certain.58 
 
 
Amery, Churchill and the Committee of Privileges 
 
In such favourable circumstances the Government believed that the work of  
 
the Joint Select Committee could be completed in time for the summer recess  
 
of 1934.59 Progress was halted in April when charges of a breach of  
 
parliamentary privilege were laid by Churchill against Hoare and Lord Derby,  
 
and ultimately Amery’s services were required for their rebuttal.60  Churchill  
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produced documents in support of his allegation that Derby had put pressure  
 
on the Manchester Chamber of Commerce to alter their evidence to the Joint  
 
Select Committee by softening the tone of their objections to the reform  
 
proposals. Furthermore, Churchill accused Hoare of being complicit in Derby’s  
 
actions.  
 
    A cross party Committee of Privileges, including MacDonald, Baldwin  
 
and Attlee, was appointed on 19 April, and examined all the available letters  
 
and minutes before exonerating Hoare and Derby when their report was  
 
published on 9 June.61 Amery was unaware of any tampering of evidence,  
 
and was therefore happy to agree, when asked on 12 May 1934 by Hoare to  
 
play a prominent part in the debate on the report of the Committee of  
 
Privileges.62 Early in the debate on 13 June, Churchill criticised the  
 
Committee, both for the evidence it sought and concealed, and also on  
 
constitutional grounds.63 He was attacked by Amery who made an equally  
 
long and forceful speech which started by questioning Churchill’s motives for  
 
raising the issue of parliamentary privilege, used vernacular Latin to taunt  
 
him, and concluded with a verbose review of the balance between  
 
Lancashire cotton interests and the fiscal autonomy of India.64 From the  
 
perspective of his memoirs in 1953, Amery believed this to be, if not his best  
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speech, certainly his most effective in the House of Commons, especially as   
 
Churchill’s charges were rejected.65  
 
 
Amery’s Support for Indirect Elections to the Federal Legislature 
 
     For all his apparent radicalism, Amery was complicit in the adoption of a  
 
compromise amendment to the proposals by Austen Chamberlain, a member  
 
of the independent centre of the Joint Select Committee, to have the key  
 
matter of direct elections to the Federal Assembly revised in favour of  
 
nomination by provincial governments.66 On 8 July 1934 Amery hosted a  
 
lunch attended by the Earl of Willingdon, the Viceroy, who was home on leave  
 
from India, and Lord Simon, with the object of discussing Austen  
 
Chamberlain’s proposal. Amery agreed that the amendment would make the  
 
ultimate passage of the Bill easier, but recognised Willingdon’s concern that it  
 
would ‘give Gandhi a handle’ to foster discontent.67 Nevertheless, he showed  
 
no such reservations on 24 November when telling the Oxford University  
 
Conservative Association that it was the most important state paper since  
 
Durham’s report on Canadian self-government during the previous century.68  
  
     Over the next year Amery was even more outspoken in his opinions that  
 
were to last into his wartime spell as Secretary of State, especially in relation  
 
to the alterations to the proposed franchise for the Federal Assembly. These  
 
were published in 1935 in The Forward View, in which he based his  
 
arguments on both practical and theoretical grounds. On the first account he  
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adjudged that the size of the constituencies in direct elections would produce  
 
no personal contact between electors and elected. 
 
    In terms of political principle, he was even more forceful in dismissing the  
 
capacity of a poorly informed Indian population to understand federal issues,  
 
especially in the absence of a developed political system. He reasoned that  
 
until the princely states could take their place in a party political structure  
 
there would be a continuing need for communal representation.69 
 
     Hoare used Amery as a spokesman in support of the Joint Select  
 
Committee report at both Conservative Party meetings and in the House of  
 
Commons. On 5 December 1934 he proposed the adoption of the report at  
 
the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations in opposition to  
 
Lord Salisbury who wanted to avoid a commitment to responsible central  
 
government in India. Using Salisbury’s key word ‘irrevocable’, Amery said  
 
there could be nothing worse than a missed opportunity, and warned of the  
 
financial and political chaos that might ensue if the Government permitted  
 
any Labour Party proposals produced by Sir Stafford Cripps to be  
 
introduced.70 That the margin in support of the report was as high as 1,102  
 
votes to 390 votes caused Amery to note in his diary that the ‘back of the  
 
diehard resistance is broken’.71  
 
     Amery had been asked by Hoare to make a supportive speech during the  
 
Parliamentary debate on the Joint Select Committee report on 10 and 11  
 
December 1934. Having been called late in the debate he delivered his own  
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philosophical interpretation of various forms of government such as federation  
 
and diarchy, and explained how the current proposals were best suited to  
 
India.72 An ironic editorial in the Daily Mirror put Amery’s role as an apologist  
 
for modest reform into perspective with the comment, ‘when instinctive  
 
diehards approve, it is harder to die harder than they’.73 
 
     Once the Commons division on the debate on the Joint Select Committee  
 
report had resulted in a substantial majority for the Government, diehard  
 
opposition from the India Defence League fell away. The Bill, as finally  
 
enacted, contained 473 clauses and 16 schedules.74  
 
 
Amery and Churchill during the Passage of the Bill 
 
Although Churchill was unable to cause further delay to the legislation, he  
 
kept up his rhetorical barrage, and had more than one skirmish with Amery,  
 
who, with Hoare’s prompting, spoke in favour of the Bill on several  
 
occasions.75 On 12 March 1935 he derided Churchill for professing to admire  
 
the detailed recommendations of the Simon Commission, yet violently  
 
opposing each one before it was voted into the  Bill.76 During the final debate  
 
on 5 June 1935, and prior to Bill passing to the House of Lords, Churchill  
 
made a long and sombre speech that suggested the Bill sounded the death  
 
knell for the British Empire, and said that he believed Amery was sharpening  
 
his pencil to make an attack on him with full governmental approval. Amery’s  
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witty, but triumphalist reply accused Churchill of being as gloomy as the  
 
prophet Jeremiah, and then attempted to demonstrate that the Bill provided  
 
equal status for India, not then, but at some unspecified future time.  
 
    It was typical of Amery’s fondness for geographical realpolitik that he  
 
justified India’s potentially tardy acquisition of dominion status on the  
 
grounds that her defence requirements had always been greater than the  
 
white dominions that had been able to grow their institutions in peace.77  
 
Whether Amery had been such an assiduous party man during the passage of  
 
the Bill and the diehard rebellion because he believed in the principles  
 
enshrined in the final legislation, or because he wanted to show Baldwin that  
 
he deserved to regain high office, is a matter for conjecture. 
 
 
Amery and Indians in East Africa 
 
Amery’s direct political contact with the interests of Indians originated as early  
 
as his two spells at the Colonial Office. He was Under-Secretary to Lord Milner  
 
from January 1919 until April 1921, and he served in the Cabinet as Secretary  
 
of State from October 1924 until the Labour election victory in May 1929. In  
 
both these periods the political and economic rights of Indian settlers in East  
 
Africa were issues that engendered strong feelings not only on the  
 
subcontinent, but also in Britain and India. Indeed it can be argued that soon  
 
after the Armistice, Indian perception of British treatment of their countrymen  
 
in East Africa was regarded as an indicator of the imperial power’s likely  
 
attitude towards constitutional reform at home.  
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    Not surprisingly this was the view of the radical Indian National Congress  
 
politician, Subhas Chandra Bose who regarded the perceived injustices  
 
committed against Indians in Kenya as typical of the prejudice suffered by the  
 
swarajist  campaigners for independence from the Raj.78 However,  
 
disillusionment was also experienced in India by more moderate elements  
 
such as C. R. Rajagopalachari, editor of Young India who began to doubt the  
 
value of retaining close ties with the colonial power, and regarded the  
 
treatment of the Indian settlers in Kenya as the ‘acid test’ of British intentions  
 
over constitutional reform.79  
 
    After 1918, opinions over the rights of the 34,000 Indians in East Africa  
 
were divided.80 On one side there were diehard white settlers, anxious  
 
to retain their privileges, and an imperial establishment fearful of alienating  
 
General Smuts and British loyalists in South Africa where Indian settlers had  
 
only been able to achieve a limited improvement in their rights. In opposition  
 
was a coalition of Indian nationalists, the India Office, various missionaries  
 
and a few liberal members of the imperial bureaucracy.81 
 
      Despite early local optimistic feeling that it might just be possible for  
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Britain and Germany to preserve the status quo in East Africa until after a  
 
settlement in Europe, the British Cabinet had already decided to annex as  
 
many of the enemy’s colonies as possible.82 The final defeat of Germany  
 
produced an increase in tension in East Africa between the white settlers and  
 
the Indian community that would soon occupy Amery’s attention at the  
 
Colonial Office. Indians believed that their wartime efforts justified a  
 
substantial dividend, in particular the conquered territory in German East  
 
Africa, a possibility suggested before the war by Lionel Curtis.83  
 
 
Amery as Under Secretary at the Colonial Office 
 
     Amery, who had been appointed as Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office  
 
in January 1919, did not envisage exclusively Indian control of this former  
 
German colony, because during a meeting on 26 February 1919 with Sir  
 
Satyendra Prasanna Sinha, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the India Office,  
 
he stressed that the uplands in the newly mandated territory would be  
 
reserved for white settlers; one of the first of his many statements that would  
 
antagonise all Indians.84  
      
     Although India soon gave up its aspirations for a colony in German East  
 
Africa, the inclusion of this territory as a Class B Mandate under Article 22 of  
 
the Covenant of the League of Nations on 28 June 1919 would soon have  
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consequences for the entire region.85 Both Milner and Amery saw Britain’s  
 
responsibilities under the mandatory system as barely any more onerous  
 
than those exercised by any benevolent colonial power.86 Indeed Amery, with  
 
not a little degree of complacency, explained in the House of Commons on 30  
 
July 1919 that ‘the conditions imposed by the Mandates were in essence no  
 
different from those that would be set by ourselves whenever we dealt with  
 
subject peoples’, and prophetically in the light of his future difficulties over  
 
trusteeship, ‘the essence of our principle of government in these vast areas is  
 
to govern in the interests of the native inhabitants’.87 However he had already  
 
expressed a more opportunistic view of Britain’s responsibilities under the  
 
mandatory system when he wrote in the privacy of his diaries, ‘it makes no  
 
difference as long as we get our flag up’.88  
 
     By the late summer of 1919, Amery was already thinking of an imperial  
 
bloc in the region as he had insisted upon the insertion of a clause in the   
 
Mandate for the future Tanganyika whereby Britain would have the right to  
 
establish closer union with the East African Protectorate and Uganda.89  
 
Furthermore, in August 1920 such a federation became more likely when the  
 
East African Protectorate became Kenya. 
      
     Milner was also unpopular with the Indian community, when, although  
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refusing to set a limit on Asian immigration, he maintained his policies of  
 
maintaining exclusive European access to highland property, and segregation  
 
in urban areas. However, Indian opinion everywhere was most outraged by  
 
his refusal to grant a common electoral roll in Kenya.90 Amery had the  
 
uncomfortable task of defending these policies in the House of Commons,  
 
enduring withering personal criticism from his Labour opponent, Colonel  
 
Josiah Wedgwood, who accused him of bias in favour of the white settler  
 
class, and being  ‘prepared to put the Indians into ghettos and segregated  
 
other settlers’.91 Amery’s responsibilities for East Africa ended abruptly, when  
 
six weeks after Milner’s resignation as Colonial Secretary, he was moved to  
 
the Admiralty as Parliamentary and Financial Secretary.  
 
    The outraged reaction of Montagu, Secretary of State for India, to Milner’s  
 
policies marked the start of a period of tension between the Colonial Office  
 
and the India Office that lasted until the General Election of 1929. Indeed so  
 
difficult were relations between these great departments that civil servants  
 
behaved not as colleagues in the same administration, ‘but more like the  
 
diplomats of sovereign powers in serious conflict’.92 
 
 
Amery’s Early Years as Colonial Secretary 
 
An East African Commission to consider the future of the region had already  
 
been set up, and by the time that it reported in July 1925, Amery had been 
 
appointed as Colonial Secretary by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin. The  
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conclusions of what became better known as the Ormsby-Gore Commission   
 
disappointed Amery, especially the rejection for the foreseeable future of an  
 
East African federation. Amery did not let the matter rest as he appointed Sir  
 
Edward Grigg as governor of Kenya, believing that he shared his views on  
 
federation.93 When Grigg realised that Amery placed a higher priority on  
 
economic groupings than political union, he became disillusioned with his  
 
boss, especially when he also discovered that the whole matter of East  
 
African reform would be reviewed by yet another scrutinising body, the  
 
Hilton-Young Commission.94 
 
   Amery was also disappointed when his draft White Paper that preceded the  
 
work of this commission was amended by a nervous Cabinet.95 Baldwin had  
 
already been alerted to Amery’s search for a compliant panel on the 
 
Commission by the deputy secretary to the Cabinet, Thomas Jones, who  
 
feared that the panel would be overloaded with Round Table figures such as  
 
Lionel Curtis.96 When a hastily convened Cabinet committee rewrote the  
 
White Paper on 30 June 1927, it contained, much to Amery’s disgust, a more  
 
cautious approach to federation in East Africa.97   
 
      Neither the White Paper nor a speech by Amery in the House of  
 
Commons on 19 July 1927 made more than a brief reference to the future  
 
rights and status of Indians in Kenya, although he did promise to adhere to  
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Devonshire’s principle of native paramountcy.98  Not surprisingly,  
 
condemnation came from Labour MPs and academics who suspected that  
 
Amery was subordinating African and Indian interests to those of the white  
 
settlers and bowing to influence from the dominions in the formation of  
 
imperial policy.99  
 
      Furthermore, Indian agitation, which had been minimal since the report  
 
of the Ormsby-Gore Commission, increased when the implications of Amery’s  
 
White Paper were considered. The East African Congress and the Government  
 
of India, now led by Lord Irwin as Viceroy, made strenuous protests that were  
 
to persist until the publication of the later Hylton-Young report.100 The  
 
dysfunctional nature of this commission was clear as it produced no single  
 
unanimous set of conclusions in 1929, but a majority report and a dissenting  
 
minority report signed only by its chairman. The majority report warned that  
 
political federation and responsible government could only be achieved in the  
 
distant future, and also gave satisfaction to supporters of Indian rights by  
 
indicating that careful progress could be made towards a common electoral  
 
roll.101  
 
 
Sir Samuel Wilson’s Mission 
 
      Amery worked assiduously to salvage something from the report, and in  
 
doing so caused considerable annoyance to both the supporters of the Indian  
 
cause, and his political colleagues at home, where the Cabinet were soon  
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made aware of his intentions. In February 1929 Thomas Jones showed  
 
Baldwin a letter from Professor Reginald Coupland arguing that the majority  
 
report of the Commission should be given a chance and that ‘Amery should  
 
not be allowed to stampede the Cabinet and get a pro-Delamere (i.e. white  
 
settler) policy’.102  
 
     Amery’s Cabinet memoranda of 23 February 1929 and 4 March 1929  
 
proposed a mission to East Africa by Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under- 
 
Secretary at the Colonial Office, to negotiate a quick local modification of the  
 
conclusions of the majority report.103  Amery’s manoeuvring to find a formula  
 
that could be enacted unobtrusively by Orders in Council, and still produce an  
 
unofficial majority in the Kenyan Legislative Assembly, was regarded by  
 
Viscount Peel, Secretary of State for India, as potentially dangerous to Indian  
 
interests.104  He warned Amery of the great hostility that the mission would  
 
provoke in India, and invited him to declare exactly what instructions he had  
 
in mind for Wilson.105 Peel’s deep distrust of Amery’s true regard for Indian  
 
rights in East Africa was clearly evident in a detailed briefing telegram that he  
 
sent to Irwin in Delhi on 13 March 1929 in connection with Wilson’s  
 
impending mission to Kenya.106  
 
    The extent of Indian unease with Amery’s instructions to Wilson was made  
 
clear to the Cabinet on 21 March 1929 by a memorandum written by Peel that  
 
enclosed telegrams to him from the Viceroy who reported the apprehension  
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felt by all political parties in the Indian Legislative Council.107 Peel clearly  
 
believed that Amery did not understand the nature of politics in India, and  
 
soon sent him a strong letter emphasising the likely difficulties that would be  
 
endured by the Viceroy and Government of India in a volatile atmosphere  
 
worsened by unwise comments.108  
 
 
Summary: Indian Opinions of Amery 
 
Amery eventually obtained a favourable compromise over the nature and  
 
terms of Wilson’s mission, but the Indian community in Kenya refused to  
 
accept any dilution of their common roll claim.109 When Amery failed to  
 
achieve his desired form of federation in East Africa, his expressions of  
 
increasing frustration became biased in favour of the European settlers  
 
to the point of echoing those made by Churchill’s in his notorious speech at  
 
the East African Dinner, in 1922. More ominously for the future, he attracted  
 
the permanent ire of Congress politicians and newspaper owners in India,  
 
who from now regarded him as a diehard.110 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
AMERY FROM 1935 UNTIL THE AUGUST OFFER OF 1940 
 
 
Introduction 
 
     It is difficult to trace any reference to India by Amery in his diaries,  
 
memoirs or correspondence, from the Royal Assent of the 1935 Act in August  
 
1935 until he was appointed as Secretary of State by Churchill in May 1940.  
 
There is therefore nothing to suggest that he had much to do with matters on  
 
the subcontinent, or that he had moved from his essentially cautious view of  
 
Indian readiness for self-government or dominion status as expressed in The  
 
Forward View.1 During this period of almost five years, Amery combined an  
 
expanding portfolio of company directorships with his advancement of a  
 
number of political causes.2 His perennial commitment to imperial preference  
 
and security was matched by a developing view that it would be necessary to  
 
oppose Hitler and Mussolini with some vigour.3 This had not always been the  
 
case. Initially, he hoped that a realistic view could be taken whereby the  
 
dictators’ ambitions could be overlooked, provided they were confined to  
 
Europe, and did not imperil the British Empire. Indeed, the record of his  
 
meeting at Berchtesgaden with Hitler in August 1935 revealed that while he  
 
may have disapproved of the Fuhrer’s policies on Austria, constitutional liberty  
 
or the Jews, the two men had some common ground on economics, especially  
                                        
1 Amery, The Forward View, pp. 226 – 235. These final pages of the chapter devoted to India 
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preferential tariffs. Nevertheless, once Amery became convinced that the  
 
British Government might be considering the return to Germany of their  
 
former colonies in Africa, his opposition to appeasement hardened  
 
considerably.4 Earlier he had pressed for Britain to make the kind of  
 
settlement with Mussolini that would have split him off from Hitler. Of  
 
particular relevance to his future work at the India Office was his fear that  
  
Italian success in Abyssinia would lead to control of the Eastern  
 
Mediterranean by an enemy power, with the consequent strategic dangers to  
 
Britain’s imperial assets in the Middle East and India.5 Before long his fears for  
 
the security of the British Empire extended to the dangers implicit in a  
 
possible alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. While not favouring  
 
direct appeasement, he believed that there would be a threat to Hong Kong,  
 
Singapore and India if Japan were to be alienated over the issue of  
 
Manchuria.6 
 
      When Neville Chamberlain succeeded Stanley Baldwin in May 1937,  
 
Amery’s faint chance of immediate ministerial office disappeared. Not only did  
 
he disagree with Chamberlain’s foreign policy, but by his own admission there  
 
was an even greater divergence with him over the way to conduct cabinet  
 
government, to the extent that he was quite happy ‘to be excluded as a  
 
disturbing element from outside’.7 
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Amery during the Phoney War 
 
When war was declared, Amery was a few weeks short of his sixty-sixth  
 
birthday, and lacked his previous range of contacts inside the government  
 
to keep him informed about the formation and execution of policy. Despite  
 
this shortage of confidants Amery continued to demonstrate, with  
 
increasing candour, his frustration with Chamberlain’s prosecution of the war.  
 
Not surprisingly, he concluded that after appealing to the Labour MP, Arthur  
 
Greenwood, to ‘speak for England’ during a debate in the House of Commons  
 
on 2 September 1939, he had ‘killed his chances of office’ under  
 
Chamberlain.8 
 
      Amery spent the time between September 1939 and May 1940 pressing  
 
the case for supporting the Finns against Stalin’s forces, but in the main  
 
discussing the war effort at innumerable dinners and lunches, as well as  
 
making a number of interventions in the House of Commons. His frustration  
 
at the time can be detected from his choice of the phrase, ‘playing at war’ for  
 
the heading of the chapter in his memoirs on the drole de guerre.9  
 
      Amery was even more critical of the urgency and vigour of the war effort  
 
during the winter and spring of 1939/40. He became chairman of Anthony  
 
Eden’s former anti-Munich Tories as well as belonging to an all-party ginger  
 
group led by the future Liberal leader, Clement Davies. His real ire was saved  
 
for the Government’s reluctance to make any air attacks on Germany’s  
 
industrial capability, especially in the Ruhr, thereby permitting the German  
 
army and Luftwaffe to build up their resources. He felt contempt for the  
                                        
8 Amery diary, 2 September 1939, AMEL 7/33. 
9 Amery, My Political Life Volume III, p. 327 
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excuses for British inaction made by Chamberlain and Halifax, who thought  
 
that any belligerence would only lead to reprisals.10 
 
    The failure of the British campaign in Norway provided the subject of the  
 
debate in the House of Commons on 7 May during which Amery made his 
 
frequently quoted exhortation to Chamberlain to go, ‘in the name of God’.11  
 
The resulting division of the House saw a sufficient defection of Conservatives  
 
to force Chamberlain’s resignation, and for the King to send for Churchill. 
 
 
Amery’s appointment as Secretary of State for India 
 
Apart from his speech in the Narvik debate, Amery did not have a central part  
 
in the feverish activity that resulted in Churchill’s accession to the  
 
premiership, but on 10 May he visited Churchill, who had yet to kiss hands  
 
with the King, to discuss his own preferred position in a new administration.  
 
He asked if he could be appointed as either Chancellor of the Exchequer, or  
 
as a War Cabinet coordinator of defence reporting to Churchill. At this  
 
meeting, Churchill was only prepared to offer Amery the Ministry of Supply,  
 
stating firstly, that he intended to be his own defence coordinator, and  
 
secondly that in wartime, he had little regard for the importance of economic  
 
policy.12 
 
     Amery was kept waiting for his new ministerial appointment by Churchill,  
 
who wanted to accommodate Chamberlain, but not alienate the Labour Party,  
 
whose support he needed in a coalition government. On 13 May, Churchill  
 
asked Amery to be the new Secretary of State for India, and despite further  
                                        
10 Ibid, p. 330. 
11 Hansard, 7 May 1940, vol. 360, cc1073 – 1196. 
12 Amery diary, 10 May 1940, AMEL 7/34. Also, Amery, My Political Life Volume III, p. 373. 
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doomed entreaties to be appointed as a defence coordinator, was left with  
 
the stark choice of accepting office, or remain in the wilderness. Churchill  
 
attempted to placate Amery by saying that India would be important,  
 
particularly if the war moved eastwards, but his feelings were of  
 
disappointment, and a sense that he was being isolated from the mainstream  
 
war effort.13 Nevertheless, Amery accepted the India Office, despite the  
 
financial cost of having to give up his directorships, almost certainly for the  
 
twin reasons of the sage advice of his wife, Florence (Bryddie), and his own  
 
undoubted patriotism.14  
 
    Amery received many letters of congratulation on his appointment, the  
 
majority from expected quarters such as provincial governors in India,  
 
teachers and dons at Harrow and Oxford University, but also a few that might  
 
be regarded as surprising. In particular, he received a warm note of approval  
 
from the socialist thinker, Harold Laski who believed he would be a  
 
progressive Secretary of State.15 
 
     There is little or no evidence in Churchill’s papers, or those of his closest  
 
colleagues, to explain why he sent Amery to the India Office. Churchill  
 
must have realised that their views on Indian constitutional reform diverged  
 
widely, and would certainly have remembered their often bitter opposition  
 
before the passing of the 1935 Government of India Act. 
 
 
 
                                        
13 Amery diary, 13 May 1940, AMEL 7/34. Amery clearly felt that his appointment to the India 
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14 Amery, My Political Life Volume III, p. 375. 
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Indian Constitutional Reform and Politics from August 1935 to 
September 1939 
 
The 1935 Government of India Act, despite its great length and acrimonious  
 
gestation period, contained only two new major proposals. Firstly, 
 
provincial dyarchy conceived by Lionel Curtis for inclusion in the 1919  
 
Government of India Act was discontinued, and replaced it with a system that  
 
gave each province a separate legal personality, as well as securing equal  
 
treatment for all portfolios.16 In an attempt to provide better local democracy,  
 
the electorate for provincial legislatures was expanded to 30 million voters,  
 
with a separate communal category for Muslims. However, the Indian  
 
provincial ministers elected under these arrangements were not given  
 
complete autonomy as governors were given powers to override in certain  
 
policy areas, and as was to happen during the war, would be able to suspend  
 
ministries under Section 93 of the Act for reasons of security, or law and  
 
order.17 
 
      The second, and ultimately doomed major reform, proposed a federal  
 
system of government at the centre, with the Indian states nominating  
 
members to two new legislative bodies, the Council of State (upper  
 
house) and the Federal Assembly (lower house).18 Legislators from British  
 
India were not directly elected as had been recommended by the Joint Select  
 
Committee, but chosen by members of the provincial legislatures, a  
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concession made by Hoare to the diehards.19  
 
     The Act transferred diarchy from the provinces to the federal centre  
 
because certain important areas such as defence and foreign affairs remained  
 
under the control of the Viceroy. Furthermore, the liberal credentials of the  
 
reforms were damaged when it was decided that a future Federal executive  
 
would not be responsible to the upper and lower houses, but instead  
 
controlled by the Viceroy, his councillors and Indian ministers whose advice  
 
he was not obliged to accept.20  
 
      Unfortunately there were stringent criteria to be met if a full federal  
 
structure were to come into force. If the rulers of states representing at  
 
least half the aggregate population of those states did not signify their  
 
desire to accede to the federal system, the arrangements at the centre,  
 
introduced by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, would remain.21 This system,  
 
introduced in 1919, had been relatively simple, with executive power in the  
 
hands of the Viceroy and his nominated Council. Although there were two  
 
largely elected legislative bodies in Delhi, their powers were limited, and  
 
subject to the Viceregal veto.22 
 
 
The Response to the Act in India 
 
The Indian response to the 1935 Act was complex. Although the federal  
 
centre never materialised, a new political environment was created, which  
 
was the product of complex and diverse changes that took place throughout  
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British India and the princely states. Tomlinson asserted that, despite the  
 
intentions of British legislators to maintain the Raj for as long as possible, the  
 
perverse consequence of events was to place the political future of India into  
 
the hands of Congress.23  
 
      The initially hostile attitude of Congress to Hoare’s legislation was  
 
demonstrated by Jawarahal Nehru who returned to India following the death  
 
of his wife, Kamala, in 1936, and immediately took office as President of  
 
Congress following his nomination by Gandhi.24 Despite Linlithgow’s appeal to  
 
Congress for cooperation, Nehru stated clearly in April 1936 that he intended  
 
to ‘combat the Act, and seek to end it’.25 However, he underestimated the  
 
desire of his colleagues to exercise power in provincial government, and was  
 
outvoted at meetings of the Congress Working Committee over the issue of  
 
whether to take office following the elections that were held in 1937.26 These  
 
elections had proved to be very successful for Congress who won 711 seats  
 
out of a possible 1,585 provincial assembly seats, and achieved absolute  
 
majorities in five provinces.27 Once Linlithgow had given assurances that  
 
provincial governors would not routinely interfere with the decisions of  
 
elected ministers, Congress agreed to take office.28 The fortunes of the  
 
Muslim League were quite different, as they won only 108 of the 185 seats  
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that had been allocated to them under the communal arrangements, a great  
 
disappointment to Jinnah who had also only just returned from Europe.29  
 
     The first experience of office for Congress did little to produce unity  
 
amongst Hindus, especially as agitation increased involving trade unionists,  
 
Marxists and other left wing groups, as well as an increasing proportion of the  
 
rural work force.30 As Congress attempted to cope with the widely differing  
 
opinions and policies espoused by such different senior members as the  
 
liberal Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the radical nationalist, Subhas Chandra  
 
Bose, the Muslim League attempted to recover from their poor recent  
 
electoral performance. It was not helped by a bullish Congress that tried to  
 
incorporate it into their national structure, but refused to offer them seats in  
 
the United Provinces and Bombay.31 
 
 
The British Response to the Act 
 
The proposed federation of British India and the princely states to form the  
 
main institution of central government was never welcomed by Congress,  
 
was mistrusted by the Muslim League, and was, in truth only ever the subject  
 
of lukewarm interest by the princes.32 The princes became increasingly  
 
unnerved when Congress began an intense campaign to secure that the  
 
representatives of the states were directly elected, and not nominated.33  
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Indeed, Gandhi stated in February 1938 that Swaraj or independence should  
 
extend to the states, and also encouraged popular movements seeking  
 
increased civil liberties.34 
 
     It is doubtful whether Britain, showing an apparent lack of urgency  
 
towards obtaining the minimum number of princely accessions, had taken into  
 
account the twin trends of Congress pressure on the states, and the  
 
increasing coolness of the princes towards federation. Despite Linlithgow’s  
 
early confidence that federation would be completed by 1 April 1938, there  
 
were soon differences of approach between London and Delhi over the  
 
princely states. In London, officials at the India Office favoured slower  
 
progress to avoid a recurrence of trouble with Conservative diehards, while  
 
colleagues in their legal department were daunted by the difficulties in  
 
drafting the accession documents.35 The Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, was  
 
similarly cautious in pressing the princes to accede, refusing to make any kind  
 
of concession that was outside the wording of the 1935 Act.36 Indeed,  
 
Zetland’s memoirs, published in 1956, cited even wider reasons for delaying  
 
federation.37 Linlithgow’s entreaties to London to amend the Act to give the  
 
princes more favourable terms predictably fell victim to departmental  
 
infighting at the India Office.38 By the time that war was declared, progress  
 
on federation had stalled completely. 
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Britain and India from August 1939 to May 1940 
 
Britain’s goal in the first few months of the war was to maximise India’s  
 
contribution to the allied war effort, while both Congress and the Muslim  
 
League pressed for constitutional changes as a price for their cooperation.       
 
Nehru and Congress were quick to declare their attitude to India’s  
 
participation in the war. Nehru, applying Marxist analysis, had consistently  
 
pointed to parallels between fascism and imperialism, and remarked with  
 
some vehemence that Britain had connived at Nazi aggression to protect its  
 
empire.39 At the Congress Working Committee meeting from 9 to 11 August  
 
1939, he had taken the lead in producing a resolution that opposed any  
 
imperial war that might be foisted on India.40 By contrast, the Council of the  
 
Muslim League did promise cooperation with Britain, but made this conditional  
 
upon changes to the 1935 Government of India Act that would protect  
 
Muslims, especially in the provinces ruled by Congress.41 
   
     Indian opinion, including the more moderate elements, was offended on 3  
 
September when Linlithgow, using national radio, declared war against  
 
Germany on behalf of British India and the princely states. Although not  
 
obliged in strict constitutional terms to consult Indians before declaring the  
 
country a belligerent, there is no doubt that his decision to proceed  
 
unilaterally was a serious mistake that set the tone for relations between  
 
Britain and India for a good part of the war.42 Indeed, the humiliation was  
 
greatest for Indians seeking independence as the dominions had submitted  
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their declarations of war for approval by their parliaments.43 
 
     The reactions of different communities to the prosecution of the war  
 
varied considerably. Initially, Gandhi offered moral support, if nothing more,  
 
but Jinnah while non-committal over helping the war effort, lost little time in  
 
asking Linlithgow to further the rights of Muslims in the provinces ruled by  
 
Congress.44 Surprisingly, the Muslim Prime Ministers of Bengal and the Punjab  
 
offered Britain unqualified help, while, perhaps more predictably, certain  
 
princes promised men, money and materials to the Allies.45 
      
     The detailed conditions under which Congress was prepared to support  
 
the war effort were set out on 15 September following another meeting of the  
 
Working Committee. Taking a course somewhere between Gandhi’s fulsome  
 
support and Bose’s aggressive opportunism, Nehru drafted a statement that  
 
asked Britain to state its war aims in respect of democracy and imperialism,  
 
and to indicate when India could expect full independence.46 Such a radical  
 
request was unlikely to produce a positive response from the British Cabinet,  
 
and after a few weeks of telegrams between London and Delhi, Linlithgow  
 
was finally authorised to make his offer to Indians on 17 October. Congress  
 
response to such a rejection of their request for early clarification on  
 
independence was one of outrage, with equal scorn directed at the  
 
consolation prize of a nominated body of Indians to be consulted about the  
 
conduct of the war.47 
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     Although Congress ministers in the provinces had settled well into their  
 
work since the elections in 1937, the party as a whole was uneasy with its  
 
dual role of opposition and government. Accordingly, the reaction of the  
 
Congress Working Committee to the Viceroy’s offer was to recommend the  
 
resignation of their provincial ministries. By 31 October these provincial  
 
ministries had been replaced by British governors under the terms of  
 
Section 93 of the Government of India Act, a development that appealed to  
 
Churchill, who praised any sidelining of Congress for the duration of the  
 
war.48  
 
     This apparent stalemate, together with the apparently increased support  
 
of the Muslim League, seemed acceptable to Linlithgow, whose main priority  
 
was the scale of India’s contribution to the war.49 This was not the case  
 
with Zetland who, for the remainder of his period in office until May 1940,  
 
differed from his Viceroy over the urgency of the need to make constitutional  
 
progress. During these next few months, he made a number of radical  
 
proposals that either had little support in the British Cabinet, or were actively  
 
resisted by Linlithgow.50 The substance of his plans was to establish, at the  
 
end of the war, a constituent assembly of Indians to frame their own  
 
constitution. The safeguard for Britain would be a treaty signed with the  
 
new Indian government that would protect, possibly for a fifteen year period,  
 
the financial, industrial and military assets of the Raj. 
 
     Two conferences in the spring of 1940 widened the schisms between  
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Britain and both Congress and the Muslim League. Firstly the Congress  
 
Working Committee made a forceful statement at Ramgarh on 19 March,  
 
refusing to be any part of an imperial war, and calling for complete  
 
independence for all Indians, including those in the princely states.51  
 
Surprisingly this statement did not satisfy Nehru who wanted Britain to  
 
promise not to intervene in the East, and who wanted the threat of civil  
 
disobedience to be made explicit.52 
 
     Secondly, on 22 March at Lahore, the Muslim League ratified a proposal  
 
by Fazul Haq, the Premier of Bengal that there should be independent Muslim  
 
states in geographically contiguous units where there were Muslim majorities.  
 
Known as the ‘Pakistan Resolution’, this gave a start to the campaign for  
 
separate nations in Bengal and the Punjab. Britain had been largely unaware  
 
that the Muslim League had cleverly exploited the void left by the break with  
 
Congress, possibly because they had provided more apparent support for the  
 
war effort, and had retained office in their majority provinces.53  
 
     That these two developments were reflected in divisions in both Delhi and  
 
London was apparent from the sombre White Paper, India and the War,  
 
published by Zetland on 9 April 1940 in which he expressed real shock at the  
 
‘Pakistan Resolution’, and grudgingly acknowledged some of the realism in  
 
the Viceroy’s position.54 Churchill, by contrast, was more triumphalist, arguing  
 
at the meeting of the War Cabinet on 12 April that he could now detect a  
 
welcome sign of self-reliance amongst Muslims in India, which, of course,  
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could only enhance their ability to confront Congress.55  
 
 
Amery’s First Weeks as Secretary of State for India 
 
 Although there had been some cross party approval of Amery’s appointment,  
 
the same could not be said of Indian opinion. Indians remembered Churchill’s  
 
diehard opposition to the 1935 Act, but somehow forgot that his principal  
 
adversary arguing for moderation in the long drawn out debate had been  
 
Amery.56 Whether Hindu suspicions about Amery dated from his period as  
 
Colonial Secretary is likely, but in May 1940 there was little doubt that,  
 
whether for good reason or not, Brahmins regarded him as anti-Congress.57  
 
Amery was surprised by this opinion as he believed that his support for the  
 
1935 Act would have generated goodwill in India towards his appointment.58 
 
     Amery took over an elaborate bureaucratic structure from Zetland at the  
 
India Office. In addition to his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Parliamentary  
 
Private Secretary, and Permanent Under-Secretary he had the support of  
 
specialist Indian, European, and military advisers. In addition he had the  
 
benefit of an Indian High Commissioner, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, who was  
 
resident in London, and able to provide an up to date perspective on matters  
 
on the subcontinent.59 Amery’s analysis of the relationship between the  
 
Secretary of State and the Viceroy in general, and his rapport with Linlithgow  
 
in particular, were described in uncritical terms in his draft memoirs covering  
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the war. This thesis will test Amery’s contention that his dealings with  
 
Linlithgow were almost always harmonious, and that he regarded himself, not  
 
as the Viceroy’s superior, but as his representative and advocate in the War 
 
Cabinet.60  
 
     Zetland briefed his successor, and underlined the fate of his proposals for  
 
an Indian constituent assembly that would have been completed by a  
 
treaty protecting Britain’s interests.61 He was frank about the size of the task  
 
facing Amery, especially as his own resignation had been driven by the  
 
certainty that his plans for India were at variance with the new Prime  
 
Minister. The implication, which is not unreasonable, is that Zetland aired his  
 
concern because he felt that Amery’s preferred solutions to the political  
 
deadlock in India would be similar in substance and spirit to his own.62 
 
    The sharp downturn in the fortunes of war following the German blitzkrieg   
 
in Europe had a marked effect upon the economic and strategic significance  
 
of India, especially after Italy had entered the war. Once the Suez Canal had  
 
been closed to the Allies, the route to the eastern parts of the British Empire  
 
was via the Cape.63 In political terms, matters also changed profoundly once  
 
the possibility of Britain losing the war became apparent to all parties in India.  
 
Accordingly, the response by Congress in the early summer of 1940 became  
 
ambiguous. While Gandhi and Nehru emphasised the horror of a Nazi victory,  
 
they made clear in their different ways that Britain could not expect India to  
 
suspend its claim for independence, nor participate in any official war  
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committees.64  
 
     Outside his India Office correspondence, Amery lost little time in writing to  
 
his old political friends to project his early views on his new responsibilities. In  
 
particular, he derived support from an exchange of letters with Jan Smuts, at  
 
the time Prime Minister of South Africa. Amery’s trust in Smuts was apparent  
 
as he felt able to confide to him that although he regarded his appointment   
 
as perhaps not what he would have wanted, it did provide a challenge that  
 
could that could extended to global matters within the Empire.65 Shortly  
 
afterwards on Smuts’ seventieth birthday, he asserted that no progress could  
 
be made, unless Indians came to some agreement among themselves; a view  
 
that he repeated for the rest of his period in office.66 
 
     Amery’s reservations about the suitability of the British model of  
 
parliamentary democracy for India, which grew during his time in office,  
 
were mirrored in a long handwritten letter that he received in May 1940 from  
 
Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of India. Although a lawyer, and not a  
 
politician, Gwyer’s letter was full of pessimism at the ‘impasse that had been  
 
reached’, and broached the idea, later adopted by Amery that the answer  
 
to the conundrum was a federal constitution based on the Swiss model.67 
 
     Amery’s first BBC broadcast on India was made in June 1940, and was at  
 
once innovative and eccentric, linking the seven hundred and twenty fifth  
 
anniversary of Magna Carta with the need to proceed practically, rather than  
 
theoretically in matters of Indian reform. Although providing little detail, he  
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gave no indication that he wanted a radical solution to constitutional change,  
 
at least for the duration of the war.68 
 
 
Early Differences on Constitutional Reform between Amery and 
Linlithgow 
 
Although the first telegrams between Amery and Linlithgow contained the  
 
usual civilities, it soon became clear that the differences of approach on  
 
constitutional reform that had existed between the Viceroy and Zetland would  
 
continue in the new partnership. The added complication regarding political  
 
progress from May 1940 was the replacement of the pragmatic, and often 
 
persuadable, Chamberlain by the more inflexible Churchill. Indeed, the first  
 
three months of Amery’s tenure were to witness serious misunderstandings,  
 
as evidenced by acrimonious triangular correspondence. Nevertheless, away  
 
from political reform there would be agreement between Amery and  
 
Linlithgow over the need to stimulate India’s war effort, whether in improving  
 
industrial performance, or in military recruitment. 
 
     Amery’s first letter to Linlithgow gave little indication of later problems  
 
between the two men. Having read the India Office papers on the  
 
constitutional deadlock, he asserted that it should be made clear to Indians,  
 
and the British Parliament, that the Secretary of State and Viceroy would do  
 
all they could to bring people together, but would eschew initiatives that  
 
could only end in failure, and lessen British prestige. Linlithgow’s sober first  
 
letter dated 14 May cited recent correspondence with Gandhi, who, once  
 
again stressed the need for immediate Indian independence. In these  
                                        
68 Amery, broadcast 15 June 1940. Reproduced in L. S. Amery, India and Freedom,  
pp. 9 – 13. 
 93 
circumstances, Amery was only too pleased to accept the Viceroy’s suggestion  
 
that a Parliamentary question and answer should be arranged to clarify the  
 
British position on India .69  
 
    Two Parliamentary questions invited Amery to state the British  
 
Government’s attitude towards the problems facing them in India, and to  
 
indicate whether any measures had yet been taken to promote a small  
 
conference of representative Indians to agree on the next steps to resolve the  
 
constitutional deadlock. Amery wisely showed his draft answers to both  
 
Linlithgow and the War Cabinet, although very few revisions were needed.70  
 
On 23 May 1940, Amery gave a combined answer to these two questions  
 
during his first appearance in the House of Commons as Secretary of State for  
 
India. Given his short period in office, the statement was predictably cautious  
 
and vague, with the emphasis on India’s communal differences as well as the  
 
continuing obstacles to progress.  
 
     Amery’s first attempt to make political progress was made as early as 
 
 1 June. In a typically longwinded, if naïve telegram, he suggested a  
 
multi-stage approach designed to produce an immediate formula that could  
 
solve the political crisis as soon as possible after the war. Amery’s plan was to  
 
invite a number of Indian politicians, provincial premiers and princes to  
 
discuss the best approach to be adopted as a first step to settling the issue of  
 
constitutional reform. In terms of detail, Amery envisaged a conference of  
 
Englishmen and Indians meeting to choose a small committee that would be  
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charged with explaining the pros and cons of various solutions to the  
 
constitutional deadlock.71  
 
     Building on Zetland’s idea, he proposed to safeguard existing British  
 
interests by a treaty, not freestanding, but as a key part of a new  
 
constitution. His fears that he might be moving too quickly for Linlithgow  
 
were borne out by the Viceroy’s telegram of 6 June 1940 which counselled  
 
against hasty action. He briefly expressed concern over the details of Amery’s  
 
radical plan, but took longer over the differences in their respective  
 
approaches to reform. Linlithgow did not want to encourage Congress as he  
 
feared this might harm the military efforts of the Muslim provinces that he  
 
reported were providing 60% of recruits to the Indian Army.72 
 
     Amery responded at length by telegram on 17 June 1940, prefacing fresh  
 
proposals with the comment that the situation in India was too serious to  
 
suffer the lack of a new initiative by the Viceroy, especially in view of India’s  
 
reaction to military events in the West. This time he recommended an appeal  
 
to the leaders of all parties to meet in order to create the kind of consensus  
 
that would enable Congress ministers to resume control in their provinces,  
 
and would also permit Indians to join an expanded Viceroy’s Executive  
 
Council. Amery hoped that this would be without prejudice to Indian  
 
consideration of the revised constitutional policy that he had proposed, and  
 
for which he intended to obtain Cabinet approval. The details of these  
 
arrangements can be summarised, 
 
        [1] India to achieve Dominion status as soon as possible.  
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        [2] India to be allowed to frame its own permanent constitution. 
 
        [3] As soon as possible after the war, India would form a constituent    
             body to adopt and ratify the new constitution. 
        
        [4] Britain would be prepared to accept the findings of this body,  
             subject to safeguards for an agreed number years to protect its long  
             term interests in India. These would include such matters as   
             defence, the sterling debt, and protection of the princely states.73 
  
     Linlithgow remained unconvinced by Amery’s new proposals, but did  
 
not respond in detail, choosing instead to arrange meetings with Gandhi and  
 
Jinnah. Although his intention was to discuss the general war situation, he  
 
hoped he would have the chance to ‘probe their minds’ on Amery’s plan for  
 
his carefully chosen study group.74 This attitude frustrated Amery who saw  
 
unwelcome delay if Gandhi and Congress could not be offered a definite  
 
timetable for constitutional reform.75  
 
   Before Linlithgow could see either Gandhi or Jinnah, there were important  
 
meetings of both Congress and the Muslim League. Firstly, the Working  
 
Committee of the Muslim League met on 15 June 1940, when despite the  
 
moderating influence of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, the Prime Minister of the  
 
Punjab, Jinnah managed to obtain authorisation that he alone should  
 
negotiate with the Viceroy.76 Secondly, the sessions of the Working  
 
Committee of Congress from 17 June to 20 June resulted in a much more  
 
complicated outcome. To some extent motivated by the Nazi military  
 
successes in the West, the Committee decided that they could not retain  
 
Gandhi’s policy of non-violence in the case of aggression against India, and  
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reserved the right to create its own system of defence and public security.77 
 
 
A Surprising Change of Approach by Linlithgow  
 
When Jinnah spoke to Linlithgow on 27 June he assured him that the Muslim  
 
League was prepared to cooperate to the extent of joining the Viceroy’s  
 
Executive Council, and would also supply non-official advisers in the Section  
 
93 provinces. In return, Jinnah wanted a promise that Britain would give a  
 
fair hearing to the concept of Pakistan, if and when, constitutional   
 
discussions began.78 The Viceroy’s concern at a likely adverse reaction from  
 
Congress if Jinnah’s offer were to be accepted was borne out by his meeting  
 
with Gandhi on 29 June 1940. Linlithgow went further than he had anticipated   
 
in offering Gandhi, on a purely personal and unofficial basis, self-governing  
 
status for India, within one year of the end of the war, subject only to certain  
 
safeguards for British interests. Linlithgow assumed that even if this offer  
 
were to be ratified by the British Cabinet, it would be turned down. In a  
 
rare show of political cunning, he calculated that if such an offer were made  
 
and spurned by Congress, Britain could be shown to have been reasonable.79  
      
     When Amery received Linlithgow’s own draft declaration and proposals for  
 
wider consultation at the centre, he became very busy. He soon accomplished  
 
his first task of agreeing immediate amendments to Linlithgow’s draft, the  
 
Viceroy taking the lead in providing more emphasis on the need for  
 
agreement between elements in India, if progress were to be made on  
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political reform.80 Anticipating difficulty when the War Cabinet considered  
 
these new proposals, Amery lobbied assiduously for support from his senior  
 
colleagues, especially Simon whose cautious views on India generally  
 
commanded respect from Churchill.81 His promises of backing from Halifax  
 
and Attlee were perhaps more predictable, as was encouragement from  
 
Zetland, whose ideas he had taken a stage further.82 
 
     Amery had already submitted a detailed memorandum to accompany the  
 
draft statement. The long early sections on the development of the  
 
constitutional issue since September 1939 with their bland style and content 
 
were almost certainly the work of senior staff at the India Office.83 However,  
 
Amery’s own influence can be detected in the latter part of the memorandum  
 
where he juxtaposed urgency, and the need to obtain wider Indian support  
 
for the war effort, with damning judgements on the Congress case for  
 
universal adult suffrage. At no point did he suggest the implementation of any  
 
political reform before the end of the war.84 
 
 
Churchill’s Implacable Opposition to Reform and a Misunderstanding 
with Linlithgow 
 
Sir Edward Bridges’ sparely written minutes of the meeting of the War Cabinet  
 
on 12 July 1940, when Amery’s memorandum and Linlithgow’s draft  
 
declaration were discussed, show that opposition to issuing a declaration on  
 
political reform was indeed led by Churchill, who stressed the unlikelihood of  
 
any sufficient agreement amongst Indians to enable change to go ahead. He  
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wanted any statement to be made in the future when Britain was in a position  
 
of greater military strength, and the Indian war effort was more developed.  
 
His misgivings on a declaration were energetically shared by Lord Lloyd, the  
 
Colonial Secretary, and rather more reluctantly by other colleagues, Neville  
 
Chamberlain, Sir John Anderson, Arthur Greenwood, and surprisingly, Attlee.  
 
While the measures to expand the Viceroy’s Executive Council and set up a  
 
War Advisory Council were approved, Amery was charged with agreeing a  
 
more modest declaration with the Viceroy for consideration by the War  
 
Cabinet.85 These minutes did not reflect the desperation felt by Amery who  
 
believed that Churchill’s criticisms were sham, revealing that he had no grasp  
 
of the problems of India at all.86  He was even more hurt by his abandonment  
 
by colleagues who had not delivered their promised support, and who in his  
 
own colourful prose had ‘left him feeling like a lonely Ajax trying to argue in  
 
the intervals of the lightning flashes’.87 
 
     Daunted by Churchill’s opposition across the War Cabinet table, Amery  
 
soon wrote to him explaining why the proposals, put forward by Linlithgow  
 
and himself, should have been approved. He argued that moderate opinion in  
 
India, while wanting self-government and equality with Britain and the other  
 
Dominions, would not wish to see the war effort damaged. He also felt,  
 
perhaps naively, that an enlargement of provincial influence could forestall  
 
the need for partition.88 Amery had already sent a copy of this letter  
 
to Halifax who sympathised with him, but felt that no amount of reasoned  
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argument would carry any weight with Churchill.89 
 
     Before Churchill could reply, Amery received an unexpected and  
 
disquieting official telegram from Linlithgow, who said with some force that  
 
he would not have agreed Amery’s development of his own draft declaration  
 
if he had known that it had not received the backing of the War Cabinet, ‘in  
 
substance or form’. As he believed that any perceived rebuff of his proposals  
 
by London would reduce the standing of the Government of India, he wanted  
 
all future drafting to originate in Delhi. His next complaint was of a more  
 
personal nature. He accused Amery of applying insistent pressure on him,  
 
throughout his short time in office as Secretary of State, to put forward  
 
proposals in the constitutional field that went further than his experience  
 
deemed advisable. In particular he thought that Amery’s suggestions had  
 
revealed ‘insufficient familiarity with matters in India’, and asked, in future for  
 
a relationship based less on instruction from London but more on  
 
consultation. He also made the point that his acquiescence with Amery’s  
 
initiative was based on the assumption that the War Cabinet had been  
 
consulted, and had been in broad agreement.90 
 
     Churchill replied to Amery’s longwinded letter of 14 July 1940 with a brief,  
 
but withering rebuke, accusing him of seeking to introduce measures that  
 
were an ‘immense departure from anything that had previously been put to  
 
Parliament, or the British public’. Above all, he believed that Amery was  
 
unwisely attempting to grant India its independence using the precedent of  
 
the arrangements employed in the case of Egypt, particularly at a dangerous    
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time for Britain.91 
 
     Amery’s rejoinder sent on 17 July made an unconvincing attempt to agree  
 
with Churchill’s view that the state of the war ruled out any early progress on  
 
Indian political reform. However, sticking tenaciously to his convictions, he  
 
underlined the modesty of his proposals for Indian independence, and  
 
reminded Churchill, with some force, that he had supported South African  
 
self-government in 1910 to the extent that Smuts was now behind the British  
 
war effort.92 
 
     Amery also lost no time in trying to mollify Linlithgow. He suggested that  
 
his opinions in the earlier telegrams were really only examples of ‘thinking  
 
aloud’, and that while he may have made strong pleas to the Viceroy, he had  
 
never intended that there should have been any coercion. He also stated that  
 
he had moved faster because the Viceroy had appeared to adopt a more  
 
optimistic view about the chance of reform, after his meetings with Gandhi  
 
and Jinnah, in late June. He was also frank in admitting that he had  
 
overestimated his likely backing within the War Cabinet, and had also failed to  
 
foresee the actual vehemence of Churchill’s opposition to any change in  
 
India.93 
 
     Churchill’s suspicions about the origins of a fresh declaration were also  
 
evident from a telegram that he sent to Linlithgow on 16 July, after first  
 
sending a copy to Amery at the India Office. Churchill asked whether  
 
Linlithgow’s views had changed from his position in April 1940 when he had  
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stated unequivocally that the schisms in India made a policy of ‘wait and see’  
 
inevitable. His description of the disruption to Britain’s capacity to defend  
 
itself that would be caused by a lengthy debate on reform in India, left the  
 
Viceroy in little doubt as to his dislike of a new declaration.94 
 
     Before Linlithgow replied to Churchill, he sent a telegram to Amery in  
 
which he appeared to accept the Secretary of State’s explanations for his  
 
actions, but still expressed his displeasure at being misled, whether  
 
deliberately or not.95 Linlithgow’s letter to Churchill on 18 July was also seen  
 
by Amery, who was annoyed that the Viceroy wanted to protect his position  
 
by showing Churchill all the telegrams that he had exchanged with the India  
 
Office in June 1940.96 Eventually, to the dismay of both correspondents, all  
 
official and personal telegrams passing between Amery and Churchill were not  
 
only shown to Churchill, but circulated to the War Cabinet. 
 
     While Linlithgow was redrafting his declaration for circulation to the War  
 
Cabinet, Amery was irked by a memorandum prepared by George Lloyd, the  
 
Colonial Secretary. Returning to the tone of his diehard opposition during the  
 
passage of the 1935 Government of India Act, Lloyd produced a point by  
 
point rebuttal of the draft declaration, attributing more responsibility for the  
 
document to Amery than to Linlithgow. While he used forceful language to  
 
warn of the likely totalitarian nature of a Congress administration, he  
 
attempted to justify his stance on two main grounds. Firstly, that Britain  
 
needed to protect ordinary disenfranchised Indians, and secondly that there  
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were compelling economic, diplomatic and military arguments to support the  
 
continuation of the Raj.97 Halifax realised that this memorandum would  
 
please Churchill, and accordingly spoke to the Prime Minister, who said that  
 
he still felt strongly about Amery’s part in the preparation of a more radical  
 
declaration.98 
 
 
Churchill’s Redrafting of the Declaration 
 
Amery had mixed feelings about Linlithgow’s revised draft that eventually  
 
went before the War Cabinet on 25 July 1940. This version contained the  
 
substance of Amery’s desired reforms, in particular the paragraphs that  
 
provided for a body agreed by Indians to frame their new constitution, and  
 
for dominion status to be achieved within twelve months of the end of  
 
the war.99 However, Amery was appalled by the ‘longwinded and clumsy  
 
phrasing’ of the draft, an opinion that he was unable to keep from Linlithgow,  
 
when he mentioned by telegram on 23 July that he would have preferred the  
 
declaration to be shorter, and more emphatic.100 
 
     Consideration of the revised declaration at the meeting of the War Cabinet  
 
on 25 July 1940 took place in two distinct parts. Firstly, there was an  
 
adversarial exchange between Churchill and Amery over the correspondence  
 
between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State in June and early July. In  
 
effect, Churchill reprimanded Amery, both for developing a dialogue with  
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Linlithgow on such an important matter as a new declaration on Indian  
 
independence, and also for allowing the Viceroy to believe that the new  
 
initiative had the support of the War Cabinet. Amery’s attempts to justify his  
 
actions were lame, although particularly disingenuous when he insisted that  
 
the centrepiece of his plans was not the declaration, but the expansion of the  
 
Viceroy’s Executive, and the creation of a new War Advisory Council.101  
 
Secondly, there was a difficult discussion of Linlithgow’s draft, in particular  
 
the promises in respect of self-government and dominions status. Although  
 
Amery received a limited measure of support from Halifax and Attlee, he was  
 
predictably opposed by Simon and Lloyd who disliked the declaration, both in  
 
principle and detail. Again the bitterest condemnation came from Churchill  
 
who saw the idea of a statement on constitutional reform as dangerous,  
 
especially if Britain contracted to accept any arrangements arrived at only by  
 
Indians.  
 
     Most humiliatingly for Amery, the War Cabinet agreed that if there were to  
 
be a declaration at all, it should be redrafted by Churchill, himself, and should  
 
incorporate no departure from the position set out by the Secretary of State  
 
in the House of Commons on 23 May 1940.102 Amery’s diaries stated in stark  
 
fashion that he had endured a ‘thoroughly bad morning during which Churchill  
 
had launched a tremendous onslaught on him’.103 When Amery saw Churchill  
 
on the following day, he explained that only the circumstances of war had  
 
prevented him from resigning. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister was  
 
                                        
101 War Cabinet conclusions, 25 July 1940, CAB 65/14/14. 
102 War Cabinet conclusions 25 July 1940, CAB 65/8/24. 
103 Amery diary, 25 July 1940, AMEL 7/34. 
 104 
unsympathetic, saying that ‘he would rather give up political life than be  
 
responsible for a resolution that meant the end of the Imperial Crown in  
 
India’.104 
 
     Churchill quickly obtained Linlithgow’s agreement to his latest draft of the  
 
paragraphs concerning the body by which a fresh Indian constitution would  
 
be written, the commitment of the British Parliament to those findings, and  
 
the date by which Dominion status could be awarded.105 Formal approval was  
 
given at the meeting of the War Cabinet on 1 August 1940.106 Amery’s view of  
 
Churchill’s amendments is surprising, given that the direct promises agreed  
 
with Linlithgow on the composition of the body to create the new constitution,  
 
and the urgency with which the new measures would operate, after the war,  
 
were replaced by a verbose, yet vague statement of British intent. Briefed by  
 
Halifax that Churchill’s draft was ‘better than might have been expected’,  
 
Amery took the view that it contained everything that he had originally  
 
envisaged, and would be sufficient for Indians to realise that Britain had  
 
sincere intentions in the long run.107 Despite his continued reservations about  
 
the style of the final declaration, Amery held to this favourable judgement  
 
about its contents some fifteen years later in his draft memoirs.108 
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Amery’s Defence of the Revised Declaration 
 
Amery tried to persuade a number of Indian journalists of the merits of  
 
the proposals, and although his departmental advisor, Rajavendra Rao, had  
 
assured him of a positive response from moderate Congress politicians, these  
 
briefings were largely in vain.109 The declaration was finally published on 8  
 
August 1940 in the name of the Governor-General.110 Between the issue of  
 
India and the War and Amery’s defence of it in the House of Commons on 14  
 
August 1940, initial reaction was received from a number of quarters. The  
 
first hostile response was made by the Muslim Congress President, Abul  
 
Kalam Azad, who refused to meet Linlithgow on 10 August since he believed  
  
that the announcement provided no common ground for a discussion.111  
 
Gandhi’s immediate feelings were those of sadness, as he cabled the News  
 
Chronicle to say that the Governor-General’s proposals widened the gulf  
 
between Congress and Britain.112  Nehru was also quick to be dismissive as he  
 
concentrated on the references in the White Paper to dominion status before 
 
rejecting it out of hand in favour of complete independence.113 By contrast,  
 
the Muslim League registered no immediate opposition, and was prepared to  
 
wait before issuing any statement. 
      
     Amery’s speech in the debate in the House of Commons on 14 August  
 
1940 was eloquent, and perhaps rarely for Amery, was concise. Rather than  
 
make any kind of prediction as to the nature of any constitution that might be  
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produced after the war, he concentrated on the communal differences within  
 
India, and the country’s unsuitability for a system in which government was  
 
responsible to an elected legislature. Amery was given a respectful, and  
 
generally consensual reception by all sides of the House, although many  
 
members had already detected the unwillingness of Congress to accept  
 
Linlithgow’s constitutional proposals, or to participate in plans for the  
 
Executive Council and the new War Advisory Council.114 Amery believed that  
 
his speech had been well received in the USA and also outside Congress in  
 
India, a view reinforced by Sir Feroz Khan, Indian High Commissioner in  
 
London, who assured him of the approval of Muslims and the Hindu  
 
Mahasabha.115 
 
 
Churchill and his Lasting Distrust of Amery 
 
     Unfortunately, at this time Amery had also incurred the Prime Minister’s  
 
displeasure on another matter. Perhaps remembering the efficient wartime  
 
administration of Lloyd George, that he had witnessed at first hand in  
 
1917 and 1918, he wasted little time on taking office in trying to persuade  
 
Churchill to undertake a radical overhaul of the machinery of government.  
 
He also acted as the champion of young Conservative politicians such as  
 
Harold Macmillan and Robert Boothby, and wrote to Churchill on 18 June  
 
asking for them to be included in a new Milneresque system of  
 
government.116 Amery’s proposals for groups of departments, led by senior  
 
ministers were anathema to Churchill, who wanted only an administration in  
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which he made the major decisions, after reasonable, but not overlong  
 
discussion.117 Churchill’s irritation with Amery was finally made clear at a  
 
meeting on 18 June during which he asked him to confine his activities to his  
 
department.118   
 
     There is little doubt that after three months in office, Amery had managed  
 
to incur the displeasure of Churchill, and generate suspicion from Linlithgow.  
 
In terms of constitutional reform he had perhaps tried to move too quickly,  
 
although it could be argued that his initiatives did not attempt to reverse his  
 
predecessor’s policies. What is evident from the voluminous papers is that he  
 
was impetuous, and even naive, but there is little evidence that this episode  
 
showed him to be Machiavellian, as Louis has suggested.119 
 
 
Indian Armed Forces, Military Supply and the Need for an Indian 
Aircraft Industry 
 
Away from the issue of Indian constitutional reform, Amery had a much more  
 
productive relationship with Linlithgow. They cooperated particularly well on a  
 
number of matters related to the Indian war effort, with initiatives coming not  
 
only from Amery, but also the supposedly reactionary and ponderous Viceroy.  
 
During the first few days of Amery’s period in office, both men were obliged  
 
to react quickly to Churchill’s request for the transfer of eight battalions of  
 
regular troops from India to assist in the defence of Britain. Amery balanced  
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this transfer by securing the movement of twelve territorial battalions, under  
 
training to be sent, as soon as possible, to India.120  
 
     Amery was even more ambitious with his ideas for improving India’s  
 
industrial war effort. A meeting with Harold Macmillan, parliamentary under- 
 
secretary at the Ministry of Supply, and George Lloyd, Colonial Secretary,  
 
convinced him that there could at least be British cooperation in utilising  
 
India’s military supplies to the full.121 Indeed, his optimism led him to write to  
 
Linlithgow hoping that ‘India would soon be humming from end to end with  
 
productive activity to meet the needs of large numbers of newly enlisted  
 
troops’.122 Three main issues concerning India’s industrial efficiency occupied  
 
both Secretary of State and Viceroy during 1940, and the early months of  
 
1941; an attempt to establish an Indian aircraft industry, a technical mission  
 
to India to improve the manufacture of military goods, and an initiative to  
 
create a coordinated system for the distribution of supplies and ordinance  
 
throughout the Eastern and Southern parts of the British Empire. 
 
 
The Abortive Search for an Indian Aircraft Industry 
 
From the beginning of powered flight at the start of the twentieth century,  
 
Amery had been quick to grasp the military and strategic value of air  
 
power, whether in relatively local operational terms, or as part of a global  
 
network to protect the British Empire.123 Although war had not yet broken out  
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with Japan when Amery took office in May 1940, the need for aircraft  
 
production on the subcontinent had already become apparent. Without any  
 
factories in India the demand for aircraft had to be met by teams of Royal Air  
 
Force engineers, who repaired damaged aeroplanes that had just managed to  
 
fly to that country from the Middle East, normally via Afghanistan.124 
 
     Linlithgow had already raised the matter of an independent Indian aircraft  
 
industry while Zetland was still in office. He had written to the India Office on  
 
6 April 1940, suggesting that research be carried out into the feasibility of  
 
such a project, but almost two months later, having received no reply, wrote  
 
pessimistically to Amery.125 In fact Amery had already written to Linlithgow on  
 
20 May in a prematurely bullish tone, stating that he was ‘stirring up the Air  
 
Ministry’ to start the manufacture of aircraft in India.126  
 
     Amery first made an informal approach to Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of  
 
Aircraft Production, on 6 June 1940, but had a predictably disappointing  
 
response. Beaverbrook, almost certainly reflecting Churchill’s attitude to this  
 
matter, flatly rejected Amery’s request for British aeronautical experts to  
 
be sent to India, and while not objecting in principle to help from the USA,  
 
asked for a delay while fighting was still taking place in France.127 By the time  
 
Amery was in a position to submit proposals to the War Cabinet, he was only  
 
able to offer a modest scheme that provided for the transfer of aircraft  
 
production from a factory in Loiwing, China, to an enterprise in Mysore,  
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funded by a Bombay businessman, Walchand Hirachand.128  
 
     Although Arthur Greenwood, the Labour Minister without Portfolio had  
 
written a long memorandum in support of an Indian aircraft industry,  
 
Churchill pre-empted War Cabinet discussion of the matter by writing a  
 
trenchant letter to Amery stating that Britain’s air defences could not be  
 
weakened by the diversion of aircraft, spares and personnel to India.129  
 
There is no doubt that the failure to establish an aircraft industry in India  
 
was a great disappointment to Amery, who was far sighted in realising  
 
its strategic value, especially in the event of Japan attacking Burma. The fact  
 
that he devoted only three pages to this subject in his draft memoirs is  
 
perhaps the best evidence of this.130 
     
 
Sir Alexander Roger’s  Mission and the Eastern Supply Conference 
 
Amery first mentioned the need to locate new sources of military supplies  
 
within weeks of taking up office. In particular he cited the need to call on  
 
India, South Africa and Australia if India were to enter the war, and close the  
 
Eastern Mediterranean.131 The matter also became urgent as plans were  
 
being made for a rapid increase in the size of the Indian Army, with the  
 
consequent need for equipment and ordinance.132 Linlithgow responded with  
 
enthusiasm to Amery’s comments, moving quickly to a wider strategic  
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perspective whereby India would not only improve its own production of  
 
munitions, but also act as a clearing house for military equipment in India,  
 
and other parts of the British Empire in the Southern Hemisphere.133  
 
     The first real progress was made when Amery decided to reverse  
 
Linlithgow’s initial idea of sending a technical mission to Britain, and, instead,  
 
assemble a team to visit India.134 Amery needed a strong leader for what  
 
would inevitably be an exacting tour of India’s factories, and after obtaining  
 
Churchill’s approval for the whole project secured the release of the  
 
experienced Scottish businessman, Sir Alexander Roger.135 Linlithgow was  
 
surprised that Roger’s mission contained as many as twenty five members,  
 
whose specialisms covered the whole field of military engineering.  
         
    Although Roger eventually made a series of detailed reports on individual  
 
Indian industries, he strayed into the area of macroeconomics, hoping to find  
 
a willing listener in Churchill who during the war had great faith in the  
 
ability of businessmen to rejuvenate industrial production.136 Although  
 
contributing in large measure to the creation of the Eastern Supply  
 
Conference, he made the mistake of persisting with an abrasive, voluble style  
 
of negotiation that irritated Linlithgow, who most certainly was not in thrall to  
 
the potential of businessmen in the public service.137  
 
    Throughout the summer and autumn of 1940 Linlithgow worked  
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assiduously, inviting technical, military and political delegates to Delhi to  
 
discuss the use that could be made of coordinating the supply of vital war  
 
materials. Amery offered little more than a supporting role, but as a  
 
confirmed strategist himself appreciated Linlithgow’s argument that the  
 
looming threat from Japan made a necessity of intra-Imperial coordination.138  
 
     Amery was relieved when the Eastern Supply Conference recommended  
 
the establishment of an Eastern Group Supply Council staffed by delegates  
 
from India, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand.139 He was especially  
 
pleased that instead of the disruptive Sir Alexander Roger, he was able to  
 
announce that the Council would be chaired by Sir Archibald Carter, formerly  
 
of the India Office, but in January 1941, Permanent Under-Secretary at the  
 
Admiralty.140 The Council operated successfully for two years, procuring  
 
goods to the value of £174 million, and only lessened in influence when  
 
Australia and the USA formed a separate supply council, as the war in the  
 
Pacific developed.141 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 FROM SATYAGRAHA TO THE ATLANTIC CHARTER 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Barnes and Nicolson, the editors of the second volume of Amery’s diaries,  
 
have stated that the year to October 1941 saw little movement in India’s internal  
 
political situation.1 While it is true that during this period there was very little  
 
discernible progress towards any form of constitutional settlement, Amery  
 
remained active, and relatively optimistic in putting forward new initiatives, most  
 
of which still encountered resistance from Linlithgow and Churchill. There were  
 
also differences between Viceroy and Secretary of State over the measures  
 
needed to counter the civil disobedience campaign by Congress that followed the  
 
rejection of the August offer.  
 
    However despite the constitutional stalemate, the strategic relevance of India  
 
to the conduct of the war became far more important as the increasing threat  
 
from Japan grew, while the military situation in the Middle East and Balkans  
 
remained no less precarious.  
 
 
Measures to Combat Civil Disobedience and Sedition 
 
In addition to their earlier misunderstandings over Indian constitutional change,  
 
Amery and Linlithgow were also at odds over the nature and use of legislation to  
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combat sedition and civil disorder. Two separate sets of counter-insurgency  
 
provisions had already been made available when Amery became Secretary of  
 
State. The more draconian legislation was drafted in early 1937 by  
 
Linlithgow, his legal staff in Delhi, and the provincial governors, at a time when it  
 
seemed likely that Congress would refuse to take up local office, except on terms  
 
unacceptable to Britain. Known as the Revolutionary Movements Ordinance these  
 
widely drawn measures were guided through the Cabinet by Zetland in 1937, but  
 
following the outbreak of war were given an unashamedly political character.2  
 
From the outset, the Cabinet was too cautious to delegate these powers  
 
unconditionally to Linlithgow, and insisted that it should be consulted again,  
 
before any implementation.3 
 
     The much milder Defence of India rules were introduced by Linlithgow,  
 
immediately following the declaration of war in September 1939, and  
 
corresponded closely, in form and substance, to the provisions of the English  
 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act. By comparison with the Revolutionary  
 
Movements Ordinance, these rules were principally designed to combat actions  
 
by individuals and small groups participating in civil disobedience, deemed to be  
 
injurious to the Indian war effort.4  
 
     During his first few weeks of his time at the India Office, Amery obtained  
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approval from the War Cabinet for the Viceroy to employ the rules of the  
 
Revolutionary Movements Ordinance, after consulting only the Secretary of  
 
State.5 However, a cautious Amery hoped that the Defence of India rules would  
 
be sufficient to deal with individuals and small groups engaged in peaceful civil  
 
disobedience.6  Linlithgow was only partly reassured by Amery’s telegram,  
 
although he accepted that if the protests amounted only to peaceful satyagraha,  
 
the use of the Revolutionary Movements Ordinance would be inappropriate.  
 
     Amery was even more circumspect during September 1940, when he  
 
proposed to refrain from authorising the use of the Revolutionary  
 
Movements Ordinance until there was irrefutable evidence of impending  
 
corporate sedition by Congress. He needed to remain calm in making this   
 
recommendation as he had been shown recent intercepts of Congress telegrams  
 
suggesting that there would soon be a call for all out resistance to the Raj.7 With  
 
members such as Clement Attlee and Sir John Anderson taking very different  
 
views on the need to employ the tougher legislation, Amery was fortunate that  
 
Churchill was prepared, albeit grudgingly, to support him.8 
 
     By November 1940, Linlithgow was still seeking the sole discretion to employ  
 
the Revolutionary Movements Ordinance, in order to proclaim Congress without  
 
the need to identify specific acts of sedition.9 On 21 November 1940, Amery  
 
                                        
5 War Cabinet conclusions, 1 June 1940, CAB 65/7/46.  
6 Amery to Linlithgow, 2 June 1940, AMEL 1/6/18. 
7 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 14 September 1940, CAB 67/8/37. 
8 War Cabinet conclusions, 16 September 1940, CAB 65/9/12. 
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showed Linlithgow’s latest description of a deteriorating security situation to the  
 
War Cabinet, and managed to convince his colleagues, including Churchill, that  
 
unless Gandhi could be shown to be considering imminent serious disorder, the  
 
Viceroy should not be given sole responsibility for applying the Revolutionary  
 
Movements Ordinance.10 Linlithgow did not provide the details requested by the  
 
War Cabinet, although his highly legalistic, if also bellicose, telegram to Amery on  
 
1 December 1940 warned of larger crowds at satyagraha meetings, and also  
 
repeated the administrative advantages of proclaiming Congress as a whole.11  
 
     Once again Amery asked the War Cabinet to be cautious, warning in  
 
particular of the political disadvantages of the excessive use of force.12 Following  
 
the War Cabinet meeting on 10 December, he was authorised to tell Linlithgow  
 
that, notwithstanding any procedural problems, the machinery should only be  
 
used to proclaim errant Congress committees, rather than the entire  
 
organisation.13  
 
 
Congress Reaction to the August Offer 
 
After Amery’s statement to the House of Commons on 14 August 1940, the  
 
Indian reaction to the proposals became clearer. At a meeting in Wardha from 18  
 
to 22 August 1940, the Congress Working Committee recorded their formal  
 
rejection of the Viceroy’s proposals, stating that they demonstrated the British  
 
                                        
10 War Cabinet conclusions, 21 November 1940, CAB 65/10/13. 
11 Amery to Linlithgow, 1 December 1940, MSS.  EUR. F. 125/19. 
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Government’s ‘determination to hold India by the sword’.14 At an emergency  
 
session of the All India Congress Committee on 15 September 1940, earlier  
 
disagreements within the party over its attitude to the war, had been set aside.  
 
Such different figures as Nehru and Rajagopalachari, who had previously  
 
recommended cooperation with the British, now realised that another approach  
 
was required.15 Accordingly, Azad asked Ghandi to resume his leadership of  
 
Congress with the aim of launching a campaign of civil disobedience.  
 
     The resolution passed at this session expressed admiration for Britain’s  
 
courage in the face of danger, and promised not to cause embarrassment, 
 
provided that Congress was ‘free to pursue its policies’.16 Gandhi clarified this  
 
statement by claiming for Congress the right to state freely what it felt about  
 
the war. In particular he wanted ‘the liberty to go through the streets of  
 
Bombay, proclaiming that he wanted to have nothing to do with the war as he  
 
did not believe in it’. If Britain did not make this concession, Congress would  
 
commence satyagraha.17 
 
     However, before embarking on the campaign of civil disobedience, Gandhi  
 
met Linlithgow on 27 and 30 September in an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate  
 
an arrangement allowing mutually acceptable freedom of speech. Linlithgow  
 
explained the rules for dealing with conscientious objectors in Britain,  
 
and pointed out, that while general demonstrations of pacifism were tolerated, it  
                                        
14 Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p. 94. 
15 Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929 – 1942, p. 151. 
16 Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India, p. 247. 
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would be forbidden to attempt to persuade industrial workers or soldiers to  
 
abandon the war effort. Gandhi could not accept this policy, and wanted to  
 
reserve the right of Congress to ask Indians to desist from helping the war  
 
effort.18  
 
 
The Satyagraha Campaign 
 
The resulting campaign of civil disobedience was, at the request of Gandhi,  
 
extremely cautious, almost certainly because he feared the Revolutionary  
 
Movements Ordinance, and the potential destruction of Congress.19  On 13  
 
October 1940, the Congress Working Committee accepted Gandhi’s plan to  
 
launch an incremental programme based on individual satyagraha.20 Since  
 
Gandhi chose individuals to make speeches against the war effort, the campaign  
 
could not be proved to be revolutionary, and therefore receive the full weight  
 
of the stronger legislation.21 The first person to be chosen, Vinobha Bhave, a  
 
dedicated follower of Gandhi, was arrested on 17 October, after making anti-war  
 
speeches, and sentenced to three months imprisonment.22 The second phase,  
 
involving the arrest and conviction of senior Congress leaders such as Azad and  
 
Rajagopalachari began on 17 November 1940 and ended on 4 January 1941, by  
 
which date nearly six hundred satyagrahas had been convicted, although not all  
 
were imprisoned. From 5 January 1941, local Congress committees prepared lists  
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of satyagrahas to speak out against the war. Although many Hindu provinces  
 
responded, and the total arrests by April 1941 grew to  
 
several thousands, there were few arrests in Muslim provinces such as Bengal.23  
 
The final category of satyagrahas chosen by Gandhi were the rank and file of  
 
Congress, the ‘four-anna members’, but although their arrests swelled the total  
 
to twenty thousand, the majority were fined, rather than imprisoned.24  
 
Throughout the summer of 1941, the campaign lost impetus, by which time most  
 
satyagrahas had been released.  
 
 
The Arrest and Conviction of Nehru 
 
One important arrest and conviction of a famous Congress politician did not fall  
 
strictly into the category of satyagraha. On 30 October 1940, Nehru was arrested  
 
in the United Provinces before he could make an anti-war protest, although he  
 
had already made speeches critical of Britain. Fearing that he would go further  
 
than Gandhi, the authorities chose to charge him, still under the Defence of India  
 
rules, but with the more serious charges of sedition and fomenting agrarian  
 
discontent. When he was found guilty, a local magistrate gave him an openly  
 
deterrent sentence of four years imprisonment.25 The War Cabinet had wanted  
 
the case to be heard in open court with a punitive sentence, rather than  
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house arrest, or detention without trial.26 Despite the view in Delhi and London  
 
that Nehru’s activities were damaging to the war effort, there is little doubt that  
 
there was widespread dismay over the severity of the sentence.27  
 
    Labour MPs and supporters also became increasingly anxious that Nehru had  
 
been unjustly treated. In the House of Commons on 7 November 1940, Amery  
 
faced especially firm questioning from Emmanuel Shinwell, who tried without  
 
success, to combine the issues of Nehru’s sentence with a renewed initiative on  
 
constitutional reform.28 Amery also concealed his real feelings over the sentence,  
 
when he wrote that Nehru was enjoying better conditions in confinement than  
 
prisoners in Germany or Russia.29 
 
 
Muslim Reaction to the August Offer 
 
Although the Muslim League had finally turned down the August Offer, their  
 
process of rejection was complicated, with Jinnah playing a typically scheming  
 
part. He met Linlithgow on 11 and 13 August, before Amery made his statement  
 
in the House of Commons, and without making any commitments, asked for  
 
clarification on a few points.30 Although the Muslim League Working Committee  
 
was encouraged by Amery’s promise not to promote any system of government  
 
that denied representation to significant groups in India, Jinnah and his senior  
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colleagues read too much into this section of the August Offer. In particular,  
 
they believed that it gave them both a veto over unwelcome constitutional  
 
developments and tacit approval for the Pakistan scheme.31 
 
     On 24 September, Jinnah began a sequence of interviews and  
 
correspondence with Linlithgow in an attempt to establish control by the Muslim  
 
League over the composition of the proposed expanded Executive Council. In  
 
particular, Jinnah believed that the Muslim League should decide, in the event of  
 
Congress offering to cooperate, whether its representatives should be permitted  
 
to join the Executive. He also wanted the Viceroy to agree that if the defence  
 
portfolio was not awarded to a Muslim, it should not be allocated to any other  
 
Indian.32 When Linlithgow refused to give any assurances, the Working  
 
Committee decided on 28 September that, despite their earlier declaration of  
 
support for the war effort, they were now unable to accept the August Offer.33 
 
     Jinnah was shrewd enough to realise that he was in a favourable position  
 
vis-à-vis the Raj. If he could persuade Britain to concede parity between  
 
Congress and the Muslim League, he believed that this would signify acceptance  
 
of the Muslim claim to be a separate nation. Furthermore, if Britain agreed that  
 
Muslims represented a distinct nation, it would be de facto support of the  
 
concept of Pakistan.34  
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     Jinnah’s relationship with other Muslims was less straightforward. In  
 
September 1940 it was imperative that he should maintain his personal profile in  
 
order to keep Muslim League control over the Muslim provinces, especially the  
 
Punjab and Bengal, where loyalty to the war effort remained strong, and  
 
antipathy to the August offer was less vehement. In the Punjab the prime  
 
minister, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, enjoyed such personal popularity that it was   
 
difficult for Jinnah to overturn his commitment to Indian unity, and by  
 
consequence his opposition to the idea of Pakistan.35 Fazlal Huq enjoyed a less  
 
secure position as Prime Minister of Bengal, but remained constant in supporting  
 
the war effort, and that in the event of a conflict he would retain the support of  
 
his local administration.36  
 
 
Differences in British Enthusiasm for the Viceroy’s Council and the War 
Advisory Council 
 
There were important, if subtle differences between Amery and Linlithgow in  
 
their approaches to persuading Congress and the Muslim League to participate in  
 
the reforms outlined in the August offer. Until well into 1941, Amery was to  
 
prove more persistently optimistic than Linlithgow in his desire to implement the  
 
proposed reforms, although he remained as critical as Linlithgow of the  
 
behaviour of Congress and the Muslim League. As early as 14 August 1940,  
 
when Azad had already publicly repudiated the Viceroy’s offer, Amery urged a  
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balanced approach to dealing with Congress. He did not want Britain to be seen  
 
to be ‘running after’ Gandhi but also did not favour the door being closed,  
 
provided that Congress did not close it themselves by actively creating mischief. 
 
     Whatever their different levels of belief in the outcome of the detailed  
 
reforms, both Linlithgow and Amery quickly developed a shared and marked  
 
distrust of Jinnah. While Linlithgow was in the course of a series of meetings  
 
with Jinnah, Amery expressed his thoughts in a long and passionate letter. After  
 
dismissing Jinnah’s intention of establishing more control over the Muslim  
 
League, he gave an apocryphal prediction of the consequences if India were to  
 
be partitioned, and drew parallels with the division of Ireland into Eire and  
 
Ulster. Employing his favoured geopolitical reasoning, he believed that the  
 
absence of natural internal boundaries would lead to a divided subcontinent,  
 
vulnerable to a Prussian brand of militarism.37 
 
     Linlithgow was more concerned with Jinnah’s cunning and duplicity. He  
 
believed that during their meetings, he had given Jinnah all the information that  
 
he was in a position to supply, and that further requests were being made just to  
 
be difficult. Despite Jinnah saying that most Muslims hated the British, Linlithgow  
 
still wanted Muslim League representatives on the Executive Council.38 
 
     Linlithgow was already losing faith in Jinnah when he wrote by telegram to  
 
Amery on 22 September 1940, setting out three options if the reforms became  
 
impossible. The three choices which subsequently formed the bases of War  
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Cabinet memoranda by Amery can be summarised, 
 
(1) To go ahead with the expansion of the Executive by including Mahsabha, 
 
Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, and a couple of Muslims, who were not in the  
 
League. 
 
(2) To go ahead as above, but with no Muslims at all. 
 
(3) To abandon, or postpone the idea of expansion. 
 
Although Linlithgow attempted to put a fair case for all options, he feared that  
 
all plans for expansion might need to be put into abeyance.39 Amery’s early reply  
 
showed no such reserve as he pressed for the first option which, he felt, at least  
 
showed Britain’s positive intent to promote constitutional change.40 
 
 
Amery’s feelings about Jinnah 
 
Before Amery could send Linlithgow’s three options to the War Cabinet, he  
 
was informed, on 28 September 1940, that the Muslim League had decided not  
 
to participate in the reforms. Amery once again chose the longer format of a  
 
letter to express his feelings, stating that ‘the miserable Jinnah has run out, as  
 
we thought he would’, and that he had only prolonged his negotiations with  
 
Linlithgow in order to establish control over the Muslim provincial premiers,  
 
and in the rare outcome of an expanded Viceroy’s Executive, to be ‘the shadow  
 
behind the throne.’ Amery once again urged Linlithgow to go ahead, although he  
 
had been asked by Churchill, first to canvass the views of Anderson, Halifax and  
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Simon, who all had experience of India.41 All three gentlemen believed that  
 
Linlithgow should proceed immediately with his first option.42 Indeed Anderson, a  
 
former Governor of Bengal, was particularly bullish in the need to face down  
 
Jinnah, whom he believed did not truly reflect Muslim feeling about the war  
 
effort.43  
 
     Before Amery took the matter of the expanded Executive Council and a 
 
new War Advisory Council to his Cabinet colleagues, he took stock. Although still  
 
very much in favour of expanding the Executive, he feared that Churchill would  
 
oppose the scheme, and that much would depend on Linlithgow’s attitude. With  
 
typical immodesty, he claimed that if he had been on the spot, and with a free  
 
hand to negotiate, matters would have already been decided.44 However, he  
 
showed far less optimism in sending a sombre, realistic, but surprisingly even- 
 
handed analysis to Smuts whom he trusted in delicate matters of imperial  
 
management.45 
 
     Amery finally sent his memorandum to the War Cabinet on 3 October,  
 
enclosing his correspondence with Linlithgow and putting a robust and floridly  
 
worded case for making the reforms with or without the support of either  
 
Congress, or the Muslim League.46  He soon received a detailed telegram from  
 
Linlithgow who having seen the Muslim League resolution of 28 September, and  
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more importantly, evidence that Jinnah now had control over Muslim elements,  
 
recommended that the whole business of the Executive Council and the  
 
proposed War Advisory Council should be put into cold storage.  
 
    Although Amery had written to Linlithgow on 5 October begging him to  
 
hold his nerve, this was the last letter that he wrote in such terms.47 He  
 
reluctantly accepted Linlithgow’s recommendation of 8 October 1940, and on 11  
 
October 1940 sent the Viceroy’s telegram to the War Cabinet accompanied by his  
 
own memorandum. Amery deplored the need to capitulate to the unreasonable  
 
behaviour of Congress and the Muslim League, but felt that he reluctantly had to  
 
agree with Linlithgow’s proposal.48  
 
 
The Restatement of the August Offer in November 1940 and Amery’s 
Attempts to Keep Political Reform Alive 
 
Amery and Linlithgow regarded the postponement of the constitutional reforms  
 
differently. Linlithgow would have been quite happy just to proceed with India’s  
 
war effort, especially bearing in mind the relative successes of the Roger  
 
Mission and the Eastern Group Supply Council. Amery’s frustration with the  
 
deadlock was illustrated by his firm stance towards the Viceroy over the matter  
 
of the restatement of the August offer in November 1940. After the War Cabinet  
 
had conceded that the expansion of the Executive Council and the establishment  
 
of the War Advisory Council had to be postponed, both Amery and Linlithgow  
 
agreed that a fresh pronouncement  should be made regarding the Indian  
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response to the August offer.  
 
     Amery was ruthless in rejecting Linlithgow’s attempt at drafting a new  
 
statement, chiefly on the grounds that it failed to distinguish between the  
 
‘immediate proposals and the longer term policy embodied in the declaration of 8  
 
August’. Amery had more than British public opinion in mind when he edited  
 
Linlithgow’s draft, being particularly concerned that Americans should be made  
 
aware of Britain’s even handedness towards Indian constitutional reform.49  
 
     Amery also sent a telegram to Linlithgow explaining why he was not prepared  
 
to agree to the Viceroy’s request for a detailed account to be published of the  
 
reasons why each of the parties in India had chosen to reject the August offer.  
 
Amery had no objection to stating why Congress had refused to cooperate, but  
 
felt strongly against any attempt to explain the rejection by the Muslim  
 
League.50 On 15 November 1940, the War Cabinet approved Amery’s new  
 
statement, and accepted his rationale for the amendments to Linlithgow’s draft.  
 
It is significant that Churchill who was lukewarm about the need for a fresh  
 
declaration, was absent from this meeting that was chaired by Attlee.51 On  
 
20 November 1940, the statement was presented to the Indian Central  
 
Legislature by the Viceroy, and while regretting the refusal of Congress and the  
 
Muslim League to respond to the two constitutional proposals, he laid great  
 
stress on the worldwide expressions of approval that had been made about the  
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fairness of the British proposals.52  
 
     Amery was more forthcoming about the reasons for the failure of the double  
 
reforms, when he spoke on 20 November 1940 in a long debate in the House of  
 
Commons about India, Burma, and the overall colonial war effort. A number of  
 
speakers representing a wide range of political opinion pressed him to speak in  
 
some detail on the constitutional deadlock, and he duly replied at length. 
 
Although inside the India Office he may have continued to look for more discrete  
 
ways to make political progress, his winding up speech conceded that while the  
 
door had not been closed to Congress and the Muslim League, it was completely  
 
impractical to hand over the entire machinery of government, as some members  
 
had suggested. While he was prepared to countenance a majority of Indians on  
 
the Executive Council, he insisted that this body should be responsible to the  
 
Viceroy, and not to the legislature, an outcome that would only have favoured  
 
Congress.53 
 
     Amery’s draft memoirs record that despite the unfavourable reporting of his  
 
speeches in radical Indian newspapers, he continued to make a series of appeals  
 
in a doomed attempt to persuade Indians to bury their differences in the  
 
interests of Indian unity.54 The Muslim League was particularly incensed by an  
 
address that Amery made to a Foyles Luncheon Club on 12 December 1940 in  
 
which he, once again, linked the realities of geopolitics and the principles  
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of Magna Carta in an appeal to the patriotism of all Indians to put unity before  
 
communal interests; a thinly disguised attack on the concept of Pakistan.55 
 
 
Amery’s Search at All Souls College for New Thinking on Constitutional 
Reform 
 
Even before the proposed reform had been deferred, Amery was considering  
 
new ways of making progress on constitutional reform. As early as 5 August  
 
1940 he had written to Lionel Curtis evoking the spirit of Milner’s Kindergarten,  
 
following the South African War. It was typical of Amery’s committee centred  
 
approach to promoting change that he recommended ‘a small band of  
 
pioneers………bringing people together in study groups’.56  Amery also had  
 
encouragement from an unlikely source when Lord Reith, the severe, and  
 
conservative Chairman of the BBC, urged him to ‘rekindle the spirit of the  
 
Round Table’.57 To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the 1935  
 
Government of India Act, the post of Reforms Commissioner had been created  
 
as part of the Viceroy’s staff. When Hawthorne Lewis, left the post in late  
 
1940, Amery gave serious thought to the sort of candidate he wanted as a  
 
replacement. His frequent visits to All Souls brought him into contact with a  
 
young economics fellow and Round Table member, Henry (Harry) Hodson, who  
 
already had considerable experience of imperial affairs, and since the start of the  
 
war had been serving as a temporary civil servant at the Ministry of  
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Information.58 
 
     Linlithgow’s response to Amery’s promotion of Hodson was cautious at best.  
 
On 16 December he wrote to Amery stating that although the Indian Chief  
 
Justice, Sir Maurice Gwyer, had supported Hodson’s candidature, he believed  
 
that the post required greater practical legal experience. He also gave  
 
considerable weight to the doubts expressed by Sir Jeremy Raisman, a  
 
senior member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, who advocated the  
 
termination of the office of Reforms Commissioner on the grounds of economy.59  
 
Amery’s urgings for Linlithgow to accept Hodson became increasingly forceful  
 
throughout the early months of 1941. On 6 February he told Linlithgow that  
 
India was confronted with one of the greatest constitutional problems of all  
 
time, and needed some fresh ideas, explained with clarity, if it was going to be  
 
saved for the British Empire.60 Soon after, Amery also dismissed Raisman’s  
 
objections, and said bluntly that the kind of creative thinking required for a  
 
Reforms Commissioner could not come from a career ICS official.61 Linlithgow  
 
took some time to agree to Hodson’s appointment, revealing a prickliness about  
 
the entire matter that was apparent from his strict condition that Hodson would  
 
only be allowed to make public statements, after obtaining approval.62 
 
     Although Amery was ultimately disappointed that he could not establish a  
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direct line of communication to Hodson, he had considerable early optimism  
 
for the work that he would be able to do.63 He was still hopeful some months  
 
later, when he thought that Hodson’s memoranda on political reform were  
 
‘fulfilling the objects for which he had been sent out’, especially the stimulation  
 
of creative thought in the Viceroy’s office.64 Although Hodson remained in India  
 
for the Cripps mission, he soon resigned his post and was back in England before  
 
the winter of 1942/43. 
 
     The detailed reasons for the failure of the appointment are not given in  
 
Amery’s draft memoirs, but a coded diary entry for November 1942 referred to a  
 
meeting at the India Office with Hodson, who, without bitterness, confirmed that  
 
he had not been able to establish a proper rapport with Linlithgow.65 Robert  
 
Wade-Gery, the author of Hodson’s entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National  
 
Biography, was much more explicit, laying the blame squarely on Linlithgow and  
 
his staff, especially the Viceroy’s private secretary, Gilbert Laithwaite, who had  
 
little time for outsiders.66 Presumably, as evidence that his opinion only related to  
 
Hodson, Linlithgow indicated that he wanted to retain the post of Reforms  
 
Commissioner, and award it to V. P. Menon, a long time insider in the Delhi  
 
administration.67  
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     Amery’s other nominee to promote new ideas on constitutional change in  
 
India was Reginald Coupland, who was much older than Hodson, although also  
 
a committed Round Tabler. For many years he had successfully combined the  
 
prestigious post of Beit Professor of Colonial History at Oxford University with the  
 
authorship of books on imperial history, and service on a number of royal  
 
commissions.68 Indeed, Amery was particularly impressed by Coupland’s drafting  
 
work in 1937 on the report of the Royal Commission on Palestine, an imperial  
 
problem that the Secretary of State believed had similarities with the issues in  
 
wartime India.69 
 
     Amery had intended to ask Coupland to succeed Lewis as Reforms  
 
Commissioner, but he was unwilling to be in India for four years and lose his Beit  
 
Professorship. Instead he was prepared to write a three part account of India’s  
 
constitutional problems, ‘as an informal royal commission of one’.70 He obtained 
 
financial support of £800 for his project from Nuffield College, Oxford, although  
 
the authorities there stipulated that the title of the study should omit all  
 
reference to ‘constitutional deadlock in India’.71    
 
    There is little record of Linlithgow’s initial reaction to Coupland’s visit. 
 
However, when Amery wrote that ‘he might be putting too many cooks into the  
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Indian broth’, he must have feared that Coupland’s visit might attract the same  
 
spiteful response already expressed by the Viceroy about Hodson.72 Coupland  
 
arrived in Delhi in early December 1942, and stayed at the official residence of  
 
the Chief Justice of India, Sir Maurice Gwyer, before touring the country to meet  
 
representatives of all political interests.73  
 
     Coupland surrendered a little of his academic independence when he was  
 
asked by the India Office to act as an adviser during the Cripps Mission in March  
 
and April 1942. At this point, he had already incurred Linlithgow’s displeasure  
 
when he suggested that dominion status could not be awarded to British India,  
 
without the princely states.74 When Coupland had just returned to England with  
 
Cripps following the failure of the negotiations, Linlithgow was more explicit in  
 
his criticism. He explained to Amery that Coupland’s approach had not been  
 
sufficiently professional, especially as he believed that he had underestimated  
 
the difficulties in India.75 
      
     Although Coupland had been asked to produce an independent report,  
 
there is considerable evidence that Amery had attempted to influence the choice  
 
of constitutional matters for him to consider. In May 1941 Amery suggested to  
 
Coupland that he should take the Swiss system as a template for constitutional  
 
reform, especially as he saw similarities with India as both countries apparently   
 
had to contend with the difficulties of having three languages and two different 
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religions.76 Later, Amery asked him to turn his attention to the princes, and the  
 
possibility of decentralisation as a formula for change.77 Coupland, on his arrival  
 
in India was far from convinced, asserting that the unitary and centralised  
 
structure of the Indian National Congress was a parallel version of the  
 
Government of India, thereby reversing the effect of the Montagu/Chelmsford  
 
reforms, increasing tension between Hindus and Muslims, and making change  
 
based on decentralisation more difficult.78 
 
     When Coupland eventually published his recommendations as Part III of his  
 
Report in 1943, they were radical, and complicated.79 The proposals envisaged a  
 
division of India into four regions, three of which corresponded to the major river  
 
basins, and the fourth being peninsular India. There was also a communal  
 
balance, that commended it to Amery. Bearing in mind his attachment to the  
 
Swiss constitution, he approved Coupland’s plan for a centre that was not  
 
responsible to the legislature, and confined its responsibilities to foreign affairs,  
 
defence and fiscal matters. Unfortunately it proved to be a brave initiative that  
 
failed to gain support from opposing factions in the country.80 
 
 
Amery’s Request for Reform Initiatives within the India Office 
 
Soon after the decision had been made to postpone the expansion of the  
 
Viceroy’s Executive Council, Amery asked his three London based Indian advisers  
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to produce their own plans for constitutional reform.81 Representing three  
 
different perspectives were, Sir Hassan Suhrawardy, a Bengal Muslim, Sir Samuel  
 
Ranganadhan, a Madras Christian, and Dr Ragahavendra Rao, a Hindu from the  
 
Central Province. By February 1941, two separate schemes had been drafted,  
 
reflecting the beliefs of their authors. Rao and Ranganadhan produced a report,  
 
more or less on liberal Hindu lines, while Suhrawardy chose a version of Jinnah’s  
 
Pakistan project that gave immediate dominion status to the Muslim provinces.82 
 
     Amery returned the drafts and insisted that a single set of proposals had to  
 
be agreed between the advisers. Although the authorship of the final version was  
 
scarcely unanimous, there was an innovative attempt to combine the best of the  
 
British and American constitutions. The result was a complicated set of  
 
institutions created partly by direct elections, partly by nomination, but in  
 
Amery’s view providing insufficient protection for Muslims and the princely  
 
states. At no stage did the proposals find favour with Linlithgow.83  
 
 
Sapru’s Proposals and the British Reaction 
 
In the spring of 1941 an abortive initiative to promote constitutional reform was  
 
led by the veteran Indian Liberal politician and lawyer, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. It  
 
was to prove a short, but difficult episode for Amery, who ultimately emerged  
 
with little credit, in Britain, or in India. Sapru, aged sixty five in March 1941, was  
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a Kasmiri Pandit from Allahabad, and had been a liberal Congressman for the  
 
first twenty five years of his adult life. In 1918, after breaking away from the  
 
Gandhian element of Congress he formed the National Liberal Federation in  
 
order to help the implementation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. His  
 
service of four years as a legal member of the Viceroy’s Executive, established  
 
his credentials as a nationalist, who favoured incremental change rather than  
 
civil disobedience. Although angered by the composition of the Simon  
 
Commission, he later attended the Round Table conferences and the Joint  
 
Select Committee, that preceded the 1935 Government of India Act; actions that  
 
led to his ostracism by Congress.84 
 
     In March 1941 he chaired a non-party conference in Bombay that was  
 
attended by less than forty delegates, mainly Hindu Liberals, but also a few  
 
minor Muslims, Sikhs, and members of the Mahasabha.85 The resolutions passed  
 
at this conference invited Britain to make a promise of dominion status within a  
 
fixed interval after the end of the war, and in the interim, to transfer all central  
 
government portfolios to non-official Indians.  
 
     Sapru envisaged that this newly reformed central executive would be  
 
responsible to the Crown, instead of the existing central legislature that he did  
 
not regard as an adequately representative body.86 This, of course, would have  
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meant that the defence and finance departments would be, for the first time,  
 
under Indian control. In an attempt to placate British opinion, the position of  
 
the Commander-in-Chief, India would not be prejudiced, and the members of the  
 
new executive would be chosen by the Viceroy.87 
 
     Amery’s dismissive response to the appointment of an Indian Defence  
 
Minister was a serious misreading of moderate opinion, especially as he later  
 
made a damning analysis of the remainder of Sapru’s proposals.88 While he  
 
accepted that some expansion of the Executive Council, and the establishment of  
 
a War Advisory Council were within the parameters of the August 1940  
 
declaration, he did not feel that ‘Sapru or any other well-meaning body’ had the  
 
political weight to make their reforms work.89 A couple of weeks later he had  
 
second thoughts, and suggested to Linlithgow that if Jinnah and the Muslim  
 
League were to come in, Congress could be bypassed in order to satisfy Sapru’s  
 
demand for an-Indian Executive Council.90  
   
     Amery’s optimism was sharply interrupted by an angry intervention from  
 
Churchill, who sent him a curtly worded minute on 8 April, deploring the attempt  
 
to enlarge the Executive and possibly offer the Defence and Finance portfolios to  
 
Indians.91 Amery’s diary for the same day showed his annoyance at Churchill’s  
 
‘petulant protest’, and made the almost certainly correct judgement that the  
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Prime Minister had never believed in the offer made in August 1940. He was also  
 
prophetic in telling Churchill that Sapru’s resolutions had stirred up matters to  
 
the extent that he would find it difficult to defend the policies of his department,  
 
in India, or in the House of Commons.92  
 
     Sapru discussed his plan with a sceptical Linlithgow at a lengthy meeting in  
 
Delhi on 7 April, and attempted to show his fairness by indicating that there  
 
should be no communal or Anglo-Indian difficulties as regards membership of  
 
an enlarged Executive Council.93 Linlithgow pressed him vigorously as to  
 
whether, once chosen by the Viceroy, a member of the new Executive Council  
 
could be removed. Sapru’s disingenuous response that this would not be  
 
necessary, as all appointees would be reasonable men, contributed to  
 
Linlithgow’s outright rejection of the whole scheme as being unworkable.94 
      
     Churchill gratefully endorsed Linlithgow’s abrupt dismissal of Sapru’s ideas,  
 
and left Amery in an exposed position by warning him not to have any dealings  
 
with the Indian Liberals.95 Amery’s plight was evidenced from the variety of  
 
opinions expressed in his correspondence with colleagues who had previous  
 
responsibilities in connection with India. On 9 April, Amery wrote to his  
 
old confidant, Lord Halifax, ostensibly to discuss Sir Firoz Khan Noon, India’s first  
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High Commissioner in Washington, but in reality to express his despair at  
 
wishing to respond to Sapru’s initiative, but being frustrated by Churchill and  
 
Linlithgow.96 Samuel Hoare, writing from the British Embassy in Madrid passed  
 
a damning judgement on Sapru and his colleagues despite praising their  
 
intellectual qualities. Linking the Indian Liberals with their English counterparts  
 
he deplored the lack of countrywide backing that they needed in order to  
 
become a credible political force.97  
    
     On 22 April, Amery addressed the House of Commons emphasising that  
 
Sapru wanted his proposals to lead to an exclusively Indian Executive Council  
 
that could be treated as a dominion, responsible to the Crown. In rejecting  
 
Sapru’s recommendations he chose not to respond in detail to every point, but  
 
concentrated on the communal difficulties that would arise if the scheme were to  
 
be implemented. Despite giving qualified praise to Sapru, his rather magisterial  
 
delivery seemed very patronising.98 Furthermore, members on all sides of the  
 
House of Commons were disappointed that he had seemed to settle too readily  
 
for the status quo, and overstate the obstacles to progress.99  
 
     While British newspapers shared their politicians’ disappointment, the most  
 
predictable criticism came from Gandhi who wrote that Amery had insulted  
 
Indian intelligence by stressing divisions in his country, for which Britain had  
 
been responsible, and also by wanting to remain, in order to maintain its  
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imperial position.100  
 
     Amery also emerged with very little credit from Sapru, whose letters to his  
 
colleagues contained comments that varied from the dry and humorous to those 
 
of outrage and disappointment. Writing to Shiva Rao on 2 May 1941, he said that  
 
he could ‘expect nothing with Amery at the helm’.101 Once the significance of  
 
Amery’s parliamentary statement became known, Sapru accused Amery of being  
 
‘unable to distinguish between friend and foe’ and throwing Hindus ‘on the  
 
tender mercies of Mr Jinnah’.102 Almost certainly Amery had been forced to  
 
defend a policy in which he did not believe, but he wryly recognised that his  
 
attitude in the House had won him few friends.103  
 
 
Linlithgow’s Eventual Expansion of his Executive Council and the 
Establishment of the National Defence Council 
 
Surprisingly, the deadlock following the British rejection of Sapru’s proposals  
 
lasted less than a few weeks. It might be supposed that the impetus for a fresh  
 
initiative came from Amery, especially after he had discussed Indian reform in  
 
some detail with the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cosmo Lang.104 However, the  
 
impetus to expand the Viceroy’s Executive, and establish the War Advisory  
 
Council, came from Linlithgow. He was surprisingly attracted to an alternative to  
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the Sapru proposals put forward by two of his Executive Council, Zafrullah Khan  
 
and Ramaswami Mudalior, who both wanted the Viceroy’s discretionary powers  
 
surrendered to central government.105  
 
     On 22 May 1941 Linlithgow, working within the twin constraints of the August  
 
offer and the blunt rejection of Sapru’s proposals, sent details of his own  
 
scheme to Amery. The entrenched positions taken by Congress and the Muslim  
 
League had forced the Viceroy to recommend the selection of three additional  
 
non-official Indians without rigid party affiliations, but with proven records in  
 
public service. In all, he envisaged the creation of three additional places on the  
 
Council and the establishment of new portfolios.106   
 
     Linlithgow’s plan for a new War Advisory Committee took account of the  
 
difficulties with both Congress and the Muslim League, as he proposed to  
 
select the members himself, after consultation with his Council. Linlithgow hoped  
 
that his reforms would appeal to some Indian politicians, but recognised that  
 
they did not go as far as Sapru’s supporters wanted, let alone the principal  
 
opponents of the August offer.107 Although Amery publicly welcomed the  
 
Viceroy’s enterprise, he privately deplored the turgidity of his prose, and the  
 
superfluity of detail that would ‘bewilder the War Cabinet’.108 Nevertheless his  
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interim reply to Linlithgow on 24 May offered complete moral support, and only  
 
disagreed in principle with the Viceroy’s suggestion that the announcement of  
 
the changes to the Council could be accompanied by a widespread release of  
 
satyagraha prisoners.109 
 
     Amery regretted that, once more it would be necessary to persuade a  
 
sceptical Churchill that the proposed constitutional changes, however minor,  
 
were urgently needed.110 His apprehension was justified because the latter,  
 
having seen Linlithgow’s explanation of his proposals, had drafted an  
 
intemperate and disapproving telegram for the Viceroy. Amery successfully  
 
canvassed Attlee’s support in persuading Churchill to moderate his language,   
 
although their eventual meeting was stormy.111 Churchill’s amended telegram,  
 
although now more restrained, revealed his annoyance that the ‘embers of  
 
controversy were being stirred up in India, and in the House of Commons’, to the  
 
detriment of the war effort.112 
 
     Once Churchill had been persuaded to be more reasonable, Amery’s next  
 
telegram to Linlithgow was designed to assuage the Viceroy’s worries before he  
 
replied to the Prime Minister, in advance of  the meeting of the War Cabinet on 9  
 
June.113 Linlithgow’s reply to Churchill was brave and realistic, emphasising the  
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need to persuade liberal Indians that Britain really intended to end the  
 
constitutional stalemate, but also conceding that his measures could only be  
 
expected to buy a few months peace.  
 
     When Amery put the Viceroy’s proposals to the War Cabinet on 9 June 1941,  
 
they were approved with very little dissent.114  His account of this meeting is  
 
more colourful than the official minutes, containing, even for him, an unusual  
 
degree of immodesty. He praised his own role in facing up to Churchill, and  
 
forcing him to change his mind, claiming that when the Prime Minister was  
 
confronted, and made to think again, he invariably later made the correct  
 
conclusion.115 
 
     Unfortunately, in July 1941 Linlithgow’s progress in assembling his Executive  
 
Council was suddenly interrupted by a dispute with the provincial government of  
 
the Punjab. On the strength of a rumour that a non-Punjabi would be given  
 
the Defence portfolio in the expanded Council, the provincial government, fully  
 
supported by the Prime Minister, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, had threatened to  
 
resign. Furthermore, they were aggrieved that the expanded Council would not  
 
include any members from the Punjab.116  With the preservation of the war effort  
 
in mind, Amery felt that it would be necessary to make immediate concessions to  
 
these Punjabi demands.117 Consequently, his instructions to Linlithgow on 15 July  
 
were unambiguous, and stressed the need to appease Sikander. Amery  
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suggested that, in addition to the selection of a Punjabi Muslim, another Hindu  
 
member should be found (i.e. a net increase of two in the Council).118 When  
 
Amery put the matter before the War Cabinet on 17 July 1941, both the  
 
proposals to elect five, instead of three non-official Indians, and to create a  
 
National Defence Council, were approved with no dissent.119  
 
     Although both Amery and Linlithgow continued to maintain that the National  
 
Defence Council performed a useful function in keeping the provinces in touch  
 
with the Central Government, its early days were damaged by a dispute with  
 
Jinnah. Muslim provincial prime ministers had been elected to the National  
 
Defence Council, but Jinnah, angry that they had been chosen without his  
 
approval, took action. He seized on the wording of a letter of invitation sent  
 
by Sir Roger Lumley, Governor of Bombay (acting for the Viceroy) who invited  
 
premiers, not in their official capacities, but as representatives of the Muslim  
 
community.120 Three of these premiers, Sikander in the Punjab, Huq in Bengal,  
 
and Saadullah Khan in Assam, were subjected to intense pressure to resign by a  
 
resentful Jinnah, and within a few weeks had duly done so. 
 
     Amery was able to do little more than express his distaste for Jinnah’s ‘skilful  
 
exploitation of the wording of Lumley’s invitation to the Premiers’, although it  
 
became clear that his cunning had helped him to strengthen his position with  
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leading Muslims.121 In a defiant performance in the House of Commons on 11  
 
September 1941, Amery stuck to his view that the Prime Ministers had been  
 
invited as representatives of the Muslim Community, and not as members of the  
 
Muslim League.122 
 
 
The Release of the Satyagraha Prisoners 
 
Although not the intended subject for the debate on the expanded Council in the  
 
House of Commons on 1 August 1941, the fiercest argument concerned a  
 
possible widespread release of satyagraha prisoners, a measure favoured by  
 
some members who felt that this would be seen by the United States as a  
 
generous gesture. However, in his summing up, Amery dismissed such an  
 
amnesty, without an assurance by Congress politicians that they would be  
 
prepared to cease their campaign of civil disobedience.123 
 
     However, during November 1941 this issue changed from a hypothetical  
 
matter to a crisis of practical politics, both in Britain and India. On 1 November  
 
1941, Linlithgow first alerted Amery to the issue of prisoner releases, advising  
 
him that three Indian members of his Executive Council, Aney, Sarkar and Rao,  
 
had urged him to take immediate action, but only in the cases of Nehru and  
 
Azad, who had both been in prison for over a year. Linlithgow was undecided,  
 
and anxious to learn Amery’s opinion, especially as his colleagues in Delhi had  
 
expressed the need to placate opinion both in the USA, and the British  
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Parliament.124 A later telegram on 7 November 1941 reported that another  
 
member of Council, Joshi, had now asked for the release of all Satyagraha  
 
prisoners to be debated in Delhi.125 
 
     Amery replied to the Viceroy on 8 November confirming that he supported  
 
the prisoner releases, especially after consultations had shown only two  
 
provincial governors, Sir Maurice Hallett in the United Provinces and Sir Arthur  
 
Hope in Madras, as opposing the plan. He did not feel unduly influenced by  
 
the need to appease American opinion, but he believed that it was imperative to  
 
get a favourable reaction in India. This would be best achieved by stressing that  
 
the releases were acts of clemency following the failure of the civil disobedience  
 
campaign.126  
 
     During the meeting of the War Cabinet on 12 November 1941, proceedings  
 
were interrupted by an angry intervention by Churchill. Bridges’ minutes merely  
 
recorded that Amery was asked to emphasise to Linlithgow that no commitments  
 
should be made regarding the release of political prisoners until the matter had  
 
been thoroughly discussed by the War Cabinet.127 However, Amery’s diary  
 
provided a fuller account showing that Churchill’s anger arose from a close  
 
examination of the telegrams between London and Delhi that appeared to  
 
smack of British defeatism, and in fact represented ‘surrender at the moment   
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of victory’.128  
 
     Before the next War Cabinet meeting, Amery prepared a memorandum  
 
summarising the background to Linlithgow’s proposals, especially the legal issue  
 
of whether responsibility for any releases should be with the Government of  
 
India,, or with the provinces. However, the main thrust of his argument was the  
 
need to support Linlithgow and his newly reconstructed Executive Council. If the  
 
prisoner releases were not approved by the War Cabinet, there could be serious  
 
consequences in the form of resignations from the Executive Council.129  
 
     At that War Cabinet meeting, Amery put the case assiduously for the  
 
releases, but was unable to persuade his colleagues that the Viceroy’s plan  
 
should be put into action without delay. Anderson’s argument that the provinces  
 
should have autonomy to make their own decisions persuaded Churchill that the  
 
matter should be further investigated by a small sub-committee, chaired  
 
by Attlee.130 This group met on 18 November 1941, and according to Amery’s  
 
diary quickly concluded that, in the peculiar circumstances of war, Delhi’s  
 
responsibility for law and order outranked provincial authority.131 Their report,  
 
drafted for the War Cabinet by Sir David Monteath, Permanent Under-Secretary  
 
at the India Office, proved to be was a masterpiece of official legalese.132  
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     At the War Cabinet meeting on 20 November 1941, the supremacy of the  
 
Central Government was confirmed. Unfortunately Amery, and later Linlithgow,  
 
were both dismayed that Churchill, while reluctantly consenting to the releases,  
 
had insisted that no public announcement should be made in Delhi on the  
 
matter, but that appropriate instructions should be communicated in confidence  
 
to provincial Governors.133 
 
     For Linlithgow, the matter of a public announcement of the releases became  
 
a critical issue regarding the status of his Executive Council. He explained to  
 
Amery that Indian public interest in the releases was high, and if it appeared that  
 
responsibility for publicity now rested with the provinces, the Central  
 
Government would seem to have been overruled.134 Amery realised that he was  
 
in a difficult position since, on the one hand he deplored Churchill’s Victorian  
 
view of India, and on the other hand he realised that Linlithgow’s tetchiness  
 
invited interference.135 Accordingly he prepared a further memorandum for the  
 
next War Cabinet meeting on 24 November 1941, recommending that while  
 
the prisoner releases should be publicly announced in India, this should be done  
 
in a bland manner, eschewing any element of triumphalism.136 The War Cabinet  
 
realised the delicacy of the situation, and was particularly nervous in considering  
 
the matter, after Churchill had made it clear that he regarded the entire handling  
 
of the matter (by Amery and Linlithgow) as unfortunate. Not surprisingly, there  
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was an unwillingness to approve Amery’s plan.137  
 
     Churchill made one last attempt to persuade Linlithgow to deal with the  
 
matter by discreet instructions to the provinces, prefacing his suggestion with a  
 
warning ‘that it would be a mistake to make a flag day out of this small  
 
unwelcomed gesture of reconciliation’.138 When Linlithgow stood his ground, the  
 
War Cabinet finally agreed the draft announcement that Linlithgow had sent to  
 
Churchill on 27 November 1941, albeit now with some recognition of the part  
 
played by the Executive Council.139 The prisoner releases, including those of  
 
Nehru and Azad, began, almost immediately on 3 December 1941. 
 
     Throughout this intense period Amery and Linlithgow had different  
 
perspectives on the prisoner releases. In early November Amery revealed his  
 
anxiety, and needed to be sure that the Government of India was taking such a  
 
drastic step from a position of strength, and not weakness.140 From the more  
 
tranquil standpoint of his draft memoirs, he claimed ‘that he saw very little in  
 
the merits of the question either way’.141 Although Linlithgow expressed his  
 
general distaste for further constitutional reform, his commitment to his new  
 
Executive Council remained paramount.142  He was grateful for Amery’s  
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continued support, but was highly critical of such Cabinet members as Anderson  
 
and Simon, who had attempted to exercise control over policy in India, without  
 
the detailed knowledge of a delicate situation.143  
 
     Neither Amery nor Linlithgow were optimistic that the prisoner releases would  
 
produce a positive reaction from Congress, although credit was given to the  
 
Hindu and Muslim members of the Executive Council who had put the policy  
 
forward. Nehru, on leaving prison remained defiant, saying that nothing had  
 
changed and duly ordered Amery to ‘get out of India’.144 Gandhi, also was not  
 
mollified, and believed that his campaign of civil disobedience should continue.  
 
     Indian Liberals were also unimpressed by Britain’s release of the prisoners.  
 
Sapru while exhorting Gandhi and Nehru to be more moderate, regretted that  
 
there were dangers in having a Secretary of State, such as Amery, with a  
 
‘supreme gift for rubbing people up the wrong way’.145 Writing a few days later  
 
to Kunwar Saleb, he went even further, stating that recent difficulties were not  
 
with Linlithgow, who had changed his attitude for the better, but with Amery  
 
who ‘belonged to the Milner school of thought’, and accordingly wanted an  
 
Indian constitution based on nomination, and not democracy.146 
 
 
Amery, India and the Atlantic Charter 
 
For many years, Amery had feared the possible effect of American economic  
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expansion on his cherished principle of imperial preference. After the Lease-Lend  
 
arrangement between Britain and the USA had been settled in March 1941, his  
 
anxiety worsened as he realised that its stringent conditions could well leave  
 
the British Empire without the protection of tariffs.147 Once Churchill and  
 
Roosevelt had signed the Atlantic Charter on 14 August 1941, he was given  
 
further cause for concern. The joint declaration that became known as the  
 
Atlantic Charter contained eight points, of which the third had considerable  
 
significance for Amery’s responsibilities at the India Office. This declared, 
 
          Britain and the USA respect the right of all peoples to choose the form  
          of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign  
          rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly  
          deprived of them. 
 
Anticipating that even this bland statement would draw an immediate response  
 
in India, Amery produced War Cabinet papers that were masterpieces of obscure  
 
official drafting, both in their interpretation and the amplification of Point III. He  
 
considered that it had no direct relevance to the development of independence in  
 
India and maintained that the crucial steps to achieve self-determination had  
 
been in place since the August offer of 1940.148 
     
     At the War Cabinet meetings on 4 September 1941 and 8 September 1941 it  
 
was decided that Churchill would make a statement in the House of Commons on  
 
the relevance of the Atlantic Charter to India, Burma, and the remainder of the  
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British Empire.149 At this stage, Amery now believed that it was necessary to be  
 
more specific in public about the consequences for India, and tried, without  
 
success, to persuade Churchill to supply further details.150 Churchill’s statement  
 
on 9 September therefore only confirmed that Point III was primarily intended  
 
for countries that were currently occupied by Nazi Germany, and had no special  
 
significance for dependencies in the British Empire that were seeking self- 
 
government.151 Once Amery had been informed by Churchill that the ‘prior  
 
arrangements in India’ ruled out the direct application of Point III, he chose not  
 
to put a gloss on Churchill’s terse parliamentary statement to make it more  
 
acceptable to Indian opinion.152 Accordingly, on both occasions his answers to  
 
questions on this matter in the House of Commons were no more than  
 
repetitions of Churchill’s statement on 9 September 1941.153 
 
     This interpretation of the Charter produced a strong reaction amongst 
 
 Congress politicians.154 Linlithgow reported that much of the criticism in the  
 
Indian newspapers came from a view that Britain was going back on the limited  
 
promises contained in the August offer. The only good he could see in the  
 
situation was that malign attention had been diverted from Amery and himself.155 
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     In the case of Amery, this was untrue, as he had been condemned for  
 
dishonesty, and making his comments about Indian freedom in ambiguous  
 
language.156 Sapru was even more trenchant than usual in his criticism of  
 
Amery for failing to clarify the essential differences between the terms of the  
 
August offer, and Point III of the Atlantic Charter.157 
 
 
Linlithgow’s Second Extension of Office 
 
In October 1940, Churchill had persuaded Linlithgow to serve for an extra  
 
twelve months from his projected retirement date of April 1941. Bearing in mind  
 
his difficulties with the Prime Minister in the period leading to the August offer,  
 
Amery wisely chose not to make an issue of the matter. Although since August  
 
1940 there had been differences between Viceroy and Secretary of State over a  
 
number of matters, there had not been the serious breach of trust that had  
 
occurred in their early days of working together.  
 
     Nevertheless, Amery was not in favour of Linlithgow’s term of office being  
 
extended to April 1943. Despite the Viceroy’s steadfast qualities, especially in his  
 
stewardship of the Indian war effort, Amery had little real respect for his  
 
intellectual qualities. As late as November 1954, Amery was frank in his  
 
recollection of what he really thought about Linlithgow. His letter to Hodson, who  
 
also had little reason to think well of Linlithgow, was a damning criticism of the  
 
Viceroy. In particular, he cited his unwillingness to support independent studies  
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of alternative forms of government, and more importantly his bias in favour of  
 
Jinnah and the idea of Pakistan.158  
 
     Amery’s diaries show that in July 1941 he offered initial resistance to  
 
Churchill’s insistence that Linlithgow should continue for another year, and also  
 
made a doomed attempt to persuade Churchill to send Hoare to Delhi.159 On 1  
 
August 1941, he reluctantly gave way on the whole matter, and sent Linlithgow a  
 
graciously worded telegram, enclosing the Prime Minister’s invitation for him to  
 
continue.160  
 
 
Summary 
 
In terms of constitutional progress the period for Amery from the August offer  
 
until the Japanese entry into the war was one of deep frustration that tested  
 
even his resilience. Many of his initiatives, whether realistic or otherwise, were  
 
unsuccessful, often because they found little favour with either Churchill or  
 
Linlithgow, but also because the complexity of Indian political affairs observed  
 
from a metropolitan standpoint, made it difficult to make progress. Soon the  
 
picture would become more clouded by the Japanese threat to India, increasing  
 
interest by the British Labour Party in Indian reform, and unsubtle pressure from  
 
a United States that disliked colonialism. Amery would only have got partial  
 
compensation from a burgeoning Indian military and industrial war effort. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE CRIPPS MISSION  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will initially be concerned with the circumstances that led to the  
 
decision to send Stafford Cripps to India in an attempt to broker a constitutional  
 
settlement, and will then consider the course of the visit and its eventual failure.  
 
In particular, an assessment will be made of the amount of influence that Amery  
 
was, or was not able to exercise, at all stages of the mission. A downbeat  
 
personal audit of his progress at the India Office during 1941 had made no  
 
reference to any fresh constitutional initiatives, and had just relied on  
 
Linlithgow’s newly reconstructed Executive Council to provide broader based  
 
government.  
 
     While he believed that his speeches had identified the sticking point as  
 
regards reform, he was in no doubt that, in doing so, he had incurred the  
 
‘contempt and indignation of Indian politicians and newspaper leader writers’.1 
 
A number of factors can be adduced to explain why, in early 1942, the British 
 
Government moved rapidly from passive acceptance of the constitutional  
 
impasse to an almost frenetic promotion of change.  
 
 
The Labour Party and a Forward Policy in India 
 
Firstly, in January 1942, the Labour Party, inspired by the return of Stafford  
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Cripps, from his highly regarded spell as Ambassador to the Soviet Union,  
 
began to agitate for fresh initiatives on reform in India.2 Amery regarded this  
 
new policy with scepticism, especially as he thought that Labour ministers such  
 
as Arthur Greenwood and Herbert Morrison were ‘feeble creatures’ who had  
 
failed to support him in the War Cabinet against Churchill’s tirades.3  
 
     The Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin was Amery’s socialist War Cabinet  
 
colleague whom he respected for his resolve, if not his trade union sympathies.4  
 
As early as 24 September 1941, Bevin had written a long and urgent letter to  
 
Amery requesting a more forward policy in India, stating that for over twenty  
 
years, promises to Indians over self-government had been so hesitant, that  
 
the latter would welcome a British defeat in the East. Dismissing as ‘divide and  
 
rule’, Amery’s view that nothing could be done without agreement between  
 
Hindus and Muslims, he maintained that short term measures to promote Indian  
 
cooperation in the war effort, would not have the same effect as a radical step  
 
towards Indian independence.5 Bevin was unwilling to let matters rest, and  
 
forcibly expressed his arguments at the War Cabinet on 19 December 1941.  
 
With Amery absent, and Attlee in the chair, he linked the democratic case  
 
for constitutional reform with the need to improve industrial production in  
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India.6 
 
     Matters became still more formal when the Labour Party leader, Clement  
 
Attlee, requested a meeting with Amery about the Indian situation, in response  
 
to increasing pressure from his backbenchers, who wanted Britain to take fresh  
 
constitutional initiatives. Amery replied that he would need more support from  
 
Labour ministers at War Cabinet meetings, but remained convinced that their  
 
view of Indian matters ‘was based on a poorly informed sympathy with  
 
Congress, and a failure to recognise the existence of the Muslim element’.7 
 
 
Congress Working Committee Meeting at Bardoli 
 
Secondly, in late December 1941, soon after the Japanese had attacked Pearl  
 
Harbour, the Congress Working Committee met at Bardoli, and decided that it  
 
could offer support to the war effort in return for independence.8 Nevertheless,  
 
interpretations of these proceedings vary in terms of the perceived willingness of  
 
the Congress Working Committee to cooperate with Britain. Sir Roger Lumley,  
 
Governor of Bombay, detected very little cause for optimism, and believed that  
 
there should be a sceptical attitude towards reports in the Congress newspapers  
 
speaking of ‘an olive branch being handed to Britain’.9  
 
     Sixty years later, a similar view was taken by Peter Clarke in The Cripps  
 
Version, where he concluded that the Congress Working Committee had acted   
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‘either through cunning or disingenuousness’, although his analysis did at least  
 
concede that Congress might yet be prepared to cooperate in the war effort.10 
 
By contrast, Coupland, at the time undertaking academic research in India for  
 
Amery, recalled that the Congress Working Committee, in recognising the new  
 
peril from Japan, both in military and propaganda terms, chose to have the  
 
option of military resistance. Nevertheless, while moderate politicians such as  
 
Rajagopalachari hoped that a mutual military arrangement between Congress  
 
and the British might possibly lead to political reform, Coupland was clear that  
 
those influenced by Nehru remained opposed to any form of cooperation.11  
 
     Amery’s view of the Bardoli resolution, was unambiguous since he explained  
 
to Linlithgow that it was absurd to regard Congress as having ‘opened the door  
 
to cooperation’. He was particularly severe on politicians and officials in London  
 
and Delhi who saw an opportunity for meeting Congress half-way, fearing that  
 
such an approach would attract the censure of Jinnah and the Muslim League,  
 
who so far had offered fair support in the war effort.12 
 
 
A New Initiative by Sapru and the Hindu Liberals 
 
In December 1941 Sapru reacted vigorously to both the Japanese threat and the  
 
Bardoli resolution. He regarded Nehru’s exhortation to Amery to ‘get out’ as  
 
particularly mischievous, when Indians needed British war machinery and military  
 
training.13 Sapru’s proposals eschewed a detailed long term consideration of the  
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constitutional position in favour of immediate measures that would involve as  
 
many Indians as possible in the war effort. Above all, he stressed that ‘India  
 
should no longer be treated as a dependency to be ruled from Whitehall’, but  
 
regarded as any other unit in the British Commonwealth (i.e. a dominion). To  
 
achieve this, he envisaged the conversion of the Viceroy’s Executive Council into  
 
a genuine national government, with departments led by non-officials drawn  
 
from all political parties, and responsible only to the Crown.14 A wily and  
 
experienced politician, Sapru ensured that his proposals received the best  
 
possible press coverage in Britain and the USA.15 
 
 
American Pressure for Political Reform in India 
 
The final factor pushing Britain to make new initiatives in early 1942 was  
 
leverage from the USA. Although this would intensify as Cripps conducted his  
 
negotiations in India, there was earlier evidence that senior American public  
 
figures were concerned at the lack of progress towards constitutional reform.  
 
The US Ambassador in London, John G. Winant, and the Secretary of State,  
 
Cordell Hull, expressed such sentiments, but it was not until after the signing of  
 
the Atlantic Charter in August 1941 that the American attitude to the British in  
 
India became a source of real tension.16 There is little evidence that Churchill  
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and Roosevelt quarrelled about India during the meetings that produced the  
 
Charter, but the President’s son, Elliott, recalled that, at the time, his father  
 
indicated that he was ‘not prepared to help England so that she could ride  
 
roughshod over colonial peoples’.17 
 
     Although the USA made little public comment over the policy of Churchill and  
 
Amery to exclude India from Article III of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt was  
 
irked that Britain had also chosen to omit India from the signatories to a United  
 
Nations Declaration.18 Although Britain soon gave way on this matter, Churchill  
 
reacted strongly to Roosevelt’s apparently uninformed comments about India,  
 
when they met in Washington in December 1941.19 
 
 
The First Reluctant Attempts to Instigate Change 
 
In the first week of January 1942, Churchill had no thought of Indian  
 
constitutional change. While in Washington he responded to the minutes of the  
 
War Cabinet meeting on 19 December 1941, when Bevin had pressed for a new  
 
initiative. He wrote a strongly worded telegram to Attlee, copied to Amery,  
 
regretting that there had been talk of ‘constitutional changes in India at a  
 
moment when the enemy was at the frontier’.20 Attlee’s response to Churchill’s  
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telegram was typically quiet, but firm, and suggested that, without some  
 
progress on Indian reform, there could be difficulties with the Parliamentary  
 
Labour Party.21 Although he had scant regard for Indian Liberals, Churchill was  
 
realistic, and asked Amery to draft a reply to the latest proposals that had been  
 
sent to him by Sapru and his colleagues.  
 
     At this stage, Amery had not moved from his opinion that Indians wanted  
 
independence, not democracy, and that any move towards dominion status  
 
should be under the present system of government. Like Attlee, he foresaw  
 
difficulties with both the War Cabinet and Parliament over Sapru’s plan, whereby  
 
an Indianised Executive would function as a national government.22 However, he  
 
believed that the spirit of Churchill’s reply to Sapru needed to be as conciliatory  
 
as possible, without in any way infringing the terms of the August offer. Above  
 
all, he needed to draft a compromise that Churchill was prepared to sign, but  
 
would still uphold Britain’s commitment to minority communities in India.23 
 
     Accordingly, Amery was uncharacteristically cautious over his draft, showing  
 
it to both Simon and Attlee, and having more consultations than usual with his  
 
officials at the India Office.24 Consequently, the draft that was shortly to become  
 
the catalyst for frantic diplomatic activity, was overlong. After an introduction in  
 
replica Churchillian prose, Amery devised elaborate arguments for rejecting  
 
Sapru’s schemes for a national government based on a reformed Viceroy’s  
                                        
21 Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, p. 51. 
22 Amery diary, 8 January 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
23 Amery diary, 15 January 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
24 Amery diary, 16 January 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
 162 
Executive, but attached most weight to the difficulties in making changes when  
 
India was under a military threat from Japan.25 
 
     Linlithgow’s telegrams to Amery on 21 January 1942 showed that he was  
 
even more resistant to change, as he repudiated both the Bardoli resolution, and  
 
Sapru’s proposals. Using blunter language than Amery, he stressed the need to 
 
support, not only the August declaration, but also the framework and philosophy  
 
of the 1935 Government of India Act. In terms which would antagonise Attlee,  
 
he deplored the influence of the Labour Party over Indian affairs, and  
 
emphasised that if Britain really wanted to stay in India, unpopular decisions  
 
would need to be taken.26 Amery was alarmed by such language, and feared for  
 
the modest constitutional amendments agreed in the summer of 1941.27 
 
 
Attlee’s Refusal to Accept a Policy of Inaction 
 
Amery, Linlithgow and Attlee produced detailed memoranda for consideration  
 
when the War Cabinet discussed the Indian situation on 5 February 1942. In  
 
their different ways, Amery and Linlithgow rejected any radical action,  
 
especially any measures that were designed to placate Congress.28 By contrast,  
 
Attlee felt the need to reflect the state of opinion in his own party. Already, the  
 
Chairman of the India League, Agatha Harrison, had been told by the pro- 
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Congress Labour MP for Leyton, Reginald Sorenson, that his colleagues wanted  
 
Cripps to go to India armed with powers to effect a settlement.29  
 
    Attlee’s paper was uncompromising in its criticism of Amery and Linlithgow, as  
 
well as being perceptive in its awareness of changing Asian geopolitics. He  
 
regarded Amery’s preference for doing nothing as a ‘hand to mouth policy that  
 
did not amount to statesmanship’. He also suspected that Linlithgow had  
 
attempted to justify his position by asserting that India was a conquered country  
 
that had no affinity with Britain, but nevertheless found it convenient to remain  
 
under British protection. Following the suggestions of his party colleagues, his  
 
solution was to send someone to speak to the leaders of all political parties.  
 
Quoting the precedent of Lord Durham and his reforms for Canada, he stressed  
 
that such an emissary should be entrusted with the authority to reach an  
 
agreement within broad limits.30  
 
    Amery had expected his colleagues to endorse his draft response to Sapru,  
 
but was disappointed. Bridges’ minutes merely recorded the conclusion that it  
 
was considered too dangerous to adhere to the status quo without making every  
 
possible attempt to break the constitutional deadlock. The compromise reached  
 
by the War Cabinet was that a reply to Sapru should be deferred, and that  
 
Amery should prepare a fresh draft statement reflecting the mood of the  
 
meeting.31 Amery’s diary for 5 February 1942 provided more missing detail,  
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particularly Bevin’s insistence that the War Cabinet should follow Attlee’s lead,  
 
and send a negotiator to India.32 
 
 
Amery’s Attempts to Draft Churchill’s Defence Council Scheme 
 
The bare comment in the War Cabinet minutes mandating Amery to prepare a  
 
new statement, did not mention his role in a radical, but short lived initiative  
 
by Churchill, who proposed to expand the Defence Council into an elective body  
 
of one hundred persons, representing the provincial assemblies and the princes.  
 
Such a reformed Defence Council would discuss the war effort, but more  
 
significantly, after the cessation of hostilities, frame the new constitution.  
 
    Amery’s initial enthusiasm for Churchill’s plan soon cooled, when his early  
 
discussions with Attlee and Anderson revealed a deep schism over the proposed  
 
method of election to the Defence Council. A sceptical Amery could not persuade  
 
his colleagues that the proposed arithmetical direct elections to this new body by  
 
members of the provincial legislatures would alarm minorities, fearful of majority  
 
Congress rule.33 
 
     Amery’s uncertainty over the value of an expanded Defence Council was  
 
apparent when he visited Chequers on 7 February 1942 to review the scheme  
 
with Churchill. He did not say whether he wanted the idea to be aborted,  
 
but did suggest to Churchill that it might not be good for his reputation, as  
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Prime Minister, if an initiative so closely identified with him, collapsed.34 
 
     The dispute between Amery and Attlee over elections to an enlarged Defence  
 
Council soon became more entrenched. After consulting Simon and his  
 
Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir David Monteath, Amery produced a detailed plan  
 
for both the composition and functions of the Defence Council, underlining the  
 
importance of the Viceroy being empowered to make appointments, if only to  
 
placate the Muslims and the princes.35 When these details were sent to Attlee’ he  
 
reacted angrily, warning that if the Viceroy were to be given the power to select  
 
members of the Defence Council, it would have an adverse effect on the pledges  
 
to minorities made in August 1940.36 
 
 
The Demise of the Defence Council Scheme and Cripps’ First 
Appearance 
 
Significantly, when Amery went to 10 Downing Street on 11 February 1942 to  
 
discuss this matter, and prepare a script for Churchill’s broadcast, he found  
 
Cripps in attendance. His appearance during these discussions was almost  
 
certainly evidence of Churchill’s intention to bring him into the War Cabinet, and  
 
capitalise both on his popularity, and also on the reputation that he had earned  
 
as British Ambassador during a difficult period in Moscow. Furthermore, as he  
 
was aware of Cripps’ longstanding interest in Indian matters he wanted to  
 
include him in the Government.37 
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     When Amery wrote to Linlithgow explaining Churchill’s plans for the Defence  
 
Council, matters were already difficult for the Viceroy. Singapore was about to  
 
fall to the Japanese forces, and General and Madame Chiang Kai-shek were in  
 
the course of a potentially troublesome and unwelcome visit to India. The tone  
 
of Amery’s enciphered telegram was necessarily sheepish as he was presenting  
 
the Viceroy with a fait accompli, and informing him that the new proposals would  
 
be broadcast to India by Churchill.38 Some tension ought to have been removed  
 
when Churchill decided to postpone his broadcast to India, but at this stage,  
 
Linlithgow had already expressed his disappointment that matters had gone  
 
so far without a consideration of his views.39 Before sending his interim  
 
comments on the scheme, he sent an angry telegram to Amery, complaining that  
 
he had been ‘ill-used’, and trusting that, in future he would get better protection  
 
from his Secretary of State.40 
       
     Linlithgow’s first detailed response largely confined itself to a sombre  
 
prediction of the consequences of forming such a revised Defence Council,  
 
whether in respect of its existing members, or in the wider matter of protecting  
 
minority groups.41 Before letting Amery see his full comments on Churchill’s  
 
proposals, he made a coded criticism of politicians in London by reminding the  
 
Prime Minister that, with Halifax away in Washington, there was no one in  
 
London with any real experience of central government in India. In these  
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circumstances, he claimed particular credibility for his own judgement that the  
 
Indian Army would suffer a loss of morale if the Defence Council were to be  
 
awarded constitution framing powers.42 In summary, he could not accept that a  
 
Defence Council elected on a politically representative basis, would settle for  
 
merely giving advice, and would really want to run the war.43 Amery realised the  
 
power and logic of these arguments, and told Churchill that it would be unwise  
 
to override the Viceroy’s strong feelings. This effectively marked the end of the  
 
Prime Minister’s Defence Council scheme.44  
 
 
Cabinet Committee on India  
 
After nothing came from the Defence Council scheme, Churchill formed a  
 
Cabinet Committee charged with ‘preparing a statement to clarify what Britain  
 
had promised to India, and to indicate whether any constitutional advance was  
 
feasible at this particular time’.45 The India Committee, that for practical  
 
purposes soon replaced the full War Cabinet as the policy making body on Indian  
 
affairs, was chaired by Attlee, now Deputy Prime Minister, and consisted of  
 
Anderson, Cripps, Amery, and Sir John Grigg.46 Whether Churchill had intended  
 
it, or not, the political composition of the India Committee turned out to be more  
                                        
42 Linlithgow to Churchill, via India Office, 14 February 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22. 
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to Attlee’s liking than might have been expected 47 
 
     The pressure on Britain to encourage political reform in India that had been  
 
evident throughout the early weeks of 1942, intensified following the fall of  
 
Singapore. Amery had very little to do with the visit of Chiang Kai-shek, and his  
 
wife, to India during February 1942, but had been kept well informed by  
 
Linlithgow, who, while concerned that they might have had too much contact  
 
with Nehru, had been relatively sanguine about his visitors’ impressions of the  
 
country.48 With an eye to the safety of China, Chiang Kai-shek wanted  
 
reassurance that the Indian war effort would be energised, primarily by Britain  
 
taking real steps in awarding self-government. Significantly, he did not address  
 
these views in the first instance to Churchill, Amery, or Linlithgow, but to Britain  
 
via Cripps. A similar message was sent to Washington.49  Roosevelt responded  
 
quickly, and mandated Averell Harriman, his Special Representative in London, to  
 
underline an unlikely connection between the vexed issue of the Lend-Lease  
 
Agreement, and Britain’s responsibilities regarding political reform in India.50 
 
     Consequently, the first meeting of the India Committee took place on 26  
 
February 1942 in an atmosphere of expectation, although the Cabinet Secretary,  
 
Sir Edward Bridges merely recorded that no decisions were taken.51 Amery’s  
                                        
47 Clarke, The Cripps Version, p. 281. The composition of the India Committee was interesting. 
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Cripps and India, p. 63. 
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diary provided a much fuller account of a meeting that he found to be far from  
 
satisfactory, and which this time saw Churchill in the chair. If the object had  
 
been to begin the drafting of a fresh declaration on reform, and not merely  
 
record the aims of the India Committee, then Amery, in frustration, lamented  
 
that no headway had been made in a session lasting two hours. His remarks  
 
about his colleagues were critical, blaming Attlee, Cripps and Anderson for still  
 
being in favour of Churchill’s discarded scheme for an expanded Defence Council,  
 
and Grigg for wanting to do nothing. However, his most damning judgment was  
 
reserved for Churchill, whom he possibly thought was in the early stages of the  
 
kind of terminal mental decline that both Asquith, and Birkenhead had suffered.52 
 
     The India Committee met a further seven times in the next eleven days, but  
 
with Attlee in the chair instead of Churchill made far better progress.53 For the  
 
second meeting on 27 February, Amery had produced alternative draft  
 
declarations that were long and somewhat pompous, presumably on the  
 
premise that they were to have formed the script for Churchill’s broadcast.54 The  
 
meeting made the critical decision that, in addition to an address by Churchill a  
 
short declaration should be prepared specifying the circumstances in which  
 
provinces could opt to stay out of the new India, and also secede from the  
 
Commonwealth.55 
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Cripps’ Increasing Influence in the India Committee 
 
At this point, Cripps also drafted his own declaration for consideration by the  
 
India Committee, in the process consulting his Labour colleague, Agatha  
 
Harrison, who explained that while she had no misgivings over making promises  
 
for the future, more needed to be offered to Indians in the short term. Her  
 
reluctant acceptance only came when Cripps admitted that he had gone as far as  
 
he could.56  
 
     When the India Committee next met on 28 February, the drafts produced  
 
by both Amery and Cripps were considered. No original version of Cripps’  
 
version has survived, but beyond a more conciliatory final paragraph regarding  
 
Indian cooperation during the remainder of the war, it is unlikely that it differed  
 
greatly in substance from Amery’s effort.57 Amery did not seem concerned that  
 
the Committee preferred to work from Cripps’ plan, and conceded that it ‘put the  
 
more sensational points into the foreground’. Nevertheless, he described the  
 
drafting as ‘looser in thought and language than he would have liked’, as well as  
 
admitting to belated reservations over permitting India to leave the British  
 
Empire.58  
 
    After taking some time to assess Cripps’ activities since his return from  
 
Moscow, Amery expressed fears that he might produce excessively pro- 
 
Congress ideas for reform that Churchill would not be sufficiently informed to  
 
                                        
56 Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, p. 64. 
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contest. However, when he had discussed Indian matters with Cripps at his  
 
home in Eaton Square, he was reassured that his new Labour colleague would  
 
be a healthy influence, especially with his realistic knowledge of the Indian  
 
Army.59  
 
     His draft memoirs that recalled his early dealings with Cripps were less  
 
complimentary, and although admitting that he was talented, stated that he had  
 
‘swallowed all Nehru’s views on his visit to India in 1939’. Interestingly, his  
 
sweeping statement that Cripps regarded Muslims as a nuisance, and the princes  
 
as an anachronism, was emphatically rejected by Turnbull, the proof reader of  
 
his memoirs.60 
 
     However, it must be said that Amery had only an incomplete knowledge of  
 
Cripps’ dealings with Indian politicians. Cripps had already disapproved of  
 
British policy towards India at the start of the war, when he made a private visit  
 
to India in December 1939 en route to China. He was able to show proposals to  
 
the Congress President, Maulana Azad that provided for an immediate  
 
reconstitution of Linlithgow’s Executive, with the Viceroy’s powers reduced to  
 
those of a constitutional monarch. It was to prove unfortunate that Azad  
 
believed that this very tentative offer was being repeated by Cripps in April 1942,  
 
an error or judgement that would have serious consequences.61 
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     From 28 February until a meeting of the India Committee on 3 March, there  
 
were a number of amendments to the draft declaration. During this short period,  
 
no radical alterations were made, but any changes of emphasis, or meaning  
 
almost certainly reflected the opinions of Cripps rather than the Secretary of  
 
State. In terms of Indian participation in the management of the war effort,  
 
Amery was to be especially disappointed, having wanted a specific clause  
 
inserted whereby any short term reforms would only be made within the  
 
framework of the existing Indian constitution.62 The responsibility for this looser  
 
invitation to Indians to cooperate almost certainly lay with Cripps and Agatha  
 
Harrison.63  
 
     The amendments to Amery’s earlier drafts may appear relatively trivial, but  
 
there is little doubt that he was becoming increasingly uncomfortable at the way  
 
in which policy was being made in London. On 1 March, he wrote to Churchill in  
 
forthright terms, warning that the future of the British Empire was at stake. In  
 
particular he suspected that he was being rushed by Cripps and Attlee over the  
 
wording and date of the declaration, and feared that Linlithgow would be  
 
similarly alarmed. Whatever the Viceroy’s failings as a subtle and imaginative  
 
negotiator, Amery had considerable respect for his dedication to the British  
 
Empire.64  Furthermore, his diary recorded his fear that he would not be  
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supported against Attlee and Cripps, chiefly because of Churchill’s ignorance of  
 
the intricacies of the Indian situation.65 
 
 
Linlithgow, Firoz Khan and their Reservations 
 
Linlithgow’s initial reaction to the draft declaration was surprisingly phlegmatic.66  
 
His telegram to Amery on 2 March demonstrated his approval of its philosophy  
 
and detailed contents, especially the contrast between the clear promises for the  
 
post-war period, and the lack of specificity for the immediate future. With the  
 
performance and morale of his Executive in mind, his only concern was that if  
 
Congress and the Muslim League accepted the declaration they would want all  
 
the portfolios on the Executive to be filled by political appointees.67  
 
     Sir Firoz Khan Noon, the former Indian High Commissioner in London, and  
 
at this time, a member of the Viceroy’s Executive, was a respected and moderate  
 
Muslim. He warned Amery that Sapru and his colleagues were agents of  
 
Congress, in the guise of liberals, and warned that if Britain conceded complete  
 
Indianisation of the Executive, a Hindu Raj would be the only outcome. This  
 
would disadvantage Muslims who, for the first time in the war, would resort to  
 
protest, and possibly civil disorder.68 At this stage Amery had sufficient belief  
 
that the declaration would provide adequate safeguards for Muslims, and asked 
 
Linlithgow to assure Noon that his worries would be calmed by the clause  
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providing for the option of Pakistan.69 
 
     The much altered declaration was reviewed by the War Cabinet on 3 March,  
 
and only minor changes were recommended, the draft being finally completed 
 
at a meeting of the India Committee, later that day.70  
 
   To provide Linlithgow with some guidance on the implementation of the final  
 
paragraph covering the immediate wartime position, a separate set of  
 
instructions was drafted by Attlee. These requested the Viceroy to use his  
 
judgement in the allocation of posts on the Executive Council, subject to the  
 
‘needs of defence and good government during the present critical time’.71 The  
 
the War Cabinet approved the declaration on the following day.72 
 
 
The Thoughts of Amery, Ministers and the 1922 Committee on the 
Declaration 
 
It is worth discovering Amery’s early opinions of the declaration that would form  
 
the basis of Cripps’ visit to India. In correspondence he chose his words with  
 
uncharacteristic restraint. Writing to a potentially hostile Linlithgow, he  
 
suggested that ‘the bark of the new declaration was worse than its bite’, and  
 
agreed that, in many respects it dealt effectively with such difficulties as Muslim  
 
aspirations and rights, as well as the need to supply an alternative to Sapru’s  
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proposals.73 His detailed minute to Churchill on 4 March 1942 was more guarded,  
 
although he did agree that Britain should go ahead with the declaration.  
 
     His private views were franker. His diary for 4 March 1942 recorded his loss  
 
of temper at a meeting of the India Committee over the issue of providing  
 
adequate explanatory material to accompany the declaration. He took exception  
 
to Attlee’s comment that, on this matter, the entire India Committee was against  
 
him, and asserted that, as Secretary of State, he had a right to stand out,  
 
especially as it would be the Viceroy and himself who would have to implement  
 
its provisions. Recalling the events many years later, Amery remained sanguine  
 
about the declaration as finally revised, but deplored its effects upon Churchill.  
 
Using the colourful metaphor of a maiden prepared to marry an odious suitor in  
 
order to repair her family’s finances, he judged that the Prime Minister had been  
 
forced by the need for domestic unity and American good will to espouse policies  
 
to which he was fundamentally opposed.74 
 
     Amery had been told by Cripps that the publication of the declaration should  
 
go hand in hand with the removal of Linlithgow from office.75 Amery was not in  
 
favour of this, but whatever his feelings on the declaration, and any consequent  
 
negotiations, it was evident that, up to this point, he and Churchill had not been  
 
able to prevent Attlee and Cripps from shaping its content according to  
 
themselves.76 
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     Amery was present at two meetings on 5 March when there was heated  
 
discussion of the declaration, in particular the right to secede from the British  
 
Empire, and the provincial opt-out. At a lunchtime meeting of all ministers in the  
 
Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons, those who were not members  
 
of the War Cabinet were given their first opportunity to examine the declaration,  
 
as well as Sapru’s manifesto. The minutes of this meeting showed that there was  
 
widespread disagreement, both over the need to make a declaration, and also  
 
its details, in particular the likely damage to military morale that could arise  
 
from the right to leave the Commonwealth.77 Later on 5 March, Amery also  
 
addressed the Conservative 1922 Committee on the wording and purpose of the  
 
declaration, and endured an even more rancorous reception from discontented  
 
backbenchers. Some members felt that any form of constitutional settlement was  
 
impossible, others believed that Sapru’s proposals should have been accepted,  
 
while many others did not want Labour’s support for Congress to result in  
 
disappointment for Muslims.78 However, the greatest concern was that India  
 
would choose to leave the British Empire, and that all influence there would be  
 
lost.79 
 
 
The Decision to Send Cripps to India 
    
The idea of sending a member of the War Cabinet to India to discuss a scheme  
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agreed in London, largely coincided with a growing sense that prior publication  
 
of the declaration might be unwise. Writing in 1979, Moore suggested that the  
 
idea of sending an emissary to India was first suggested by Cripps, in a  
 
detailed note that he composed for the War Cabinet on 8 March 1942.80  
 
However, Amery’s diary for 7 March 1942 recorded that, at a War Cabinet  
 
meeting on that day, Cripps proposed that someone should go to India to  
 
attempt to break the political deadlock, and offered to travel himself. Amery’s  
 
partial deafness led him to miss this suggestion, with the result that he was  
 
unable to express his objections during the meeting. Nevertheless, once the  
 
proceedings were over, he lost no time in telling Churchill that Cripps was  
 
completely unsuitable for such a delicate mission, chiefly because Muslims  
 
regarded him ‘as an out and out Congress man’. Not surprisingly, he told the  
 
Prime Minister that he should be the man to go to India, although no record can  
 
be found of a response.81 
 
     On 8 March, Amery was at Chequers with Cripps, when Churchill accepted  
 
the latter’s offer to discuss the declaration with Indian leaders. His perceived  
 
slight at the likelihood of Cripps conducting negotiations in India, rather than  
 
himself, was considerable. Churchill was shrewd enough to suggest to Amery  
 
that Cripps, as a left wing politician, was better placed to put forward an  
 
‘essentially pro-Muslim and reasonably Conservative policy’. Amery reluctantly  
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saw some merit in this argument, but remained apprehensive that Linlithgow  
 
might well offer his resignation on hearing of Cripps’ visit.82 
    
       The likelihood of the Viceroy’s resignation was made stronger when a  
 
telegram from Linlithgow was delivered to Amery at this meeting of the War  
 
Cabinet. This telegram stated in forthright terms that if the declaration were to  
 
be published in its current form, he would resign. His concerns were wide  
 
ranging, whether making specific points such as the effect on the fighting  
 
capacity of the Indian Army, or condemning the entire declaration ‘as a flop’. He  
 
was almost certainly not playing a devious game of bluff, because most of the  
 
contents of the telegram concerned the arrangements for his leaving office.83 
 
     Churchill replied to Linlithgow’s drastically worded telegram, and writing with  
 
surprising calmness, explained that a public announcement of the declaration  
 
had been shelved, and that Cripps would be coming out to ‘put it across on the  
 
spot’. Somewhat as a hostage to fortune, he proposed that Cripps would be  
 
bound by the terms of the declaration, as finally drafted.84 
 
 
The Preparation and Delivery of Churchill’s Speech in the House of 
Commons on 11 March 
    
Once it was decided that Churchill would make an announcement in the House of  
 
Commons about Cripps’ impending visit to India, Amery sought to influence the  
 
contents of his speech. As the statement was to be made on 11 March, there  
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was little time for preparation. The first draft was written by Cripps on 8  
 
March, and while not including anything likely to worry Amery or Churchill, was  
 
too wordy, and not suitable for an excited House of Commons.85 Amery’s  
 
detailed amendments were minor and self-explanatory, but his advice to the  
 
Prime Minister over Cripps’ negotiating tactics was enigmatic. On the one hand,  
 
he favoured Cripps working to a definite plan, and on the other hand, he was  
 
anxious not to ‘fetter the Cabinet’s emissary’s discretion’.86 
 
     Churchill soon took over the redrafting of his proposed statement, and invited  
 
Amery to review the result, early on 11 March, the day on which the  
 
announcement was to be made. Amery’s diary recorded that he considered this  
 
draft to be poor, and that he needed Monteath’s assistance to produce a further  
 
version. The Prime Minister’s eventual announcement to an initially quiet, but  
 
later raucous, House of Commons, was much briefer than the drafts prepared by  
 
Cripps and Amery, and certainly in terms of tone and ambition, did not go as far  
 
as the declaration, or indeed the negotiating instructions produced by the India  
 
Committee.87 Cripps’ mandate was confined to short term reform, in particular  
 
the licence to offer posts to Indians in the Executive Council, provided the state  
 
of negotiations were favourable.88 
 
     Before Cripps left for India on 14 March, Amery attempted to ensure that  
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Linlithgow was as content as possible with the forthcoming negotiations, as well  
 
as being informed about the exact brief given to Cripps. With predictable  
 
pedantry, Amery sent a number of telegrams to Linlithgow on 10 March 1942.  
 
Initially, Amery tried to persuade the Viceroy that the declaration was an  
 
essentially Conservative policy, although he conceded that Muslims could well be  
 
prejudiced against Cripps. Above all, he expressed his regrets that in composing  
 
the declaration, Linlithgow had barely been consulted at all.89 He then chose to  
 
portray Cripps’ mission as one which, even in the probable event of failure over  
 
the long term constitutional issues, would demonstrate Britain’s good faith to the  
 
outside world.90 His third short telegram was a less than convincing prediction  
 
that Cripps would be prepared to face unpopularity with his left wingers by  
 
adopting a policy that ‘fell so short of their crude ideas’.91 
      
     His fourth telegram, issued on 10 March, was a much longer, yet closely  
 
argued justification for the thinking in Britain that had produced the declaration.  
 
With a touch of false modesty, he also provided a full explanation why Cripps  
 
could well be preferable to himself as an emissary, possibly because a member  
 
of the British left might speak more effectively to Congress.  
 
    Whether Cripps really accepted the constraints of the terms of reference  
 
envisaged by Amery and the War Cabinet, would remain unanswered, even after  
 
the end of his mission. Moore made the clear point that Cripps did not feel the  
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need for close consultation with Linlithgow over the reconstruction of the  
 
Viceroy’s Executive. As a consequence, he probably convinced himself that he  
 
could negotiate with Indian party leaders ‘within limits that Linlithgow might feel  
 
unable to accept’.92  
 
     Clarke’s account of the Cripps mission concluded that Amery, by flattering  
 
Linlithgow, and stating that the declaration did not unpick the 1940 offer, was  
 
being Machiavellian.93 Amery was certainly capable of intrigue and devious  
 
conduct, but at this time, the exasperated and anxious tone of his  
 
correspondence and diary point to a man not in control of events. His fanciful  
 
and self-deluding diary entry for 11 March would seem to confirm this  
 
judgement, as he claimed that he had exerted considerable influence in the  
 
drafting of the declaration, that had been the end product of the education he  
 
had given his colleagues in India matters, over the last two years.94 
      
    Once Linlithgow learned that Cripps was coming, he realised that he would  
 
have to cooperate. Nevertheless, he immediately asked Amery to ensure that his  
 
position of authority in India would not be undermined by Churchill’s statements,  
 
or by any instructions given to Cripps by the War Cabinet.95 
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Important Correspondence and Opinions before the Start of the 
Mission 
 
Before Cripps commenced work, Amery corresponded regularly with Linlithgow.  
 
The Secretary of State’s telegrams initially concerned the practical arrangements  
 
for Cripps’ visit, including his offer to loan his Private Secretary, Frank Turnbull,  
 
to the Lord Privy Seal for the whole of his time in India. Of more significance for  
 
the conduct of the mission was Amery’s support for Cripps’ suggestion that, after  
 
two days of meeting with Linlithgow, his Executive Council, and some provincial  
 
governors, he should move with his entourage to a separate house in Delhi,  
 
where he could interview Indian politicians.96 Amery would have gained a little  
 
comfort from the fact that Coupland, in Delhi conducting his constitutional  
 
research, was added to the team assisting Cripps.97 Similarly he realised that  
 
Hodson, his appointee as Reforms Commissioner, would be present in the  
 
Linlithgow camp throughout the negotiations. 
 
     Amery soon became aware that there could be difficulties with paragraph (e)  
 
of the declaration, which stated that, ‘His Majesty’s Government must inevitably  
 
bear responsibility for Indian defence’. As this phrase concerned a likely area of  
 
immediate reform, its interpretation was more than mere semantics. The  
 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, sought clarity from Amery,  
 
fearing that, at a time of rapidly worsening sterling balances with India,  
 
implementation of the declaration could increase Britain’s financial commitments,  
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as well its political and military responsibilities.98 Amery, one of the few ministers  
 
to understand the technicalities of Britain’s financial relationship with  
 
India was alarmed by Wood’s concern, and immediately put the matter in the  
 
hands of his senior officials, Monteath and W.D. Croft. Their two detailed  
 
minutes of 16 March and 17 March reassured Amery that the wording of the  
 
declaration referred only to strategic and military issues, and recommended that  
 
Cripps should be briefed to this effect.99 Amery reflected for a few days on this 
 
advice from the India Office, but while accepting that Britain would not be  
 
contracting any more financial obligations, explained to Wood that any mention  
 
of the matter to Cripps could jeopardise ‘the bargaining atmosphere’.100 
 
     As the start of Cripps’ negotiations approached, Amery looked forward with  
 
suspicion and sober realism, rather than optimism, suspecting that British left  
 
wing newspapers were poised to denounce the mission as a Conservative ploy to  
 
use Cripps to advance the policies of Churchill and Amery. He was especially  
 
sombre, when he admitted that his speeches had received a poor reception from  
 
Hindu politicians, and with uncharacteristic humility conceded that in the  
 
eighteen months since the August offer, he had not been able to make a  
 
significant contribution to a political settlement in India.101 
 
     Once Churchill had announced the mission, Linlithgow was able to report a  
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variety of responses from Indians. Nehru and Jinnah chose to say nothing until  
 
they had been given more time, but Azad, Rajagopalachari and Sapru all gave  
 
qualified approval to the forthcoming negotiations.102 Similarly, representatives of  
 
the Sikhs, Scheduled Castes, and the Chamber of Princes provided cautious  
 
support.103  
 
 
Cripps’ Meetings with the Viceroy’s Executive Council 
 
A scrutiny of Amery’s diary, and both his private and official correspondence,  
 
reveal that he was told little about Cripps’ first few days in India. On 24 March,  
 
Cripps differed with Linlithgow over the responsibility for making appointments to  
 
an Executive Council, reconstructed within the terms of the declaration. Cripps  
 
had handed the Viceroy a list of the members of a completely new Council, made  
 
up entirely of nominated Hindus and Muslims. Not surprisingly, Linlithgow  
 
demurred.104 Cripps merely replied that whatever he or Linlithgow did, final  
 
responsibility for the selection of personnel in the Executive remained with the  
 
War Cabinet.105 
 
     Before Cripps had discussions with anyone else, he issued a statement to the  
 
press, which although revealing no details of the declaration, gave an effusive  
 
account of his affection for India, and an expression of his desire for a short  
 
visit, with no long-winded meetings. In admitting his previous close association  
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with Congress politicians, he asserted that he would be speaking to  
 
representatives of other parties and faiths with an open mind.106  
 
     When Cripps read out the declaration to the Executive Council he swore the  
 
members to secrecy, but did agree to answer questions, which bearing in mind  
 
the diverse nature of his audience, were wide ranging. Although Cripps  
 
responded to enquiries relating to both the immediate and post war situations, it  
 
would later emerge that many Council members felt slighted by their  
 
treatment.107 Indeed, one of Amery’s few early actions was to confirm to  
 
Linlithgow that, although he would prefer three official members to remain on  
 
the Executive, the difficulties in even appointing an Indian unofficial Finance or  
 
Defence member were not insuperable.108 
 
 
Cripps and the First Meetings with Indian Politicians 
 
In truth, Cripps had been impatient to speak to Indian politicians, and after brief  
 
meetings with provincial governors, spent the next few days away from the  
 
Viceregal palace, conducting interviews, on his own, with a large number of  
 
Indian politicians.109 Although, at this stage, the details of the declaration had  
 
not been officially divulged, he had been sufficiently explicit to invite responses  
 
to both the long term plans for constitutional reform, and also the possible  
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changes that could be made immediately.110 The minority groups such as the  
 
Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikhs rejected the proposals, the former chiefly  
 
because they disliked the provincial opt-out, and the latter because they feared  
 
the partition of the Punjab.111  
      
      However the first meetings with Azad, the Congress President, and Jinnah,  
 
representing the Muslim League, held out more hope of a settlement. Cripps’  
 
account of his meeting with Azad was a matter of fact record of the Congress  
 
desire to have an Indian in charge of the defence of the country.112 Azad, whose  
 
grasp of English was not perfect, believed that Cripps had offered full  
 
Indianisation of the Executive Council, and more importantly, the end of the  
 
Viceregal veto.113  
 
     The proceedings of his interview with Jinnah were less obscure, as the  
 
Muslim leader showed surprise at the apparent progress towards meeting his  
 
case for Pakistan, and was even prepared to consider any interim arrangements  
 
that gave proper representation to his people in a Viceroy’s Executive that would  
 
operate as a cabinet.114 When Cripps met Gandhi on 27 March, he found the  
 
Mahatma polite, but opposed to the declaration, on the joint grounds that the  
 
princely states were still too undemocratic, and that insufficient safeguards for  
 
the unity of India had been provided.115  
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Cripps and the Press Conference on 29 March 
 
Cripps took the initiative when, having obtained the permission of the War  
 
Cabinet, he made the contents of the declaration public at a press conference on  
 
29 March.116 As Cripps realised that the true sticking point for his mission was  
 
the matter of responsibility for the defence of India, he chose his words  
 
carefully, but nevertheless went further than Linlithgow or Amery would have  
 
wanted. Although he still emphasised that the defence of India was the joint  
 
responsibility of the British Government and the Government of India, he  
 
conceded that the conventions of the constitution could be altered in such a way  
 
as to permit the Executive Council to become a Cabinet.117 When Amery saw the  
 
approbation that the proposals had received in the British press, he did not  
 
appear to notice Cripps’ gloss on the machinery of government in India, and  
 
indeed remarked with some irony, that none of the coverage had linked him with  
 
the declaration.118 
 
     Cripps’ optimism did not last long. A friendly, but fruitless conversation with  
 
Nehru on 30 March convinced him that, while the defence issue was the specific  
 
area of disagreement, Gandhi and his pacifistic colleagues on the Congress  
 
Working Committee were still opposed to the declaration on general grounds.119  
 
Cripps attempted to rescue the situation when he wrote to Churchill, via Amery  
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and Linlithgow, and in stressing how dangerous matters had become, still  
 
believed that there could be an Indian responsible for defence, without  
 
compromising the operational freedom of the Commander-in-Chief.120  Amery  
 
lost no time in supporting Cripps by writing to Churchill, endorsing this  
 
suggestion, an opinion that he repeated at a meeting of the War Cabinet, later  
 
that day.121  
 
     Cripps certainly had cause for pessimism, as on the day after his appeal  
 
to Churchill he was obliged to send him a further telegram, after a meeting  
 
with Nehru and Azad. They had brought a resolution passed by the Congress  
 
Working Committee that rejected the proposals in the declaration, especially  
 
those relating to the control of defence, which were described as ‘vague and  
 
incomplete’.122  
 
     Amery’s view prevailed at the meeting of the War Cabinet on 2 April, and it  
 
was agreed that Churchill should indicate to Cripps how far he could go in his  
 
negotiations with Congress over the role that an Indian could play in defence.123  
 
The telegram to Cripps authorising him to go ahead was drafted by Churchill, but  
 
finally amended by Amery, so as to be helpful, yet wary of the intentions of  
 
Congress. Above all, Cripps was told that he could not agree anything with Azad  
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and Nehru, without obtaining War Cabinet approval.124  
 
     The next two days brought evidence to Amery that Linlithgow was becoming  
 
anxious about Cripps’ activities. The Viceroy felt that he needed to acquaint the  
 
War Cabinet with his own worries and those of the Commander-in-Chief.125  
 
Initially, he was willing to show any such telegrams to Cripps, but later  
 
suggested that provided Churchill agreed, they should be sent directly to  
 
London.126  
   
 
Cripps’ Search for Help in Finding a Defence Formula 
 
By the time Cripps wrote to Churchill on 4 April, he had already sought fresh  
 
assistance in finding a politically acceptable formula concerning India’s wartime  
 
role.127 He asked Shiva Rao, the Congress politician and journalist, to assemble a  
 
small sub-committee to produce a solution that might appeal to both sides. Aided  
 
by V. P. Menon, who was working in the Reforms Office, Sapru, Rajagopalachari,  
 
and B. N. Rau, he drafted a plan recommending that Executive Council members  
 
should operate under collective responsibility, and also that the War Cabinet  
 
would always have the final say in the defence of India. As a gloss to this latter  
 
point, the Indian Defence Minister, and the British Commander-in-Chief would  
 
cooperate fully, although each would have their own clearly defined areas of  
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responsibility.128 
 
     There was some evidence of these ideas, when, Cripps wrote to Churchill on  
 
4 April, setting out a number of options regarding the functions and  
 
responsibilities of an Indian responsible for defence. His preference was for the  
 
riskier step of awarding the Defence portfolio to an Indian, subject to a  
 
convention, providing that in matters relating directly to the prosecution of the  
 
war, the Commander-in-Chief would have primacy. With a sense of realism, he  
 
suspected that this option would not commend itself to Wavell, the incumbent,  
 
and also proposed that an Indian, who held the defence portfolio would only be  
 
allocated functions that the Commander-in-Chief felt that it was safe to  
 
transfer.129  
 
 
Amery’s Opinions on a Change of Function for the Viceroy’s Executive 
Council 
      
The expressions of disapproval in Amery’s diary referred to Cripps’ suggestion for  
 
changing the constitutional position of the Executive Council, but made no  
 
detailed mention of the various choices put forward for Indian involvement in  
 
defence.130 It was not long before Linlithgow echoed Amery’s general misgivings.  
 
On 5 April, he told Amery that, while he had substantial concerns about  
 
offending the Muslim League and the princes if Cripps’ negotiations became too  
 
protracted, he was prepared to do his best to reach a compromise on the  
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defence issue.131 His telegram on the following day, addressed to both Churchill  
 
and Amery, was far more sombre in tone, and although still conceding that a  
 
division of defence responsibilities was still theoretically possible, remained  
 
adamant that any form of quasi-cabinet government was out of the question. In  
 
particular, he insisted that he must retain his veto over the Executive Council,  
 
and still be finally answerable to the British Parliament.132 
 
     Surprisingly, Amery was unclear about the meaning of Cripps’ proposals for  
 
the operation of the Viceroy’s Executive. When Churchill telephoned him from  
 
Chequers, he was unable to give him more than the vague opinion that the  
 
outcome of Cripps’ constitutional proposals was simply the addition of a few  
 
non-official Indians to the Executive Council.133   
 
     When Cripps’ latest ideas were put to the India Committee and the War  
 
Cabinet on 6 April, members were also made aware of the trenchant views of a  
 
former colleague, as well as erstwhile enemy, Jan Smuts, the South African  
 
Prime Minister. Smuts used the importance of India to the defence of the British  
 
Empire to underline the dangers of dividing military control, and stressed the  
 
need to keep all responsibility with the Commander-in-Chief.134 Amery had  
 
quickly recovered his focus on the constitutional difficulties that would arise if the  
 
Executive Council became a quasi-Cabinet, in which the Viceroy had no power of  
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veto, and showed that he had mastered the subtleties of the Indian defence  
 
options put forward by Cripps. His memorandum on these matters survived two  
 
meetings of the India Committee as well as a War Cabinet meeting, without  
 
serious amendment, and formed the basis of a telegram that he was told to  
 
send to Cripps, via Linlithgow. Amery accepted that Cripps was prepared to  
 
respect the Viceroy in Council as responsible to the Secretary of State, and asked  
 
him to list the defence functions that could be transferred to a representative  
 
Indian.135     
 
     As the British press were anxious to learn more about the latest constitutional  
 
position in India, Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, persuaded Amery to  
 
conduct a press conference. On 7 April, he answered a large number of  
 
questions with his usual circumlocution, speaking on many more matters than  
 
the present state of Cripps’ negotiations. As usual he sought to place the latest  
 
declaration as the logical development of the August offer, and was careful to  
 
spend more time on the rights of Muslims and the Princes than he had done in  
 
his correspondence with Cripps and Linlithgow. He was also frank in his  
 
prediction that Congress was likely to use its members’ dislike of Cripps’  
 
proposals for an Indian Defence Minister, as an excuse for rejecting the complete  
 
declaration. In his view, Congress had become so entrenched in their position  
 
that nothing short of the immediate transfer of the entire governance of the  
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country to Indians would suffice.136 
 
 
Cripps Final Attempt to Reach a Settlement 
 
From 7 April until 10 April, when Congress announced its final rejection of all  
 
parts of the declaration, Amery could only play a reactive role in London.  
 
Cripps was encouraged to produce a last suitable formula for settlement soon  
 
after 3 April, when Colonel Louis Johnson, Roosevelt’s personal representative,  
 
arrived in Delhi.137 The grounds for renewed optimism came from a meeting that  
 
Johnson had on 5 April with Nehru and Azad, during which the American  
 
believed that he had persuaded them to accept the plans for an Indian defence  
 
representative put forward by Cripps on 4 April.138  
 
     Congress politicians were well aware of Roosevelt’s desire for a settlement  
 
that would galvanise India’s war effort, and buoyed by this knowledge, Cripps  
 
wrote to Azad on 7 April proposing that the Commander-in-Chief should remain  
 
on the Viceroy’s Executive Council with the title, War Member. He also  
 
suggested that an Indian representative would be added to the Executive Council  
 
to take over the functions that could be separated from the Commander-in- 
 
Chief, and also to lead the Defence Coordination Department, at that time still 
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under the direct control of the Viceroy.139 
      
     When Nehru met Johnson, later on 7 April, he indicated that he would not be  
 
able to persuade the Congress Working Committee to accept Cripps’ proposal,  
 
but promised that he could give half a day’s grace before a final rejection of the  
 
declaration was issued.140 Without consulting the Viceroy, or the India Office,  
 
Johnson had a further meeting with Cripps on 8 April. Hodson was also present  
 
when Johnson explained that he had produced a new formula on the allocation  
 
of responsibilities for defence that Nehru told him Congress would accept. This 
 
simple idea, readily accepted by Cripps was, in effect an inversion of the  
 
proposal sent to Azad on the previous day.141 In an attempt to convince  
 
Congress that they were not being offered an inferior option, Johnson and Cripps  
 
proposed that the defence portfolio should be offered immediately to an Indian,  
 
with responsibility for operational matters retained by the Commander- 
 
in-Chief.142 
 
     Although this was not sent formally to Congress, a copy in Cripps’  
 
handwriting was sent immediately, and unofficially to them.143  The Congress  
 
Working Committee used the Johnson-Cripps formula as the basis for a revision  
 
of their own, that further strengthened the powers of the Indian Defence  
 
Minister, and only provided for the Commander-in-Chief to be an extraordinary  
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member of the Executive Council.144 Cripps was able to negotiate a partial  
 
softening of this Congress amendment, that would enable the Commander-in- 
 
Chief to be a full member of the Executive Council, and retain control of the  
 
Indian armed forces.145  
 
    Only at this point, late in the evening of 8 April, did Cripps show the new  
 
defence formula to the Viceroy. Linlithgow was surprisingly phlegmatic about this  
 
final redraft, and asked for more time in which to consider it. However, on the  
 
issue of protocol, he left Cripps in no doubt as to his anger at the ‘manner in  
 
which he and the Commander-in-Chief had been passed over’.146 
     
  
Final Congress Rejection 
 
Immediately after his meeting with Cripps, Linlithgow sent a number of  
 
telegrams to Amery, enclosing the text of the latest Johnson-Cripps formula, but  
 
making little comment on the division of responsibilities between the  
 
Commander-in-Chief and a putative Indian defence minister. Nevertheless, he  
 
left Amery under no illusion about his sense of grievance, because Cripps, aided  
 
by Johnson, had effectively negotiated with Congress without consulting him.  
 
Although he expressed his willingness, to work with any proposals approved by  
 
the War Cabinet, he made it clear that he could not take responsibility for any  
 
detailed problems that might arise from a flawed settlement that had been made  
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over his head.147 Amery was full of suspicion when he read these telegrams,  
 
deploring the new formula as well as both the subterfuge employed by Cripps,  
 
and the involvement of Johnson. Unsurprisingly, after he had spoken to Churchill  
 
the whole matter was put before the India Committee and the War Cabinet.148 
 
     Before any decision was made as to whether Cripps could proceed with  
 
negotiations over this latest amendment, Amery sought the legal and  
 
constitutional opinions of his officials at the India Office. Somewhat to his  
 
surprise, Major-General Lockhart, a military adviser and P.J. Patrick, an Assistant  
 
Under-Secretary, saw little in the proposed arrangements that was objectionable  
 
in administrative or military terms.149 Monteath’s legal analysis endorsed the  
 
proposed division of defence duties, but underlined the constitutional impropriety  
 
if the executive authority of the Viceroy in Council were to be amended.150 
 
     The War Cabinet meeting on 9 April deprecated Cripps’ tactics as well as the  
 
intervention of Johnson. The latest formula regarding defence was not ruled out,  
 
but it was felt that matters had moved too far away from the text of the  
 
declaration, especially paragraph (e) concerning the immediate future.151 
 
Amery recorded that the members of the War Cabinet, although unhappy at  
 
events in Delhi, were still confused as to what had been offered to Congress. For  
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his own part, he feared that Cripps had offered all the posts on the Executive  
 
Council to non-official Indians.152 As a consequence, two separate telegrams  
 
were drafted by Amery and Simon, and sent on behalf of the War Cabinet to  
 
Cripps. These asked for clarification on both the overall constitutional position, as  
 
well as the more detailed issue of the division of defence responsibilities.153 
 
     By the time Churchill had written to Cripps ostensibly offering him a vote of  
 
confidence, but in reality chiding him for having exceeded his brief, Congress had  
 
already decided it could not accept provisions in the declaration.154 Azad’s letter  
 
of 10 April to Cripps, setting out the grounds for rejection, ran to almost five  
 
pages. Using the context of an imminent invasion by the Japanese, Azad  
 
repeated the arguments that had been employed in the unpublished Congress  
 
Working Committee resolution sent to Cripps on 2 April, but with the addition of  
 
the reasons for dissatisfaction over the recent negotiations over the defence  
 
issue. Despite the concessions offered by Cripps and Johnson, Azad was  
 
adamant that Indians were still not being given a proper say in the defence of  
 
their country. 
 
      This argument was reinforced by Congress disappointment over British  
 
reluctance to transform the Viceroy’s Executive Council, by the use of a  
 
convention, rather than legal changes, into a national government and a cabinet  
 
in which the Viceroy was merely a constitutional head. Of particular interest to  
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Amery would have been the comment that the failure to bring a new  
 
psychological approach to the governance of India was characterised by the  
 
continuance of the India Office, which had been a ‘symbol of evil to Congress’.155 
 
     In many ways, Jinnah and the Muslim League were little more than observers  
 
when these frenzied negotiations were taking place between Cripps and  
 
Congress. However, they had been watching matters closely and also chose to  
 
issue their own rejection of the provisions in the declaration. On 11 April a  
 
detailed resolution was published, appreciating that the opt-out provisions in the  
 
declaration envisaged the possibility of Pakistan. However, the Muslim League  
 
believed that Britain regarded this as only a theoretical possibility, rather than  
 
something practical and attainable, as they had allowed for no debate on the  
 
electoral arrangements by which a separate state of Pakistan might be  
 
achieved.156 
 
 
The Reactions of Churchill, Amery and Linlithgow to the Failure of the 
Mission 
 
Churchill wasted little time, not in castigating Cripps, but in telling him that  
 
the effect of his mission in Britain and the United States ‘had been wholly  
 
beneficial’. He believed that the breakdown occurred over broader issues, rather  
 
than the small print of the allocation of defence duties, and that therefore, by  
 
implication, Congress would be regarded as intransigent in the face of a fair  
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offer.157 His war memoirs, written some nine years later, were cryptic in the  
 
extreme about his feelings over the failure of the mission, and admitted only that  
 
he was philosophical about an outcome that he always thought probable.158 
      
     By contrast, Amery offered far more in the way of his opinions, both in his  
 
diary, draft memoirs, and correspondence. Initially he believed Cripps had been  
 
close to offering a Sapru type of national government to Congress, and that he  
 
had been spared the ignominy of having to withdraw any offer of a convention  
 
that would be used to adjust the constitution.159 He was also unwilling to take, at  
 
face value, Cripps’ assertion that ‘the matter of a national government had been  
 
sprung on him’ at the last minute by Nehru and Azad. Furthermore, he suspected  
 
that Cripps had been prepared to hand over all posts on the Executive Council to  
 
non-official Indians, against the wishes of the Viceroy. In summary he recorded  
 
that ‘we are well out of the wood, and can go ahead with the war with a clear  
 
conscience’.160  
     
     Amery’s unpublished memoirs deal in greater detail with the possible  
 
difficulties with the Muslim League that had been avoided by the failure of the  
 
mission, but some years after the events, there was new material regarding the  
 
responsibility for the final breakdown of the negotiations. Instead of making a  
 
general condemnation of the Congress Working Committee, Amery believed that  
 
a two hour telephone conversation between Gandhi and his colleagues had  
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turned the possibility of acceptance into certain rejection.161 
 
     Amery’s first letter to Linlithgow offered little sympathy. Indeed, he largely  
 
blamed Linlithgow for having kept Whitehall in the dark, almost as much as he  
 
suspected that Cripps had done. With an eye to any future negotiations, he  
 
asked the Viceroy bluntly how far he would have been prepared to go in making  
 
concessions to Congress. Linlithgow’s manuscript comments in the copy of this  
 
telegram were terse, and showed exactly what he thought about Amery’s  
 
questions. In particular he underlined how much he had been bypassed by  
 
Cripps, and misled over the issue of complete Indianisation of the Viceroy’s  
 
Executive that he was informed had been agreed in London.162 
 
 
American Reaction to the Breakdown of the Negotiations 
 
As soon as Roosevelt learned that Congress had rejected the proposals in the  
 
declaration he sent an urgent message to Churchill, via his special envoy, Harry  
 
Hopkins, who, at the time was in London.  Roosevelt stated firmly that public  
 
opinion in the United States did not believe that ‘the negotiations had broken  
 
down on general and broad issues’. It was the President’s view that Americans  
 
blamed the British Government for being unwilling to hand self-government to  
 
Indians during the war, when it was apparently prepared to grant independence  
 
at the end of hostilities. He implored Churchill to keep Cripps in India in order to  
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a have a final attempt at arriving at a settlement, although with the chilling  
 
comment that if India fell to the Japanese, Americans would lay considerable  
 
blame with the British.163 
 
     Churchill regarded Roosevelt’s comments with some disdain, and before  
 
sending a short telegram declining to keep Cripps in Delhi, discussed the matter  
 
with Hopkins. Although it is improbable that Amery would not have been  
 
consulted about the content of Churchill’s reply, there is surprisingly no reference  
 
to the matter in his papers. In any event, Churchill informed Roosevelt that as  
 
his telegram had been addressed to him as ‘the Former Naval Person’, the whole  
 
matter would remain private, and not be put before the War Cabinet.164 For the  
 
the remainder of the war, India did not appear on the agenda of any of the  
 
wartime conferences attended by the two leaders. 
 
 
The Parliamentary Debate on the Cripps Mission 
 
Before the debate on the Cripps Mission in the House of Commons on 28 April,  
 
there was correspondence between Linlithgow and Amery that concentrated as  
 
much on what was going to be said in the debate, as on conducting a post- 
 
mortem on the failed negotiations. Before Cripps had returned to London, Amery  
 
marshalled his thoughts on the constitutional developments and initiatives that  
 
had taken place since his appointment in May 1940. Despite his hope that the  
 
                                        
163 Roosevelt to Former Naval Person (via Hopkins), 12 April 1942, R/30/1/1: ff 5 – 8. It should 
be remembered that at this time there had been substantial Allied shipping losses in the Bay of 
Bengal. Once the Japanese fleet left the area, they did not return. 
164 Former Naval Person to Roosevelt, 12 April 1942, R/30/1/1: ff 2 – 4. 
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drafting of the latest declaration would end the deadlock created by his earlier  
 
insistence that unity was the prerequisite for any reform, he regretted that the  
 
different communities had not even spoken to each other when Cripps was in  
 
India.  Nevertheless, he stressed that the offer had not been withdrawn, and at  
 
some point there would be an Indian responsible for defence.165 
 
     Before the debate, the British Government had issued a White Paper that  
 
reproduced in full the major documents relevant to the Cripps Mission. Starting  
 
with Churchill’s announcement of the mission to the Commons on 11 March  
 
1942, and the text of the original draft declaration, there were also the  
 
responses of all groups, as well as the correspondence between Cripps and Azad.  
 
Although this constituted excellent briefing for members wishing to contribute to  
 
the debate, there was nothing included in the way of review or analysis by the  
 
War Cabinet, or the India Office.166 
 
     In the event Cripps made a lengthy, but straightforward speech, with very  
 
little to annoy either Linlithgow or Amery, although the latter admitted to having  
 
needed to exercise some minor influence in a sub-editing capacity.167 In a  
 
speech that was free of rancour, if not sadness, Cripps stressed that whatever  
 
else may have been concluded, he did not seek a settlement that was outside  
 
the boundaries of the Indian constitution, even at the eleventh hour when  
 
                                        
165 Amery, note on the Indian situation, 24 April 1942, L/P & J/10/2: ff 28 – 32. 
166 Government White Paper, India (Lord Privy Seal’s Mission) April 1942, Cmd. 6350. 
167 Amery diary, 23 April 1942, AMEL 7/36. Amery admitted that he was not successful in 
persuading Cripps to alter his statement that, in a new union the princes would not be subject to 
the paramountcy of the Crown. 
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attempting to overcome Congress objections over the defence portfolio.  
 
     After a number of speeches which praised the gallantry of Cripps, but not  
 
necessarily his judgement, or that of the London and Delhi administrations,  
 
Amery was able to respond. He did not give any indication that Cripps might  
 
have exceeded his brief by offering to give away all posts on the Viceroy’s  
 
Executive, and laid the blame squarely with Congress, who wanted a national  
 
government that was accountable to no one.168 
 
 
An Assessment of Amery’s Influence before and during the Cripps 
Mission 
 
The logical starting point for any appraisal of Amery’s role in the Cripps mission  
 
must be in Louis’ book, In the Name of God, Go!. There, the point is made that  
 
Amery was not ‘baffled and blown about by the storm of policy battlefields’, and  
 
played an important role as conciliator.169 If being a conciliator meant arbitrating  
 
between the main players, this was certainly not his function. However if his  
 
behaviour can be described as a prolonged attempt to soothe Linlithgow’s  
 
wounded feelings, then this probably did amount to conciliation.  
 
     It cannot be doubted that Amery took some time to suppress his suspicions  
 
of Cripps, especially in respect of the latter’s long, and previously friendly  
 
relationships with Nehru, and other Congress members. Nevertheless,  
 
whatever his dislike of the pressures that had led to a mission that could only  
 
                                        
168 Hansard, 28 April 1942, Vol. 379, cc 826 – 917. 
169 Louis, In the Name of God, Go!, p. 153. Cited by W. H. Morris, Political Quarterly, Volume 4 
(January – March 1973), p. 94.  
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distract the Viceroy’s attention from the Indian war effort, he needed to be  
 
certain that the venture, at least initially, had Churchill’s support. 
     
     If there had been a campaign by Linlithgow and Churchill to sabotage the  
 
negotiations during their latter stages, it was certainly not enjoined by Amery.  
 
Moore suggested that an organised axis of Churchill and Linlithgow had  
 
deliberately ensured the failure of the mission, but the pattern and content of all  
 
the telegrams between London and Delhi indicates that, although both men were  
 
ultimately relieved by the breakdown, there was little, or no collusion between  
 
them.170  Considering Amery’s predilection for intrigue, and the position of the  
 
India Office vis-à-vis London and Delhi, it is highly likely that he would have been  
 
involved if there had been any clandestine planning to ruin Cripps’ negotiations.  
 
      
                                        
170 Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, pp. 115 – 132. The main area of common ground between 
Churchill and Linlithgow was their dislike of a quasi-cabinet system for the Viceroy’s Executive 
Council. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
‘QUIT INDIA’, GANDHI’S FAST AND SOCIAL REFORM IN INDIA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 Although from May 1942 until June 1943 there was not as many constitutional  
 
reform initiatives as during the early years of the war, there were nevertheless a  
 
number of important issues, both in relations between the British and Indians,  
 
and also in the conduct of the war. The threat of a military invasion by Japan  
 
remained for several months, and provided the context for a worsening of  
 
relations between Congress and the British that found its expression in the ‘Quit  
 
India’ movement. This was a protest that went far beyond the milder civil  
 
disobedience of the 1940/41 Satyagraha campaign, and was firmly suppressed  
 
by the Government of India. As the campaign lost impetus, Gandhi commenced  
 
his fast, which proved to be all the more troublesome for Britain as both China  
 
and the USA sought to exercise some form of influence over events in India. 
    
     Apart from their acrimonious exchanges on the technically complicated, but  
 
politically difficult aspects of Britain’s rapidly growing adverse sterling balances  
 
with India, Amery spent a good part of the next twelve months on better terms  
 
with Churchill.1 Their fundamental differences continued over the role and status  
 
of the British Empire, but they were far more united in terms of the action  
 
required to suppress the Congress insurrection, and also the response to  
 
                                        
1 The issue of Britain’s sterling balances with India will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 206 
Gandhi’s fast.2 Each shared considerable impatience at attempts by China and  
 
the USA to interfere, both as regards the imprisonment of Congress leaders,  
 
especially Gandhi, and also in the promotion of attempts to set up a national  
 
government in India.  
 
     It had already been apparent during the latter part of the Cripps mission that 
 
Amery’s influence on events in Delhi had begun to ebb away. Furthermore, he  
 
often did his authority and reputation at the India Office few favours with his  
 
unwelcome interventions on matters outside his remit. In particular, he spoke  
 
critically about both the civil and military organisation of the war effort, often  
 
reflecting with some nostalgia on the nature of governance during the final two  
 
years of the Great War.3  
 
      
Further Expansion of the Viceroy’s Executive Council 
      
Considering the degree of disappointment felt in Britain at the end of Cripps’  
 
negotiations, Amery was able to tell Linlithgow that, apart from the debate in the  
 
House of Commons on 28 April, there had been little retrospective consideration  
 
of the mission.4 Nevertheless, there was a feeling in London and Delhi that ‘the  
 
situation was not, and could not be as though Cripps had never been to India’.5 
 
     Accordingly, in an attempt to improve the Indian war effort without the  
 
cooperation of Congress, Linlithgow proposed to increase his Executive Council  
                                        
2 Amery diary, 10 May 1942, AMEL 7/36.  
3 Amery diary, 20 April 1942, AMEL 7/36.  
4 Amery to Linlithgow, 6 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. Linlithgow’s manuscript comment next 
to the relevant paragraph in Amery’s letter was the single Urdu word Shabash, or 
‘congratulations!’ 
5 Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, p. 206. 
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to fifteen members, and also asked provincial governors about the feasibility of  
 
introducing non-official advisers into the operation of local governance. The  
 
matter of enlarging the Executive Council had been approved at the meeting of  
 
the War Cabinet on 2 February 1942, but had not been implemented while  
 
Cripps was still in India.6 Linlithgow sent his detailed, but provisional proposals to  
 
fill five vacancies on his Executive Council to Amery on 3 May 1942, and his long  
 
carefully argued telegram stressed the need for communal balance. His most  
 
important recommendation was that the respected Muslim, Firoz Khan Noon,  
 
should fill the new post of Defence Coordinator that had been at the centre of  
 
Cripps’ negotiations.7 
 
     Although Amery fully commended the Viceroy’s plans to the India Committee  
 
that met on 11 May 1942, his own view was that more British members were  
 
required on the Executive in order to block any request by the Muslim League for  
 
parity of membership with Hindus.8 However, at this meeting, discussion centred  
 
on the merits of a split Defence portfolio, a matter that had been such a source  
 
of recent controversy. The somewhat disingenuous conclusion of the India  
 
Committee was that the Viceroy should be asked to confirm whether the  
 
suggested arrangements for Defence had been put forward for political or  
 
administrative reasons. If the latter situation applied, the India Committee would  
 
give their approval subject to the agreement of Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief,  
                                        
6 War Cabinet conclusions, 2 February 1942, CAB 65/25/14. 
7 Linlithgow to Amery, 3 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/27. The five vacancies consisted of two 
replacements, in addition to the three new posts.  
8 Amery, India Committee memorandum, 6 May 1942, L/P & J/8/537: ff 298 – 305. Also, Amery 
diary, 30 April 1942, AMEL 7/36.  
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India.9 A disgusted Amery immediately remarked that these attempts to reform  
 
the Defence portfolio were ‘political eyewash’.10 
          
     Linlithgow responded in the most trenchant terms on 20 May 1942, leaving  
 
the Secretary of State in no doubt that, whatever their constitutional relationship,  
 
it could only be in exceptional circumstances that he should not get his way over  
 
appointments to his Executive Council.  Although he conceded that dividing the  
 
Defence duties was a political measure, he had no qualms because Wavell as  
 
Commander-in-Chief, had readily agreed to work in partnership with Firoz Khan  
 
Noon.11 
 
     Amery had been sufficiently shaken by the strength of Linlithgow’s resolve to  
 
have separate discussions with Cripps and Attlee, and managed to persuade  
 
them that the Viceroy’s grievances should not be discussed at another meeting  
 
of the India Committee, but should be put directly to the War Cabinet.12 Amery’s  
 
decision to bypass the essentially hostile India Committee in order to support the  
 
Viceroy proved to be wise. The War Cabinet minutes for 26 May 1942 recorded  
 
that, although certain members had reservations about Linlithgow’s proposals, it  
 
was felt nevertheless that his responsibility for running his Council should not be  
 
undermined.13 Amery’s exultant diary entry made it clear that it was only his  
 
appeal to Churchill to support the beleaguered Viceroy that had finally decided  
 
 
                                        
9 India Committee conclusions, 11 May 1942, L/P & J/8/544: ff 92 – 94. 
10 Amery diary, 11 May 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
11 Linlithgow to Amery, 20 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22. 
12 Amery diary, 21 May 1942, AMEL 7/36.  
13 War Cabinet conclusions, 26 May 1942, CAB 65/26/24. 
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the matter.14 
 
     Following his experiences as Assistant Cabinet Secretary during the Great  
 
War, Amery was receptive to Linlithgow’s suggestion that a member of his  
 
Executive Council should be invited to meetings of the Pacific Council and the  
 
War Cabinet.15 Eventually, two Indians were chosen, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar  
 
from the Executive Council and the Maharajah Jam Saheb of Nawangar, a  
 
representative of the princes. When Churchill disagreed, Amery sought specialist  
 
advice from Monteath before sending a firm note to the Prime Minister,  
 
explaining why there were no constitutional impediments to both Indians  
 
attending the War Cabinet. By way of humour, he forecast that both men were  
 
likely to be taciturn, and not be ‘a couple of brown Earl Pages’.16 Churchill’s  
 
cryptic minute of acceptance merely prophesied that ‘we shall have to take the  
 
Albert Hall for our War Cabinet meetings’.17 
 
 
Congress Response to the Failure of the Cripps Mission 
 
Whatever the inadequacy of the offer that Congress believed had been made by  
 
Cripps, the final breakdown brought bitter disappointment, especially as their  
 
leaders thought it unlikely that British and Indian troops would be able to defend  
 
the vulnerable potential points that could be attacked by Japanese forces.18  
 
                                        
14 Amery diary, 26 May 1942. AMEL 7/36. 
15 Linlithgow to Amery, 3 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/27. 
16 Minute by Monteath, 6 June 1942, L/P & J/ 8/560: f 159. Also, Amery to Churchill, 6 June 
1942, L/P & J/ 8/560: ff 157 – 158 . Earl Page, a former caretaker Prime Minister of Australia, 
had been appointed as Resident Australian Minister in London from December 1941. 
17 Churchill to Amery, 7 June 1942, L/P & J/8/560: ff 156. 
18 Voigt, India in the Second World War, pp. 139 – 145.   
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Although Jinnah and the Muslim League had not seen enough encouragement  
 
regarding their aspirations for Pakistan, their commitment to the war effort  
 
continued. By contrast, the Congress response was fractured, particularly in the  
 
first few weeks following Cripps’ departure from India.19 
 
     On the one hand, the Congress President, Azad, recognised that his party  
 
was ill-perceived by world opinion, both for its rejection of Cripps’ proposals, and  
 
also for contributing to communal strife. He was also very aware that it was  
 
necessary to develop both national and local strategies in the case of Japanese  
 
incursions into the eastern parts of the country. In conceding that even amongst  
 
his senior colleagues there was confusion and misunderstanding on all matters,  
 
he convened meetings of the Congress Working Committee and the All India  
 
Congress Committee, to run consecutively at Allahabad from 27 April to 2 May.20  
 
On the other hand, Rajagopalachari, took a much more cross-party line, having  
 
wanted to accept Cripps’ offer, and accepted some responsibility for the damage  
 
caused by Congress to communal harmony.21 Indeed, on 23 April he had already  
 
asked his own party members in the Madras Legislature to approach the  
 
Congress Working Committee in order to persuade them to consider the Muslim  
 
claim for separation.22 His suggestion that this should lead to talks with the  
 
Muslim League earned him Gandhi’s displeasure despite having enjoyed earlier  
 
support from Sapru.23  
                                        
19 Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942, p. 287. 
20 Azad, India Wins Freedom, pp. 70 – 73. 
21 Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942, p. 288. 
22 R. K. Murti, C. Rajagopalachari, The True Patriot, New Delhi, Rupa and Co, 2003, p. 43.  
23 Sapru to Sir Jagdish Prasad, 19 April 1942, Hooja, Crusader for Self-Rule, pp. 377 – 378.  
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     The lead in framing the Congress response to both the constitutional and  
 
military position was taken by Gandhi, who did not appear at Allahabad, but sent  
 
his draft resolution through a faithful follower, Mira Behn.24  His extremely radical  
 
proposals provided the basis for the final version of the Congress resolution,  
 
although it is unclear whether he expected them to be approved in their entirety  
 
by the Working Committee.25  His message was clear. Britain was now regarded  
 
as being incapable of defending India, and therefore in the likely event of a  
 
Japanese invasion, opposition would now only be provided through the tactics of  
 
non-violent non-cooperation that, in Gandhi’s view could only work if Britain  
 
immediately abandoned India.26 Only a last minute amendment by Nehru  
 
provided that an occupied India would not become a passive partner of the Axis  
 
powers.27 
 
     A few days before, Linlithgow had sent Amery the substance of the All India  
 
Congress Committee resolution of 1 May, stressing that it had been approved by  
 
a turnout of just 180 members, barely half the number entitled to vote.28 Out of  
 
deference to the pressing need to ratify Linlithgow’s new Executive Council,  
 
Amery waited to comment on the news from Allahabad before informing the  
 
Viceroy that even such a pro-Congress British newspaper as the Manchester  
 
                                        
24 Voigt, India in the Second World War, p. 146. 
25 Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942, pp. 288 – 289. 
26 All India Congress Committee resolution, 1 May 1942, enclosed by Hallett to Linlithgow, 10 
May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105. The complete text, together with full details of the 
amendments, had been intercepted by the local branch of the CID during a raid on the CWC 
premises at Allahabad. 
27 J. Nehru Papers, Post 1947, 1st Instalment, Subject File No. 819, Nehru Memorial Archives and 
Library, New Delhi. Cited by Brown, Nehru, p. 150. 
28 Linlithgow to Amery, 2 May 1942, L/P & J/8/510: f 488. 
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Guardian ‘had washed its hands of them’.29 Amery’s diary entry of 1 May placed  
 
the blame for the resolution squarely with Gandhi, and, with some smugness  
 
added that ‘he had always believed that this would be the outcome’.30 
 
    Nehru and Azad were both relieved when Gandhi modified his position to  
 
permit the retention of Allied troops in India if Britain were to grant self  
 
government. Nehru was anxious to avoid the alienation of American and Chinese  
 
opinion, especially if Japan attacked India.31 Azad felt that Japanese forces would  
 
only be encouraged by the withdrawal of British troops, even if they had only  
 
been able to offer token resistance.32 Although Gandhi recanted to the extent of  
 
admitting that an ‘abrupt withdrawal of Allied troops might lead to the fall of  
 
both India and China’, he still favoured a widespread non-violent protest that he  
 
conceded ‘might not be foolproof’.33 
 
     Although having failed to obtain any practical support for Indian  
 
independence from Roosevelt, and even Chiang Kai-shek, Gandhi continued with  
 
his plans by putting the matter before the Congress Working Committee that sat  
 
at Wardha from 6 July until 14 July. The Resolution, passed on 14 July was long  
 
and wide ranging, arguing at first that Indian political parties had only been  
 
created to meet the conditions imposed by British power, and that in the  
 
eventual absence of that imperial presence would cease to exist. Despite  
                                        
29 Amery to Linlithgow, 6 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/12. Also, leading article Manchester 
Guardian, 6 May 1942. 
30 Amery diary, 1 May 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
31 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharal Nehru, A Biography, Volume One: 1889 – 1947, London, Jonathan 
Cape, 1975, pp. 291 – 294. 
32 Azad, India Wins Freedom, pp. 73 – 75. 
33 Harijan, 28 June 1942. Cited by Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942, p. 291. 
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conceding that Allied forces could remain in India for protection against the  
 
Japanese enemy, the resolution concluded by stating that a British failure to  
 
hand over the government of the country would cause Congress to ‘utilise all the  
 
non-violent strength it had galvanised since 1920 for the vindication of its  
 
prohibited rights and liberty’.34 
 
     The final version of the resolution approved by the All India Congress  
 
Committee on 8 August made only two additions to the July resolution. These  
 
were designed to assuage world wide condemnation of their stance during the  
 
final stages of Cripps’ mission, firstly by promising that the armed forces of a  
 
free India would be put at the disposal of the United Nations, and secondly by 
 
asserting that Congress was not seeking power for its own ends, but for the  
 
benefit of the entire Indian population.35 
 
 
Amery, Linlithgow and the Initial British Response to Gandhi’s 
Campaign 
 
On the evidence of forcibly expressed, but poorly detailed early reports from  
 
provincial Governors, Amery wrote to Linlithgow stating unequivocally that  
 
Congress was ‘going steadily in the wrong direction under Gandhi’s leadership’,  
 
and that, in the event of a Japanese invasion, extreme steps would have to be  
 
taken against the Party.36 He received further menacing, if still vague warnings  
                                        
34 Resolution of the Congress Working Committee, Wardha 14 July 1942. See, Government of 
India, Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances 1942 – 43, White Paper March 1943, Cmd. 
6430. 
35 The ‘Quit India’ Resolution, Text of the resolution adopted by the All India Congress 
Committee, 8 August 1942. Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances, 1942 – 43, Cmd. 6430. 
36 Amery to Linlithgow, 15 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/105. Amery was writing after reading a 
report from Hallett to Linlithgow of 10 May 1942 that had been copied to him, MSS. EUR. F. 
125/105. 
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in the next few weeks, not least when Linlithgow advised him that Gandhi,  
 
during a press conference in Bombay, had indicated his willingness to risk  
 
complete lawlessness in order to remove British rule.37  
 
     Although reports obtained from the Intelligence Bureau of the Home  
 
Department in Delhi offered nothing more specific than a prediction that mass  
 
protests would start in Bombay and Bihar, Amery was cheered by a letter from  
 
Linlithgow who recounted an interview with Gandhi’s secretary, Amrit Kaur, who  
 
described Congress as ‘having been beaten to pulp’, by the failure of the  
 
negotiations with Cripps.38 His grim delight at this news was reinforced by a wish  
 
that Congress would disintegrate completely, and followed an assurance to the  
 
Viceroy that, in any appropriately serious circumstances he would not need to  
 
consult the India Office before arresting Gandhi or Nehru.39 
      
     Amery’s early bellicosity took on a more practical note when he asked  
 
Monteath to compose separate draft telegrams to Linlithgow, firstly stressing the  
 
need for members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council to attack Gandhi’s policy of  
 
non-violent non-cooperation by speaking publicly in support of the war effort,  
 
and secondly for some effective propaganda to be used in both Britain and the  
 
USA to combat the widely held view that the Mahatma was a senile and  
 
ineffective old man.40 
 
                                        
37 Linlithgow to Amery, 18 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. 
38 Linlithgow to Amery, 26 May 1942, L/P & S/13/966 f 79. 
39 Amery to Linlithgow, 28 May 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. 
40 Minute by Monteath, 29 May 1942, L/P & J/8/596: f 240. For the two resulting telegrams, see, 
Amery to Linlithgow, 30 May 1942, L/P & J/8/596: ff 238 – 239, and Amery to Linlithgow, 30 May 
1942, L/P & J/ 8/596: ff 242 – 243.  
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     During this period Linlithgow’s concern for the seriousness of the situation  
 
with Congress varied considerably. He had been advised by Sir Roger Lumley,  
 
Governor of Bombay, that industrial production in the city had now revived after  
 
the early fears of a Japanese invasion, and that in the event of a call for mass  
 
action from Gandhi, there would be little response.41 While Linlithgow was  
 
careful not to underestimate Gandhi, he did not believe that, at this stage, he  
 
commanded enough support to start a new campaign of civil disobedience. For  
 
this reason he was unwilling to take any premature action that would serve only  
 
to produce recruits for Congress.42 On 11 June 1942 he was still sanguine,  
 
believing that documents seized during a police search of the offices of the All- 
 
India Congress Committee revealed deep differences within that organisation.  
 
He was also unsure that Gandhi now believed that Japan could successfully  
 
invade India, and accordingly he felt that there was no immediate case for hasty  
 
disciplinary measures against Gandhi.43 
 
     Within four days the Viceroy had come to a very different conclusion, almost  
 
certainly because his latest intelligence reports confirmed that ‘Nehru had given  
 
in to Gandhi’, and therefore believed that the time had come to have nothing to  
 
do with Congress.44 This new firmer stance hardened still more on reading the  
 
transcript of a long interview that Gandhi had given to a number of American  
 
journalists for publication in Harijan. Whether he was speaking primarily to the  
 
                                        
41 Sir Roger Lumley to Linlithgow, 6 June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56. 
42 Linlithgow to Twynham, 6 June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/63. 
43 Linlithgow to Amery, June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22.  
44 Linlithgow to Amery, 15 June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/22. 
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USA, or not, he repeated his assertion that Britain should leave India, even  
 
without an agreement between Hindus and Muslims.45 
 
 
The First Interest of the War Cabinet in the Impending Insurrection 
 
It was not until several weeks after the Allahabad resolutions that the War  
 
Cabinet began to take a serious interest in the aftermath of the failure of Cripps’  
 
mission. Not surprisingly, the military disasters in the Far East and the perilous  
 
Allied position in Libya, resulting in the fall of Tobruk on 21 June, were  
 
inevitably matters of more interest to British politicians than a possible further  
 
campaign of satyagraha. However, in the light of Linlithgow’s newly increased  
 
concerns, Amery was given approval by the War Cabinet to circulate a  
 
memorandum that would give clear guidance to the Viceroy regarding any  
 
action that he could take, ‘if it became clear that Gandhi was about to stir up  
 
trouble’.46 
     
    Amery wanted Linlithgow to be sure that, despite possible adverse publicity in  
 
China and the USA, he had the War Cabinet’s support if he chose not to give  
 
Gandhi preferential treatment.47 His telegram to Linlithgow was at once cautious  
 
and bellicose. On the one hand, he advised against breaking off relations with  
 
Congress, if only to keep in touch with moderate politicians such as  
 
Rajagopalachari. On the other hand, he thought, whether seriously or not, that  
 
the best way to discipline Gandhi would be to deport him to Uganda by  
 
                                        
45 Linlithgow to Amery, 15 June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29. 
46 War Cabinet conclusions, 15 June 1942, CAB 65/26/35. 
47 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 16 June 1942, CAB 66/26/35. 
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aeroplane.48 
 
     Although Amery did not believe that Britain should flinch from draconian  
 
measures for fear of offending American opinion, he made Halifax aware that full  
 
details of Gandhi’s campaign, and its damaging effects on the Indian war effort  
 
should be made clear to the American President and Secretary of State. He also  
 
assured the Ambassador that he would be given as much notice as possible  
 
before Britain took any firm action.49 Although unwavering in his support for any  
 
necessary action against Congress, Amery was determined that the Government  
 
of India should provide newspaper editors with a clear explanation of the political  
 
and military situation. He had, of course in mind, not only the reception of news  
 
in China and the USA, but in all parts of the British Empire.50 
 
     Until the session of the Congress Working Committee at Wardha from 6 July  
 
to 14 July, there was considerable correspondence between the India Office  
 
and Linlithgow, as well as detailed reports of varying optimism sent to the  
 
Viceroy by provincial governors. Despite the amount of intelligence available,  
 
these communications remained purely speculative, with the outcome that the  
 
British authorities allowed the Congress leaders to ‘preach rebellion’ until their  
 
actual plans were revealed.51 Even the first resolution of the Congress Working  
 
Committee on 10 July was regarded by Linlithgow as too specific and mild to  
 
                                        
48 Amery to Linlithgow, 16 June 1942, L/P & J/8/596: ff 187 – 188. See also Amery to Linlithgow, 
17 June 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.  
49 Amery to Halifax, 17 June 1942, R/30/1/2: f 73. Also, Amery to Sir Horace Seymour and Sir 
Archibald Clark Kerr, via Foreign Office, 17 June 1942, L/P & J/8/607/: f 31. 
50 Amery to Government of India Home Department, 19 June 1942, L/P & J/8/596: ff 158 – 160.  
51 Coupland, Indian Politics 1936 – 1942, p. 295. 
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require immediate action, a response that Amery regarded as insipid.52 
 
     On the evidence of this first resolution, Amery was swift to press Churchill for  
 
the immediate arrest of Gandhi and the Congress Working Committee using the  
 
following quotation as the justification for the only measures possible against  
 
persons who were now the enemies of Britain, 
 
                        Twice armed is he that had his quarrel just; 
                        but thrice armed is he who gets his blow in first.53 
 
Amery’s appeal to the Prime Minister was unsuccessful, as an enlarged War  
 
Cabinet considered this Congress resolution, but preferred to defer any action  
 
until the final, more general one was issued. Nevertheless, the Viceroy was  
 
promised support if Congress proved to be as rebellious as the latest  
 
intelligence reports had indicated. Amery was relieved that the majority of the  
 
Cabinet attendees appeared to be steadfast, although he detected some  
 
reluctance on the part of Cripps to take firm action.54 
 
     Once the main resolution was issued on 14 July, Amery made his feelings  
 
clear to Linlithgow. His initial opinion was that the challenge to the Government  
 
of India was as absurd and poorly thought out as it was dangerous. His thoughts  
 
also turned to the legal sanctions that could be employed against Congress at  
 
this stage, although the resolution was not yet official party policy, pending  
 
ratification by the All India Congress Committee. It now seems surprising that  
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Amery was already sufficiently hawkish to believe that the unapproved  
 
resolutions warranted the application of the Defence of India Rules, or even  
 
possibly the Revolutionary Movements Ordinance.55 ICS officials in Delhi did not  
 
agree with Amery’s insistence on an immediate legal response to the Congress  
 
resolutions. Instead, he received a cagey telegram from the Government of  
 
India, Home Department, deploring the Congress position but still advocating no  
 
action until the resolutions were approved by the AICC.  
 
 
Amery’s Statement to the House of Commons on 30 July 1942 
 
By 24 July the Government of India, Home Department, had prepared a stage- 
 
by-stage contingency plan on the assumption that the AICC would soon ratify the  
 
Wardha resolutions. Amery was asked to obtain War Cabinet approval for a  
 
sequence of measures that started with propaganda, and continued with the  
 
proclamation of the AICC and the provincial Congress Committees. The ultimate  
 
sanction, if these two measures failed to suppress any insurrection, would be to  
 
proclaim the whole of Congress by means of the Revolutionary Movements  
 
Ordinance.56 While accepting the usefulness of this telegram, Amery agreed with  
 
Linlithgow that he should make a public statement of British policy through an  
 
answer to a Parliamentary Question in the House of Commons on 30 July.57 
 
     Before Amery composed his Parliamentary statement he took the opportunity  
 
to press the case for British action against Congress during interviews in London  
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with Ivan Maisky, the Russian Ambassador, and V.K. Koo, the Chinese  
 
Ambassador. Amery was able to assure Maisky that to accede to Congress  
 
demands would paralyse the Indian war effort, and possibly enable Japanese  
 
forces to link up with the Axis Powers in the Middle East. He also took care to  
 
explain that the Indian Army would remain loyal, and that most trade unionists  
 
were indifferent to Congress.58 Although his discussions with Koo also related  
 
to the maintenance of the war effort, Amery also had in mind Chiang Kai-shek’s  
 
strong interest in Indian political reform. He warned the Ambassador that,  
 
despite Nehru’s love of China and detestation of Japan, he would always fall in  
 
behind Gandhi on constitutional issues.59 
 
     In composing his statement for the House of Commons, Amery needed to be  
 
mindful of a number of domestic political matters. He was surprisingly  
 
encouraged by the support of the Labour Party National Executive, which had  
 
publicly condemned the Congress resolutions and, also by a supportive editorial  
 
in the Daily Herald that had forsaken its normal pro-Congress stance. He was  
 
also reassured by an all party House of Commons Committee report that  
 
described the Congress resolutions as ‘amounting to ninety percent eyewash,  
 
and intended to cover the organisation’s difficulties’.60  
 
     The final version of Amery’s statement to the House of Commons on 30 July  
 
1942 was the result of a difficult drafting procedure. He composed a War Cabinet  
 
memorandum enclosing his first attempt, having already broadly agreed the  
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contents with Linlithgow.61 This was considered at two War Cabinet meetings on 
28 July and 29 July, when a number of amendments were agreed.62 Despite a  
further War Cabinet memorandum on 28 July, and a strongly worded minute to  
Churchill on the same date, he was not successful in retaining in his speech a  
detailed restatement of the section of the offer made in August 1940 that had  
offered eventual self-government to India. He was also unable to include the  
pledge taken to India by Cripps, giving an independent India the option of  
leaving the Commonwealth at the end of the war.63 
     His eventual statement in the House of Commons on 30 July was much  
harsher in tone than he had originally envisaged. He made only a brief reference  
to Britain’s existing promises regarding Indian independence, and instead  
stressed the damage that the action threatened by Congress would make, not  
only to the Allied war effort, but also to the goals set out by the United Nations.  
He continued in trenchant mood, pointing out that the British Government and  
the Government of India would take any action necessary to defeat a Congress  
rebellion. Realising that he had the support of senior Labour Party politicians, he  
was able to dismiss requests by other socialist MPs, Charles Ammon and Manny  
Shinwell, for an immediate resumption of negotiations with Congress.64 Typically, 
he felt justified in recording in his diary that his speech had gone down well.65 
61 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 27 July 1942, CAB 66/26/49. 
62 War Cabinet conclusions, 28 July 1942, L/P & J/8/59: f 178. Also, War Cabinet conclusions, 29 
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Minor Disagreements with Linlithgow before the Final All-India 
Congress Committee Vote 
      
Before the AICC gave final approval to its general resolution on 7 August 1942,  
 
Amery and Linlithgow differed on a small number of matters, that were all  
 
eventually settled in the Viceroy’s favour. This could be said to be a  
 
reinforcement of the influence from Delhi at the expense of the India Office,  
 
motivated almost certainly by Linlithgow’s desire to maintain the unanimity and  
 
cohesion of his Executive Council. 
 
     Firstly, there was the issue of where Gandhi and the Congress Working  
 
Committee (CWC) members should be imprisoned following their planned  
 
arrests. Although Amery had considered the deportation of Gandhi as early as 16  
 
June 1942, Linlithgow, who had to bear in mind the almost entirely Indian  
 
composition of his Executive Council, was only prepared for the younger and  
 
fitter members of the CWC to be deported to Uganda. The critical issue for the  
 
Viceroy was that the detainees, wherever they were, should have no contact with  
 
their followers.66 Although Amery immediately sent a telegram to Linlithgow  
 
underlining his preference for widespread deportation, the Viceroy wisely took  
 
the time to consult his provincial governors and advisers in Delhi.67  
 
     Although Linlithgow supported the majority of his governors and advisers,  
 
who wanted any prisoners to be kept in India, a surprisingly unanimous War  
 
Cabinet decided on 6 August that the final responsibility lay with His Majesty’s  
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Government, and that the Congress leaders should be exiled.68 On the  
 
following day Linlithgow learned of this decision and reacted sharply. He took  
 
soundings from his Executive Council and reported to Amery that his colleagues  
 
were unanimously against deportation, especially if Gandhi were to undertake a  
 
fast, as seemed likely.69 As soon as Amery received Linlithgow’s telegram, he  
 
brought the matter to another meeting of the War Cabinet, at which it was  
 
reluctantly agreed that the Viceroy’s wishes should be respected.70 Amery’s diary  
 
showed that despite his distaste for the policy chosen by Linlithgow and his  
 
Executive Council, he had lobbied strenuously for the judgement of the man on  
 
the spot to be conclusive.71 
 
     Secondly, Amery attempted to delay the publication of the documents seized  
 
in May 1942 from the Congress offices until the resolutions had been finally  
 
approved. The Viceroy was anxious to placate his Executive Council, whose  
 
members believed that publication of the proceedings at Allahabad would be  
 
useful for propaganda purposes. In particular there were sentences in Gandhi’s  
 
draft that might be construed as pro-Japanese, and although a first reading of  
 
the material might possibly have shown Nehru in a favourable light, this was  
 
negated by his later behaviour.72 Amery, showing caution, asked Linlithgow not  
 
to publish the documents before the critical AICC meetings for fear of Britain  
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appearing to be provocative, especially in the USA.73 By the time that Linlithgow  
 
replied to Amery, the documents had already been released for publication to  
 
twelve Reuters centres, and thence to national and provincial newspaper  
 
editors.74  
 
     Amery was irritated that Linlithgow had apparently ignored his instructions,  
 
but saw an opportunity for delivering his own propaganda in Britain. He  
 
summoned the entire Press Lobby, and put his own slant on the Congress  
 
documents, emphasising that Gandhi had been prepared to negotiate with the  
 
Japanese, and that only Rajagopalachari was genuine in his support for the Allied  
 
cause.75 
 
     Finally, Amery, who never completely lost his suspicion that Cripps was pro- 
 
Congress, nevertheless supported the Lord Privy Seal’s suggestion that he  
 
(Cripps) should broadcast to India in an attempt to rally moderate opinion before  
 
the impending AICC meetings.76 Amery was insistent that Cripps should be  
 
allowed to broadcast, especially as his proposed script emphasised the  
 
breakdown in military and civil administration that would arise if there were to be  
 
widespread civil disobedience.77 However, Linlithgow’s outright refusal could not  
 
have been more strongly worded. Clearly remembering Cripps’ perceived  
 
snubbing of his Executive Council a few months earlier, he stressed that ‘such a  
 
broadcast by a man whose stock was so low in India would be seen by elements  
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outside as a sign of a wobbling’.78 
 
 
The British Response to the Final All-India Resolution 
 
Once the War Cabinet had decided not to pursue Sapru’s call for an immediate  
 
conference to be attended by all political parties and communities in an attempt  
 
to produce an eleventh hour settlement, Amery sent a telegram to Churchill, in  
 
the Middle East, explaining that the Viceroy had been asked to act quickly once  
 
the AICC had made its resolution public.79 After the resolution had been  
 
approved on 8 August by a margin of 250 votes to 13 votes, the Government of  
 
India swiftly put its carefully made plans into action. At a very early hour on the  
 
following morning, Gandhi, Nehru, Azad and the other CWC leaders were  
 
arrested, as well as large numbers of provincial Congress leaders, who lived  
 
outside Bombay. The leaders who were arrested in Bombay were taken to their  
 
places of incarceration by train, Gandhi to the Aga Khan’s palace at Poona, and  
 
the others to Ahmednagar Fort, where although they remained incommunicado,  
 
were kept in relative comfort.80 Azad recorded that Gandhi had been dismayed  
 
by the speed of the British reaction, especially as he had wanted one more  
 
chance to negotiate with the Viceroy.81 
 
     During the period of unrest, when sabotage and civil disturbance followed the  
 
arrests, Amery was largely restricted to a role that provided support for  
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Linlithgow from London, whether by letter or telegram, but also in the War  
 
Cabinet and the House of Commons. He was also occupied in attempting to  
 
ensure that the reporting of the rioting, and the measures used in suppressing it,  
 
were as accurate, and as favourable to HMG and the Government of India, as  
 
possible. 
 
     The unrest that followed the detention of the Congress leaders soon became  
 
violent, which was not surprising as Gandhi’s statements on the need for any  
 
protests to remain peaceful were, at best, ambiguous. For example, in mid-1942  
 
he had stated that he had waited while the ‘country developed the non-violent  
 
strength to throw off the foreign yoke’. However, he admitted that his ‘attitude  
 
had undergone a change, and he could no longer afford to wait’.82  
 
     Whether Gandhi had expressed qualified support for violence, or not, it was  
 
evident that within two or three days of the arrest of the leading Congress  
 
politicians, serious disorders had broken out in parts of Bombay, Madras, the  
 
Central Provinces and Bengal. Matters were graver in Bihar and in parts of the  
 
United Provinces, although on a much milder scale in Orissa and Assam. Few  
 
disturbances were reported in the Punjab, Sind or the North West Frontier  
 
Province, or even the princely states. Attacks were first directed against  
 
communications, especially railway stations, signal boxes and post offices that  
 
were set on fire by large mobs, possibly thousands strong. The permanent way  
 
was damaged to the extent that Bihar was cut off, while Bengal and Assam were  
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isolated off from the rest of Northern India.83 
 
     Some 2,000 police officers were wounded, and a further 63 killed, sometimes  
 
in brutal circumstances. When police or troops were given the order to open fire,  
 
a total of 831 persons were injured, and as many as 297 killed. Although these  
 
figures were serious, they were very small when compared with the number of  
 
92,000 arrests that were made, chiefly in Bombay, Bihar and the United  
 
Provinces.84 
      
     The first bulletins from India enabled Amery to report to the War Cabinet  
 
about the early disorder that had broken out. Whether or not, at this stage, he  
 
had been given full details of the disturbances, he was anxious that matters  
 
should not be given the sensational coverage that was already being accorded in  
 
the USA.85 In any event, his diary for the day suggested that the rioting was only  
 
sporadic, and ‘largely committed by students and hooligans’.86 For the next  
 
couple of days he described little escalation in the disorders, and once again  
 
showed his mistrust for ‘unnecessary detail and bad headlines in the press’.87  
 
However, by 17 August, he had been obliged to observe that the degree of  
 
coordination in the sabotage, suggested more planning than could be expected  
 
from just students and hooligans.88 
 
     During this early period of the disturbances, Amery made BBC broadcasts to  
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India, one of which annoyed Churchill, since without stating the exact  
 
circumstances in which it might come about, there was a reference to the  
 
possibility of Indian independence.89 These broadcasts also drew criticism from  
 
two very different sources. Firstly, George Orwell, then a talks producer in the  
 
BBC Eastern Service, lamented that Amery made ghastly speeches, talking of  
 
Gandhi and Nehru as ‘wicked saboteurs’.90 Secondly, and possibly of more  
 
consequence, it was suggested by Francis G. Hutchins in 1973 that Amery, in  
 
broadcasting to India at this time, revealed such detail from intercepted  
 
Congress documents that he accidentally gave specific tactical advice to potential  
 
saboteurs, who previously had only a tentative idea of what to do.91 
 
     As he did on other occasions when he wanted to be candid on issues of  
 
political controversy, Amery confided in Smuts. At the very start of the measures  
 
against Congress, he sent him a long and remarkable letter, reviewing the  
 
constitutional and political position in stark terms. Drawing an unlikely parallel  
 
with the situation in South Africa, he bleakly asserted that Congress had rejected  
 
both the August 1940 offer and the Cripps proposals as a pretext to stage  
 
another civil disobedience movement. He believed that whether Congress would  
 
need to wait until the end of the war or not, its ultimate aim was one party  
 
domination, a goal that he regarded as ‘at bottom totalitarianism’. It was ironic  
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that when Smuts eventually replied to Amery, he provided only qualified short  
 
term support to the British Government. Although he agreed that during the  
 
initial period of civil disobedience Congress leaders should be interned, he felt  
 
that the insurrection would be short lived. Once matters had settled down, he  
 
recommended that the prisoners should be released and a fresh attempt be  
 
made to settle the constitutional position by summoning all parties and interest  
 
groups.92 
 
     At first, the Viceroy gave Amery a sanguine account of the agitation,  
 
believing that prompt action by the authorities had deprived Congress militants  
 
of the time in which to organise a wholesale revolution to be run by an  
 
underground network.93 However, as more detailed reports came in from  
 
provincial governors, Amery was forced to accept that there had been real  
 
violence in a number of areas and that substantial numbers of troops were  
 
required to suppress the insurrection.94  
 
    The suspicion of enemy influences behind the disorders was discussed at a  
 
meeting of the War Cabinet on 24 August. Intelligence reports from the  
 
Government of India, Home Department, had suggested that Congress alone  
 
was not responsible for the troubles, but had been assisted by agencies working  
 
directly for the Japanese.95 Amery, who was asked by the War Cabinet to look  
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into the matter, clearly believed that sabotage, especially in Bihar was ‘real fifth  
 
column work’.96 Nevertheless, a scrutiny of Amery’s subsequent correspondence  
 
and diary for 1942 reveals very little in the way of high quality intelligence about  
 
organised subversion, or contact between Congress and Japan. This would  
 
appear to be corroborated by a passage in a telegram sent by the Government of  
 
India, Home Department, to Amery on 1 September 1942. This telegram that  
 
was intended to provide briefing for Amery to use during an impending debate in  
 
the House of Commons, attributed the disturbances exclusively to Congress  
 
discontent following the failure of the Cripps mission.97  
 
 
The House of Commons Debates on India in September and October 
1942 
 
Although order was largely to be restored by the end of September 1942, the  
 
situation had been grave. Despite the relatively small number of fatalities,  
 
Linlithgow described the disturbances as the most serious since the Indian  
 
Mutiny of 1857.98 Amery was more bullish, asserting that the prompt action  
 
taken by the authorities had prevented bloodshed on the scale of 1857.99   
 
Churchill concurred with these views, but believed that it was necessary to  
 
explain to the House of Commons why Britain had responded to the Congress  
 
resolutions in such a forthright manner. Once a statement from Downing Street  
 
had been arranged for 10 September, Amery amended Churchill’s first draft that  
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he found ‘curiously jejeune’.100 However, the Prime Minister would have nothing  
 
to do with such editing, and after some long winded discussions, settled upon a  
 
version that had Amery fearing for its reception in India.101 
 
     Churchill’s forceful analysis divided opinion sharply in the House of Commons. 
 
Labour backbenchers such as Aneuran Bevan directed their anger not only at   
 
him, but also at their colleagues, Attlee and Cripps, who were senior ministers in  
 
the Coalition Government. Churchill first used simple arithmetic in an attempt to  
 
show that Congress did not speak for the majority of Indians by stating that 235  
 
millions out of India’s population of 390 millions were supporters of other parties  
 
or communities. He then claimed that Gandhi’s commitment to non-violence was  
 
only theoretical, with the consequence that Congress had moved seamlessly into  
 
its current revolutionary campaign. Finally, his claim that the rebellion was being  
 
put down with restraint drew an angry response.102 
 
     On the following day, an adjournment debate about India revealed a  
 
surprising consensus on the need for goodwill from all sides, both in Britain and  
 
India. When Amery was called to speak, he approved of parts of a thoughtful  
 
contribution from Arthur Greenwood, the Labour Minister without Portfolio, and  
 
Leader of the Opposition, but also disagreed with his view that Churchill’s  
 
speech, on the previous day, had been provocative. After a sharp exchange with  
 
Manny Shinwell over the tone of the Prime Minister’s statement, he turned to the  
 
metamorphosis of Congress from a party of satyagraha into one that was  
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attempting to paralyse the country’s communications, and therefore its war   
 
effort.  
     
     There had been further improvement in the security situation in India by the  
 
time that the next Parliamentary debate on the matter took place on 8 October.  
 
During these intervening weeks there had been the usual progress reports from  
 
Linlithgow to Amery, but of more interest was a detailed minute by Alec Joyce, a  
 
publicity adviser at the India Office. He detected general support in Britain for  
 
the strong action taken against Congress, but also suggested that it ought to be  
 
possible to combine firmness with an invitation to representative Indians to  
 
resume consideration of constitutional reform.103 Various senior officials at the  
 
India Office considered the issues raised by Joyce, and soon Amery received a  
 
minute from Monteath, conceding that disagreeable as it might be, publicity  
 
considerations should be in Amery’s mind when preparing his speech for the  
 
debate on 8 October.104  
 
     When the War Cabinet discussed its tactics, it was decided to ‘avoid a  
 
controversial debate’, and instead stress that previous offers made to Congress  
 
were still open. To this end it was agreed that the debate would be wound up by  
 
Attlee, and not Churchill, who would be away from London.105 However, even  
 
without the Prime Minister, the atmosphere in the chamber was more than  
 
usually tense and adversarial. Amery’s opening speech was long, full of self-  
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justification and covered very little new ground, concentrating as before on  
 
Congress intransigence and communal differences.  
 
     Although Amery had some support from his Conservative colleagues, a  
 
number of left wing Labour MPs made powerful and denunciatory speeches that  
 
somewhat unfairly portrayed him as an arch imperialist in the diehard tradition.  
 
Although Greenwood attempted to put the case for the Government, it was left  
 
to Attlee to employ his usual pragmatism to put an effective case for the need to  
 
restore order before any reforms could take place. In the division, the House  
 
supported the Government by 360 votes to 17 votes.106 
 
 
Amery and the Concern of the United States and China with the Indian 
Situation 
 
Although the Congress campaign lost national momentum throughout the  
 
remaining months of 1942, the matter of Britain’s action to repress the  
 
insurrection, and a perceived wish to hang on to a valued colony still occupied  
 
American and Chinese opinion. As mentioned in the previous chapter, following  
 
the end of the Cripps mission, Roosevelt made no further direct attempts to  
 
persuade Churchill to make any fresh initiatives on the subject of Indian  
 
constitutional reform. Accordingly, when Cripps’ assistant Graham Spry, visited  
 
the President on 15 May 1942, he was assured that the USA did not want to  
 
interfere in matters between Britain and India.107 
 
     However, Amery had long resented American opinions on the British Empire,  
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and in common with Linlithgow, had been particularly irked by Louis Johnson’s  
 
intervention in the final stages of Cripps’ mission. Not surprisingly, he asked both  
 
Eden and Churchill to ensure that Johnson would not be allowed to return to  
 
India.108 Churchill acquiesced by writing to Harry (Lloyd) Hopkins, Roosevelt’s  
 
Special Adviser, explaining that Johnson would no longer be welcome in India,  
 
and responding to rumours, insisted that he did not want Nehru to be permitted  
 
to visit the President in Washington.109 However, Clymer has suggested that  
 
Roosevelt and Hopkins still harboured suspicions over Britain’s intentions in  
 
India, and that these were confirmed by the final failure of the American  
 
Technical Mission in October 1942.110 
 
     If Roosevelt was discreet about his real opinions on the British in India, there  
 
were many others, such as Cordell Hull, who were not so reticent, especially  
 
when a Japanese invasion appeared imminent.111 However, there was  
 
ambivalence in American thinking. On the one hand, there were those who  
 
had always harboured doubts about the moral legitimacy of the British Empire.  
 
On the other hand, there was also widespread concern over the behaviour of  
 
certain Indians. In particular, there was disappointment about the Congress  
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rejection of Cripps’ offer, alarm at the nature of the Allahabad resolutions, but  
 
most of all, dismay over the inflammatory radio broadcasts sent from Berlin by  
 
Subhas Chandra Bose.112 
 
     Once the arrest of Congress officials had begun, Amery really began to feel  
 
apprehensive about any potential interference from the USA or China. He had  
 
already bluntly explained the British position over the Congress resolutions  
 
to John Winant, US Ambassador to London, at a meeting at the India Office on  
 
29 July. In particular, he revealed his scorn at attempts by Nehru to associate  
 
the Congress cause with the best interest of the United Nations.113  
 
    However, it was only when Chiang Kai-shek attempted to persuade Roosevelt  
 
to use his influence with Churchill that Amery really became incensed. The  
 
Generalissimo had already written to Roosevelt asking that he should insist  
 
on Britain granting complete freedom to India, only for Churchill, having seen the  
 
letter to state, with some vehemence, that Congress did not represent India.114  
 
Once the widespread arrests had started, Chiang Kai-shek sent a further  
 
impassioned telegram to Roosevelt, imploring him to take immediate action on  
 
India, and this was again forwarded to Churchill, who, by this time, was in  
 
Moscow.115 Amery, having seen this telegram, immediately wrote to Churchill,  
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describing the Chinese intervention as ‘mischievous and ignorant’ and asserting  
 
that Congress leaders had no interest in helping the Allies, but were only  
 
concerned with establishing their supremacy.116 
 
     It was only in his diary that Amery really expressed his true worries,  
 
especially his consternation at the demise of Britain’s influence in the world. He  
 
had already denounced the Atlantic Charter as ‘tripe’, and deeply regretted an  
 
atmosphere of defeatism in which all post-war problems would be handed to  
 
Americans, Chinese, or even Russians to solve.117  
 
     He was much calmer when writing a War Cabinet memorandum, India as a  
 
Factor in Anglo-American Relations. This put a sober well argued case for the  
 
division of propaganda duties on the subject of Indo-British relations between  
 
the British Information Services and Sir Girja Bajpai, who, since 1941, had been  
 
in Washington as the Indian Agent-General.118 Unfortunately, it did not take long  
 
after the British crackdown for the efforts of Bajpai and his colleagues to become  
 
less effective in resisting demands by the American public for a national  
 
government to be installed in India. Even respected newspapers such as the  
 
Washington Post  believed that the Indian problem was no longer a ‘solely  
 
British problem or headache’.119 
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William Phillips’ Mission to India  
 
Grudgingly accepting a suggestion from Halifax, Amery loyally wrote to  
 
Linlithgow, and pressed the case for a high calibre American to live in Delhi, gain  
 
the confidence of members of the Government of India, and then send valuable  
 
propaganda material to the USA.120 Possibly to his surprise, the Viceroy  
 
supported the idea, but stipulated that the ideal representative should be unlike  
 
Louis Johnson, whom he regarded as ‘too much of a sensationalist’. Instead he  
 
was quite specific in wanting a mature, professional diplomat, who was not  
 
ambitious, and who would report to the State Department, instead of the White  
 
House.121   
 
   There was a considerable amount of political bargaining between London,  
 
Washington and Delhi before the veteran American career diplomat, William  
 
Phillips was formally appointed by Roosevelt to be his personal representative in  
 
India.122 Earlier, on 24 November, and before Roosevelt had given Phillips his  
 
exact title, his appointment had been approved by Britain, and on his way to  
 
Delhi, he had visited Amery at the India Office. He promised him that he was  
 
going to India to assist in any way he could, but would not mediate; a welcome  
 
reassurance that Amery immediately passed on to Linlithgow. In particular he  
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reported to the Viceroy that the sixty four year old Phillips had recent  
 
ambassadorial experience in Rome, and had also assured him that he was at the  
 
stage in his career when he was certainly not ‘out to make political capital for  
 
himself’.123 
 
     Linlithgow’s first meeting with Phillips on 9 January 1943 was promising,  
 
particularly as the American planned to travel widely in India, rather than remain  
 
in Delhi, and more importantly said he hoped to keep out of politics.124  
 
Unfortunately for the remainder of his mission that lasted until May 1943,  
 
there was a worsening of the relationship between Phillips and the Viceroy. The  
 
origins of their difficulties were ironically to be found in a meeting in London in  
 
late 1942 attended by Phillips, Anderson, Amery, and the Editor of The Times,  
 
Barrington-Ward.125 Phillips believed that Amery had assured him that he had  
 
the licence to do anything he could to bring the parties together in India.126 
 
     Amery’s recollection of events was quite different as he believed that he had  
 
only repeated what he had said to Phillips at their first meeting on 24 November,  
 
namely insisting that Britain saw his role in India as one of informing the  
 
President, and not mediating between the Government of India and various  
 
political groups. However, Amery did admit that, when asked for advice by  
 
Phillips on how to speak to Indians, he had suggested that he should stress the  
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consensual manner in which the American and Dominion constitutions were  
 
formed.127 
 
     The first real difficulty between Phillips and Linlithgow occurred on 8 February  
 
1943, when the former asked to be allowed to meet Gandhi who was on the eve  
 
of his fast. Linlithgow proved to be far too optimistic when he thought that  
 
Phillips had taken his refusal very well, and that the matter was at an end.128  
 
Within the next few days, Phillips was put under considerable pressure by  
 
Roosevelt and the State Department to persuade the British to release Gandhi  
 
from detention.129 Accordingly, he made contact with Linlithgow, enclosing a  
 
message from Cordell Hull, expressing the extreme disquiet felt in Washington  
 
about the crisis in India.130  
 
     Amery, who hitherto had been unwilling to bother Churchill about American  
 
intervention in Indian matters, was sufficiently alarmed to send him a strongly  
 
worded minute. In particular, he saw beyond Linlithgow’s view that Phillips was  
 
the main cause for concern, and told the Prime Minister that he had been given  
 
direct instructions to mediate by the American Government. He beseeched  
 
Churchill to ask Roosevelt to ‘keep off the grass’, and was delighted when this  
 
message was passed to Hull by Halifax.131  
 
     Although Phillips was to try again to meet Gandhi, his attempts were politely  
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refused by Linlithgow, who had Amery’s assurance that his actions were  
 
supported by the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet.132 Any remaining leverage  
 
that Phillips might have had with the British largely disappeared, when Gandhi  
 
ended his fast in late February 1943. Soon after, he returned to the United  
 
States a bitter and disappointed man, and moreover one, who in Amery’s opinion  
 
had permitted himself to be duped by Congress propaganda.133 
 
 
Gandhi’s Fast 
 
Some months before Gandhi commenced his fast in February 1943, his campaign  
 
had been anticipated by Amery and the War Cabinet in London, and Linlithgow  
 
and his Executive Council in Delhi. The matter of how to deal with a possible fast  
 
by Gandhi was discussed by the War Cabinet on 6 August 1942, even before the  
 
‘Quit India’ movement started. A bullish meeting rejected the earlier suggestion  
 
by the Government of India Home Department that a ‘cat and mouse’ policy  
 
should be applied, whereby the Mahatma would be released from custody as  
 
soon as his life was in danger.134 Amery’s diary for the same day recounted that  
 
he was the most hawkish of his colleagues in recommending that Gandhi be  
 
allowed to fast to death, but also that not only Anderson, but more surprisingly,  
 
Cripps and Bevin supported him.135 
 
     At the time of the ‘Quit India’ resolution, a majority of provincial governors  
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had been fearful of the consequences for public order if Gandhi fasted to death  
 
in captivity, a view supported by Linlithgow, and his advisers. However the War  
 
Cabinet had remained unconvinced. Firstly, Gandhi was a detenu, and not a  
 
prisoner, a fact which made him responsible for his own fate.136 Secondly, they  
 
stressed the propaganda difficulties that would arise for the Viceroy if Congress  
 
were able to portray the release of Gandhi as a victory.137 Once it became clear  
 
that a fast by Gandhi was not imminent, matters were left as decided by the War  
 
Cabinet on 7 September 1942. If Gandhi were to fast he would not be released,  
 
but his son, Devdas, would be permitted to join him at the Aga Khan’s palace in  
 
Poona.138 
 
     The prospect of a fast by Gandhi recurred many weeks later following an  
 
exchange of correspondence with Linlithgow, that if courtly in expression, was  
 
nevertheless more acrimonious in meaning. Gandhi wrote to Linlithgow on 31  
 
December 1942 in a mood of frustration over the blame that had been attributed  
 
to him for the violence of the Congress campaign. He felt that unless Linlithgow  
 
could convince him that he was responsible for the bloodshed, he would be  
 
obliged to fast under his personal code of satyragraha.139 Amery had a critical  
 
role in the wording of the Viceroy’s reply that was delayed until after a meeting  
 
of the War Cabinet that had been arranged to discuss the change of opinion in  
 
Delhi over the action that would need to be taken, if Gandhi again chose to  
 
                                        
136 War Cabinet conclusions, 10 August 1942, CAB 65/27/25. 
137 War Cabinet conclusions, 17 August 1942, CAB 65/27/29. 
138 War Cabinet conclusions, 7 September 1942, CAB 65/27/37.  
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fast.140 On 7 January 1943 the War Cabinet softened its position from the  
 
previous September to the extent of countenancing the release of Gandhi on  
 
humanitarian grounds, provided that the security situation with Congress had  
 
eased.141  
 
     Amery, nevertheless realised that the War Cabinet, especially Churchill did  
 
not wish to make any special allowances for the judgement of the man on the  
 
spot, and shrewdly wrote two separate telegrams to Linlithgow on 8 January.  
 
The first telegram merely stated the War Cabinet conclusions, but the  
 
second, which Amery did not wish to be circulated, gave the Viceroy a list of  
 
options to consider before finally replying to Gandhi. The themes of the latter  
 
telegram were not only the importance of avoiding a tactical victory for Gandhi,  
 
but also a recognition of Linlithgow’s need to carry his Executive Council with  
 
him.142 
 
     Linlithgow’s eventual reply to Gandhi on 13 January was the first in a  
 
sequence of letters between the two men, the last written on 7 February.  
 
Gandhi’s letter of 29 January contained the statement that, on 9 February he  
 
proposed to commence a fast for twenty one days, albeit one that permitted the  
 
consumption of water flavoured with citrus juice. The Viceroy’s letters  
 
unequivocally laid the blame for the violence and sabotage during the previous  
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few months at the door of Congress, of which he regarded Gandhi as the  
 
undisputed leader. The Mahatma’s opposite view was that it was not the nature  
 
of the Congress resolutions that were the cause of the disorders, but the  
 
suddenness of the widespread arrests by the Government of India in August  
 
1942.143 
 
     Although Gandhi had lost a considerable amount of weight during his fast, by  
 
the time it ended on 2 March, he recovered quickly from a condition that a team  
 
of British and Indian doctors had, at times considered to be critical.144 A day by  
 
day account of Gandhi’s fast is beyond the scope of this thesis, but an early, and  
 
representative example of Amery’s difficulties occurred during and after the  
 
meeting of the War Cabinet on 7 February. Amery supported the decision of the  
 
Viceroy’s Executive Council to release Gandhi for the three weeks of his fast,  
 
following which he would be returned to custody. Even the normally strictly  
 
factual minutes of the meeting showed that the War Cabinet was deeply opposed  
 
to this decision made in Delhi, and had asked for a telegram to be sent to the  
 
Viceroy, saying that no action should be taken without further instructions from  
 
London.145  
 
    Amery’s diary showed that he was unable to convince Churchill and his  
 
colleagues that the key issue was not how to deal with Gandhi, but whether the  
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War Cabinet should insist on Linlithgow overriding his Council. There was further  
indignity for Amery as he was only one of a trio chosen by Churchill to draft the  
telegram to be sent to the Viceroy, and was unable to persuade the other  
members, Anderson and Simon, that it should not be peremptory in tone.146  He  
was particularly concerned that the final version sent to Linlithgow, and signed  
only by himself, seemed preoccupied with the perceived weakness of the  
Executive Council’s stance, and the danger that Gandhi might be able to achieve  
a propaganda success.147 Indeed he was sufficiently worried about his  
relationship with Linlithgow to send him a separate personal telegram, explaining 
that the main content of the official telegram had been drawn up by Anderson  
and Simon.148  
     Despite a forceful telegram that Churchill sent to Linlithgow on 8 February,  
emphasising the danger of British rule in India being brought into ridicule, the  
Viceroy in replying to Amery’s two telegrams, insisted that a decision to override 
his Council would endanger the war effort.149 Amery was delighted that  
Linlithgow had ‘applied the Nelson touch’ to the War Cabinet instructions, and  
remained confident that, once any storm had subsided, the Viceroy would be  
supported by the War Cabinet.150 
146 Amery diary, 7 February 1943, AMEL 7/37.  
147 Amery to Linlithgow, 8 February 1943, L/PO/ 6/102b: ff 345 – 346. 
148 Amery to Linlithgow, 8 February 1943, L/PO/6/103b: ff 341 – 342. Also, Amery diary, 7 
February 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
149 Churchill to Linlithgow, via War Office and Commander-in-Chief, India, 8 February 1943, MSS. 
EUR. F. 125/158. This telegram was not copied to Amery, or the India Office. Also, Linlithgow to 
Amery, 8 February 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. This telegram answered Amery’s personal 
telegram. Also, Amery to Linlithgow,8 February 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. 
150 Amery diary, 8 February 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
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     In the event, Gandhi, who seemed taken aback by the Viceroy’s offer of  
 
temporary freedom, informed the Governor of Bombay that he did not wish to be  
 
released for the duration of his fast.151 With the possibility now that Gandhi could  
 
die in captivity, the unanimity of Linlithgow’s almost exclusively Indianised  
 
Council broke up, and three members, Sir Mormasji Mody, Dr Madhao Aney and  
 
Nalini Sarkar, resigned from office.152 
 
     Although Amery had needed to be cunning in his relations with Churchill and  
 
the War Cabinet, he had surprisingly few problems elsewhere at home in  
 
defending British policies over Gandhi’s fast. Despite describing the editorials in  
 
the News Chronicle and the Manchester Guardian as ‘mischievous’ he found The  
 
Times ‘helpful’.153 His defence of the Viceroy’s stance in the House of Commons  
 
was also relatively straightforward, as on the only two occasions that he was  
 
obliged to answer Parliamentary questions during Gandhi’s fast, his usual Labour  
 
Party interrogators were not particularly awkward.154  
 
     Once it became clear to Amery, Linlithgow and Churchill that Gandhi’s fast,  
 
whether to death or not, was not going to have a significant effect on the War  
 
Cabinet, or the Government of India (the resignation of the three Indian Council  
 
members notwithstanding), they became increasingly more confident that  
 
matters were under control. Sapru, as a liberal Hindu, had generally been held in  
 
fair esteem by Britain, but the request to release Gandhi put forward by a group  
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of moderate Indian politicians he had assembled, drew no positive response.155  
 
Indeed, Churchill’s curt reply to Sapru, via Amery and Linlithgow, merely  
 
reinforced the determination of the authorities in London and Delhi not to be  
 
intimidated by Gandhi’s fast.156 
 
     When Gandhi’s health began to improve towards the end of February, the  
 
tone of British utterances became more triumphalist. Linlithgow was the most  
 
understated, although he insisted to both Amery and Lumley that Gandhi had  
 
suffered a major defeat.157 Unsurprisingly, Churchill showed little restraint, telling  
 
Smuts that he doubted whether Gandhi had fasted at all, and when praising  
 
Linlithgow for his handling of the whole matter could not resist sharp criticism of  
 
his colleagues in the War Cabinet, who may have fallen for the Mahatma’s ‘bluff  
 
and sob-stuff’.158  
 
     Amery had generally remained conscious of his need to maintain a  
 
responsible position between the Government of India and the War Cabinet,  
 
although he had taken care not to dignify Gandhi’s action as a fast, but rather a  
 
‘restricted diet’.159 However once Gandhi’s survival had been confirmed, he too  
 
suggested that his gesture had failed, and rejected the proposal in the News  
 
Chronicle that the end of the fast offered an opportunity to end the constitutional  
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deadlock.160  
 
    In his view Gandhi was a ‘a woolly pacifist who combined a reputation for  
 
holiness with a political dictatorship exercised in a wrecking and negative  
 
sense’.161 He had not changed his opinions about Gandhi’s fast when he  
 
composed his draft memoirs, and described a ‘theatrical performance that  
 
achieved nothing, beyond his capacity for survival’.162 
 
     A more sober assessment of the effects of the fast on the Indian public can  
 
be gained from a scrutiny of the contemporaneous reports sent to Linlithgow by  
 
the provincial governors. Most accounts conceded that there was some local  
 
tension when it seemed possible that Gandhi would die, but the broad theme  
 
was the general level of apathy, even amongst students.163  
 
     Hutchins’ analysis of Gandhi’s fast concluded that the whole matter so  
 
occupied the British in London and Delhi that the ordinary business of  
 
government was overwhelmed, and that the Viceroy was obliged to offer to  
 
release him while on hunger strike.164 This was untrue, but there can be little  
 
doubt, that the time taken by the War Cabinet in dealing with Gandhi’s fast  
 
might well have been better spent in planning for the looming famine in  
 
Bengal.165 
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Amery and Social Reform in India     
When Cripps and Bevin suggested the option of undertaking social reform in  
India as a way of making progress, and bypassing traditional communal and  
party politics, they started a policy debate that lasted until the final weeks of  
Linlithgow’s term in late 1943, and once more placed Amery in a difficult  
position. Although Amery was to take a highly sceptical view of the value  
of social engineering to undermine Congress, and indeed the value for money  
that could be delivered by such a project, he was not opposed in principle to well 
thought out reforms. Indeed, by illustration, there is evidence that he differed  
considerably from his Conservative colleagues over the Beveridge Report since  
he did not believe that it contravened Tory philosophy.166 
     Some five months after the failure of his mission, Cripps was the first to take  
the initiative, and employed tactics that his biographer, Peter Clarke, described  
as combining Marx with Machiavelli.167 His note to Churchill and Amery was  
based on the highly optimistic premise that measures to promote more economic 
and industrial fairness would enable the Indian working classes to identify  
Congress businessmen as their natural enemy, and not the British.168 
     Despite some warnings about the scope and underlying political motivation of 
Cripps’ ideas by William Croft, an Under-Secretary at the India Office, and Sir  
Anul Chatterjee, one of Amery’s Indian advisers, the project surprisingly  
166 Amery diary, 30 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. Amery had a surprisingly progressive view of the 
social arrangements recommended by Beveridge. 
167 Clarke, The Cripps Version, pp. 351 – 352. 
168 Cripps, note for Churchill and Amery 2 September 1942, L/E/8/2527: ff 339 – 341. 
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recommended itself to Churchill, who asked for it to be developed.169 Amery’s  
 
early response to Cripps was cautious and non-committal, especially as he  
 
insisted that while he was prepared to include Bevin and Kingsley Wood in any  
 
discussions, he felt that he needed the specialist advice that could only come  
 
from Chatterjee and Mudaliar.170 
 
     By the time that Amery chaired a large meeting on the subject at the India  
 
Office on 25 September 1942, he had been made aware by Cripps’ assistant,  
 
Graham Spry, that a recent statement by an important policy study group at  
 
Chatham House had included social reform in India as an important element in  
 
any wider programme to break the constitutional deadlock.171 The minutes of the  
 
meeting at the India Office showed a critical difference of emphasis between  
 
Amery, Cripps and Bevin. Amery, assisted by Mudaliar, stressed the need for any  
 
critical decisions to be taken by the Government of India, and any provinces not  
 
being governed under Section 93. Cripps, still wanted political responsibility for  
 
reform to remain with the War Cabinet, while Bevin, his mind firmly on the well-  
 
being of Indian workers, stressed that the rigorous enforcement of existing  
 
labour legislation would be sufficient for the moment.172  
 
     Surprisingly Amery felt the need to be pragmatic. Although he disliked Cripps’  
 
proposals and wanted to dismiss them in peremptory fashion, he felt obliged to  
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be altogether more circumspect in their correspondence. While doubting their  
 
value as a substitute for political progress, he was more comfortable when  
 
stressing the financial constraints upon any viable action to make social progress  
 
in India.173 Despite the coolness of Amery, Linlithgow, and Mudaliar, Cripps  
 
persevered. Before his transfer to the Ministry of Aircraft Production he sent a  
 
detailed blueprint for a social and economic policy to Amery, Bevin and Kingsley  
 
Wood. The paper prepared by Cripps’ assistant, Arthur Owen, was stronger on  
 
analysis than prescription, proposing a number of conferences in India, but  
 
suggesting little detail on funding.174 Amery’s response in January 1943 was  
 
again cautious, but he insisted that any major decisions should be taken in India,  
 
and not London. He was still wary as to how such an ambitious scheme could be  
 
paid for, especially bearing in mind the vexed issue of the sterling balances, and  
 
suggested that no commitments should be made until a new Viceroy had taken 
 
office.175 
 
     It was inevitable that Bevin and Cripps would be disappointed by Amery’s  
 
pessimistic response to Owens’ paper, and wrote him separate letters, both  
 
suggesting that the issue should be put before Churchill and the War Cabinet.176  
 
At this point Amery showed his bent for intrigue, and pointed out to Bevin that it  
 
would be necessary to hear the views of the Viceroy’s experts before putting the  
                                        
173 Amery to Cripps (after consulting Bevin), 2 October 1942, L/E/8/2527: f 299. Also Amery to 
Cripps (copied to Bevin and Kingsley Wood), 23 October 1942, L/E/8/2527: ff 278 – 280. 
174 Cripps to Amery, 15 December 1942, enclosing a paper, A Social and Economic Policy for 
India, L/E/8/2527: ff 231 – 240. 
175 Amery to Bevin (copied to Cripps and Kingsley Wood), 22 January 1943, L/E/8/2527: f 218.  
176 Bevin to Amery, 26 February 1943, L/E/8/2527: f 204. Also, Cripps to Amery, 26 February 
1943, L/E/8/2527: f 203. 
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matter before Churchill. In any event, he did not believe that Linlithgow would  
 
want to take any new initiatives in the final six months of his Viceroyalty.177  
 
     Only when Bevin called Amery’s bluff by requesting that ICS officials in Delhi  
 
should know Churchill’s opinion as soon as possible, did the Secretary of State  
 
act with any urgency.178 Despite an attempt to persuade Churchill that the  
 
outgoing Viceroy’s views should be sought before matters were discussed at the  
 
War Cabinet, the Prime Minister wanted much quicker progress.179 Accordingly,  
 
on 9 April,  Amery was obliged to prepare a War Cabinet memorandum that said  
 
very little that was new, but was expressed in terms intended to convince  
 
Churchill that any new measures for social improvement in India would cost at  
 
least £400 million, and furthermore, that in the last forty years there had already  
 
been worthy improvements in public health, education and labour relations.180  
 
Ironically, as Churchill was away in Washington and North Africa from 4 May  
 
until 5 June, Amery’s memorandum was never discussed by the War Cabinet. 
  
    Although no ambitious schemes for social and economic reform were  
 
implemented during the war, the debate on the matter represented a fascinating  
 
case study, not only in relations between Delhi and London, but also within the  
 
War Cabinet. Amery had been forced to defer to the greater knowledge of the  
 
men in Delhi, with the adverse consequences of this concession for the supposed  
 
seniority of the India Office. In terms of the balance of British political power,  
                                        
177 Amery to Bevin, 1 March 1943, L/E/8/2527: f 201. 
178 Bevin to Amery, 11 March 1943, L/E/8/2527: f 190. 
179 Amery to Churchill, 19 March 1943, L/E/8/2527: ff 179 – 181 Also, Churchill to Amery, 23 
March 1943, L/E/8/2527: f 108. 
180 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 9 April 1943, CAB 66/35/50. 
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although Bevin and Cripps did not get their own way over this issue, it was clear  
 
that their influence was growing, often at the expense of traditional Tory  
 
politicians. 
 
Summary 
 
Amery and Linlithgow were united in seeing the ‘Quit India’ campaign and  
 
Gandhi’s fast as episodes orchestrated by the Mahatma, Nehru and the Congress  
 
leadership, and requiring forceful and immediate action by both the Government  
 
of India, and HMG. Although violence and sabotage continued after the arrests of  
 
the Congress Working Committee, reports from provincial governors showed that  
 
order had largely been restored by the end of 1942. Subsequent historiography  
 
has been able to show that Congress militancy at local levels survived the strong  
 
British response, but it is hard to accept Hutchins’ overarching thesis that the  
 
‘Quit India’ movement was the main reason for Britain granting independence in  
 
1947.181 
 
 
 
 
     
                                        
181 Bidyut Chakrabati. ‘Political Mobilisation in the Localities: The 1942 Quit India Movement in 
Midnapur’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1992), pp. 791 – 799, and pp. 805 – 
814. Bidnapur was located in Bengal. Also, Francis G. Hutchins. India’s Revolution, Gandhi and 
the ‘Quit India’ Movement, pp. 282 – 296. Also, Judith Brown, review, Francis G. Hutchins, 
‘India’s Revolution, Gandhi and the “Quit India” Movement’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 
(1975), pp. 555 – 557. Brown put forward a dismissive view of Hutchins’ thesis, and suggested 
that in 1947, a war weary and impoverished Britain was only too glad to be rid of the 
responsibility for India. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
A SUCCESSOR FOR LINLITHGOW, THE STERLING BALANCES AND FOOD 
SHORTAGES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with a number of issues that proved to be difficult for Amery,  
 
who was invariably awkwardly placed between a truculent Churchill, other  
 
abrasive characters in the War Cabinet, and a nervous administration in India. In  
 
the long running matter of choosing a successor to Linlithgow, Amery worked  
 
tenaciously to find a suitable candidate, but was ultimately overridden by  
 
Churchill. 
 
     On two other issues, the sterling balances and the food shortages, he was  
 
able to enjoy a little more sustained influence, although he frequently  
 
encountered such intransigence in London that, on more than one occasion, he  
 
felt obliged to consider resignation. Finally, during the few months that Wavell  
 
spent in England before travelling to India to become Viceroy, Amery had the  
 
demanding task of making sure that his unexpectedly radical ideas on  
 
constitutional reform were not destroyed at birth by his diehard colleagues. 
 
 
Attempts to Find a Successor to Linlithgow in 1942 
 
By late 1942, when the question of Linlithgow’s replacement as Viceroy arose  
 
again, his term of office had already been extended on two occasions.  
 
Accordingly, on 26 August, Amery discussed the matter at some length with  
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Churchill, after reviewing a long list of names that ranged from the more feasible  
 
choices such as John Anderson and Bobbety Cranborne to more improbable  
 
candidates such as Rab Butler, Lord Zetland and the Duke of Devonshire.1  
 
However, when Churchill met Amery again on 22 September, he stated his  
 
preference for Anderson, not least because he had served as Governor of  
 
Bengal; a suggestion that Amery regarded as sound, if unimaginative.2 Whatever  
 
his thoughts on the succession, Churchill’s reluctance to make a decision caused  
 
Linlithgow great anxiety, leading him to threaten to announce his departure in  
 
April 1943. This was drastic, but Amery waited for a month to react on 13  
 
November, with an urgent minute to Churchill, narrowing the possible choice  
 
down to Anderson or, surprisingly, Attlee.3  
 
     In the interim, Amery had discussed the choice of a new Viceroy with his  
 
perpetual confidant, Smuts, who was visiting London for military discussions with  
 
Churchill.4 Smuts stressed that Anderson’s formidable work load in coordinating  
 
the war effort on the home front meant that he could not be spared, but  
 
supported Amery’s alternative choice of Attlee. Unfortunately, on the same day,  
 
Attlee ruled himself out with the words, ‘God forbid!’5 
      
     Amery’s next conversation with Churchill about the Viceroyalty took place as  
 
they travelled to the annual Harrow School Concert. Significantly, this was the  
                                        
1 Amery diary, 26 August 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
2 Amery diary, 22 September 1942, AMEL 7/36.  
3 Linlithgow to Amery, 18 October 1942, L/PO/8/6: f 46. Also, Amery to Churchill, 13 November 
1942, L/PO/8/6: ff 33 – 34.  
4 J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, London, Cassell, 1952, pp. 421 – 422.  
5 Amery diary, 9 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
 255 
day after Amery learned that his dissolute son, John was in Berlin, and being  
 
employed by the Nazis for propaganda purposes. Despite this desperate news,  
 
Amery was not too distracted to comment disparagingly on Churchill’s latest  
 
suggestion for Viceroy, Sir Richard (Dick) Law, who had been Parliamentary  
 
Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office since July 1941, and was well  
 
regarded in America. However, Amery had doubts about Law’s intellectual  
 
qualities, and even graver reservations about his American wife’s suitability as  
 
Vicereine.6 Once Amery had told the Prime Minister that Mrs Law had left wing  
 
views his candidature ended.7 
 
     Churchill’s next candidate, Sir Miles Lampson, proved even more   
 
objectionable to Amery, who believed that a professional diplomat could not  
 
satisfy the criteria of parliamentary or Cabinet experience.8  He then took the  
 
extraordinary step of offering his own services as Viceroy, glossing over his age  
 
and reputation as a diehard in India, and even more fantastically suggesting that  
 
he was uniquely qualified to keep the country in the British Empire, and yet still 
 
retain the confidence of nationalist politicians. Above all, he took the  
 
opportunity to denigrate the ability of a diplomat such as Lampson to express  
 
true imperial zeal.9  
 
                                        
6 Amery diary, 18 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. Dick Law was the son of the former Prime 
Minister, Bonar Law. 
7 Amery diary, 23 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
8 Amery diary, 24 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. Lampson, who was sixty two years of age at the 
time, had been British Ambassador in Egypt since 1942. 
9 Amery diary, 30 November 1942, AMEL 7/36. Also, Amery to Churchill, 1 December 1942, 
L/PO/8/6: ff 28 – 30. 
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     Churchill finally seized the initiative by cunningly asking Linlithgow to  
 
continue as Viceroy for a further six months.10 When Linlithgow loyally accepted  
 
this suggestion, the final word on the abortive succession came from Amery, who  
 
wrote to the Viceroy in strong terms deploring how the subject had been covered  
 
in the British press. Although it was untrue that the Viceroyalty had been offered  
 
to a number of persons, who had rejected it, this had been the message  
 
‘poisonously reported’ in the New Statesman and the Daily Mail. In Amery’s view,  
 
this gave the impression that ‘Britain thought little about India, and was  
 
pessimistic about its future’.11 
 
 
The Actual Replacement of Linlithgow in 1943 
      
Linlithgow’s successor was finally announced in June 1943 after a drawn out  
 
selection procedure that lasted three months. Amery worked assiduously to  
 
influence the choice of the new Viceroy, but ultimately matters were settled  
 
exclusively at the whim of the Prime Minister. The period from the confirmation  
 
of Linlithgow’s final extension to the commencement of renewed speculation  
 
about his successor saw the final stages of the ‘Quit India’ campaign, the entire  
 
duration of Gandhi’s fast and Phillips’ mission to India, but according to the  
 
pessimistic Linlithgow and Amery, little progress in constitutional reform.12 
 
     The military situation over the winter of 1942/43 changed the context in  
                                        
10 Amery diary, 3 December 1942, AMEL 7/36. Also Churchill to Linlithgow, via India Office, 3 
December 1942, L/PO/8/6: f 23. 
11 Amery to Linlithgow, 16 December 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. 
12 Amery to Linlithgow, 19 October 1942, L/P & J/8/515: ff 57 – 60. Also, Amery to Linlithgow, 
telegram 10 November L/P & J/8/515: ff 43 – 45. 
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which the search for a new Viceroy would take place. At the time of the  
 
Congress resolution in August 1942, India had seemed to be in considerable peril  
 
from invasion by Japanese forces, who believed that they might be welcomed by  
 
the indigenous population. However, in the next few months there was some  
 
easing in the military situation as following the defeat of Rommel in North Africa,  
 
the stalling of the German advance in Russia, and the change in the balance of  
 
sea power after the Battle of Midway, Japanese enthusiasm for an invasion of  
 
India waned.13 
      
      In his letter of 16 April 1943 to the Prime Minister, Amery put forward his  
 
own list of suitable candidates in order of preference, but preceded this with a  
 
statement that, even by his tendency to hyperbole, was astonishing. He asserted  
 
that a Viceroy with a suitable personality could keep India within the British  
 
Empire for the next ten years, possibly even as a dominion. He then trumped this  
 
claim by stating that the ‘job of Viceroy of India was the biggest in the British  
 
Empire, and intrinsically more important than any post in the British  
 
Government’.14  
 
      His first choice was now Anthony Eden, from whom he had apparently  
 
obtained an indication of willingness to serve as Viceroy, and who would be  
 
successful at promoting Britain’s position in India to the USA. When Eden’s  
 
Private Secretary, Oliver Harvey heard of Amery’s preference for his political  
 
master, he was appalled and did not believe that the suggestion should be taken  
                                        
13 Voigt, India in the Second World War, pp. 181 – 192. 
14 Amery to Churchill, 16 April 1943, L/PO/8/9a: ff 116 – 118. 
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seriously.15  
 
Nevertheless, on 22 April, Amery discussed the matter with a reluctant Eden,  
 
who had already been informed that Churchill was thinking of sending him to  
 
Delhi. Although Eden did not refuse immediately, he did tell Amery that  
 
accepting the Viceroyalty might carry serious political risk, which was a coded  
 
way of saying that it could disqualify him from the premiership.16 
 
     Churchill pursued the idea of Eden becoming Viceroy to the extent of putting  
 
his case in writing to the King, but, on 3 May explained to a disappointed  
 
Amery that the monarch had expressed serious misgivings about the loss of the  
 
Prime Minister’s right hand man.17  Unsurprisingly, when Eden later spoke to  
 
Amery about the matter he regretted that, in view of the King’s strong  
 
opposition, he could not accept the offer to become Viceroy.18  
 
     However, while Churchill was away in Washington and Algiers from 4 May  
 
to 5 June, a persistent Amery took the opportunity to make another attempt to  
 
persuade Eden to succeed Linlithgow, largely dismissing the dangers to his  
 
political ambitions.19 Eden, to his credit, bore no grudge towards Amery’s  
 
dogged lobbying that he dismissed as no worse than ‘friendly persistence’, and  
                                        
15 John Harvey (ed.), The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, 1941 – 1945, London, Collins 1978, 
 p. 245. 
16 Amery diary, 22 April 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
17 Amery diary, 3 May 1943, AMEL 7/37. Also, John Wheeler-Bennett, King George VI, His Life 
and Reign, London, Macmillan, 1958, pp. 700 – 701. Wheeler-Bennett cited diary entries by the 
King from 21 to 25 April 1943 that reflected his grave concerns, in addition to a long and forceful 
letter from His Majesty to Churchill on 28 April 1943. The King had chosen to discuss the issue of 
Eden and the Viceroyalty with Bobbety Cranborne and his Private Secretary, Sir Alexander 
Hardinge, rather than with Amery.  
18 Amery diary, 4 May 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
19 Amery to Eden, 9 May 1943, L/PO/8/9a: ff 109 – 11. 
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even at this stage, did not give his final refusal.20 Harvey, who saw Eden on a  
 
daily basis throughout this period, was less charitable towards the Secretary of  
 
State for India, noting in his diary on 11 May 1943 that ‘Amery had been at it  
 
again’.21 Amery’s final, but doomed, plea to Churchill to appoint Eden also  
 
repeated the suggestion that he could go himself, as a last resort, in the belief  
 
that that he would be able to keep alive his lifelong dream of ‘seeing through  
 
Joseph Chamberlain’s Empire Policy’.22 Churchill did not bother to respond. 
 
     After Eden’s refusal, the matter of the succession was finally settled by the  
 
need to make appointments to the posts of Commander-in-Chief, India, and  
 
Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia. When Churchill met Amery on 9 June, he  
 
announced his plan that saw Wavell become a surprising choice as Viceroy.  
 
Auchinleck and Mountbatten were more predictable choices as C-in-C, India, and  
 
C-in-C, South-East Asia respectively.23 Amery clearly believed that Churchill had  
 
such a jaundiced view of India and the role of the Viceroy, that he gave the post  
 
to someone whom he barely respected, in order to remove him from his existing  
 
military command.24  
 
     Although the editors of Amery’s diaries, Barnes and Nicolson described his  
 
reaction to the choice of Wavell as lukewarm, there is no irrefutable evidence of  
 
                                        
20 Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs, The Reckoning, London, Cassell, 1965, pp. 383 – 385. 
21 Harvey, War Diaries, 1941 – 1945, pp. 255 – 256. 
22 Amery to Churchill, 8 June 1943, L/PO/8/9a: ff 96 – 98.  
23 Amery diary, 9 June 1943, AMEL 7/37.  
24 Irial Glynn, ‘An Untouchable in the Presence of Brahmins, Lord Wavell’s Disastrous Relationship 
with Whitehall during his Time as Viceroy to India, 1943 – 1947’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, 
No. 3 (May 2007), p. 642  
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this. His diary for 9 June 1943, referred, with some approval to a bold  
 
experiment, and stated somewhat prophetically, that despite possible early  
 
difficulties with Hindu nationalists, ‘Wavell might soon prove more radical than  
 
most politicians’.25 He also judged that, had Churchill read Wavell’s approving  
 
account of Viscount Allenby’s sympathy towards Egyptian self-rule during his  
 
term as High Commissioner following World War I, he would not have appointed  
 
him as Viceroy.26 
 
 
The Origin of the Sterling Balances 
 
The politics of the sterling balances, rather than their financial intricacies were to  
 
cause even more rancour between Amery and Churchill than their differences  
 
over the August offer of 1940, or the release of the satyagraha prisoners in  
 
1941. Furthermore, there was also ill-feeling between Sir Kingsley Wood,  
 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government of India, especially its Finance  
 
Member, Sir Jeremy Raisman.  
 
     The question of Britain’s economic relationship with India in the decade  
 
before 1939, and also during the war, has not attracted a substantial body of  
 
scholarship, but it is relatively safe to conclude that the world recession and the  
 
failure to implement the federal provisions of the 1935 Government of India Act  
                                        
25 Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), commentary, The Empire at Bay, The Leo Amery Diaries, 1929 – 
1945, p. 866.  Also, Amery diary, 9 June 1943, AMEL 7/37. Also, Amery to Linlithgow, 10 June 
1943, L/PO/8/9a: f 93.   
26 Amery diary, 9 June 1943, AMEL 7/37. Also, Viscount Wavell, Allenby in Egypt, A Study in 
Greatness Volume II, London, Harrap, 1943, pp. 119 – 129. Wavell’s final summary of Allenby’s 
performance in Egypt left little doubt that he believed him to have been a much more honest and 
trusted administrator in Egypt than Lord Kitchener, who went before him, or Lord Lloyd who 
became his successor. 
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made reform of India’s financial system difficult.27 Sir James (‘Percy’) Grigg, who  
 
became converted to the diehard cause during his spell as Finance Member of  
 
the Viceroy’s Executive Council from 1934 to 1939, had been sceptical of  
 
Keynesian attempts to move away from a laissez-faire policy in Indian economic  
 
management, and even more scathing about the establishment of an Indian  
 
Reserve Bank to manage currency and debt independently of the Government of  
 
India.28  
 
     By the outbreak of war, the weaknesses in the Indian economy, and the  
 
terms of its trade with London had led to a sterling debt of £350 million in  
 
Britain’s favour. This was exacerbated when, at the outbreak of war, sterling was  
 
declared non-convertible leading to the establishment of credit balances in the  
 
form of Treasury Bills lodged with the Indian banking institutions in London.29  
 
The origin of India’s transformation from sterling debtor to creditor, lay in the  
 
provisions of the Defence Expenditure Plan, announced, with surprisingly little  
 
comment to the House of Commons on 29 March 1940 by Zetland’s deputy, and  
 
Under-Secretary of State for India, Sir Hugh O’Neill.  
 
     The new arrangements, backdated to 1 April 1939 were the product of an 
 
agreement between London and Delhi, and were intended to take into account  
 
wartime conditions. They proposed that the Indian budget should provide during  
                                        
27 B. R. Tomlinson, The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914 – 1947, pp. 91 – 92. 
28 Sir P. J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, London, Jonathon Cape, 1948, pp. 289 – 290. Grigg 
was quite open in his assertion that the India Reserve Bank Board became quickly dominated by 
Hindus, under the sway of Congress. 
29 B. R. Tomlinson, ‘Indo-British Relations in the Post-Colonial Era: The Sterling Balances 
Negotiations, 1947 – 1949’, p. 143. 
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the war for, 
 
(a) the normal cost of India’s pre-war forces, whether employed inside or  
outside India, adjusted for price inflation, and  
 
(b) the cost of special defence measures undertaken by India in Indian  
interests during the war. 
 
All defence expenditure over this amount incurred by the Government of India 
 
would be met by the British taxpayer.30  
 
     It is possible to put forward a variety of reasons why the 1940 Financial  
 
Settlement turned India so rapidly from a sterling debtor into such a major  
 
creditor, but the most convincing explanation was put forward in 1950 by  
 
Herbert Austen Shannon, who believed that it arose when India ‘became the  
 
operational base and arsenal of democracy in the East against Japan’.31 The  
 
heavy extra military expenditure that this involved was added to India’s sterling  
 
balances in London, as it did not fall within (a) or (b) of the criteria laid down by  
 
O’Neill.   
 
 
The Politics of the Sterling Balances in 1942 
 
The matter of the rapidly increasing balances was viewed with some concern in  
 
London by senior Treasury officials, who felt that the state of the British  
 
economy should be borne in mind as well as the public finances in Delhi.32 In  
 
July 1942, the first serious attempt to change the 1940 settlement was made  
 
when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, gave notice of his  
                                        
30 Hansard 29 February 1940, Vol. 357, cc2255 – 2256. 
31 Shannon, ‘The Sterling Balances of the Sterling Area, 1939 – 1949’, p. 540. 
32 Hinds, ‘Imperial policy and Colonial Sterling Balances 1943 – 1956’, p. 25. 
263 
intentions to Amery, who immediately became fearful that Churchill would lend 
enthusiastic support to any attempt to make India pay more during the war.  
     Amery was correct to be apprehensive over Wood’s campaign to make  
substantial revisions to the arrangements agreed in 1940. The Chancellor’s War  
Cabinet memorandum of 31 July 1942 used, as a justification for change,  
Roosevelt’s statement on Reciprocal Aid, whereby at the end of the war, no  
member of the United Nations would owe a monetary debt to another as a result 
of the common war effort.33 Wood realised that so far, India’s debt to Britain had 
merely been extinguished, but warned that the Treasury had forecast a likely  
Indian sterling creditor balance of between £400 million and £450 million by April 
1943. 
     He recognised that Raisman had offered minor amendments to the system,  
but as these amounted only to adjustments of £7.5 million per annum, they  
could not be said to produce a solution. Wood revealed that Raisman would not  
make any larger concessions for fear of inviting criticism in India, especially from 
Congress. However, Wood felt that the War Cabinet would not accept the risk of 
potential political criticism from India as an excuse to allow any substantial  
accumulation of sterling balances. As Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the  
Exchequer in February 1940, had not accepted the settlement as necessarily  
final, Wood saw no reason why Britain and India should not now accept the  
33 Fifth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the period ended 11 June 1942, 
Chapter 3, pp. 22 – 23, 77th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 799, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1942. Cited by N. Mansergh, The Transfer of Power, Volume II ‘Quit 
India’, London, HMSO, 1971, p. 505. 
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principle enshrined in Reciprocal Aid.34 
 
     Before producing his detailed rebuttal of Wood’s arguments in his War  
 
Cabinet memorandum of 1 August 1943, Amery tried to pre-empt controversy by  
 
writing to Churchill, asking for Raisman to be heard at the meeting of the War  
 
Cabinet on 6 August 1942.35 Amery’s subsequent memorandum, often frankly  
 
expressed, conceded that the picture had been changed by Japan’s entry into  
 
the war, but described the Treasury claim that Britain was building up a huge  
 
monetary debt for the defence of India ‘as a travesty’. In particular he stressed  
 
that much of the expenditure that was being credited in sterling in London,  
 
represented part of the Allied war effort in Egypt, Iraq and the Middle East.36  
 
     The next meeting of the War Cabinet on 6 August 1942 was chaired by Attlee  
 
in Churchill’s absence, and the minutes referred only to very brief summaries in  
 
support of their cases by Amery and Wood. Raisman made a powerful plea for  
 
making few changes to the arrangements during the war, especially as the cost  
 
of the defence of India itself had increased fivefold. He reasoned that during the  
 
war, the accumulated sterling balances were of little value to India, and also  
 
made the innovative suggestion that after the cessation of hostilities, they could  
 
be used to fund reconstruction projects.37  
 
          Amery’s disagreement with Wood had been civil, but once Churchill had  
 
returned to London, the issue of the sterling balances generated stronger  
                                        
34 Wood, War Cabinet memorandum, 31 July 1942, CAB 66/27/5. 
35 Amery to Churchill, 31 July 1942, L/PO/11/3: f 277. 
36 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 1 August 1942, CAB 66/27/8. 
37 War Cabinet conclusions, 6 August 1942, CAB 65/27/21. 
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feelings. By the time that the matter was considered by a War Cabinet chaired  
 
by the Prime Minister, Linlithgow had already conveyed to Amery the likely anger  
 
in India if the 1940 settlement were to be amended.38 However, this meeting on  
 
16 September concluded that, while the British Government had serious  
 
concerns over the outcome of the 1940 arrangements, it proposed to take no  
 
action at the time, beyond the despatch of an explanatory telegram to the  
 
Viceroy, indicating the need for a ‘wider financial readjustment’.39 The minutes  
 
did not record a lengthy and embittered outburst from Churchill, who considered  
 
it ‘monstrous that Britain should be expected to defend India, but be left to pay  
 
millions of pounds for the privilege’. Once again, Amery lamented that when he  
 
attempted to explain the technical intricacies of the situation to Churchill, he  
 
enjoyed no support from his colleagues.40 
 
     Within the next few days, the composition of the formal telegram to the  
 
Viceroy about the sterling balances became increasingly contentious. Wood sent  
 
his version to Amery on 17 September, and although the early paragraphs were  
 
unremarkable, the later ones were candid, stressing the relevance of Roosevelt’s  
 
principle of Reciprocal Aid, and indicating that a fresh settlement could be in  
 
place before the end of the war.41 Amery reacted strongly to Wood’s draft,  
 
describing it as ‘long and argumentative’. His dual objections were not only to  
                                        
38 Linlithgow to Amery, 8 September 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23. 
39 War Cabinet conclusions, 16 September 1942, CAB 65/27/41. 
40 Amery diary, 16 September 1942, AMEL 7/36. 
41 Wood, draft telegram for issue by the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, 17 September 
1942. Enclosed with a letter sent by Wood’s Private Secretary to Turnbull (Amery’s Private 
Secretary) 17 September 1942, L/PO/2/16: f 110. 
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the veracity of Treasury claims about the nature of the expenditure that was 
inflating the balances, but more importantly, to the disastrous political  
consequences in India that would follow if the telegram were to be sent, as  
composed by Wood.42 
     Whatever his doubts, Amery accepted Wood’s paper, although he told  
Linlithgow that he did so with great reluctance.43 However, when Churchill  
composed his own memorandum, to be issued in the name of the Secretary of  
State, Amery was horrified by the additions to the Treasury version, especially  
the new final paragraph which provided for a potential counter-claim by Britain in 
respect of naval and air expenses incurred in the defence of India.44 Risking  
Churchill’s displeasure, Amery immediately sent a copy of this contentious  
paragraph to Linlithgow.45 Despite Amery’s protest to Churchill that a British  
counter-claim would be unacceptable to the Viceroy, both the drafts of the  
Treasury and the Prime Minister were put before the War Cabinet on 24  
September 1942.46 
     The differences between London and Delhi over the need to alter the 1940  
arrangements were apparent from the Viceroy’s long and aggrieved telegram of 
20 September 1942. He argued that his Executive Council would not only reject 
42 Amery to Wood, 18 September 1942, L/PO/2/16: f 101. Also, Amery diary, 18 September 
1942, AMEL 7/36. 
43 Amery to Linlithgow, 18 September1942, L/PO/2/16: f 99. 
44 Churchill, draft telegram for issue by the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy, 
19 September 1942, L/PO/2/16: ff 97 – 98. 
45 Amery to Linlithgow, 19 September, L/PO/2/16/: f 95. 
46 Amery to Churchill, 19 September 1942, L/PO/2/16: f 94. 
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the minor concessions offered to Wood by Raisman, but had already considered  
 
them as too harsh for India.47 At this stage, the situation so frustrated Amery  
 
that he ‘considered resignation in order to make Churchill see sense’.48 
 
     Feeling that the War Cabinet should be made aware of all matters concerning  
 
the sterling balances, Amery composed a long memorandum for the War Cabinet  
 
that he intended to be circulated, together with the draft telegrams prepared by  
 
Churchill and the Treasury. He made no attempt to disguise his support for the  
 
position of the Viceroy and his Executive Council, and recommended that the  
 
British Government should make no reference to a possible change in the 1940  
 
settlement, before the end of the war.49 
 
     Unfortunately for Amery, Bridges, the vigilant War Cabinet Secretary,  
 
 realised how contentious Amery’s memorandum could prove to be, and  
 
showed it to Churchill, who refused to allow it to be circulated before the  
 
meeting of the War Cabinet on 24 September 1942.50 Although Churchill was  
 
typically aggressive towards Amery at this meeting of the War Cabinet, and  
 
accused him of sending the Viceroy only a small selected paragraph of his draft,  
 
he did not get his way with the War Cabinet.51 Although his draft that was so  
 
objectionable to Amery was eventually sent to Linlithgow, it was despatched with  
 
qualifying conditions that made it toothless.52 Churchill was sufficiently angered  
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at this outcome that he wrote directly to Linlithgow, not openly dissenting from  
 
the decisions of his War Cabinet, but condemning Amery’s disingenuous conduct  
 
in sending only a selected part of his draft.53 
 
     Despite being bruised by his latest spat with Churchill, Amery managed to  
 
engineer a lengthy hiatus in the Treasury’s attempt to keep alive the prospect of  
 
a reservation to alter the 1940 arrangements. Linlithgow had never mentioned  
 
the possibility of this to his Executive Committee, and told Amery bluntly on 3  
 
October that if they learned of potential changes to the 1940 settlement, there  
 
would be irreparable damage to the Indian military and industrial war effort.54  
 
Once Amery had circulated this telegram to the War Cabinet, the political climate  
 
in London changed.55 After consulting Wood, Amery was able to tell Churchill  
 
that in view of the Viceroy’s arguments it had been decided, at this time, not to  
 
pursue an alteration of the rules about the sterling balances.56  
 
 
Renewal of the Controversy of the Sterling Balances from July 1943 
 
After an interval of nine months, political differences over the sterling balances  
 
resurfaced at a meeting of the War Cabinet on 27 July 1943, when Wood  
 
predicted that, by the end of the year, India would be Britain’s sterling creditor  
 
to the extent of £745 million. Describing this matter as ‘the one black spot in  
 
Britain’s finances during the war’, Churchill insisted that this hitherto obscure  
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subject should be aired in Parliament. Amery was less successful than on  
 
previous occasions in calming the worries of his colleagues, and despite support  
 
from Bevin, Wood was asked to prepare a fresh paper on the topic.57  
 
     Although Amery quickly wrote an impassioned letter to Wood, requesting that  
 
the possibility of India contributing more to the war effort should not be made  
 
public, he lost control of the sterling balances issue when the War Cabinet  
 
decided to set up a Standing Committee on Indian Financial Questions.58 The  
 
remit of this body that, included Amery, but was chaired by Wood, was not only  
 
the sterling balances, but also the matter of inflation that was exacerbating food  
 
shortages.59 To Amery’s horror the new committee included the ‘regrettable Lord  
 
Cherwell’, who was to have Churchill’s ear for the remainder of the war.60  
 
     The first meeting of this new Standing Committee concentrated more on  
 
inflation in India and the terms of trade between the two countries than  
 
matters of currency.61 Nevertheless, Amery’s subsequent letter to Linlithgow  
 
revealed his annoyance at Cherwell’s misreading of the exact economic and  
 
financial relationship between Britain and India, and feared that this would be  
 
the interpretation believed by Churchill.62 
 
     By the time that the sterling balances were discussed again, there were new  
 
                                        
57 War Cabinet conclusions, 27 July 1943, CAB 65/35/16. Also, Amery diary, 27 July 1943, AMEL 
7/37.  
58 Amery to Wood, 28 July 1943, L/F/7/2861: f 31. 
59 War Cabinet conclusions, 4 August 1943, CAB 66/40/17. 
60 Amery diary, 4 August 1943, AMEL 7/37.  
61 Standing Committee on Indian Financial Questions, minutes 16 August 1943, L/F/7/687. 
62 Amery to Linlithgow, 17 August 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/12.  
 270 
principals in important posts. Wood had died suddenly on 21 September, to be 
 
be replaced as Chancellor by Anderson, and Wavell had arrived in Delhi to  
 
commence his duties as Viceroy. Amery’s relationship with Anderson, who also  
 
chaired the Standing Committee on Indian Finances, was smoother than with  
 
Wood, although he did not manage to convince him that it was technically  
 
incorrect to compare the growing total of the sterling balances with Britain’s  
 
future indebtedness to the USA.63 
 
     Wavell’s position on the sterling balances was essentially a moral, and not a  
 
technical one. After a wait of several months he asked Amery whether Churchill  
 
could make a joint announcement on Indian constitutional reform and the ethical  
 
imperative for Britain to ‘honour the sterling balances’.64 On failing to obtain any  
 
reassurance from Amery, he sent a powerful telegram supporting the views of  
 
Indians who felt insulted that Britain should now regard the sterling balances as  
 
‘ill-gotten gains’, and also suggest that the British taxpayer had funded India’s  
 
entire war effort. While admitting that the matter had been reported hysterically  
 
in Indian newspapers, the Viceroy was adamant that the Government of India  
 
had been slighted and believed that the damage was now almost beyond  
 
diplomacy.65 
 
     Amery soon realised that he had been placed in a difficult position between  
 
Wavell and Churchill, when, after a year of deliberation, Anderson’s Standing  
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Committee issued its report, which supplied considerable detail on how Britain’s  
indebtedness had been built up. However, the paragraphs identifying the  
immediate and longer term problems to be solved were vague, and suggested  
little beyond the hope that India might make some abatement of the claim to the 
final sterling balances total.66 The minutes of the meeting of the War Cabinet on  
4 August 1944, when these findings were discussed did not reveal the voluble  
exchanges between Amery and Churchill, but merely reported that Anderson was 
seeking to make ‘repayment of the balances by easy stages’, and still hoping that 
there might be some readjustment of the debt to take account of Britain’s  
contribution to the defence of India. Nevertheless, any immediate action was  
postponed.67 
     The true bitterness of this meeting was apparent from Amery’s diary in which 
he claimed to have had to contradict Churchill’s assertion that a British counter- 
 
claim was justified by the ‘worthlessness of the Indian Army’. The Prime Minister  
had also apparently wanted to renege on any promises made to India, once the  
war had been won, especially as he believed that the sterling balances had been  
created by Hindu money lenders. Amery, in accusing Churchill of behaving like  
Hitler, also suspected the malign influence of Bracken and Cherwell.68 
     Fortunately, Amery was able to put a positive gloss on the War Cabinet  
conclusions to Wavell, who gratefully accepted the War Cabinet’s postponement 
66 Anderson, Report of Committee on Indian Financial Questions, 19 July 1944, CAB 66/52/48. 
67 War Cabinet conclusions, 4 August 1944, CAB 65/43/18. 
68 Amery diary, 4 August 1944, AMEL 7/38.  
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of any plans to adjust the sterling balances. Despite expressions of intent by  
 
both Viceroy and Secretary of State for the matter to be discussed in the spring  
 
of 1945, it was not raised again before the end of the war.69 At this point, India  
 
was Britain’s creditor to the extent of £1,111 million.70 
 
 
 Amery’s Discussions with Wavell in London 
 
Compared with the predictably weary Linlithgow, who reported on 19 July 1943  
 
that the political situation was quiet in India, Wavell was anxious for change, and  
 
unwilling to take up duty in Delhi before seeking ways of breaking the  
 
constitutional deadlock.71 He spent the period from his appointment in June until  
 
his departure for India in mid-October, putting his radical thoughts down on  
 
paper, attending meetings of the War Cabinet and the restored India Cabinet  
 
Committee, and also having numerous discussions with Amery. These early  
 
exchanges of opinion set the tone for their subsequent relationship, and were  
 
recorded differently in their diaries. Amery was patronising, praising Wavell’s  
 
steadfast character and sound judgement, but echoing his earlier comments  
 
about Linlithgow, reserved judgement on his ability to think constructively in  
 
political terms.72  Wavell was initially more complimentary, noting that Amery  
 
was not the Tory diehard that Indian and some British newspapers had  
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depicted.73  
 
    Unfortunately, within a few weeks, he had amended this view, describing the  
 
Secretary of State as having more intellectual qualities than Churchill, but ‘rather  
 
let down by an unimpressive personality, and little suitability for the rough and  
 
tumble of high level politics’.74 By the time that he had spent four months in  
 
London working with Amery on Indian matters, he had become even more  
 
critical. On 19 October, having just arrived in Delhi, he recorded that Linlithgow  
 
shared his opinion of Amery whom they both regarded as having admirable  
 
attributes, but ‘quite unable to get his stuff across in Cabinet or Parliament’.75 
 
       Before Wavell’s thoughts on reform were reviewed by the India Committee  
 
that had been revived at Amery’s insistence, the critical question of whether to  
 
take any constitutional initiative in the near future was discussed at the India  
 
Office on 10 September 1943.76 In front of a group of senior officials, Amery and  
 
Wavell differed politely, but significantly, over the sort of reform measures that  
 
had any chance of success. In stressing that his ideas did not contradict the  
 
terms of the Cripps offer, Wavell advocated the replacement of the currently  
 
nominated Viceroy’s Executive Council by a representative body, made up of  
 
leading politicians.  
 
     Amery, supported by his officials had little enthusiasm for Wavell’s proposal.  
 
His rebuttal repeated his usual observation that British Parliamentary  
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government was unsuitable for India, and only offered yet another consultative  
 
body as a way of making progress.77 Wavell was irked by Amery’s intention to  
 
deliver an hour long monologue on Indian constitutional reform, and detected  
 
some hostility from civil servants when his directness cut short the Secretary of  
 
State.78 Amery graciously admitted that Wavell had put his case frankly and  
 
shrewdly, but feared that there was not even a one in five chance that his  
 
proposals would succeed.79 
 
     The memorandum that Wavell submitted to the India Committee on 17  
 
September alarmed his colleagues in rejecting the existing strategy of doing  
 
nothing in terms of reform while there was a war still to be won. Fearing  
 
long term resentment in India he urged Britain to go even further than Cripps  
 
had recommended, and install coalition governments, not only at a national, but  
 
also at a provincial level.80 
 
     To his disappointment, Wavell’s proposals were received with a combination  
 
of lukewarm support, and outright hostility.81 The official minutes do not record  
 
the degree to which Grigg, Anderson and Simon urged rejection of Wavell’s  
 
scheme, only that it was agreed that an amended paper should be prepared.82  
 
Amery’s account demonstrated the ambiguity of his position, as he maintained at  
 
first that there were advantages in waiting until the end of the war, and then,  
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after brief reconsideration, hoped that some form of constitutional change could  
 
be attempted early in 1944.83  
 
     With Churchill’s likely antagonism in mind, Amery persuaded Wavell to amend  
 
his memorandum in order to convince the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet  
 
that there was little difference of opinion between Secretary of State and  
 
Viceroy-Designate.84 When this amended paper was discussed at a further  
 
meeting of the India Committee on 29 September, Wavell’s proposals were  
 
largely shelved in favour of a briefer memorandum to be prepared by Amery,  
 
and a directive to the Viceroy-Designate to be drafted by Cripps, who would  
 
specify the circumstances in which Indian leaders would be permitted to  
 
participate in any political negotiations.85 Amery believed that he had ‘backed up  
 
Wavell stoutly’ at this meeting, but the latter’s diary complained of having  
 
received only limited support.86 
 
     Wavell’s chances of making early constitutional progress were severely  
 
damaged by a Cabinet memorandum written by Churchill, who argued that the  
 
strong action taken against Gandhi and the Congress leaders had produced  
 
sufficiently stable conditions to enable an Allied offensive to be launched against  
 
Japan from India at some time in 1944. In these circumstances, he contended  
 
that the installation of a new Viceroy provided no reason for running any risks  
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that could lead to a renewal of agitation and civil disorder.87  On 7 October 1943,  
 
despite the attempts of Wavell and Amery to convince their colleagues to  
 
authorise a fresh constitutional initiative, the War Cabinet decided that matters in  
 
India should be left much as they stood, and that Churchill alone should draft a  
 
directive by which Wavell should be guided during his first months in office.88 
 
     Wavell was not in the least persuaded by Amery that they had both done as  
 
well as could have been expected at the meeting, and was vitriolic in his diary  
 
over the perceived spinelessness of most members of the War Cabinet. While  
 
conceding that Amery had been on his side, he criticised his circumlocution and  
 
vulnerability to Churchill’s interruptions.89  
 
 
The Growing Food Shortages 
 
Amery’s limited capacity to control the response to the food shortages in India  
 
that became worse in late 1942, proved to be typical of his lack of influence  
 
during previous episodes such as the release of the Satyagraha prisoners and the  
 
Cripps mission.  Furthermore he was obliged to answer difficult questions on this  
 
matter in the House of Commons by members who felt that Britain was being  
 
shamed by its dilatory response to the tragedy. 
 
     The onerous task of providing sufficient grain for India’s own population, and  
 
an increasing number of troops, was characterised in its early stages by  
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inadequate data and poor channels of communication.90 Although the Japanese  
 
occupation of Burma had ended the relatively modest imports of rice that were  
 
required to make up the gap in self-sufficiency in Eastern India, there was to be  
 
no real recovery from the famine, especially in Bengal, until the end of 1944.  
 
     Although estimates of the deaths attributable to the famine in Bengal have  
 
varied considerably, the fact that a major tragedy took place has never been  
 
contested. The official report commissioned by the Government of India stated  
 
that there had been approximately 1.5 million deaths attributable to the famine,  
 
although it was conceded, at the time, that record keeping had been flawed.91  
 
Writing in 1990 Sugata Bose summarised the statistical work done by a number  
 
of his colleagues, and computed a figure of famine related deaths between 3  
 
millions and 3.5 million.92 There was more consensus over the quantification of  
 
the poor yield of rice crops in Bengal from December 1942 to August 1943. The  
 
main aman crop harvested in December 1942 that represented 75% of the total  
 
tonnage was poor, as were the yields of the smaller bora and aus crops in May  
 
1943 and August 1943, respectively. Alarmingly, during this critical period the  
 
total production of rice fell 2.8 million tons short of normal requirements.93 
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Amery’s First Involvement with the Food Shortages 
Possibly because the forecast shortfall in the 1942 rice harvest was relatively  
modest, there were few worried reports from Linlithgow to Amery until the last 
weeks of that year. The Viceroy only began to reveal signs of concern when he 
wrote to Amery on 30 November 1942. Far from confining his misgivings to  
Bengal, he also cited food problems in Bombay, Madras and certain of the  
princely states. Above all, he was particularly anxious that Amery should  
emphasise to the War Cabinet that if the situation worsened, India would no  
longer be able to export rice to Ceylon or wheat to Persia.94 
     Before Amery could reply, he had received more increasingly urgent  
telegrams from both Linlithgow and the Government of India Food Department.  
These warnings anticipated a major crisis in grain production in several regions  
of the country, and stressed that the scarcities were being increased by the  
hoarding of supplies by both affluent merchants and subsistence farmers, all  
waiting for prices to increase.95 Amery’s early responses to requests for food  
relief could scarcely be said to be sympathetic. On 15 December he told the  
Government of India, Food Department, that the need for shipping capacity by  
British imports had priority over its use in sending grain to India, and suggested  
that India should cut its own programme of imports in order to make some space 
94 Linlithgow to Amery, 19 November 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. Also, Linlithgow to Amery, 30 
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for more food shipments.96  
 
     His letter to Linlithgow of 23 December was even less encouraging, and  
 
feared, with justification, that any requests for extra shipping would face the  
 
formidable obstacle of Lord Leathers and his Ministry of War Transport. As  
 
suspicious of Congress as ever, Amery suggested that it might well be  
 
encouraging hoarding in order to worsen the shortages, so that they could then  
 
be in a position to blame the British for starving the Indian people.97  
 
Unsurprisingly, when Linlithgow took more radical action to improve the food  
 
situation by decontrolling the price of wheat, Amery did not respond, although it  
 
had been made clear that the success of such as step depended on substantial  
 
imports of grain.98  
 
      By this time, Amery had already made his first parliamentary statement  
 
about the food shortages, optimistically stating  that, with care, there should be  
 
enough grain to go round. In particular, he attributed the inflationary prices to  
 
hoarding, and was less than complimentary about the procedures introduced by  
 
the Government of India in order to improve the distribution of grain, and  
 
stabilise prices.99 In a later statement he made his own constitutional position  
 
clear, when after announcing the removal by the Government of India of the  
 
                                        
96 Amery to Government of India Food Department, 15 December 1942, L/E/8/3297: ff 283 -285. 
97 Amery to Linlithgow, 23 December 1942, MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. Frederick Leathers (1883 – 
1965) was a self-made businessman who, after performing an advisory role in the early years of 
the war, was appointed by Churchill in May 1941 to be Minister of the newly merged Department 
of Shipping and War Transport.  
98 Linlithgow to Amery, 26 January 26 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/12.  
99 Hansard, 21 January 1943, vol. 386, cc277 – 279. 
 280 
maximum price for wheat, he stated that such matters were outside his remit,  
 
notwithstanding that India was not yet self-governing.100 
 
     There was then a political hiatus in the food crisis of almost two months  
 
during which the matter of Gandhi’s fast largely occupied Amery and Linlithgow.  
 
However, matters resumed, when in response to Amery’s request on 15 March  
 
for a fresh report, Linlithgow produced a mixed account, citing the improved  
 
military position, and anticipating a better harvest in 1943. However, his  
 
optimism did not extend to Bengal, where there was both a shortage of rice and  
 
alarming levels of price inflation. Finally, he promised that central Government  
 
would begin to coordinate the distribution of foodstuffs with rationing introduced  
 
in urban areas.101 
 
     The ability of the administration in Bengal to alleviate the famine was further  
 
damaged by a constitutional crisis that resulted in the effective dismissal of the  
 
Chief Minister, Fazlul Huq by Governor Herbert, on 28 March. Herbert then took  
 
charge of administration under Section 93 until 24 April, when a new Muslim  
 
Chief Minister, Sir Kwaja Nazimuddin, was appointed.102 
 
     For the remainder of Linlithgow’s period in office until he was relieved by  
 
Wavell in October 1943, much of the early optimism, and possible complacency  
 
over the food shortages, especially in Bengal, had disappeared. He told Amery 
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that some provincial ministers were encouraging hoarding, but also expressed his  
 
doubts about the effectiveness of a free trade solution in bringing down the price  
 
of grain.103 Amery also became gloomier, lamenting the poor outcome of the  
 
plans already made in Delhi, and insisting that there should be better liaison  
 
between the central and provincial authorities in taking action against the  
 
activities of middlemen.104 
 
     Amery did not offer immediate support to the urgent demands from Delhi for  
 
the supply of 500,000 tons of wheat from September 1943 to March 1944, and  
 
indeed admitted on 26 July 1943 that he could only offer limited assistance.  
 
However, he changed his mind after noting the difficulties cited by the Shipping  
 
Committee.105 This conversion to the political as well as the economic and  
 
humanitarian need for substantial shipments of wheat was reflected in a  
 
comprehensive memorandum that he prepared for a meeting of the War Cabinet  
 
on 4 August. An impressive technical review of the Indian economy was followed  
 
by a blunt statement of the dire consequences for munitions production, public  
 
order, and the loyalty of the Indian Army if Linlithgow’s demands were not met  
 
in full.106 
 
     The War Cabinet on 4 August 1943 was the first of a series, at which Amery  
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met implacable opposition, not only from Churchill, but also from Leathers and  
 
Cherwell. The minutes recorded that Amery pleaded the Indian case for  
 
substantial imports, but Leathers argued successfully that only a token shipment  
 
of 100,000 tons of barley should be sent from Iraq.107 Amery’s diary that had  
 
previously hardly mentioned the food shortages charged his colleagues with  
 
treating the Indian appeal for grain as a ‘bluff to loosen existing hoards’. Once  
 
again, he accused Cherwell of talking nonsense as a consequence of his visceral  
 
dislike of India and Indians, but at least was able to record that for once,  
 
Churchill was sympathetic.108 
 
     When Amery wrote his next memorandum requesting further cereal imports,  
 
the situation in Bengal had become serious, not only in terms of the famine, but  
 
also in the governance of the province. Herbert had been taken seriously ill, and  
 
replaced, on a temporary basis by the Governor of Bihar, Sir Thomas  
 
Rutherford.109 When this urgent request was discussed at the War Cabinet on 24  
 
September, Amery was staunchly supported by Wavell, then Viceroy-Designate,  
 
but also an experienced Commander-in-Chief, India. Nevertheless, the outcome  
 
was disappointing to both men as Leathers prevailed with his argument that he  
 
was only prepared to authorise an additional 200,000 tons of grain, well short of  
 
the figure of 1 million tons that the Government of India now wanted.110  
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Churchill’s apparent lack of sympathy at this meeting caused a despairing Amery  
 
to record his profound disappointment at the Prime Minister’s continued failure to  
 
realise that the interests of the British Empire should be placed at the at the  
 
head of his list of priorities.111 
 
 
The Famine: Wavell in India 
 
When Wavell replaced Linlithgow as Viceroy on 20 October 1943, he was far  
 
more energetic than his predecessor in seeking solutions to the food shortages.  
 
Amery was impressed by the powerful, but concise letters and telegrams that he  
 
found a welcome change from ‘Linlithgow’s loquacious obfuscations’, thereby  
 
permitting him to take a firmer stance over food imports with his colleagues in  
 
the War Cabinet.112 Unlike Linlithgow, Wavell immediately travelled to Bengal  
 
with the Vicereine, both showing great courage in visiting the poorer districts of  
 
Calcutta by night, and witnessing large numbers of destitute refugees from the  
 
countryside, starving and sleeping rough.113 
 
     Armed with this first hand knowledge, his first reports to Amery not only  
 
underlined Rutherford’s shortcomings as acting Governor, but condemned the  
 
entire provincial administration for its weak and inefficient response to the  
 
famine. In particular, he underlined the long and short term action that he  
 
required, especially in terms of liaison between the civil and military  
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authorities.114 He also became rapidly aware that the deteriorating morale of a 
dwindling establishment of Indian Civil Service officials was a serious barrier to 
improvement.115 
     Amery was forced to endure a difficult time in London, both in obtaining  
shipments of grain for India, and also defending his own performance in the  
House of Commons. Firstly, he was unsuccessful in persuading the War Cabinet  
to accept an offer of a gift by the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King of  
100,000 tons of wheat for India.116 A few days later, a partially successful appeal 
to the War Cabinet did see Leathers promise a further 100,000 tons of wheat  
from Australia in the first two months of 1944.117 Amery’s diary gives some  
important details about Churchill’s influence on Leathers, at this meeting,  
especially the comment that ‘Indians were breeding like rabbits’.118  
     Secondly, on 4 November 1943, during a long debate in the House of  
Commons on the Indian famine, he was challenged by the senior Labour  
politician, Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, who recognised that Amery had always  
been honest in acknowledging the shortcomings of all agencies in solving the  
food problem, but disputed the Secretary of State’s view that these failures were 
not dishonourable. The Liberal MP, Sir George Schuster, a former Finance  
Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, was even more critical of the  
114 Wavell to Amery, 29 October 1943, L/PO/8/31: f 155. Also, Wavell to Amery, 29 October 
1943, L/E/8/3322: ff 125 – 126. 
115 Fort, Archibald Wavell, p. 363. 
116 War Cabinet conclusions, 2 November 1943, CAB 65/36/17.  
117 War Cabinet conclusions, 10 November 1943, CAB 65/36/20. 
118 Amery diary, 10 November 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
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leadership given to the Government of India by Amery and his officials.  
 
     Amery’s defence was a tortuous, and oft recounted history of the famine,  
 
especially the mistakes of various provincial governments. His main excuse for  
 
the shortage of available shipping to transport grain to India was the demand for  
 
vessels to take part in the landings in Sicily in July 1943.119 It was disingenuous  
 
of Amery to tell Wavell that ‘the debate on the Indian famine had gone  
 
reasonably well’.120 
 
     Although the Government of India, Food Department, forcibly reminded  
 
Amery of the food requirements of both civilians and the military, he was not  
 
able to make any further progress in obtaining the promise of further shipments  
 
during the last few weeks of 1943.121 His detailed, but sober reply of 1 January  
 
1944 could only restate the British Government’s difficulties in improving on  
 
previous offers, not least of which was the priority for shipping in connection  
 
with the impending Second Front.  
 
 
The Appointment of Richard Casey 
  
In the view of Wavell, the poor performance of both Herbert, who eventually  
 
retired with a fatal illness in October 1943, and his temporary replacement,  
 
Rutherford, made the choice of a new Governor of Bengal extremely urgent. The  
 
origins of the decision to appoint the Australian politician and diplomat, Richard  
 
                                        
119 Hansard, 4 November 1943 vol. 93, cc886 – 970. 
120 Amery to Wavell, 6 November 1943, L/PO/10/21. 
121 Government of India Food Department to Amery, 24 November 1943, L/E/8/3322: f 85 and 
also, 21 December 1943, L/PO/10/25. 
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Casey, at the time serving in Cairo as Minister of State, are somewhat obscure.  
 
Amery’s diary for 5 November 1943 recorded that he recommended Casey to  
 
Churchill, and that his suggestion was ‘received with enthusiasm’.122 Whether he  
 
was correct in taking the credit for what turned out to be an inspired choice is  
 
debatable, as a minute sent on the same day to Amery by his Private Secretary,  
 
Francis Turnbull, included the name of Casey, added in manuscript to  
 
a typed list of other candidates.123 
 
     Although Casey had earned an enviable reputation for his pragmatic  
 
diplomacy in the Middle-East, he had little knowledge of Bengal beyond the  
 
famine, and its reputation for fierce Hindu-Muslim antipathy among its  
 
population of 65 million.124 From the date that he was sworn in on 22 January  
 
1944, he became aware that the province had a small Muslim electoral majority  
 
which gave them control of the administration, in circumstances that virtually  
 
excluded other communities from power. This, of course contrasted uneasily  
 
with the situation in which most business leaders, especially in Calcutta were  
 
from an educated Hindu elite. The result was that those best qualified to govern  
 
were not available to contribute to an administration, barely supported by an  
 
already stretched, despondent and diminishing cadre of ICS officials.125 In  
 
assessing how much influence he could exert in reforming such an ineffective,  
 
and sometimes corrupt provincial ministry, Casey did not forget that it was still a  
                                        
122 Amery diary, 5 November 1943, AMEL 7/37. 
123 Turnbull to Amery, 5 November 1943, L/PO/8/31. 
124 Casey, An Australian in India, p. 9. 
125 Hudson, Casey, pp. 156-157. 
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part of British India, and that despite the devolution of some power to the  
 
province provided by the 1935 legislation, he was answerable to Delhi and  
 
London.  
 
     His attempts to reform provincial governance were initially hampered by a 
  
bout of amoebic dysentery, but after setting up a commission to make a  
 
thorough review of the entire administration, he made changes in advance of its  
 
findings.126 More technocrat and mandarin than politician, he used his  
 
professional skills to make some early progress in his reforms. As well as  
 
introducing systems of organisation and methods into the province, he broke  
 
with the habits of Herbert and Rutherford by expanding government publicity,  
 
and also by entertaining persons of all sections of Bengal, sometimes at his  
 
official residence.127 
 
     Amery’s relationship with Casey was excellent throughout the eighteen  
 
months that they worked together, especially as both men were keenly  
 
interested in both technical innovation and the reform of administrative  
 
procedures. Amery quickly expressed his approval of the initiatives proposed by  
 
Casey not only for the distribution of food supplies, but also for the introduction  
 
of modern methods in water management and the fishing industry.128 
 
                                        
126 Ibid, p. 162. Casey was to endure recurrent bout of dysentery, and also attacks of boils, 
throughout his service in Bengal. 
127 Casey, Personal Experience, 1939 – 1946, p. 181. Also, Casey, An Australian in India, pp. 24 – 
31. In 1918, Casey had graduated from Cambridge University in mechanical sciences 
(engineering). 
128 Amery to Casey, 9 August 1944, AMEL 2/3/18. Also, Casey to Amery, 4 May 1944, 7 July 
1944, and 19 July 1944, all AMEL 2/3/19. 
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     Casey’s chosen solution to the grain crisis was for the Bengal Government to  
take over the rice trade of the province, a course which necessitated the  
construction of substantial storage facilities.129 This required Casey to build up a  
very large organisation, virtually from scratch. He supported the small group of  
beleaguered ICS officials by recruiting a diverse, but highly effective collection of 
new staff. In addition to army officers, who volunteered for civic duty, and a  
number of Ministry of Food officials seconded from Britain, he used his  
antipodean contacts to obtain experienced staff from Australia and New  
Zealand.130 
     Although as will be seen later in the chapter there was an improvement in  
the availability and promise of grain from the middle of 1944, Casey finally  
decided to ask for the freedom to run the province under Section 93. He had  
become increasingly frustrated by the weakness of the Muslim ministry, and  
despite the assistance of administrators from overseas believed that a collapse of 
the food distribution system could occur at any time.131 The matter was not  
finally settled until March 1945, when direct rule was introduced in Bengal.132  
Attempts to Obtain Grain during Amery’s Illness 
While Casey was making his first organisational changes in Bengal, Amery’s 
fraught attempts to obtain grain were interrupted by a painful kidney stone 
129 Casey, An Australian in India, pp. 18 – 19. 
130 Casey, Personal Experience, 1939 – 1946, p. 194. 
131 Casey to Wavell, 24 July 1944, L/P & J/8/652. Also, Wavell to Amery, 10 August 1944, 
L/PO/10/21. Also, Casey to Amery, 26 August 1944, AMEL 2/3/19. 
132 Casey, Personal Experience, pp. 216 – 217. Also, Hudson, Casey, pp. 170 – 171. 
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which kept him away from the India Office from 30 January until 1 March.133  
While he was absent, R. A. Butler, President of the Board of Education, and a  
former junior minister at the India Office, deputised for Amery in a spell that was 
characterised by the expression of angry views by both Churchill and Wavell.
     At the War Cabinet meeting on 7 February, the Prime Minister questioned the 
statistical basis of the Government of India’s claim for grain imports quoted  
in Amery’s memorandum of 28 January, and suggested that a small committee  
should be appointed to review the veracity of the figures.134 Wavell was angry  
and hurt that his officials’ calculations had been questioned, and for the first time 
raised the matter of the psychological value of impending imports in helping  
central government control grain prices.135  
     Before Amery returned to the India Office there was a marginal softening in  
the War Cabinet’s stance on providing shipping, almost certainly prompted by  
two telegrams sent by Wavell on 16 February 1944. Firstly, supported by  
Auchinleck and Mountbatten, he told Amery that the War Cabinet’s adverse  
decision on grain shipments was jeopardising Britain’s good name in the  
world.136 Secondly, he sent a short message to Churchill asking the War Cabinet 
to reconsider its position, warning that a failure to do so ‘would have serious  
133 Amery diary, 2 February 1944, AMEL 7/3. Throughout his confinement at home Amery was 
briefed by both Turnbull and Monteath. 
134 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum 28 January 1944, CAB 66/46/13. Also, War Cabinet 
conclusions, 7 February 1944, CAB 65/41/16. The members nominated for this committee were 
Butler, Leathers, Llewellin and Cherwell. 
135 Wavell to Amery, 9 February 1944, R/30/1/4: ff 92 – 93. 
136 Wavell to Amery, 16 February 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
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repercussions on India’s war effort’.137 
 
     Surprisingly, Churchill did not dismiss Wavell’s plea out of hand, but  
 
persuaded the War Cabinet to ask the Committee on Indian Food Grain  
 
Requirements to reconsider matters.138 Their next set of findings proved  
 
to be more helpful to Wavell, and conceded that it might be feasible to make  
 
some reductions in the British imports programme in order to find the capacity to  
 
send grain to India.139 The War Cabinet adopted these modest proposals, albeit  
 
with the addition of a more promising offer from Auchinleck and Mountbatten to  
 
forego some shipping capacity earmarked for military supplies in favour of  
 
imports of grain.140 Once Wavell had been informed of this by Butler, he reacted  
 
with predictable fury, accusing the British Government of deliberately ignoring  
 
the advice of those working in India.141 
 
     Although unwell, Amery was sufficiently moved by Wavell’s angry response to  
 
write a strong letter to Churchill, offering to fly to Washington to ask Roosevelt in  
 
person to release ships to carry food to India.142 Nevertheless he was less bullish  
 
when explaining the British Government’s position to Wavell, and repeating the  
 
official view that ‘it was better to take the risk of a second famine than risk the  
 
 
                                        
137 Wavell to Churchill, via India Office, 16 February 1944, Wavell Papers: Private 
Correspondence: Secretary of State, 1943 – 1946, p. 14. 
138 War Cabinet conclusions, 17 February 1944, CAB 65/41/22. 
139 War Cabinet Committee on Indian Food Grain Requirements, Paper I.F.R. (44) 2, 19 February 
1944, L/E/8/3323: f 364. 
140 War Cabinet conclusions, 21 February 1944, CAB 65/41/22. 
141 Amery (written by Butler) to Wavell, telegram 23 February 1944, L/E/8/3321: ff 352 – 353.  
Also, Wavell to Amery, 26 February 1944, L/PO/10/25.  
142 Amery diary, 17 February 1944, AMEL 7/38. 
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failure of the Second Front’.143 
Progress in Famine Relief after Amery’s Return to the India Office 
When Amery looked anew at the Indian food situation, he was obliged to act on  
a telegram sent by Wavell on 4 March 1944 that gave new figures for required  
imports of grain. Wavell foresaw, ceteris paribus, no shortages of rice, but the  
combined estimated shortfall for wheat was 500,000 tons for civil and military  
needs, even after taking into account all possible economies. His solution was  
not to rely only on the shipping space promised by Auchinleck and Mountbatten,  
but also to ask the American Commander in the region, Lieutenant-General  
Joseph (‘Vinegar Joe’) Stilwell whether he was prepared to make a similar  
gesture as his British colleagues. This would, Wavell calculated, provide a total of 
an extra 40,000 tons of wheat per month.144 
     Amery was immediately alarmed that Stilwell, who had often been hostile  
towards Britain, should have been approached for a favour on the scale  
suggested by Wavell, without prior approval from the War Cabinet. However, his  
minute to Churchill explaining that he had already written in these terms to the  
Viceroy, received the Prime Minister’s complete approval.145 Amery’s predilection  
for widespread consultation ensured that the matter of finding shipping space for 
grain by reducing imports of military supplies by British and American  
143 Amery to Wavell, 17 February 1944, L/PO/10/21.  
144 Wavell to Amery, 4 March 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
145 Amery to Churchill, 4 March 1944, L/WS/1/654: f 261. Also, Churchill to Amery, 5 March 1944, 
R/30/1/4: ff 67 – 68. 
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commanders should be reviewed, firstly by the Committee on Indian Food Grain  
 
Requirements, and secondly by the Chiefs of Staff in London. The former  
 
Committee, aware of their lack of specialised military knowledge, largely passed  
 
the responsibility for making recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff, who  
 
accepted a reduced need for military maintenance and proposed that the War  
 
Cabinet should release twenty five ships to transport wheat to India in the  
 
second six months of 1944.146 They also suggested that the US military  
 
authorities should be asked to make a similar commitment.147 
 
     The minutes of the War Cabinet meeting on 20 March show that only a  
 
total of 200,000 tons of wheat could be promised unreservedly in 1944, but  
 
another 150,000 tons could be made available, provided that a similar amount of  
 
rice was shipped from India to Ceylon. Furthermore the meeting concluded that  
 
no approach should be made to the United States military authorities for  
 
assistance.148 Amery’s diary recorded that there were considerable acrimonious  
 
exchanges at this meeting, especially when Churchill vented his anger at the  
 
Chiefs of Staff who were all present. Yet again, Amery claimed that he put the  
 
Viceroy’s case strongly in face of Leathers’ hostility, and the Prime Minister’s  
 
frequent interruptions, while only receiving support from Field Marshall Alan  
 
Brooke.149 
                                        
146 War Cabinet Committee on Indian Food Grain Requirements, Paper I.F.R. (44) 3, 7 March 
1944, L/E/8/3323: ff 315 – 319. 
147 War Cabinet memorandum, Report by the Chiefs of Staff 18 March 1944, CAB 66/48/15. 
148 War Cabinet conclusions, 20 March 1944, CAB 6541/36. 
149 Amery, diary 20 March 1944, AMEL 7/38. Field Marshal Alan Brooke, later Viscount Alanbrooke 
(1883 – 1963): Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 
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     Following this meeting, three attempts by Amery to pacify Wavell, were  
 
unsuccessful, once the Viceroy had realised that, at best, only a net 250,000 tons  
 
of grain had been promised.150 Similarly, Wavell used one telegram to produce a  
 
sober explanation of why the grain recently offered was inadequate, and another  
 
more cryptic one to express his acute disappointment at the outcome of the War  
 
Cabinet meeting on 20 March. In particular he blamed the Prime Minister and his  
 
War Cabinet colleagues for failing to back his judgement, and also for suggesting  
 
that he might have been exaggerating the scale of India’s food situation.151  
 
 
Amery’s Change of Strategy over the Food Crisis 
 
Amery was sufficiently concerned by Wavell’s extreme frustration to write  
 
directly to Churchill, concentrating in particular on the likely shortfall in wheat  
 
requirements for the armed forces garrisoned in India, especially in Bengal.152 He  
 
developed this theme on 29 March in a letter to Wavell, asserting that there were  
 
two separate questions to be asked about the food situation. Firstly, whether  
 
India could feed its own civilian population without imports, and secondly if food  
 
could be provided for foreign troops in addition to the needs of its own forces.  
 
He also made the important judgement that once the Government of India made  
 
it clear that it could supply no more than a specific amount of food for the  
 
military, the responsibility for satisfying any additional demands lay with the War  
 
                                        
150 Amery to Wavell, 22 March 1944, L/E/8/3323: f 260. Also, Amery to Wavell, 22 March 1944, 
L/E/8/3323: ff 254 – 257. Also, Amery to Wavell, 24 March 1944, L/PO/10/21.  
151 Wavell to Amery, 25 March 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
152 Amery to Churchill, 27 March 1944, L/E/8/3323: f 243. 
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Cabinet.153 
     The meeting of the War Cabinet Committee on Food Grain Requirements  
on 6 April was attended by Sir Archibald Rowlands, Wavell’s official Adviser on  
Administration, who made an impassioned plea for the USA to send as much  
grain as possible so that prices could be controlled. Although the meeting was  
not swayed by these arguments, Amery insisted that progress could be made if  
the War Cabinet were to choose from three distinct choices over the food  
problem. Firstly, the wheat imports requested by India should be supplied to the  
general public, even if at the expense of the military. Secondly, the USA should  
be approached for help. Thirdly, the Viceroy should supply all the food needed to 
satisfy the armed forces, even at the expense of the civilian population. He  
recognised that this latter course would have serious political and economic  
consequences.154 
    Before the matter could be put to the War Cabinet, Wavell informed Amery  
that unprecedented rain and thunderstorms had reduced crop forecasts in a  
number of provinces, other than Bengal, to the total extent of 500,000 tons.  
Even if the promised grain of only 200,000 tons were to be received there would 
be nothing to meet the defence requirements of 724,000 tons for the twelve  
months from 1 May 1944.155 Although Amery confessed to shock at this sudden  
153 Amery to Wavell, 29 March 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
154 War Cabinet Committee on Food Grain Requirements, Paper I.F.R. (44) 4, L/E/8/3323: ff 213 
– 216, 208. Also, Cherwell to Amery, 21 April 1944, L/E/8/3323: f 174. Also, Amery diary, 6 April
1944, AMEL 7/38. 
155 Wavell to Amery, 19 April 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
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worsening of the situation, he persevered with his choice of options, but added 
some statistical analysis to support the Viceroy’s warnings.156 
    At the War Cabinet on 24 April, Churchill expressed some sympathy with  
India, and conceded that the 45,000 tons of wheat lost in an explosion in  
Bombay should be replaced, and that the Americans should provide the shipping. 
An ad hoc committee to be chaired by Morrison, but including Amery and Firoz  
Khan, Indian Representative at the War Cabinet, was asked to draft a letter to be 
sent from Churchill to Roosevelt, not only asking for transport of the grain to  
Bombay, but also seeking wider assistance with shipping.157 Amery’s own  
assessment of this meeting was somewhat more colourful, noting that only the  
presence of Firoz Khan and the Maharajah of Kashmir prevented Churchill from  
being more offensive about India than usual, although he came close to  
suggesting that Britain ‘could not let Indian starvation interfere with military  
operations’.158 
    Great care was taken with the content of the letter to Roosevelt, not only the 
section on the worsening grain position, but also a paragraph warning about the 
effect of food shortages on the effectiveness of SEAC.159 Nevertheless, possibly  
distracted by the preparations for D-Day, and certainly on the advice of his  
military advisers, the President delayed for over a month before he turned down 
156 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum 21 April 1944, CAB 66/49/16. 
157 War Cabinet conclusions, 24 April 1944, CAB 45/42/13.  
158 Amery diary, 24 April 1944, AMEL 7/38. 
159 War Cabinet conclusions, 28 April 1944, CAB 28/4/44. Also, Amery to Wavell, 29 April 1944, 
L/E/83323: f 165. This telegram enclosed the complete text of Churchill’s telegram to Roosevelt. 
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Churchill’s request.160 As was his wont in such circumstances, Amery pondered  
whether the only way to convince the President would be for him to visit  
Washington in order to press the British case.161 He made this suggestion at the  
Indian Food Grains Requirements Committee that met on 7 June, but was told by 
Leathers that nothing could be done to obtain more shipping from the USA,  
especially as an increasing number of vessels would be required in connection  
with the campaign in Normandy.162  
    Wavell’s faith in the Chiefs of Staff proved justified. Amery was able to  
confirm on 24 June that the British Government had accepted the  
recommendation of the military leaders that 200,000 tons of wheat should be  
shipped from Australia to India during the third quarter of 1944, and that the  
situation could be considered again in August and November of the year.163  
However, this did not prevent Wavell’s continued impatience with the delays over 
the actual provision of grain. This was apparent in a letter sent on 19 July from  
the Viceroy’s summer camp at Simla. Before supplying a long, and only partially  
favourable report on the food situation he again criticised the ‘lack of attention’  
that Amery’s colleagues in London had given to the grain shortages.164 Although  
not naming Amery in this letter, his true feelings were apparent in his diary entry 
160 Amery to Wavell, 2 June 1944, L/PO/10/21. Also, Amery to Wavell, 3 June 1944, L/WS/1/654: 
f 196.This telegram enclosed Roosevelt’s cryptic message rejecting Churchill’s appeal. 
161 Amery diary, 2 June 1944, AMEL 7/38.  
162 Amery diary, 7 June 1944,  AMEL 7/38. 
163 Amery to Wavell, 24 June 1944, L/E/8/3323: ff 95-96. Also, Wavell to Churchill, via India 
Office, 24 June 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
164 Amery to Wavell, 19 July 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
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of 13 July. He deplored both the Committee on Food Grain Requirements that he 
felt was ‘packed’ with unsympathetic characters such as Cherwell and Leathers,  
and also the India Office, which had ‘failed to make its weight felt’. This thinly  
disguised criticism of the Secretary of State for India only repeated the  
judgement by Linlithgow, who had always felt that he had little influence within  
the War Cabinet.165 
    In the early months of 1944, Amery had not been seriously challenged in the  
House of Commons over the response to the famine by the governments in  
London and Delhi. On 28 July, during a long debate that chiefly concerned itself  
with constitutional matters, he was not the subject of serious blame. His winding  
up speech dealt only partly with the food crisis, and then concentrated mainly on 
the effective rationing systems introduced by Casey in both Calcutta and the  
rural areas of the province. However, his progress report on grain imports was  
more guarded as, although he reported that 800,000 tons of grain would have  
been shipped to India by September 1944, he realised that this was  
disappointingly short of the required amount. For someone who had fought hard, 
if often unavailingly in the War Cabinet, he rather limply quoted the military  
demand for shipping as a legitimate excuse for the delay in providing grain to  
the affected areas.166  
165 Moon (ed.), Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, 23 July 1944, p. 81. 
166 Hansard, 28 July 1944, Vol. 402, cc1013 – 1021.  
 298 
The Easing of the Food Crisis  
 
The first indication of an end to the severity of the food shortages came from the  
 
Chiefs of Staff Committee. In a short, but decisive paper these senior military  
 
men put the provision of wheat on a par with other strategic considerations, and  
 
recommended that their computed deficit of 300,000 tons be made good in the  
 
final quarter of 1944.167 Unfortunately, the implementation caused Amery  
 
difficulties. On the day that Paris was liberated, Attlee, who was standing in for  
 
Churchill, refused to approve the Chiefs of Staff recommendation before Amery  
 
had obtained the consent of the Food Grains Committee.168 His difficulties  
 
increased when Leathers, seeking to divert some tonnage to the Balkans,  
 
refused to make arrangements to transfer the full 300,000 tons of wheat to  
 
India.169 A few days later, when Amery wrote to a frustrated Wavell, he reported  
 
not only the possible diversion of some grain to the Balkans, but also the more  
 
damaging prospect that a poor wheat harvest in Australia might limit the amount  
 
available for India.  
 
     Wavell’s replies to Amery expressed regret that the Balkans could be  
 
preferred to India as regards imports of wheat, although he exempted him from   
 
the charge directed at those in power in Britain whom, he believed knew little  
 
about India, and bore the moral responsibility for the deaths caused by the  
 
 
                                        
167 War Cabinet paper, 19 August 1944, Committee, C.O.S. (44) 752 (0), L/E/8/3324: ff 195– 
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168 Amery to Wavell, 23 August 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
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famine.170 His diary more than hinted at a conspiracy in London, when he  
 
repeated his accusation that the Indian Food Grains Committee had been  
 
deliberately staffed with members hostile to India. Amery was again given  
 
partial exemption from criticism, but Wavell suspected that Churchill believed  
 
sending food to India was ‘appeasement of Congress’, and that his prejudice had  
 
been fuelled by the release of Gandhi.171 
 
     Until 9 October when Amery was able to inform Wavell that the outstanding  
 
300,000 tons of wheat would be shipped during October, November and  
 
December, there was a brief period during which the Viceroy, although anxious  
 
about shortages in other parts of India, was able to announce that Bengal was  
 
soon likely to have produced a substantial surplus of rice.172  
 
    Even with a relatively successful outcome to the campaign for grain imports,  
 
Amery’s problems in Whitehall were not over. The original draft of the report by  
 
Sir Henry French into the food crisis had pleased Wavell, not only for its  
 
favourable comments about Indian efforts to deal with the problem, but also  
 
because it had a degree of impartiality, having not been produced by the  
 
Government of India, or the India Office.173  
 
    Unfortunately, Amery was not able to repeat this message in the House of  
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Commons as the Food Grains Committee had watered down its laudatory  
statements about India’s performance.174 Furthermore, he had to endure the  
ignominy of the abhorred Cherwell partially redrafting those passages originally  
written by French, that he would have read out in Parliament.175 In the event,  
Amery did not need to address the House as Leathers considered that renewed  
demands for shipping in the Pacific theatre of war necessitated caution in making 
promises of exports to India.176 
     Nevertheless, by the end of the year, the crisis had largely passed, and  
Wavell was willing to take the credit for securing 1,000,000 tons of grain.177  
Indeed, throughout the year there was an apparent contradiction between the  
expressions of gratitude in his correspondence with Amery, and the comments in  
his diary, that praised the tenacity, if not the influence of the Secretary of State  
in his efforts to secure grain for India. Whatever the effectiveness of the India  
Office at this time, Amery’s departmental staff supported their Secretary of State. 
In particular, his Private Secretary, Turnbull, wrote to Mrs Amery, absolving him  
from any blame for the tardy supply of grain to India, and placing responsibility  
squarely with Leathers and the Ministry of War Transport.178 
     There is little doubt that Amery was upset by what he regarded as ill  
informed and flagrantly orchestrated criticism. In January 1944 he wrote to 
174 Wavell to Amery, 5 December 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
175 Amery to Wavell, 7 December 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
176 Amery to Wavell, 21 December 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
177 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 31 December 1944, p.107. 
178 Turnbull to Mrs Florence Amery, 6 November 1943, AMEL 6/3/101. 
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Attlee suggesting that an otherwise flagging campaign against him in Britain by  
Krishna Menon and the India League had been revived by the famine, and that,  
aided by the Communist Party were seeking his dismissal. As late as the General 
Election campaign in Birmingham in the summer of 1945, he was being accused  
by the Communist candidate Rajani Palme Dutt as being the ‘murderer of one  
and a half million Bengalis’.179  
     Despite his poor press during the famine in Delhi and the provinces, and the  
usual personal criticism from Sapru, he has not always been damned by recent  
Indian scholarship. Indeed the highly polemical analysis of the food crisis by  
Madhusee Mukerjee stated that, ‘one person who emerged from the famine with 
remarkably clean hands was Leopold Amery’.180 There can be little doubt that,  
during the period of famine in India, Amery operated with his usual courage and 
persistence. Although relief supplies of food took longer to reach the starving  
than he would have wished, he had faced indifference and hostility in London,  
and yet ultimately achieved a better result than on many other issues. 
179 Amery to Casey, 11 July 1945, Amery Papers, AMEL 2/3/18. 
180 Madhusee Mukerjee, Churchill’s Secret War, The Secret Ravaging of India during World  
War II, New York, Basic Books, 2010, p.275. The author’s praise for Amery was only by 
comparison with her fierce criticism of Churchill, and the rather odd attribution of his helpful 
attitude to the need for expiation in respect of his son John’s treachery. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
 
FINAL ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BEFORE THE 
LABOUR ELECTION VICTORY 
 
 
Introduction 
    
Although the time from Amery’s recovery from gallstones in March 1944 until the  
 
declaration of the Labour electoral landslide on 26 July 1945 was still, to some  
 
extent, concerned with food shortages and the sterling balances, there was a  
 
considerable renewal of interest in constitutional reform, both in India, and in  
 
Britain. Amery, beset with worries over his wayward son, Jack, and still partially  
 
diverted by his obsession with imperial preference, again worked assiduously,  
 
but the impetus for change in India came primarily from Wavell, as well as the  
 
major communal groups. 
 
     As the end of the war approached, a number of Indian politicians produced  
 
schemes to achieve a settlement, but it was really only when Wavell took the  
 
initiative in designing the basis of an interim constitution that Amery was able to  
 
put forward his own proposals. Unfortunately, this final attempt by Amery to  
 
break the deadlock found favour with practically no one, whether the Viceroy, his  
 
political colleagues in London, or his senior officials at the India Office. In  
 
particular, this last phase of his tenure showed a further decrease of his  
 
influence in London that would be marked by key tasks such as the drafting of  
 
memoranda on Indian reform allocated to other members of the India  
 
Committee. 
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   Although there were also inevitable disagreements between Secretary of State  
 
and Viceroy, whether the latter was in Delhi, or London, these proved to be tepid  
 
compared with the diehard attitudes that often prevailed at meetings of the War  
 
Cabinet.  
 
 
The Constitutional Position in India in the Spring of 1944 
 
With the Congress leaders imprisoned and Wavell strongly mandated by  
 
Churchill and the War Cabinet to concentrate on the war effort, there had been  
 
few constitutional developments since the ‘Quit India’ movement and Gandhi’s  
 
fast. Amery had found very little time to produce any new thinking on the  
 
matter, but during his recovery from illness he discussed possible ways of  
 
breaking the deadlock with his Private Secretary. Turnbull’s views are not  
 
recorded, but Amery’s continued attachment to whimsy can be seen both from  
 
his continued commitment to the Swiss model of federal government, and also a  
 
suggestion that they could employ Coupland’s latest version of his scheme for  
 
the administration of a united India based on its four main river basins.1 
 
     The only Indian politician to propose realistic new reforms during the months  
 
following the end of Gandhi’s fast was Rajagopalachari, who represented liberal  
 
Hindu opinion. He was particularly innovative, and prepared a formula, promising  
 
a form of Muslim self-government that he hoped might form the basis of an  
 
agreement between Jinnah and the Mahatma. As early as March 1943,  
 
Rajagopalachari had explained his proposals to Gandhi, who although fasting,  
                                        
1 Amery, diary 19 March 1944, AMEL 7/38. Also, Coupland, The Future of India, pp. 119 – 125. 
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had apparently been well enough to give them his approval. On 8 April 1944 he  
 
sent them to Jinnah optimistically claiming they had been accepted by Gandhi as  
 
the basis for a settlement between Congress and the Muslim League. The  
 
available evidence remains inconclusive, but it is likely that, in response, Jinnah  
 
told Rajagopalachari that he was unable to agree to the formula without  
 
consulting his colleagues in the Muslim League.2  
 
    The position in which Jinnah and the Muslim League had been left by Cripps’   
 
proposals was more difficult than might have been thought. Cripps had been  
 
prepared to allow individual provinces to opt out of any all-India arrangements,  
 
thereby offering a serious threat to Jinnah’s ambitions to bring all Muslim  
 
majority provinces under the communal banner.3 Consequently, scholars have  
 
been hesitant in confirming that Jinnah was able to take control of these  
 
provinces during the early months of 1944. Although Fazlal Huq had been  
 
dismissed by Herbert in Bengal, and the Unionist premier in the Punjab, Sikander  
 
Hyat Khan had died, it has been shown that Jinnah did not immediately benefit  
 
from the installation of majority Muslim League administrations in these  
 
provinces.4 Only after the breakdown of Jinnah’s discussions with Gandhi in  
 
September 1944 did his influence, and that of the Muslim League, increase  
 
rapidly throughout the country. 
 
     Amery received detailed briefings, whether directly from Wavell or from  
 
                                        
2 Wavell to Amery, 12 July 1944, L/P & J/8/519: ff 310 – 312.  
3 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 82. 
4 Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, pp. 95 – 105. Also, Humayun Kabir, ‘Muslim 
Politics, 1942 – 7’, Philips and Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India, p. 394. 
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experienced governors, on Jinnah’s difficult relationship with these Muslim  
 
provincial premiers who were not necessarily attracted by the concept of  
 
Pakistan.5 Surprisingly, he contributed very little, at this time, to the  
 
development of British policy towards a separate Pakistan, merely making the  
 
point on 11 May that Jinnah was ‘even more tiresome in his authoritarianism  
 
than Ghandi’, and advising that it would be better to wait and negotiate a  
 
settlement from a position of strength, later in the war.6  
 
     By contrast, Amery had clearer views on the future status of the princely  
 
states. Even before the Cripps mission, he had written to Linlithgow setting out  
 
the India Office view on the course needed to be taken in the 582 states. In  
 
short, he made it clear to the Viceroy that, although Britain would not be  
 
repudiating any past pledges to the states, matters could not go on as before. In  
 
particular, there would need to be some move towards grouping, especially  
 
amongst the smaller states.7  
 
     By the time that Linlithgow expressed his broad agreement with this  
 
assessment, direct responsibility within the Government of India for the States  
 
had passed to the energetic and forceful Sir Francis Wylie, who as Political  
 
Adviser to the Crown Representative (Viceroy), worked hard to persuade the  
 
princes to countenance reform.8 The powers of the Viceroy to promote the  
                                        
5 Wavell to Amery, 16 April 1944, L/P & J/8/513: ff 298 – 304. Also, Glancy (Punjab)to Wavell, 24 
April 1944, L/P & J/8/662: ff 33 – 35. 
6 Amery to Wavell, 11 May 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
7 Amery to Linlithgow, 16 May 1941, L/P & S/13/889: ff 63 – 72. Wylie’s position was Political 
Adviser to the Crown Representative (the title of the Viceroy) as regards his dealings with the 
States). 
8 Linlithgow to Amery, 13 September 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/14. Also, Copland, The Princes of 
India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917 – 1947, pp. 196 – 201. 
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grouping of smaller, and supposedly less viable states, needed to be reinforced  
 
by legislation in the form of the 1944 Attachment of States Bill.9 Despite outrage  
 
from the Chamber of Princes, lukewarm support from Wavell who knew little  
 
about the states, and the opposition to such measures in the House of  
 
Commons, Amery took the lead in getting the necessary provisions enacted by  
 
21 March 1944.10 Amery’s initiative forced Wavell to publish his thoughts on the  
 
states. He was anxious that no further pledges should be made to the princes,  
 
and stressed that self-government for India was incompatible with preserving all  
 
582 States in their current form.11 
 
     Amery agreed with Wavell’s sober analysis, and after advising the Viceroy not  
 
to meet the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes in the near future, outlined his  
 
own plan for the future of the states. In brief, he envisaged a three tier hierarchy  
 
of states with only the largest certain to retain their independence, and even  
 
then at the cost of some rationalisation. All other states would have to accept  
 
some element of merging.12 A non-committal Wavell merely agreed to send  
 
these proposals for his Political Department to consider.13 
 
 
Gandhi’s Approaches to Wavell and the Reaction in London 
 
In the few weeks following Gandhi’s release from custody, Amery made no  
 
                                        
9 The need for legislation was made urgent by a judicial decision in December 1943 that enabled 
a talukadar (ruler) in Bhadwa to resist the Crown Representative in a particular attachment 
scheme. 
10 Hansard, 14 March 1944, vol. 398, cc177 – 202.   
11 Wavell to Amery, 20 April 1944, L/P & S/13/981: ff 164 – 168. 
12 Amery to Wavell, 22 May 1944, L/P & S/13/981: ff 143 – 148. 
13 Wavell to Amery, 30 May 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
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new initiatives on Indian reform possibly in view of the imminent Second Front,  
 
but also because he remained cautious about the need to maintain the means of  
 
dealing with any fresh unrest.14 Gandhi took some little time before attempting  
 
to break the deadlock, but finally on 13 June asked Wavell if he could meet the  
 
Congress Working Party in order to find out their current thinking about  
 
constitutional reform.15 Amery lost little time in supporting Wavell’s blunt refusal  
 
to allow Gandhi to meet his Congress colleagues, especially as the Viceroy had  
 
received no expression of regret over the ‘Quit India’ resolution of 1942.16 
 
     While Wavell was awaiting a further initiative from Gandhi, Amery had  
 
become anxious over the comments he should make during an imminent debate  
 
in the House of Commons about Indian constitutional reform. In particular, he  
 
sought guidance from Wavell on the answers to be given to two questions that  
 
might be put to him. Firstly, what should be the attitude of His Majesty’s  
 
Government towards the establishment of a national government in India during  
 
the war, and secondly was there still to be continued opposition towards Gandhi  
 
meeting the Congress Working Committee to discuss such an administration?  
 
Amery made it clear that, in formulating his reply, he needed Wavell’s insistence  
 
that the Viceroy should maintain his full reserve powers as envisaged by the  
 
terms of the Cripps offer.17 
 
     Wavell’s trenchant reply was an indication of his growing impatience with  
                                        
14 Amery to Wavell, 11 June 1944, L/P & J/8/623: f 75. 
15 Gandhi to Wavell, 17 June 1944, L/P & J/8/623: f 50. 
16 Wavell to Gandhi, 22 June 1944, L/P & J/8/623: f 49. Also, Amery to Wavell, 26 June 1944, 
L/PO/10/21. 
17 Amery to Wavell, 15 July 1944, L/P & J/8/519: ff 304 -306. 
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Westminster’s failure to grasp the delicacy of the situation in India, especially at  
 
a time when a number of political groups were already considering proposals by  
 
Rajagopalachari that permitted some degree of Muslim self-government.  
 
Consequently, he advised Amery to give as few details as possible about a new  
 
wartime national government, and to confine himself to a restatement of the  
 
criteria  set out in the Cripps proposals.18 To a degree, Amery heeded Wavell’s  
 
advice, and said he hoped that his statement in the House of Commons would  
 
largely confine itself to reconstruction in India. Nevertheless, he feared that he  
 
would need to speak about Gandhi when questioned by Sorensen and other left  
 
wing Labour members.19  
 
     Amery’s wish that the parliamentary debate, which took place on 28 July  
 
should concentrate on Indian reconstruction was generally fulfilled. Although  
 
many speakers did restrict themselves to economic matters and the food  
 
shortages, it was no surprise that Sorensen and his colleagues, although more  
 
moderate than Amery had feared, advocated the release of Congress leaders  
 
and the immediate resumption of negotiations with Gandhi. Amery’s very long  
 
summing up commenced with a terse denunciation of Gandhi’s view that any  
 
plans depended on the removal of the Viceroy’s reserve powers, but soon  
 
became more rambling in its references to India’s military effort, scientific  
 
advancement and alleviation of the food crisis.20 Although his speech was widely  
 
                                        
18 Wavell to Amery, 18 July 1944, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944 – July 1945, Part I, 
pp. 22 – 23. 
19 Amery to Wavell, 19 July 1944, L/PO/6/110: ff 159 – 160. 
20 Hansard, 28 July 1944, vol. 402, cc1013 – 1021. 
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criticised in India, Amery’s diary struck a self-congratulatory note by claiming  
 
that his speech had ‘informed and steadied the House’.21  
   
     When Gandhi made his next proposal on the form of a new national  
 
government on 27 July, the details had not been known by the participants in  
 
the debate referred to above. Gandhi was now prepared to advise the Congress  
 
Working Committee to call off any threat of civil disobedience, provided that  
 
Indian independence was declared immediately, and a national government  
 
installed, answerable only to the legislature. He also stipulated that, although  
 
military operations could continue for the remainder of the war, this should be at  
 
no financial cost to India.22 
 
     On 1 August, Wavell sent two telegrams to Amery in connection with  
 
Gandhi’s proposal. Firstly, he reluctantly sent his proposed reply to Gandhi for  
 
consideration in London.23 He combined an outright refusal of Gandhi’s terms  
 
with a declaration that progress might be possible if the leaders of all groups  
 
were willing to participate in a transitional government, operating within the  
 
framework of the current constitution.24 Secondly, he explained the rationale  
 
behind his draft reply, especially his suggestion for an acceptable provisional  
 
government. Above all, he stressed that merely rejecting Gandhi’s scheme would  
 
not be enough.25 
 
                                        
21 Wavell to Amery, 1 August 1944, L/PO/10/21. Also, Amery, diary 28 July 1944, AMEL 7/38. 
22 Wavell to Amery, 1 August 1944, L/PO/10/25. Wavell’s telegram enclosed the verbatim text of 
Gandhi’s letter of 17 July 1944. 
23 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 2 August 1944, p. 82. 
24 Wavell to Amery, 1 August 1944, L/PO/10/25 (1493 – S). 
25 Wavell to Amery, 1 August 1944, L/PO/10/25 (1491 – S). 
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     In the period from 2 August until 15 August, when Wavell was finally able to  
 
send a reply to Gandhi, there were a number of meetings of the India Committee  
 
and the War Cabinet that tested Amery sorely. During these sessions that were  
 
arranged to agree the details of a reply to Wavell, he attempted, with only  
 
limited success, to support an irascible Viceroy in the face of an unhelpful War  
 
Cabinet, subjected to an even greater level of bullying by Churchill than before. 
 
     Amery’s attempt at editing Wavell’s draft was enclosed with his War Cabinet  
 
memorandum of 2 August, and made only minor amendments that sought to  
 
emphasise the need for an interim provisional government to be established  
 
within the framework of the existing constitution.26 Amery’s difficulties soon  
 
became more serious, when his draft was considered by the India Committee,  
 
and found to be so inadequate that he was mandated to collaborate with Cripps  
 
to produce a completely new version for consideration by the War Cabinet, later  
 
that day. As might be expected from the joint authorship of Amery and Cripps,  
 
greater stress was laid on the prior need for communal groups to find some  
 
agreement amongst themselves on the means of framing a new constitution.27 
 
     Even with a more robust draft before them, the War Cabinet meeting later  
 
that day was stormy. Amery spoke carefully in order to protect his position.  
 
Although he conceded that it would have been difficult for the Viceroy to decline  
 
to respond to Gandhi, he pointed out that he had not consulted the India Office  
 
before doing so. His criticism of Wavell also extended to the latter’s draft reply to  
                                        
26 Amery, War Cabinet memorandum, 2 August 1944, CAB 66/53/26. 
27 Attlee, War Cabinet memorandum 3 August 1944, CAB 66/63/29. Also, Amery diary, 3 August 
1944, AMEL 7/38. 
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Gandhi that had needed revision by the India Committee to become ‘firm and  
 
dignified’.28 
 
     Amery’s sophistry had been occasioned by a trenchant outburst from  
 
Churchill that even the normally discreet Bridges did not attempt to disguise. His  
 
minutes described the Prime Minister as expressing unease at ‘a renewal of  
 
negotiations with a bitter enemy of Britain’. Accordingly, the India Committee  
 
was asked to produce a fresh draft reply that was ‘even stiffer, and less  
 
forthcoming in tone’.29  
 
     Amery’s diary provided an even more graphic account of Churchill’s  
 
behaviour, quoting his remark that ‘Gandhi was a traitor who ought to be put  
 
back in prison’. He also recorded that he had harangued the Prime Minister  
 
accusing him of behaving like Canute, and being out of touch with the great  
 
majority of the Conservative Party.30 At the War Cabinet meeting on the  
 
following day, an even greater row broke out between Prime Minister and  
 
Secretary of State. Although only minor amendments to Wavell’s reply were  
 
being discussed, Churchill accused the Viceroy of being a ‘wretched  
 
sentimentalist’, and Amery of being short on patriotism in ‘failing to stand up to  
 
Indian moneylenders’. When Churchill promised that after the war was won he  
 
would renege on any promises that had been made to Indians, Amery retorted  
 
that he was ‘behaving like Hitler’.31  
 
                                        
28 War Cabinet conclusions, 3 August 1944, CAB 65/43/16. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Amery diary, 3 August 1944, AMEL 7/38. 
31 Amery diary, 4 August 1944, AMEL 7/38. 
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     Possibly fearing some collusion between Amery and Wavell, Churchill sent an  
 
urgent telegram directly to the Viceroy, expressing not only his own, but also the  
 
War Cabinet’s concern that contact had been resumed with Gandhi.32 Wavell,  
 
despite his clear annoyance at the Prime Minister’s intervention, wrote a calm  
 
reply, shrewdly explaining that his response to Gandhi did not fall outside the  
 
terms of the directive given to him in 1943 on the eve of his departure for India.  
 
In the circumstances, he felt fully justified in adopting a more positive attitude  
 
towards Congress.33 
 
     Amery sent the draft favoured by Churchill to Wavell on 4 August 1944  
 
together with a separate cryptic telegram admitting that while the latest version  
 
was ‘stiffer in tone’, there had been no change in substance.34 As Wavell spent  
 
the next few days visiting the troops who, earlier in the year, had repelled the  
 
Japanese attackers at Imphal and Kohima, he took a little time to respond to  
 
Amery. When he returned to Delhi his dismay at reading the latest War Cabinet  
 
draft was acute. He accepted that the amendments had resulted in little change  
 
in principle, but regretted the new tone that seemed ‘intransigent and  
 
discourteous’.  He particularly deplored the lack of awareness in Britain of the  
 
importance that Indians attached to ‘good manners, and at least an appearance  
 
of consideration’.35 
 
                                        
32 Churchill to Wavell, via India Office, 4 August 1944, L/PO/6/110: f 142. 
33 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 4 August 1944, p. 82. Also, Wavell to Churchill, via 
India Office, 4 August 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
34 Amery to Wavell, 4 August 1944, L/P & J/8/519: f 113.  Also, Amery to Wavell, 4 August 1944, 
L/P & J/8/519: ff 120 – 121. 
35 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 9 August 1944, pp. 83 – 84. 
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     Wavell repeated these reflections to Amery, and explained why he had felt it  
 
necessary to produce yet another redraft, this time with the help of Menon, the  
 
Reforms Commissioner.36 His letter to Amery, also on the same day, made the  
 
point that a more friendly approach to Congress would earn Britain a better  
 
press, especially in the USA.37  
 
     The consideration of Wavell’s latest redraft by the India Committee on 11  
 
August marked another low point in Amery’s influence. Although he made a  
 
spirited case in support of the Viceroy, Cripps, Butler and Anderson all favoured  
 
the uncompromising approach that the Prime Minister wanted. He also suffered  
 
the indignity of being asked to prepare a very short alternative reply to Gandhi,  
 
rejecting his offer on the grounds that it was not constructive.38 Amery’s  
 
telegram to Wavell explaining the conclusions of the India Committee, and  
 
enclosing his short alternative draft, produced an angry reaction, which did not  
 
absolve the Secretary of State from blame.39 Not surprisingly, Wavell’s first  
 
inclination was to send his own revised draft directly to Gandhi, and ‘risk  
 
Winston’s displeasure’.40  
 
     The final meeting of the War Cabinet arranged to decide the wording of  
 
Wavell’s reply to Gandhi, took place on 14 August, and in the absence of  
 
Churchill, was chaired by Attlee. Amery’s performance was one of contradictions.  
 
Although his opening remarks indicated that the absence of several members of 
                                        
36 Wavell to Amery, 10 August 1944, L/PO/10/25. 
37 Wavell to Amery, 10 August 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
38 India Committee conclusions, 11 August 1944, L/PO/6/110: ff 107 – 110. 
39 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 12 August 1944, pp. 85 – 86. 
40 Wavell to Amery, 12 August 1944, L/PO/6/110: f 85. 
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 the War Cabinet made it impossible to adopt the Viceroy’s latest draft, he later  
 
asked for the minutes to record his dissent from the final conclusions. His plea  
 
for the judgement of the man on the spot to be respected was unsuccessful, and  
 
Wavell was left with the unenviable choice of sending the longer War Cabinet  
 
draft, or Amery’s blunt alternative.41 Of the three telegrams that Amery sent in  
 
connection with the War Cabinet’s decision, the final one was the most  
 
significant as it urged the Viceroy not to resign merely on such a matter as the  
 
wording of a reply to Gandhi.42 Amery’s plea was successful as Wavell reluctantly  
 
sent the longer War Cabinet draft to Gandhi on 15 August 1944.43  
 
     Wavell’s judgement proved to be correct as the letter that he finally  
 
despatched to Gandhi evoked an angry response in India, with blame attaching  
 
more to London than to Delhi. By way of proof, when Amery sent a letter to  
 
Wavell with the intention of mollifying him, the recipient added a manuscript  
 
comment to the original copy, revealing the Secretary of State to be even more  
 
unpopular amongst Indians than Churchill.44  
 
 
The Talks between Gandhi and Jinnah: 9 to 22 September 1944 
 
When Wavell was obliged to send his uncompromising reply to Gandhi, the  
 
consequences that he had feared seemed likely to follow. Believing that Britain  
 
had shut the door on immediate progress, Gandhi turned to Jinnah in the hope  
                                        
41 War Cabinet conclusions, 14 August 1944, CAB 65/43/21. 
42 Amery to Wavell, 14 August 1944, L/PO/6/110: ff 63 – 64. Also, Amery to Wavell, 14 August 
1944, L/PO/6/110: ff 65 – 66. Also, Amery to Wavell, 14 August 1944, L/PO/6/110: f 62. 
43 Wavell to Gandhi, 15 August 1944, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944 – July 1945, Part 
I, pp. 40 – 42. 
44 Amery to Wavell, 16 August 1944, L/PO/10/21. 
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that Rajagopalachari’s plan could still be used as the basis for negotiations. As  
 
Gandhi had spoken out so often against the vivisection of India, it is worth  
 
questioning if he really supported his colleague’s formula. We get a clue from  
 
a letter sent on 10 August to Wavell by Sir Henry Twynham, who was Governor  
 
of Central Provinces and Berar. Twynham indicated that his intelligence officers  
 
had obtained proof that Gandhi had no faith in the Pakistan project, and that his  
 
endorsement of Rajagopalachari’s scheme was only a ‘matter of expediency’.45 
 
   The formula that was originally published by Rajagopalachari on 10 July 1943  
 
provided for a provisional interim government to be set up through cooperation  
 
between Congress and the Muslim League. More importantly, he proposed that  
 
at the end of the war, a commission should be set up to demarcate areas in  
 
north-west and north-east India where Muslims were in an absolute majority. In  
 
these areas, there would be a plebiscite of all inhabitants to elect whether to  
 
separate from Hindustan or not. If a majority chose separation, effect would be  
 
given to that decision.46 If Rajagopalachari had intended to provide for a viable  
 
form of Pakistan he had made no provision for it to have its own set of central  
 
functions such as defence, commerce and communications. Instead these would  
 
have to be shared with Hindustan, an arrangement that was not likely to appeal  
 
to either Hindus or Muslims.47 
 
     If Gandhi could be said to have had an ambiguous approach to  
 
Rajagopalachari’s willingness to permit separate Muslim territories, Jinnah had an  
                                        
45 Twynham to Wavell, 10 August 1944, L/P & J/5/193: f 71. 
46 Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p. 163. 
47 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, pp. 119 – 120. 
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even more awkward relationship with the creator of the formula. On 2 July 1944,  
 
Jinnah had insisted that, so far he had not rejected the formula, but was waiting  
 
to submit it to the Working Committee of the Muslim League.48 Within a month,  
 
Jinnah had recanted, telling the All India Muslim League Council that the  
 
initiative was a travesty offering only a ‘maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten  
 
Pakistan’, and designed to ‘torpedo’ the Lahore resolution of 1940.49 
 
     Amery had only received summaries of the relevant correspondence before  
 
13 July, when after conceding that the situation regarding Gandhi and Jinnah  
 
was obscure, he gave non-committal answers to questions in the House of  
 
Commons.50 After receiving Wavell’s thorough analysis he felt able to record in  
 
his diary that, at this stage, neither Gandhi nor Jinnah ‘wanted the responsibility  
 
of government’.51  
 
     When the anticipated talks between the two leaders finally began at Jinnah’s  
 
house in Bombay on 9 September, prospects for success were poor. Although,  
 
since the end of the Cripps mission, Gandhi had become more realistic  
 
concerning Muslim aspirations for Pakistan, he underestimated the strength of  
 
feeling against this proposition from Sikhs, Mahasabha nationalists and most  
 
importantly, Hindus in the Punjab and Bengal.52 In these provinces, Jinnah had  
 
also been placed in a difficult position because having already dismissed  
 
Rajagopalachari’s formula, he was still unsure of the unqualified support of fellow  
                                        
48 Wavell to Amery, 12 July 1944, L/P & J/8/519: ff 310 – 312. 
49 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, p. 121. 
50 Hansard 13 July 1944, vol. 401, cc1866 – 1868. 
51 Amery diary, 20 July 1944, AMEL, 7/38. 
52 Brown, Gandhi, Prisoner of Hope, p. 351. 
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Muslims.53 
 
     Although their discussions were conducted, at least with outward courtesy,  
 
the differences between the two men proved too great for a constructive  
 
outcome to emerge. There are considerable differences in the reasons put  
 
forward by scholars for the failure of the talks, but it is probably safe to conclude  
 
that Gandhi was not prepared to accept that the Muslims of India were a  
 
separate nation, a key condition for Jinnah who also rejected any future sharing  
 
of central administrative functions by Pakistan and Hindustan.54 
 
 
Wavell’s Initiative in September 1944 and Amery’s Counter Proposal 
 
Wavell did not wait for the failure of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks before showing  
 
Amery fresh proposals for constitutional reform. In taking this step he was  
 
encouraged by the generally favourable response of his provincial governors to a  
 
new initiative before the end of the war.55 He made a passionate case for early  
 
action, intending that his plan should operate within the existing constitution, but  
 
significantly include Gandhi and Jinnah, if possible. In terms of detail, he  
 
envisaged the formation of a transitional central government consisting of a  
 
reconstituted Executive Council representing the main political parties. The  
 
longer term goal was intended to be the selection of a constituent assembly that  
 
                                        
53 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, pp. 121 – 122. Also, Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, pp. 
163 – 164. 
54 Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, p.165. As someone who, at the time, was working in 
the Reforms Office in Delhi, Menon would have had a clear perspective on these events, as his 
even handed account revealed. 
55 Note by Jenkins, 31 August 1944, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944 – July 1945, Part I, 
pp. 44 – 47. Also, Note by Wavell, Ibid, pp. 47 – 49. 
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would draft the new permanent constitution, as well as negotiate a treaty with  
 
His Majesty’s Government for the purpose of protecting existing British interests  
 
in India.56  
 
     Wavell admitted that his ideas carried risk, especially as there was a  
 
possibility that the Viceroy’s position could be undermined by a politicised  
 
Executive Council, a danger that he conceded might cause disquiet in London.  
 
Such misgivings were shared by others in Delhi, including Jenkins who warned  
 
his boss that any broadcast by Wavell in connection with his initiative would have  
 
to be expressed in his own words, and ‘not a hotch-potch by the India Office, P.  
 
J. Grigg, or Lord Cherwell’.57 
 
     Such suspicion was confirmed by Amery’s reaction to Wavell’s proposals. His  
 
letter of 3 October, which was not delivered to Wavell for nine days, was striking  
 
for the paranoia contained in his statement that the principal Indian grievances  
 
were with His Majesty’s Government, control by the India Office, and most of all,  
 
‘that odious person the Secretary of State’. His radical solution to such perceived  
 
bitterness was the concession of independence to Indians immediately following  
 
the end of the war, and before any attempts were made to arrive at a new  
 
constitution.58 
 
    Before Wavell could respond he received two further telegrams from Amery,  
 
who had discussed the Viceroy’s proposals with his senior officials at the India  
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Office.59 Encouraged by their strong disapproval of Wavell’s politicised Executive  
 
Council, he made his own trenchant criticisms before defending his own scheme  
 
that intentionally bypassed Gandhi and Jinnah, and that he felt would be more  
 
likely to commend itself to his colleagues in London. On the one hand, he argued  
 
that the need for unity in the coalition made it probable that Churchill’s prejudice  
 
over India would prevail. On the other hand, he suggested that the transitional  
 
government advocated by Wavell would be unable to maintain its cohesion,  
 
especially while Congress Working Committee members were still detained.60  
 
     Although Wavell took some time to send his response to Amery, his opinions  
 
were clear since he recorded in his diary that the Secretary of State’s ‘objections  
 
to his own plan were ill advised, and the counter proposal fatuous’. In particular,  
 
he deplored the suggestion that the National Defence Council should be used as  
 
a constitutional sounding board, an idea that had already been canvassed by  
 
Churchill.61 At the time, the Reforms Commissioner, Menon, made a sober  
 
analysis of the two different plans, and while not giving approval to either, was  
 
especially damning about Amery’s proposals that he did not feel would ‘bear  
 
examination’.62 However, his account of events, published some thirteen years  
 
later, was kinder to Amery, and suggested that he showed a ‘boldness of vision  
 
that was only thwarted by the circumstances of the time’.63 
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     Wavell’s eventual reaction to Amery was written in a generally dismissive  
 
tone, although the first paragraphs that rebutted criticism of his plan were frank  
 
in their admission that his own plan for a reformed Executive Council carried  
 
risks. Later in his telegram he made it clear that Amery’s strategy of excluding  
 
Gandhi and Jinnah was ‘quite impracticable’, and showed little appreciation of  
 
the realpolitik  needed to deal with Congress and the Muslim League.64 
 
     The schism between official thinking in Whitehall and Delhi was clearly  
 
revealed in the views expressed by Amery’s senior officials. John Gibson (Political  
 
Office), Patrick and Monteath, while praising Wavell’s military record, stressed his  
 
political inexperience and possibly suspect judgement that they believed was  
 
causing him to rush into hazardous reforms capable of prejudicing the Indian  
 
war effort.  
      
     Despite Wavell’s impatience at the slow progress in London, Churchill was  
 
unapologetically determined to defer any consideration of the Viceroy’s initiative,  
 
if possible until the ‘achievement of a victorious peace’.65 Amery could only react  
 
by asking Attlee, in his capacity as Leader of the Labour Party, and not as  
 
Churchill’s deputy, to persuade him to permit the India Committee to consider   
 
Wavell’s proposals as soon as possible.66 There are no details as to how  
 
Churchill’s mind was changed, but on 4 December he relented and referred the  
 
correspondence between Wavell and Amery to the India Office.67 
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The India Committee and the Latest Reform Proposals 
 
The meeting of the India Committee on 6 December was to be the first in a long  
 
series over the next five months during which Amery, and later on occasions  
 
Wavell, had to defend their policies against a group of highly sceptical  
 
colleagues. At this first meeting, Wavell’s plan to replace the existing Executive  
 
Council by a selection of political appointees was described as ‘abject surrender’.  
 
Amery was only supported in his defence of the Viceroy by Cripps, although he  
 
did have the satisfaction that his own idea for a constitutional conference  
 
received a more sympathetic reception. Overall, there was little to argue with in  
 
Amery’s contention that the Committee was generally diehard in approach,  
 
especially after it had recommended a wait of two or three months after  
 
which it was hoped that Wavell might be ‘less wedded to his ideas’. The only  
 
concession was to defer a final rejection of the Viceroy’s scheme until he had  
 
been given the chance to come home, and defend it.68 
 
     Amery used his own opinions, rather than those of the India Committee in an  
 
attempt to placate Wavell. Nevertheless, his suggestion that a larger body of  
 
non-political figures and academics should sit on the constitutional conference,  
 
was unlikely to find favour with the Viceroy.69 By the time that Wavell had sent a  
 
powerfully worded reply to Amery expressing his contempt for constitutional  
 
research conducted by academics, the War Cabinet had ratified the recent  
 
conclusions of the India Committee. Although Wavell was to be permitted to  
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defend his ideas in person, he was also requested to take no new initiatives, until  
 
permitted to do so by the War Cabinet.70 
 
     Amery, who had the distasteful task of sending, under his own signature, a  
 
telegram, composed by Attlee explaining the decision of the War Cabinet, soon  
 
received a reply from Wavell. The Viceroy, while denying any bad faith by His  
 
Majesty’s Government towards India, nevertheless repeated the views of  
 
educated Indians, suspicious of British intentions. As examples of pledges that  
 
Indians wanted Britain to honour Wavell quoted the last sentence of the August  
 
offer, and the preamble to Cripps’ 1942 proposals.71 
 
     Wavell also found considerable practicable obstacles in getting his ideas over  
 
to colleagues in London. Firstly, Amery supported his request to see the minutes  
 
of the India Committee, albeit with any sensitive paragraphs removed.72 Attlee’s  
 
curt refusal patronisingly attributed Wavell’s request to his lack of political  
 
experience, but fortunately Monteath was able to see this correspondence, and  
 
find a solution. Realising that it would be politically unwise to deny Wavell  
 
completely, he suggested that the Viceroy’s status as a Privy Councillor should at  
 
least enable him to be shown a point by point summary of the proceedings.73  
 
    Secondly, it was no surprise that Churchill proved to be difficult over Wavell’s  
 
request to explain his proposals in London. Although Churchill expected to be  
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away at various times attending war conferences, the real motive for his  
 
unwillingness to meet Wavell in London was to defer any constitutional  
 
discussion for as long as possible. Indeed, on 1 January 1945 he stated that he  
 
did not want the Viceroy to come at all, ‘for fear of a scene and a possibly  
 
dramatic resignation’.74 Despite further regular requests from Wavell, Amery did  
 
little until he sought Attlee’s support on 12 March, but then only received a curt  
 
refusal for the matter to be sent to either the War Cabinet or the India  
 
Committee.75  
 
      Amery’s apparently willing acquiescence with Attlee’s wish to defer Wavell’s  
 
visit until June 1945 annoyed the latter to the extent that he immediately  
 
despatched his angriest telegram.76 Only then was Amery able to put the matter  
 
to the India Committee whose members decided, on balance, that Churchill  
 
should be asked to approve a visit by the Viceroy in March 1945.77 Amery’s diary  
 
recorded that, on meeting Churchill he chose not to show him the Viceroy’s testy  
 
letters, and that, despite the Prime Minister’s usual tirade against  
 
Wavell’s capacities as a soldier, he agreed that he could return home within a  
 
fortnight.78  
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Attlee’s Call for Alternative Reform Initiatives 
 
Attlee’s India Committee paper of 28 December 1944 requested further reform  
 
ideas from its members, quoting the recommendations of the Simon Commission  
 
and Coupland’s ideas in The Future of India as examples of potentially viable  
 
schemes.79 Amery did not in fact reply specifically to Attlee as he had already  
 
drafted a substantial memorandum based on his response to Wavell’s scheme.  
 
Despite the length of his paper, Amery said very little that was new, adding a  
 
history of failed reform initiatives to his insistence on severing the chain of  
 
responsibility from Delhi to Westminster, and suggesting the establishment of a  
 
large representative body to devise a new constitution.80 In compiling this  
 
memorandum, he had certainly not enjoyed the unqualified support of his  
 
officials, especially Monteath who minuted his detailed misgivings about the key  
 
proposal to end the subordination of the Executive Council to the Secretary of  
 
State and the British Parliament.81 
 
      Four members of the India Committee, Simon, Anderson, Cripps and Butler,  
 
gave replies of differing length to Attlee, who wanted Amery’s technical experts  
 
to examine and report on the various suggestions. Simon offered little of a  
 
constructive nature, choosing to underline the communal perils if the Viceroy  
 
became a figurehead and an Indian Prime Minister conducted foreign policy in  
 
both peace and war. Anderson offered even less, merely a study group to  
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consider possible variants of Coupland’s plan. Cripps was more innovative. Two  
 
widely differing proposals envisaged indirect elections based on the village  
 
community and a second chamber elected on a racial or religious basis, much in  
 
the manner of the Soviet of nationalities in the U.S.S.R.; a system familiar to  
 
Cripps following his mission to Moscow. 
 
      The most wordy contribution came from Butler, who after a cautious  
 
preamble wanted an interim government with dominion status, and a looser  
 
arrangement with HMG that nevertheless still protected long term British  
 
interests. One of his key ideas was the incorporation of the Princes into his  
 
scheme, a development that he regretted would necessitate some  
 
repartitioning of the territories held by British India and the Indian States.82 
 
      Cripps had not only responded to Attlee’s appeal for alternative approaches  
 
to reform, but had also sent Amery a personal letter asking for clarification on  
 
certain points in his India Committee paper of 5 January 1945. As befitted a  
 
lawyer, Cripps pointed out the contradictions that attended any scheme to  
 
declare India a dominion under the Statute of Westminster, but still retain the  
 
existing constitution. Not only did he assert that, in these circumstances it would  
 
be impossible to ‘remove the hand of Whitehall’, but also his letter was written in  
 
a tone that suggested Amery was intending to mislead.83 Amery admitted that  
 
Cripps had been very direct, but argued that as his plan was for an interim  
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government, it could not be wholly logical. The remainder of his long attempt to  
 
assuage Cripps’ anxieties was disingenuous, and really only argued that the  
 
Viceroy would only exercise his reserved powers towards India, and not towards  
 
any established British interests.84 
 
 
The End of Amery’s Scheme for Reform 
 
During these early discussions on various reform proposals, Amery had still  
 
believed that his ideas were the best way to progress, at least in the short term,  
 
although he did not have the unqualified support of his Private Secretary,  
 
Turnbull, who strongly advised him not to send a copy of his India Committee  
 
paper of 5 January 1945 to Wavell. The reason, ostensibly unconnected with the  
 
details of Amery’s plan, was to avoid giving the Viceroy the impression that he  
 
was working against his proposals.85 Despite Turnbull’s counsel, Amery wanted  
 
Wavell to ‘see the workings of his mind’, and enclosed a copy of his paper with  
 
his letter of the same date, insisting that it should not to be shown to  
 
anyone else, except possibly Jenkins.86 
 
     Wavell reacted in a firm but polite manner on 20 January, disagreeing  
 
completely with Amery’s recommendation. Unless he was to be permitted to  
 
consult his Home Member, Political Adviser, or the Reforms Commissioner, he  
 
would not comment any further.87  
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With typical tenacity Amery persevered with his plan for reform, replying to  
 
Wavell with the assertion that their favoured schemes were not incompatible.  
 
Basing his reasoning on a tortured review of the meaning of political  
 
responsibility, he once again repeated his conclusion that a central government  
 
for India should be independent of any legislature.88 
 
      Amery’s final major attempt to persuade his colleagues cunningly linked his  
 
own proposals with those already put forward by Butler, possibly because the  
 
latter had a respected record on Indian matters.89 His India Committee paper of  
 
17 February 1945 was another masterpiece of obscure reasoning, especially in  
 
relation to the real and moral authority of the Viceroy under his scheme. At no  
 
point in this long memorandum did he produce a credible rebuttal of the charge  
 
made by his officials that, even with the most meticulous drafting, a declaration  
 
of dominion status would leave the Viceroy answerable to no one.90 Indeed the  
 
highly detailed and technical objections to Amery’s plan expressed by his experts  
 
at the India Office were so convincing that, at Attlee’s request, he had no choice  
 
but to enclose them as part of another official paper. Each point in Amery’s  
 
scheme was criticised, not only on legal grounds, but also for its likely failure to  
 
achieve the desired effect on the Indian psyche.91   
 
     Although Amery had sent a copy of his proposals to Bevin, probably in the  
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hope of securing support at a future War Cabinet, they did not progress beyond  
 
the India Committee meeting of 28 February 1945.92 Opposition was led by  
 
Attlee, who did not believe that Amery’s proposals represented ‘practical politics’.  
 
Once he had secured the support of Anderson and, more surprisingly, Cripps, he  
 
concluded that these ideas did not have the approval of the India Committee. A  
 
chastened Secretary of State could only accept this decision, albeit with the hope  
 
that he could continue to develop his ideas incrementally.93 His diary showed a  
 
far less sanguine reaction towards colleagues, whom he believed disliked new  
 
ideas, most of all those in relation to Indian independence. Even with the  
 
passage of six years a manuscript note appended to this entry showed no  
 
diminution in his bitterness at this rejection. This addendum claimed that his  
 
scheme would have secured Indian independence without partition had it not  
 
been for the intransigence of his officials and fellow ministers.94 
 
 
Desai’s Initiative 
 
By the time that Amery had lost his battle with his India Office colleagues,  
 
the most promising initiative so far had been launched in India. Matters began  
 
with a meeting on 13 January 1945 between Wavell’s Private Secretary, Jenkins, 
 
and Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in the Legislative Assembly  
 
and a member of the Congress Working Committee. Desai, who had requested  
 
the meeting, put forward a plan that apparently had the support of Gandhi and  
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Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s deputy. A distinguished constitutional lawyer, Desai  
 
used the rising status of the Muslim League to convince Liaqat Ali of his bona  
 
fides.95  
 
    The moderate proposals that Desai outlined to Jenkins provided for an interim  
 
government at the Centre with the posts divided between Congress, Muslim  
 
League and the minorities in the ratio of 4:4:2. Potential members would first be  
 
chosen by Jinnah and Gandhi after consultation with groups in the Indian  
 
Legislature, and the final composition selected from this short list by individual  
 
elected members. As this would be an interim government it was made clear,  
 
with Jinnah in mind, that such short term arrangements would be without  
 
prejudice to a future Pakistan. Desai was prepared to wait for his colleagues in  
 
the Congress Working Committee to be released until the formation of an interim  
 
government, although he did insist that all members of a reformed Executive  
 
Council, other than the Viceroy or the Commander-in-Chief, would be Indians.96 
 
      Wavell’s reaction to this plan was generally favourable, despite being  
 
unhappy with the proposed arrangements for selecting the members of the  
 
Executive Council. His request to be able to discuss the development of the plan  
 
with Desai was approved by Amery, who while similarly optimistic, feared that it  
 
would get a colder reception from the India Committee and the War Cabinet.97 
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      While Desai’s ideas gained increasing support from British officials in India,  
 
Amery’s fears about the response in London were justified. At Churchill’s  
 
insistence the strategy for dealing with this development was discussed at a  
 
meeting of the India Committee, when it was decided that Jenkins should see  
 
Desai again before Wavell undertook any negotiations.98  Once Wavell had  
 
informed Amery that he had already arranged to meet Desai, he was permitted  
 
by the India Committee to proceed, although on the assumption that he would  
 
be non-committal.99 Wavell considered his meeting with Desai on 20 March 1945  
 
to have been successful although he remained wary about the degree of backing  
 
that the proposals might get from Jinnah and the Muslim League.100 
 
     Amery’s attempts to obtain support at the India Committee for Wavell’s  
 
continued endorsement of Desai’s ideas were largely unsuccessful. Although  
 
ministers were sceptical about the entire scheme, Amery was unable to persuade  
 
them that Desai had provided any guarantee that India would continue to  
 
support the war effort, or that the Viceroy would have any say in the selection of  
 
members of the Viceroy’s Council.101  
 
     His increasing loss of control over the British response to the Desai proposals  
 
became apparent when Attlee, who once again seized the initiative, drafted the  
 
two sceptical telegrams that were to be sent to Wavell after approval by the War  
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Cabinet.102 At the meeting on 29 January, Amery found his fellow ministers even  
 
more difficult under Churchill’s partisan chairmanship. In particular he was not  
 
able to resist the stiffening of the tone of the proposed telegrams following the  
 
news that Jinnah had disclaimed any association with Desai’s scheme.103  
 
     Amery’s difficulties with the diehards continued when the India Committee  
 
considered further instructions to Wavell. In particular, his fears that Britain  
 
risked a loss of world prestige, especially in the USA, by an obstructionist attitude  
 
to reform in India, did not convince Grigg, Anderson, Simon, or Attlee.104  Before  
 
Amery sent two further telegrams to Wavell requesting caution in any meetings  
 
that he might have with Jinnah, he despatched a letter that attempted to put a  
 
positive gloss on War Cabinet intransigence, but also contained a considerable  
 
amount of special pleading about the fight that he had already put up on behalf  
 
of Desai and the Viceroy.105 
 
      Matters came to a head when Wavell, frustrated that he could not speak to  
 
Jinnah in Delhi as requested by the War Cabinet, instead asked Colville to meet  
 
him in Bombay to discover if he supported Desai’s plan.106 The result of Colville’s  
 
interview with Jinnah on 24 February 1945 was unambiguous as the leader of  
 
                                        
102 Attlee, War Cabinet memorandum, 24 January 1945, CAB 66/61/9. 
103 War Cabinet conclusions, 25 January 1945, CAB 65/49/9. Also, Amery diary, 25 January 1945, 
AMEL 7/39. 
104 India Committee conclusions, 30 January 1945, L/P & J/8/521: ff 55 – 59. Also, India 
Committee conclusions, 31 January 1945, L/P & J/8/521: ff 51 – 54. 
105 Amery to Wavell, 1 February 1945, L/PO/10/22. This letter was received by Wavell on 6 
February 1945, after the two telegrams sent on 3 February 1945. Also, Wavell to Amery, 3 
February 1945, L/P & J/8/521: f 48.  
106 Wavell to Colville, 22 February 1945, Wavell Papers, Political Series, April 1944 – July 1945, 
Part I, PP. 189 – 191. Sir John (David) Colville (1894 – 1954), later Baron Clydesmuir: Governor 
of Bombay 1943 to 1948. Temporary Viceroy of India March 1945 to June 1945. 
  332 
the Muslim League insisted that he had not authorised any discussions between  
 
Liaqat Ali and Desai. However, Jinnah still wanted to discuss matters with Wavell,  
 
when he next visited Delhi, probably within the next fortnight.107 At this point,  
 
the Viceroy, disheartened both by Colville’s report and Jinnah’s subsequent  
 
indisposition with pleurisy, decided that it would be preferable to return to Britain  
 
and ‘learn the mind of His Majesty’s Government’.108 
 
      Wavell’s return to Britain in March 1945 effectively put an end to the Desai  
 
proposals. However, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State had not been misled.  
 
A shrewd observer such as the Indian Reforms Commissioner, Menon, was in no  
 
doubt that there had been an understanding between Desai and Liaqat Ali over  
 
the formation of an interim national government, and that the latter only resiled  
 
from it when he found that Jinnah was not going to be helpful. Whatever the  
 
disappointment felt by Desai and Liaqat Ali, the precedent of equality between  
 
Congress and the League in the formation of a national government had been  
 
set.109 
 
 
Wavell in London and the Discussion of his Proposals for Simla 
 
The Viceroy’s arrival in Britain on 23 March was the start of a period of activity  
 
lasting ten weeks during which there was intense, and often heated argument  
 
over the precise nature of the proposals to be taken to the constitutional  
 
conference at Simla, later in the summer. In view of the imminent end to the war  
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in Europe, Attlee asked Amery to be available for frequent meetings of the India  
 
Committee during the early days of Wavell’s visit.110 He readily assented.111 
 
    The first meeting in this sequence took place on 26 March, when Wavell  
 
reported that he was heard in a friendly manner as he outlined his simple plan to  
 
create an Executive Council of political appointees, and also responded to  
 
specific criticisms that his proposals had already attracted.112 Nevertheless, he  
 
was questioned closely by Simon, Anderson, Grigg and Butler, who all had  
 
reservations about the potential reduction in the Viceroy’s powers, especially his  
 
veto over his Executive Council. Amery said very little during this meeting that  
 
was adjourned to the following day.113  
 
    Before Wavell faced the India Committee again, Amery had issued a  
 
memorandum, largely prepared by his advisers, on the details of a possible  
 
interim constitution. He was clearly at one with his officials on the need to secure  
 
a greater number of Muslim seats on a reformed Executive Council, especially if  
 
it were to be elected by proportional representation from the Legislature.  
 
However, he differed from them over the selection of the Prime Minister,  
 
preferring him to be chosen by the Viceroy, and not by the Legislature as  
 
suggested by his staff.114 
 
    Wavell did not find his second appearance before the India Committee as  
 
comfortable as the first. Amery, who also found this meeting difficult, contributed  
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very little beyond a statement that the Executive Council was rarely overridden  
 
by Whitehall or the House of Commons.115 Anderson voiced serious concern  
 
regarding any possible de facto loss of control by the Secretary of State and the  
 
British Parliament, and also doubted whether an Executive Council as envisaged  
 
by Wavell could prevent the administrative machine from breaking down. Attlee’s  
 
concerns were even more bluntly expressed as he was ‘horrified at the thought  
 
of the substitution for the present government of a brown oligarchy subject to no  
 
control either from Parliament or the electorate’. Without referring to any  
 
particular communal group, he suspected that members of the Executive  
 
Committee might, in future, owe their allegiance to party caucuses.116  
 
     Wavell did not attend the next meeting of the India Committee on 29 March,  
 
but was occupied, spending part of the day discussing Indian matters with  
 
Churchill. Although the Viceroy stressed the importance of early progress on  
 
constitutional reform, a highly pessimistic Prime Minister left him in no doubt  
 
that, at such a busy time, it was not first amongst his priorities.117 
 
     In Wavell’s absence, Anderson stated that he did not want to send him back  
 
to India empty handed, and therefore offered an alternative plan. This envisaged  
 
no radical changes to the constitution, but proposed fixed percentages of  
 
communal representation on the Executive Council, drawn from a wider field of  
 
candidates. Amery felt able to give reluctant support to Anderson’s scheme,  
 
especially as it was intended to be without prejudice to dominion status for  
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India.118 There may have been some similarities between these proposals and  
 
those that Amery had been advocating for some months, but it is hard to agree  
 
with the claim in his diary that all his ideas were eventually adopted by others,  
 
after initial rejection.119 
 
      At this point, a further scheme emerged from the India Committee, the  
 
author being Cripps who put his ideas in the form of a draft declaration by the  
 
Viceroy. His retention of the existing constitution pending the negotiation of a  
 
permanent arrangement was not new, but his plan to set up a Grand Council  
 
was more original. From such a body, itself chosen from the Centre and the  
 
provinces, would come the members of a reformed Executive Council.  
 
Nevertheless, his radicalism ended with the proposed selection of members of  
 
the Grand Council by the Viceroy, and provincial governors.120 Amery did not like  
 
Cripps’ draft declaration and told him so in frank terms. Firstly, he saw no proper  
 
function for the Grand Council, and secondly he believed that any major  
 
statements should be made by His Majesty’s Government, and not the Viceroy.121  
 
     Before the next meeting of the India Committee, Amery was shrewd enough  
 
to obtain expert legal and constitutional opinion from his own officials on the  
 
proposals put forward by Anderson and Cripps. Although not completely  
 
dismissive of these schemes, they identified a number of practical and theoretical  
 
difficulties thereby confirming the suspicions that Amery that had already formed  
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about their viability.122 That wariness was present throughout the meeting of the  
 
India Committee, which again convened without Wavell, but finally took the  
 
decisions, firstly to report its preference for Anderson’s scheme to Churchill, and  
 
also to brief Wavell in order to enable him to attend their next session.123  
 
    Wavell’s return to the India Committee was a long and tetchy affair, that  
 
ended with an anti-climactic decision to adjourn the debate to a later date. His  
 
own criticism of Anderson’s plan for a Grand Council of India drew admonition  
 
from Attlee who thought that the same criticisms could be applied to the  
 
Viceroy’s proposals.124 Later that day, a still indignant Wavell was asked to  
 
attend a meeting with Cripps, Amery and the legal experts from the India Office,  
 
but was displeased to be summoned merely to re-open the earlier discussion at  
 
the India Committee. Despite his colleague’s irritation, Amery still felt that  
 
sufficient legal ground was covered to make agreement on reform closer.125 On  
 
the following day at the India Office, despite more pressure from Amery to  
 
appease Attlee by adopting a more democratic method of selecting the Executive  
 
Council, Wavell stubbornly refused to budge.126 
 
    Before the next meeting of the India Committee that again took place without  
 
Wavell, Amery was bypassed by Anderson who saw the Viceroy on his own. Still  
 
bothered by the curtailment of the Viceroy’s power implicit in Wavell’s scheme,  
                                        
122 Undated, but likely to have been written on 3 April 1945, Brief for Amery, MSS. EUR. D. 
714/68. 
123 India Committee conclusions, 3 April 1945, L/PO6/108c: ff 236 – 244. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 5 April 1945 p. 122. Also, Amery diary, 5 April 1945, 
AMEL 7/39. 
126 Moon (ed.), Wavell, the Viceroy’s Journal, 6 April 1945, p. 123. 
  337 
Anderson tried, without success, to persuade him to agree to legislation in the  
 
British Parliament clarifying the matter.127 When the India Committee met on 10  
 
April, it was once again in an atmosphere hostile to Wavell’s stance. Incited by a  
 
strong note from Simon, who did not want His Majesty’s Government to  
 
authorise reform in India, Attlee, Butler, Grigg and Anderson expressed doubts  
 
about Wavell’s proposals.128 Furthermore, Amery’s aspiration that Wavell’s  
 
scheme might lead smoothly to a dominion style constitution was derided  
 
by Anderson. A final breakdown was only avoided by the political acumen of  
 
Cripps, who suggested that the Executive Committee could be chosen from a list  
 
of nominees put forward by both the Central and Provincial Legislatures.129 
      
    When the next India Committee meeting took place on 12 April, Butler, Simon  
 
and Grigg still registered dissent, but eventually there was a reluctant agreement  
 
to Wavell’s plan, as amended by Cripps.130 Although Cripps’ canny political sense  
 
had been the critical factor in making this progress, Amery showed little restraint  
 
in congratulating himself on the impetus that he had given to producing a result  
 
that turned out to be little different from his own scheme; an odd claim  
 
considering that his own proposals envisaged no change to the composition of  
 
the Viceroy’s Executive Council.131  
 
    Unfortunately, Wavell did not approve Cripps’ draft. Despite a series of brief  
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conversations in which Amery sought to reassure him that matters were  
 
proceeding satisfactorily, Wavell remained unhappy, not least with the Secretary  
 
of State’s apparent complacency. Aided by Jenkins and Menon who both shared  
 
his unease, Wavell composed a strongly worded memorandum, condemning both  
 
the proposal for a more democratically selected Executive Council, and also a  
 
suggested legislative clarification of the reduction in the Viceroy’s power of  
 
veto.132 
 
    Wavell had a most unfavourable reception when his proposals were discussed  
 
by the India Committee on 18 April. In the absence of Cripps, Amery attempted  
 
manfully to support the Viceroy, but was unable to alter the tone of the meeting  
 
that had been determined at the outset by Attlee, who accused Wavell of  
 
thinking only of Indian opinion, and not the reception of his ideas in Britain.  
 
Again, nothing was decided.133  
 
    This glacier like progress continued when the India Committee considered two  
 
new but contrasting papers by Amery and Wavell. Amery favoured a  
 
parliamentary statement, to be made by himself about Britain’s proposals for  
 
reform, but with a degree of vagueness about the effect of the de facto changes  
 
on the Viceroy’s powers.134 Wavell opposed both the idea of a public statement  
 
and any attempt to explain the Viceroy’s reduced authority.135 
 
     In the absence of Attlee, Simon chaired the next meeting of the India  
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Committee, and in combination with Butler and Grigg, wanted to send Wavell  
 
back to India with no agreed plan. Cripps, with his eye on world opinion and the  
 
need to show Gandhi and Jinnah as intransigent, insisted that a statement  
 
should be made in the House of Commons endorsing either Anderson’s scheme,  
 
that he personally favoured, or Wavell’s proposals as amended by the Secretary  
 
of State. The redrafting of the statement was entrusted to the combined efforts  
 
of Amery, Cripps and Wavell.136 Again, the official minutes showed that Cripps  
 
played the leading part in overriding the diehards, yet Amery claimed the  
 
majority of the credit in his diary.137 
 
     The new proposed statement incorporated few radical changes, and stressed  
 
that the Viceroy’s powers regarding his Executive Council would be unchanged.  
 
Nevertheless, the matter of the release of the remaining Congress prisoners  
 
would not be included in the parliamentary declaration, but would be covered in  
 
a separate statement.138 This convoluted process of composition drew a strong  
 
response from Amery who warned that if Churchill did not approve his actions he  
 
would resign together with Cripps and Wavell.139  
 
     The India Committee’s last meeting before the entire matter was put to the  
 
War Cabinet lacked Wavell, leaving Amery and Cripps to grapple again with the  
 
reluctance of Simon, Grigg and Butler, who seemed to want to make little  
 
progress at all. Only after Anderson had insisted on including an explanatory  
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paragraph in the Viceroy’s powers was there sufficient consensus to enable the  
 
War Cabinet to consider a new paper, to be written by Simon.140 Wavell was so  
 
upset by this meeting that he made his frequently quoted comment that  
 
throughout his few weeks in London he had been treated as ‘an Untouchable in  
 
the presence of Brahmins’.141 
 
     The memorandum that Simon prepared for the War Cabinet, although  
 
stressing the problems in undertaking any reform, was surprisingly more even  
 
handed than the views he had expressed at previous meetings of the India  
 
Committee.142 Amery, helped this time by his Labour colleagues, Bevin and  
 
Morrison, made a strong case for Wavell’s amended scheme. However his  
 
proposal that matters should move quickly in order to avoid India becoming a  
 
party political issue in the imminent General Election did not impress Churchill,  
 
who refused to allow any decision to be made.143  
 
     Not even the euphoria of VE Day on 8 May 1945 prompted Churchill to show  
 
any urgency over Wavell’s initiative since Amery’s request to make a statement  
 
in the House of Commons before its adjournment on 17 May 1945 was met with  
 
a flat refusal.144 When Amery pressed him again, the coalition had broken up,  
 
and a purely Conservative administration formed on 23 May. Fearful of the  
 
political mischief that could be made on India by the Labour Party, he pleaded  
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that if he could make a prompt statement in the House of Commons it would be  
 
supported by Attlee and Cripps.145 Wavell also wrote to Churchill, failing to  
 
conceal his frustration at the way he had been treated during his eight weeks in  
 
London.146 Churchill’s reply was ungracious, stating that, at no point, had he   
 
wanted Wavell to come to London at all.147 
 
    It is difficult to trace from the available primary sources how progress was  
 
finally made, but following Churchill’s unpromising letter, events moved to a final  
 
Cabinet approval of Wavell’s amended plan with considerable suddenness. On 30  
 
May, matters were discussed at two meetings of the Cabinet. At the first session,  
 
Wavell’s plan and mandate for discussion were approved with little debate, or  
 
even dissent from Churchill once Amery had stressed that the Viceroy was taking  
 
proposals back to India to be accepted or rejected, without negotiation.148  
 
    Later in the day, Churchill telephoned Amery to say that he no longer wanted  
 
to make an early decision on Indian constitutional reform merely to avoid  
 
electoral difficulties, and in support of his view, quoted similar misgivings by  
 
three Conservative members of the India Committee.149 Amery was relieved that,  
 
at the second Cabinet meeting he was able to persuade Churchill not to  
 
postpone the reform initiative until after the General Election, or at least until  
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Wavell had been allowed to speak to their colleagues.150 At the decisive Cabinet  
 
meeting on the following day, after enduring a long polemical statement from  
 
Churchill, Wavell was permitted, without interruption to make a highly detailed  
 
case that assuaged the Prime Minister’s anxieties.151  
 
     For all his efforts, Amery did not emerge with credit at the end of this  
 
meeting. Firstly, the official minutes barely concealed the judgement that the  
 
Viceroy’s proposals had not been advocated with sufficient rigour or clarity.152  
 
Secondly, Wavell noted that, even at the eleventh hour, ‘Amery could not leave  
 
well alone’, and made a long verbose contribution that was truncated by the  
 
Prime Minister.153 
 
 
Wavell’s Return to India and the Simla Conference 
 
When Wavell made a verbal presentation of the proposals to his Executive  
 
Council on 6 June, they received a mixed, but generally unfavourable reception.  
 
On the following day several members gave him a written indictment of the  
 
scheme and submitted a list of their own proposals, the most serious of which  
 
was the immediate grant of dominion status to India. Wavell summarily rejected  
 
this particular demand, but was more prepared to accept the others, especially  
 
the release of the remaining political prisoners in advance of any announcements  
 
about the reforms. After twenty four hours of constant meetings, Wavell  
 
managed to persuade his Council to give him the necessary support to take the  
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proposals to a conference.154 
 
    Amery finally made his statement about this latest British plan in a  
 
poorly attended House of Commons at the same time that Wavell broadcast to  
 
the Indian people. The circumstances of his final major parliamentary speech  
 
were somewhat irregular since, to the irritation of some Labour members, he  
 
chose to read verbatim, a Command Paper that he had placed, only a few hours  
 
earlier in the Vote Office. Amery, well supported by Attlee who was now on the  
 
opposition benches, followed his declaration with a statement that reaffirmed  
 
Cripps’ proposals, and also stressed the need for agreement amongst Indians of  
 
all communities before there could be progress. These comments could have  
 
been expected, but his remark that ‘agreement between Hindus and Muslims on  
 
any form of Indian unity may be unattainable’ was his first public concession to  
 
partition.155 
 
    The bipartisan atmosphere in Britain was also maintained by Cripps on 14  
 
June when he endorsed Wavell’s declaration, and also supported Amery’s  
 
frequently stated views on such matters as the inappropriateness of  
 
parliamentary government to India.156 Nevertheless, despite the generally  
 
favourable reaction to Wavell’s broadcast in the Indian press, the Viceroy  
 
encountered considerable difficulties with both Gandhi and Jinnah in making the  
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final arrangements for the conference at Simla. He observed that both men were  
 
‘manoeuvring for position’,  whether in connection with their representation at  
 
Simla, or the number of seats that their parties might secure in a reformed  
 
Executive Council.157 
 
      Amery had already told Wavell on 18 June 1945 that as he would be  
 
occupied during the next three weeks ‘in an electioneering mudbath’, and away  
 
from the India Office, the Viceroy would be largely on his own.158 Therefore, until  
 
the General Election on 5 July, Amery was a virtual spectator as Wavell fought  
 
his brave, but doomed battle to negotiate a settlement. In these circumstances,  
 
a detailed account of the Simla Conference is outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
     When Amery returned to the India Office before the announcement of the  
 
election results on 26 July, the outcome of the conference had practically been  
 
decided. After some suggestions and encouragement from Amery, Wavell made  
 
an eleventh hour attempt to salvage a solution by producing his own list of  
 
Muslim members for the Executive Council.159  When the Cabinet met on 10 July  
 
to approve Wavell’s latest proposal, Amery spoke strongly in support of the  
 
Viceroy, notwithstanding the usual pessimistic expressions from Simon and  
 
Grigg. Despite the worry of John Amery’s appearance in court in London on a  
 
charge of high treason, his father was clear headed enough to soften the Cabinet  
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instructions to Wavell, and even suggest that Jinnah should be shown the  
 
Viceroy’s entire list. Above all, he did not want the Muslim League to take the  
 
entire blame for the breakdown.160  
 
     The unfortunate end to the conference came quickly. At his meeting with  
 
Wavell on 11 July, Jinnah maintained his insistence that the suggested Muslim  
 
complement of five representatives in the Executive Council should all be League  
 
members. He also persisted with his demand that any proposal in the Executive  
 
Council to which Muslims objected could only proceed with a two thirds or three  
 
quarters majority; effectively creating a Muslim League veto. The minutes of the  
 
Cabinet meeting on 12 July recorded an appreciation of Wavell’s efforts to secure  
 
an interim settlement, although Amery was sure that some members could  
 
barely conceal their relief that the Viceroy’s initiative had failed.161 
 
     Amery praised Wavell’s generosity in taking official responsibility for the  
 
failure of the Simla Conference, although his own thoughts on how to apportion  
 
blame between the Muslim League and Congress were to change.162 On 12 July  
 
his letter to Wavell stated that ‘our plans have for the moment broken down in  
 
the face of Jinnah’s intransigence’ and seemed to suggest that, at this point,  
 
Britain had few difficulties with Congress.163 A week later, his stance had  
 
hardened, especially after Azad had attached conditions to their continued  
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support in the war against Japan.164  
 
     His pessimism was not confined to the state of affairs in India, since he did  
 
not believe that the Cabinet would willingly encourage any further attempts at  
 
reform. Evidence for this view was provided by Grigg, who had broken cover,  
 
and now denounced Wavell’s proposals as ‘handing over India to a small gang of  
 
greedy industrialists’.165 
 
     While Jinnah had been blamed in Britain, and also by Congress in India for  
 
the breakdown of the talks, it is difficult to find a balanced perspective. As  
 
Gandhi had wanted Congress to be regarded as a national rather than a  
 
communal organisation, their non-Hindu members were recommended for  
 
minority places on the Executive Council. Not surprisingly, this alarmed the  
 
Muslim League who feared the consequences of a permanent Congress  
 
majority.166  Similarly, Jinnah deplored attempts by Congress to court Sikhs, or  
 
even Unionist Muslims such as Khizar, the Prime Minister of the Punjab.167  
 
Possibly the most decisive verdict came from the Reforms Commissioner,  
 
Menon, who suggested that, as long as Churchill was Prime Minister, the  
 
overriding goal of winning the war against Japan made it impossible to force  
 
through any plan that excluded the Muslim League.168 
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Amery’s Departure from the House of Commons and the India Office 
 
When the results of the landslide Labour victory were announced on 26 July  
 
1945, Amery had lost his seat in Birmingham by a majority of over five thousand  
 
votes. His earlier fears about adverse demographic changes in his constituency  
 
were borne out, rather than any concerns stemming from his local vilification at  
 
the hands of the Indian Communist, Palme Dutt. His immediate reaction to loss  
 
of office was gracious as he expressed some faith in his Labour successor’s  
 
ability to work with Wavell. Although he did not claim to have settled the Indian  
 
constitutional problem, he took the credit, rightly or wrongly, for the selection of  
 
such key personnel as Wavell, Colville, Casey and Auchinleck.169 He was less  
 
generous to his Cabinet colleagues, whom he felt did not really deserve a fresh  
 
mandate. He complained in his diary that they had never given him any real  
 
support, and also castigated Linlithgow for letting him down in 1940 over the  
 
August offer.170  
 
    Amery’s final letter to Wavell was world weary to the extent that he regarded  
 
his departure as for the good, especially as he believed that Churchill would have  
 
become even more difficult over India, without the restraining influence of being  
 
part of a coalition.171 Wavell’s own valedictory note was friendly, but not effusive,  
 
and generally confined itself to a review of the possible next steps in India.172  
 
However, he did associate himself with the comments of a robust letter in  
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support of Amery that had been sent to The Times by Coupland, who was now  
 
back in Oxford. Coupland’s letter was a rebuttal of an editorial in the Hindustan  
 
Times that welcomed the departure of Amery, who had been described as the  
 
man who brought the curse of Pakistan and ‘Jinnahism’ to the country. Coupland  
 
maintained that Amery had supported Wavell in the Indianisation of the  
 
Executive Council, and had worked tirelessly to maintain the unity of India in  
 
order to ‘avoid the insuperable problems that partition would bring’.173 
 
     Amery received a number of consolatory messages on his departure from  
 
both the House of Commons and the India Office. Letters from Casey,  
 
Templewood, and Lady Tweedsmuir might have been expected, but political  
 
opponents such as Hugh Dalton and Sir Walter Jowitt revealed that many on  
 
their benches had thought well of him as Secretary of State for India.174 Even  
 
more surprisingly given their previous differences over India, he received a  
 
sympathetic letter from the editor of The Times, Robert Barrington-Ward, who  
 
with real sincerity or not, said it was unfortunate that he was leaving the India  
 
Office, when a constitutional settlement seemed possible.175 
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CONCLUSION 
 
                It is one of the mysteries of politics why Amery did not  
                ordinarily command a greater authority and reach a higher, 
                perhaps the highest position. Hard-working, well informed, a 
                ripe scholar, imaginative and passionately sincere, he had a  
                far better grasp of world affairs than all the Hoares and the 
                Simons put together. He also had what many lacked; courage, 
                physical and moral.1 
 
This thesis has attempted to provide at least a partial answer to the mystery that  
 
the admittedly biased Harold Macmillan quoted in the second volume of his memoirs. 
Clearly, in assessing the achievements of all politicians, perspective is critical. When 
attempting to evaluate Amery’s success or failure at the India Office, this is 
particularly the case. As Philip Williamson has bluntly asserted, the vast size of 
Amery’s diary and personal archives are invaluable to scholars, but their sheer 
volume should not be taken as an indication of his ability as a politician capable of 
holding a front rank ministerial post.2 Furthermore, his diaries, not only from 1940 to 
1945, but also for his entire period in public life, were the work of someone who 
believed that he had achieved more than was the case, and who lamented that he 
should have held one of the main offices of state. 
    The context of Amery’s period as Secretary of State for India should be kept in 
mind at all times. He was not able to enjoy a peacetime stewardship during which 
the issues of Indian economic development and constitutional reform could be 
addressed in stable conditions. Instead, both in Britain and in India, the effects of  
war influenced most decision making. In the first few months in office the demands 
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of the Battle of Britain gave Beaverbrook the pretext to kill, at birth, Amery’s plans to 
establish an Indian aircraft industry. Soon after, the Cripps mission failed and the 
‘Quit India’ movement was born. Finally, in the months before and after the Second 
Front, Britain, if perhaps not Churchill became increasingly interested in post-war 
reconstruction at home, and as shown by poor attendances at debates on India in 
the House of Commons, there was less interest in the subcontinent. 
    Later in this conclusion there will be the inevitable audit of his achievements and 
failures, but firstly it is only fair that there should be a brief examination of his life 
before the India Office, and how it left him prepared for such a task. From his days 
at Harrow, Balliol and All Souls, through his periods of inspiration from Joseph 
Chamberlain and Lord Milner, he had developed an almost theological belief in the 
British Empire. In addition to his view that it represented moral goodness, he 
believed that an imperial zollverein would provide a buffer from American and 
European competition, Nevertheless, his first practical attempts to promote such 
economic federation in East Africa while Colonial Secretary in the 1920s were 
unsuccessful, and managed only to engender lasting hostility amongst Indians, 
wherever they were living. 
    While he was able to develop his policies on imperial preference in relation to 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, especially during his leadership of 
the Dominions Office, his views on India’s potential status within the British Empire 
were far more cautious. As early as 1922, he had maintained that any changes in 
India should be incremental, a principal that demonstrated his condemnation of the 
liberal philosophy of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Similarly he supported the 
careful recommendations of the Simon Commission against the more radical 
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message of the declaration made by his friend, Lord Irwin. Although, as a back 
bencher during the passage of the 1935 Government of India Act, he had opposed 
such diehards as Churchill and George Lloyd, he nevertheless made an early 
assertion that Congress would be the sole party profiting from any political system 
that permitted irresponsible government by a majority.3 He never wavered from this 
view. 
    Bearing in mind that Amery made little or no further comment on the 
constitutional situation in India until he became Secretary of State for India, it is 
unlikely that he would have been very aware of the difficulties arising from the 
implementation of the 1935 legislation, especially the initial unwillingness of 
Congress to take part in provincial government, the humiliation of the Muslim 
League in the 1937 elections, and the reluctance of the princes to join a federated 
centre. The conclusion must be that he entered the India Office with very little up to 
date knowledge. 
    The deep disappointment felt by Amery at his appointment is plain from his 
diaries and private correspondence, where he revealed his nervousness about 
performing his duties under such a diehard premier as Churchill. Although he loyally 
accepted office, this study has clearly revealed that it was not what he wanted, and 
it is arguable that he only showed interest in matters that really inspired him, such 
as maintaining imperial preference in the face of American disapproval, and 
attempting to have the machinery of wartime government reformed. 
    The nature of both the personal and official relationships between the Secretary 
of State for India and the Viceroy were critical to the governance of India. Although 
                                        
3 Amery, The Forward View, pp. 211 – 217. 
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the final responsibility for India affairs rested with the Secretary of State and, of 
course the British Parliament, Amery was adamant in his draft memoirs that the 
views of the Viceroy and the Executive Council had been decisive. Indeed this 
account made the extravagant claim that during his period in office, his relationship 
with the two Viceroys was ‘more like that of a Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
and a settler government before the Statute of Westminster, although with a more 
frequent interchange of letters and telegrams’.4  
    Even more questionable was his assertion that, during his five years in office, the 
constitutional  views of the Viceroy and his Executive Council had never been 
overruled from London. Certainly, as was shown in Chapter IV of this thesis, when in 
1940 and 1941, Linlithgow applied to be given sole discretion to employ the 
Revolutionary Movements Ordinance he had been denied by a War Cabinet in which 
the main objector had been Amery. As explained in Chapter VIII, Wavell had 
suffered a similar fate in 1944, when his draft reply to Gandhi, who wanted to 
resume negotiations with Britain, had been rejected by the War Cabinet, with Amery 
unable to prevent the substitution of a petulant letter that the Viceroy was obliged to 
sign.  
     Amery and Linlithgow were able to cooperate satisfactorily on the practicalities of 
India’s war effort, as was demonstrated by Sir Alexander Roger’s industrial mission 
and the Eastern Group Supply Council that was established as a successful clearing 
house for equipment in the region. Unfortunately their agreement on these matters 
did not extend to the continuing problem of initiating constitutional reform, which 
was not surprising as Amery had little regard for Linlithgow’s capacity for original 
                                        
4 Amery, draft memoirs, Volume IV, Chapter I, pp. 7 – 8, AMEL 8/84. 
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thought. In 1942, he did not want the Viceroy’s term extended, and almost ten years 
after leaving the India Office, was still complaining about his intransigence. Such 
critical opinions were mutual. Linlithgow clearly resented that as the man with local 
knowledge, his opinions did not always seem to be respected, and certainly before 
the Cripps mission, complained that he was not being given enough protection by 
his Secretary of State. On handing over to Wavell in 1943, he made his most telling 
criticism, when he cited Amery’s lack of influence in London. 
    Amery was almost certainly to blame for his difficulties with Linlithgow in the first 
months after taking office. Although he had already indicated that there would be no 
abortive initiatives that might diminish Britain’s standing in the world, he impulsively 
attempted to build on Zetland’s scheme for reform by producing a typically 
complicated plan that would provide for Indian self-government after the war. The 
loss of trust felt by Linlithgow, when he believed that he had been deceived by 
Amery into thinking that these ideas had been approved by the War Cabinet, would 
never entirely disappear. Their differences persisted through such episodes as the 
release of the satyagraha prisoners, and above all, Amery’s attempt to send his All 
Souls protégées, Hodson and Coupland, to Delhi in order to energise thinking on 
reform. 
    In terms of Amery being able to influence events, his differences with Linlithgow 
over constitutional reform had ensured Churchill’s lasting suspicion. The 
consequence was that the Prime Minister shared the Viceroy’s prioritisation of the 
Indian war effort over the search for a new Indian constitution. For the remainder of 
Linlithgow’s time in Delhi, Amery was obliged to confine himself to supporting the 
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Viceroy’s more modest reforms such as increasing the size of the Executive Council 
through the inclusion of more Indians. 
    Amery’s relationship with Wavell proved to be more intense, and on occasion, 
troubled; almost certainly because they spent more time together in London, 
discussing political initiatives. In fairness to Amery, throughout his partnership with 
Wavell, he made few pejorative remarks about his personal qualities, although as 
with Linlithgow, he did not believe that he belonged in the intellectual first rank. 
However, he was unusually prescient in forecasting that Wavell would turn out to be 
far more radical than Churchill expected, although he did not predict the extent to 
which this would be the case. Wavell’s criticisms of Amery were harsher. On the one 
hand, while praising his courage in answering Churchill back, he deplored his 
verbosity, and repeated failure to carry his political and official colleagues with him. 
On the other hand, he believed that Amery’s judgement was frequently suspect, 
typified by the plan he put forward in January 1945 to grant immediate 
independence to a unified India, thereby bypassing Gandhi and Jinnah. To Wavell 
such an idea represented both a triumph of academic theory over practicality and an 
ignorance of the realities of Indian politics, as they had developed during the war. 
Although Wavell could not blame Amery for not having the same feel for matters as 
someone, who was resident in India, he could castigate him for not having the 
political weight to press the case of his colleagues who were working there. 
    In London, Amery’s most important dealings were with Churchill, who had his 
own, yet still unexplained reasons for sending him to the India Office. Much is often 
made of their contemporaneous schooldays at Harrow, but despite a well- 
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documented incident, when Churchill threw the diminutive Amery into the swimming 
pool, the aristocratic scion of the Marlborough family and the aspirational outsider 
had little in common. William Roger Louis’ published version of his Chichele Lectures 
gave a substantial amount of detail about Amery’s relationship with Churchill during 
the war, and stressed how he had been brave enough to stand up to a grumpy 
premier at many meetings of the War Cabinet.5 However, the research for this study 
has revealed that while Amery may have often been bold enough to take part in 
shouting matches with Churchill, this rarely altered the outcome of the meeting. 
Similarly, from 1940 to 1945, his diary recorded that he considered resignation on 
several such tense occasions, but of course, never actually did so. 
    Although Amery managed to get his way on a few important matters such as 
Gandhi’s release in 1943 and the final British refusal to amend the financial 
arrangements by which the sterling balances had accumulated, there were far more 
instances when he had to give best. For example, as early as August 1940, the first 
of a number of occasions when Churchill was so aggrieved at the course events 
were taking, that he drafted the correspondence himself. Later in the summer of 
1943, Amery had been active in seeking a successor to Linlithgow, intriguing 
enthusiastically to secure Eden, only for Churchill to exclude him from the decision 
making process, and make his unilateral, and surprise selection of Wavell. 
    Even when matters did not go as far as this, policy discussions and decision 
making about India invariably took place in the shadow of Churchill’s potential 
displeasure. This was especially the case in 1945 and 1945 at the India Committee 
that had largely replaced the War Cabinet as the body for the detailed consideration 
                                        
5 Louis, ‘In the Name of God, Go!’, pp. 123 – 179. 
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of policy, and was chaired by Attlee, in the absence of Churchill, who was often 
abroad at conferences. Despite Amery’s best efforts to produce definitive conclusions 
at these meetings, Attlee’s chairmanship often left matters of controversy undecided 
until Churchill had been able to see the papers. 
    The real decline in Amery’s influence over events started with the preparation for 
Cripps’ mission, and its control from London, when the latter was in India. Although 
we have seen that this was not the first time that he had been excluded from the 
composition of a key document, he was also unable to follow the detailed course of 
the negotiations in India. Consequently, he could not protect Linlithgow from Cripps’ 
takeover of the bargaining, or more unfortunately from the Viceroy’s point of view, 
the snubbing of the Executive Council. Throughout this period, Amery cut a lonely 
political figure, with very few allies in the War Cabinet. As had often been the case 
during his time in public life, he chose confidants who were not Westminster 
insiders. During the first two years of the Great War it had been Lord Milner and 
General Sir Henry Wilson. This time his correspondents were his former adversary, 
Jan Smuts, and Samuel Hoare, by now exiled in Madrid. 
    As the end of the war drew nearer, his sway at the India Committee and the War 
Cabinet diminished still further at the hands of coalition colleagues, from all political 
parties. Although in 1944, he was eventually able to obtain sufficient shipping 
capacity to alleviate the food shortages, he had first to endure a number of 
acrimonious meetings at which the dour Minister of War Transport, Leather, and the 
spiteful Cherwell, who undoubtedly had Churchill’s prejudices in mind, raised any  
number of practical difficulties.   
357 
 
   However, Amery met his greatest resistance in the drawn out process of drafting 
the new declaration on constitutional reform that Wavell would eventually take to 
the Simla Conference. Both in the doomed presentation of his own scheme, and the 
repeated India Committee redrafting of Wavell’s plan to create a politicised 
Executive Council, he managed to attract the ire of his own colleagues and the 
Viceroy. It was not surprising that such a confirmed diehard as Percy Grigg refused 
to countenance any reform, but there was also resistance from Simon, who had not 
really wanted to deviate from his own proposals, Anderson, who was sceptical, if not 
so obstructive, and Butler, who for all his subsequent attachment to consensus, felt 
bound by the 1935 legislation. Furthermore, during this process in the spring of 
1945, Amery enjoyed little support from his officials at the India Office. And it was 
only really with Cripps’ assistance that Churchill was persuaded to allow Wavell to 
take his proposals back to India. 
    As well as having an unenviable reputation for verbosity and a lack of political 
pragmatism, Amery also made errors of judgement that confirmed the opinions held 
about him in London and Delhi. In April 1941, he rejected reform proposals put 
forward by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, not in itself a provocative step. However, the 
manner in which his statement in the House of Commons dismissed Sapru’s scheme 
for an all-Indian Executive Council was, at best clumsy, and at worst insensitive, 
drawing opprobrium from moderate opinion in London, and less surprisingly from 
Gandhi. Similarly, when pressed to reveal his true opinions on the Atlantic Charter, 
his dogged and ill-advised public support for Churchill’s denial of its relevance to  
India attracted powerful expressions of anger. 
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    Amery had long been annoyed by American opposition to not only imperial 
preference, but also to the very existence of the British Empire. As the war 
progressed, he feared and resented the potential consequences of the American 
conditions for Lend-Lease and the perils of the most favoured trading nation clause. 
He also shared Linlithgow’s considerable irritation with two Americans, Louis Johnson 
and William Philips, who both travelled to India, promising not to become involved in 
constitutional matters, but who actually intervened in no small measure, and 
reported back to Washington in terms unfavourable to Britain. However, whatever 
his reservations, Amery had to bear in mind that, in the context of winning the 
global war, Britain could not afford to offend American public opinion with perceived 
colonial attitudes. For example, his successful opposition to Churchill over the 
release of the ailing Gandhi in 1943 was motivated as much by likely American 
disapproval if the Mahatma were to die in captivity, rather than any concern with a 
reaction from Congress. 
    These various constraints on Amery’s freedom to perform his duties as he would 
have wished were real enough, but his greatest difficulties occurred because he was 
not the man on the spot. Both his Viceroys, anxious to retain their status in India, 
discouraged Amery from visiting the subcontinent. It is probable that they were well 
rid of the danger of poorly informed pep talks by a Secretary of State, who had a 
poor reputation in India, but the consequence was that they were able to act as a 
filter on items of information, especially reports from provincial governors that were 
later sent on to London. Amery did not receive candid reports, free from the  
blandness of typical ICS prose, until Casey became Governor of Bengal in 1944, and  
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began a series of correspondence that went directly to the India Office, and not via 
Delhi. Amery was only too aware of the value of such frankness, because as an 
intelligence officer, a quarter of a century earlier, he had despatched political and 
military letters and telegrams from the Balkans, often grasping the issues better 
than the ambassadors or diplomats in post.6 
    It is sad to relate that Amery’s poor reputation in India did not improve after he 
had left office. In early 1947, he had hoped to visit India with his wife, not with the 
intention of interfering in politics, but by way of a holiday to get over the death of 
his son, who had been executed little more than a year earlier. The Secretary of 
State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, who was uneasy about even a private visit, 
consulted Wavell, who in turn sought Nehru’s opinion. The latter’s reply was polite, 
but unequivocal, and stated that while there were no legal grounds for barring 
Amery from India, his reputation was such that a strong reaction in the press would 
be inevitable.7 Amery reluctantly accepted Pethick-Lawrence’s request not to go to 
India, but wrote to Bevin, now Foreign Secretary, sarcastically suggesting that he 
had been blackballed as a ‘notorious opponent of Indian aspirations’.8 
    If the sole criteria judging Amery’s period in office is visible progress on 
constitutional reform, then he must be deemed to have been unsuccessful. He was 
not helped by factors such as a diehard premier, the trauma regarding Jack,  
unsupportive colleagues in the War Cabinet, a lack of imagination in his senior 
officials at the India Office, interference from the USA, and diminishing interest in 
                                        
6 Whittington. MA dissertation, UWE, 2010. 
7 Nehru to Wavell, undated, probably 22 January 1947, AMEL 1/6/27. 
8 Pethick-Lawrence to Amery, 22 January 1945 and Amery to Bevin 23 January 1945, both AMEL 
1/6/27. 
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India in Britain. Above all, he had to promote change from a great distance, without 
detailed information about the views of ordinary Indians, and within the practical 
constraints of the working relationship between a Viceroy and his Secretary of State. 
    That said, he contributed in no small measure to his own difficulties. A career in 
public life characterised by creativity and innovation, juxtaposed with a tendency to 
intrigue, and an obsession with imperial finance had left his senior colleagues 
suspicious of his political judgement. Despite the need to trim in order to avoid 
Churchill’s displeasure, he did not deviate from two principles; India’s unfitness for 
government based on parliamentary democracy, and the need to obtain a large 
degree of consensus between Hindus and Muslims before any reforms could be 
implemented. Almost a year after leaving office, he was still repeating these 
opinions.9 
    His slowness in appreciating the changing political situation in India was best 
illustrated by his attitude to the partition of the country. His preference for federal 
systems, and dislike of ‘Balkanisation’ ensured that he only recognised the possibility 
of a separate Pakistan at a late stage in the war. Although he had often expressed 
his disapproval of Jinnah in the same language that he used for Gandhi, there is no 
doubt that he underestimated the Muslim leader and did not detect the rise in his 
political influence. Sadly, he also proved to be delusional about his own efforts in 
promoting constitutional change, as was shown by his valedictory diary entry that 
contained a claim to have ‘set Indians on the right lines towards making their own 
constitution .10 Even after independence had been granted, his views had not  
                                        
9 Speech by Amery at the Sorbonne, 8 April 1946, AMEL 1/6/27. 
10 Amery, diary 27 July 1945, AMEL. 
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changed as was shown by an address to the East India Association in 1953.11 
Furthermore, his claim to have been largely responsible for the appointments of 
Wavell, Auchinleck and Casey was, to say the least, exaggerated. He certainly had a 
hand in choosing Casey, but the other selections bore the stamp of Churchill. 
    Even if Amery fell short on the matter of constitutional reform, his contribution to 
India’s war effort is less open to challenge. By 1945, more than 2 million Indians had 
been mobilised, and the country’s industries placed on a war footing. Most of the 
detailed policies to achieve these successes originated with Linlithgow and Wavell, 
but Amery’s efforts by way of support were considerable. In the end he had proved 
to be a better technocrat than constitutional reformer. 
      
 
                                        
11 Amery, speech to the East India Association, 16 July 1953, AMEL 1/6/25. 
 362 
 
APPENDIX I 
The Viceroy’s Statement:  August Offer 1940 
Note In reproducing the documents in Appendices I – III, the original punctuation 
and use of capital letters has been retained. 
1. India’s anxiety at this moment of critical importance in the world struggle against  
tyranny and aggression, to contribute in full to the common cause and to the 
triumph of our common ideals is manifest. She has already made a mighty 
contribution. She is anxious to make a greater contribution still. His Majesty’s 
Government are deeply concerned that the unity of national purpose in India which 
would enable her to do so should be achieved at as early a moment as possible. 
They feel that some further statement of their intentions may help to promote that 
unity. In that hope they have authorised me to make the present statement. 
2. Last October, His Majesty’s Government again made it clear that Dominion Status 
was their objective for India. They added that they were ready to authorise the 
expansion of the Governor-General’s Council to include a certain number of 
representatives of the political parties, and they proposed the establishment of a 
consultative committee. In order to facilitate harmonious co-operation, it was 
obvious that some measure of agreement in the Provinces between the major 
parties was a desirable pre-requisite to their joint collaboration at the Centre. Such 
agreement was unfortunately not reached and in the circumstances no progress was 
then possible. 
3. During the earlier part of this year I continued my efforts to bring political parties 
together. In these last few years I gladly entered into conversation with prominent 
political personages in British India and the Chancellor of the Chamber of the 
Princes, the results of which have been reported to his Majesty’s Government. His 
Majesty’s Government have also seen the resolutions passed by the Congress 
working Committee, The Moslem League and Hindu Mahasabha. 
4. It is clear that earlier differences which have prevented the achievement of 
National Unity remain unbridged. Deeply as His Majesty’s Government regret this, 
they do not feel that they should any longer, because of those differences postpone 
the expansion of the Governor-General’s Council and establishment of a body which 
will more closely associate Indian public opinion with the conduct of the war by the 
Central Government. They have authorised me accordingly to invite a number of 
representative Indians to join my Executive Council. They have authorised me 
further to establish a War Advisory Council which would meet at regular intervals 
and which would contain representatives of Indian States and of other interests in 
the national life of India as a whole. 
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5. The conversations which have taken place and resolutions of bodies which I have 
just mentioned made it clear however that there is still in certain quarters doubt as 
to the intentions of His Majesty’s Government for the Constitutional future of India 
and there is doubt, too as to whether the position of minorities whether political or 
religious, is sufficiently to any future Constitutional change by assurances already 
given. There are two points that have emerged. On these two points His Majesty’s 
Government now desire me to make their position clear. 
6. The first is as the position of minorities in relation to any future Constitutional 
scheme. It has already been made clear that my declaration of last October does not 
exclude examination of any part of either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and 
plans on which it is based. His Majesty’s Government’s concern that full weight 
should be given to views of minorities in any revision has also been brought out. 
That remains the position of His Majesty’s Government. It goes without saying that 
that they could not contemplate transfer of their present responsibilities for peace 
and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied 
by large and powerful elements in India’s national life. Nor could they be parties to 
coercion of such elements into submission into such a Government. 
7. The second point of general interest is machinery for building within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations the new constitutional scheme when the time comes. 
There has been very strong insistence that the framing of that scheme subject to 
certain matters for which His Majesty’s Government cannot divest themselves of 
responsibility, obligations arising out of their long connection with India, should be 
primarily the responsibility of Indians themselves and should originate from Indian 
conceptions of the social, economic and political structure of Indian life. It is clear 
that a moment when the Commonwealth is engaged in a struggle for existence is 
not one in which fundamental constitutional issues can be decisively resolved. But 
His Majesty’s Government authorize me to declare that they will most readily assent 
to the setting up after the conclusion of the war of a body representative of the 
principal elements in India’s national life in order to devise the framework of the new 
constitution and they will lend every aid in their power to hasten decisions on all 
relevant matters to the utmost degree. Meanwhile they will welcome and promote in 
any way possible every sincere and practical step that may be taken by 
representative Indians themselves to reach a basis of friendly agreement, first upon 
the form in which the post-war representative body should take, and secondly upon 
the principles and outlines of the constitution itself. They trust, however that for the 
period of the war (with the Central Government reconstituted and strengthened in 
the manner I have described and with the help of the War Advisory Council) all 
Parties, communities and interests will combine and co-operate in making a notable 
Indian contribution to the victory of the world cause which is at stake. Moreover, 
they hope that in this process new bonds of union and understanding will emerge 
 364 
 
and thus pave the way towards the attainment by India of that free and equal 
partnership in the British Commonwealth which remains the proclaimed and 
accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and of the British Parliament. 
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APPENDIX II 
Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders, March 1942: Cripps 
Mission 
His Majesty’s Government having considered the anxieties expressed in this country 
and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of 
India have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they 
suppose shall be taken for the earliest possible realisation of self-government in 
India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a 
Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a 
common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way 
subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs. 
His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following declaration:- 
     (a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in 
India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of 
framing a new Constitution for India. 
     (b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian 
States in the constitution making body. 
     (c) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the 
Constitution so framed subject only to:- 
              (i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept 
the new Constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being 
made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. 
With such non-acceding Provinces, should they so desire, His Majesty’s Government 
will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status 
as Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down. 
              (ii) the signing of a Treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty’s 
Government and the constitution-making body. This Treaty will cover all necessary 
matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian 
hands; it will make provision in accordance with the undertakings given by His 
Majesty’s Government for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will 
not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future 
its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth. 
Whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the Constitution, it will be 
necessary to negotiate a revision of its Treaty arrangements, so far as this may be 
required in the new situation. 
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     (d) the constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the 
leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form 
before the end of hostilities:- 
Immediately upon the result being known of the provincial elections which will be 
necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of 
the Provincial Legislature shall, as a single electoral college proceed to the election 
of the constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This 
new body shall be in number about one tenth of the number of the electoral college. 
Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to 
their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a 
whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members. 
     (e) During the critical period which now faces India, and until the new 
Constitution can be framed His Majesty’s Government must invariably bear the 
responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of 
their world war effort, but the task of organising to the full the military, moral and 
material forcers of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with 
the cooperation of the peoples of India. His Majesty’s Government desire and invite 
the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of 
the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the 
United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help 
in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India. 
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APPENDIX III 
Declaration Taken by Viscount Wavell to the Simla Conference: June/July 
1945 
1. Since the offer by His Majesty’s Government to India in March 1942 there has 
been no further progress towards the solution of the Indian constitutional problem. 
2. As was then stated, the working out of India’s new constitutional system is a task 
which can only be carried through by the Indian peoples themselves. 
3. While His Majesty’s Government are at all times most anxious to do their utmost 
to assist the Indians in the working out of a new constitutional settlement, it would 
be a contradiction in terms to speak of the imposition by this country of self-
governing institutions upon an unwilling India. Such a thing is not possible, nor could 
we accept the responsibility for enforcing such institutions at the very time when we 
were, by itself, withdrawing from all control of British Indian affairs. 
4. The main constitutional position remains therefore as it was. The offer of March 
1942 stands in its entirety without change or qualification. His Majesty’s Government 
still hope that the political leaders in India may be able to come to an agreement as 
to the procedure whereby India’s permanent future form of government can be 
determined. 
5. His Majesty’s Government are, however, most anxious to make any contribution 
that is practicable to the breaking of the political deadlock in India. While the 
deadlock lasts not only political but social and economic progress is being hampered. 
6. The Indian administration, over-burdened with the great tasks laid on it by the 
war against Japan and by the planning for the post-war period, is further strained by 
the political tension that exists. 
7. All that is so urgently required to be done for agricultural and industrial 
development and for the peasants and workers of India cannot be carried through 
unless the whole-hearted cooperation of every community and section of the Indian 
people is forthcoming. 
8. His Majesty’s Government have therefore considered whether there is something 
which they could suggest in this interim period, under the existing constitution, 
pending the formulation by Indians of their future constitutional arrangements, 
which would enable the main the communities and parties to co-operate more 
closely together and with the British to the benefit of the people of India as a whole. 
9. It is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government to introduce any change 
contrary to the wishes of the major Indian communities. But they are willing to make 
possible some step forward during the interim period if the leaders of the principal  
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Indian parties are prepared to agree to their suggestions, and to co-operate in the 
successful conclusion of the war against Japan as well as in the reconstruction in 
India which must follow the final victory. 
10. To this end they would be prepared to see an important change in the 
composition of the Viceroy’s Executive. This is possible without making any change 
in the existing statute law except for one amendment to the Ninth Schedule to the 
Act of 1935. That Schedule contains a provision that not less than three members of 
the Executive must have at least 10 years’ service under the Crown in India. If the 
proposals of His Majesty’s Government meet with acceptance in India, that clause 
would have to be amended to dispense with that requirement. 
11. It is proposed that the Executive Council should be reconstituted and that the 
Viceroy should in future make his selection for nomination to the Crown for 
appointment to his Executive from amongst leaders of Indian political life at the 
Centre and in the Provinces, in proportions which would give a balanced 
representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Moslems and 
Caste Hindus. 
12. In order to pursue this object, the Viceroy will call into conference a number of 
leading Indian politicians who are the heads of the most important parties or who 
have had recent experience as Prime Ministers of Provinces, together with a few 
others of special experience and authority. The Viceroy intends to put before this 
conference the proposal that the Executive Council should be reconstituted as above 
stated and to invite from members of the conference a list of names. Out of these 
he would hope to be able to choose the future members whom he would 
recommend for appointment by His Majesty to the Viceroy’s Council. Although the 
responsibility for the recommendations must of course continue to rest with him, 
and his freedom of choice therefore remains unrestricted. 
13. The members of his Council who are chosen as a result of this arrangement 
would of course accept the position on the basis that they would wholeheartedly co-
operate in supporting and carrying through the war against Japan to its victorious 
conclusion. 
14. The members of the Executive would be Indians with the exception of the 
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, who would retain his position as War Member. 
This is essential as long as the defence of India remain a British responsibility. 
15. Nothing contained in any of these proposals will effect the relations of the Crown 
with the Indian States through the Viceroy as Crown Representative. 
16. The Viceroy had been authorised by His Majesty’s Government to place this 
proposal before the Indian leaders. His Majesty’s Government trust that the leaders 
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of the Indian communities will respond. For the success of such a plan must depend 
upon its acceptance in India and the degree to which responsible Indian politicians 
are prepared to co-operate with the object of making it a workable interim 
arrangement. In the absence of such general acceptance existing arrangements 
must necessarily continue. 
17. If such co-operation can be achieved at the Centre it will no doubt be reflected 
in the Provinces and so enable responsible Governments to be set up once again in 
those Provinces where owing to the withdrawal of the majority party from 
participation, it became necessary to put into force the powers of the Governors 
under Section 93 of the Act of 1935. It is to be hoped that in all the Provinces these 
Governments would be based on the participation of the main parties, thus 
smoothing out communal differences and allowing Ministers to concentrate upon 
their very heavy administrative tasks. 
18. There is one further change which, if these proposals are accepted, His Majesty’s 
Government suggest should follow. 
19. That is, that External Affairs (other than those tribal and frontier matters which 
fall to be dealt with as part of the defence of India) should be placed in the charge 
of an Indian Member of the Viceroy’s Executive so far as British India is concerned, 
and that fully accredited representatives shall be appointed for the representation of 
India abroad. 
20. By their acceptance of and co-operation in this scheme the Indian leaders will 
not only be able to make their immediate contribution to the direction of Indian 
affairs, but it is also to be hoped that their experience of co-operation in government 
will expedite agreement between them as to the method of working out the new 
constitutional arrangements. 
21. His Majesty’s Government consider, after the most careful study of the question, 
that the plan now suggested gives the utmost progress practicable within the 
present constitution. None of the changes suggested will in any way prejudice or 
prejudge the essential form of the future permanent constitution or constitutions in 
India. 
22. His Majesty’s Government feel certain that given goodwill and a genuine desire 
to co-operate on all sides, both British and Indian, these proposals can mark a 
genuine step forward in the collaboration of the British and Indian peoples towards 
Indian self-government and can assert the rightful position, and strengthen the 
influence, of India in the counsels of the nations. 
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